Kiichi Arita
Kiichi Arita | |
---|---|
有田 喜一 | |
87th Minister of Education | |
In office 1 August 1966 – 3 December 1966 | |
Monarch | Hirohito |
Cabinet | Eisaku Satō I Second Reformed Cabinet |
Preceded by | Umekichi Nakamura |
Succeeded by | Toshihiro Kennoki |
24th Director of the Defense Agency | |
In office 30 November 1968 – 14 January 1970 | |
Cabinet | Eisaku Satō II Second Reformed Cabinet |
Preceded by | Kaneshichi Masuda |
Succeeded by | Yasuhiro Nakasone |
22nd Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy | |
In office 12 July 1972 – 22 December 1972 | |
Cabinet | Kakuei Tanaka I |
Preceded by | Kakuei Tanaka |
Succeeded by | Zentarō Kosaka |
Personal details | |
Born | 30 April 1901 Hikami, Hyōgo Prefecture, Japan |
Died | 9 February 1986 |
Political party | Democratic Liberal Democratic |
Alma mater | Tokyo Imperial University Faculty of Economics |
Kiichi Arita (Japanese: 有田 喜一; 30 April 1901 – 9 February 1986) was a Japanese politician. During his time in politics, he served as the Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy, Director of the Defense Agency, Foreign Minister, and Minister of Education.
Career
As Chairman of the Research Commission on National Security, Arita participated in the debate over the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The three pillars supporting the treaty were "non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology." Arita and his clique agreed with the first two, but did not like the third. However, Arita was willing to accept the treaty's pillars.[1]
As foreign minister under Prime Minister Eisaku Satō, Arita pursued a proactive foreign policy. He believed that Japan needed to make "positive contributions to the 'fight for peace'". He wanted Japan to do everything possible to reduce international tension. However, in the case of a military threat, Arita stressed the importance of US-Japan cooperation and the strength of the Japan Self-Defense Force.[2]
Arita was one of the two supporters of Takeo Fukuda who were chosen to have a ministerial position under Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka. Fukuda and his supporters were angered by the appointment of Tanaka as the successor of Satō, as Fukuda had previously been one of the top candidates for succeeding him. Upon his calling to the cabinet, then, Arita declined service in his position, citing the lack of representation for Fukuda supporters within the government. However, Tanaka convinced Fukuda to let his two supporters serve in their roles.[3]
Arita was skeptical of the Chinese nuclear program, perceiving it as a direct "threat" and stating so in 1969. He thus called on Japan to increase its preparedness for a "worst-case scenario". This was before the change in the Defense Agency's perception of China to an indirect threat in early 1970 under Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone.[4] Arita was also the writer of the first Defense white paper in Japan in 1970 - his original draft argued for increased defense capability if there was ever a "delay" in assistance from the US in case of an invasion, but the final draft saw Arita back down on this, as he called for "autonomous defence capability" only, a controversial move.[5]
References
Citations
- ^ Takeda & Kim 2021.
- ^ Arita 1969, p. 155.
- ^ Chapin 1972, p. 170.
- ^ Oren & Brummer 2020, p. 92-3.
- ^ Tan 1989, p. 51.
Bibliography
- Arita, Kiichi (1969). "Japanese Foreign Policy". Survival. 11 (5): 155–157. doi:10.1080/00396336908440982. Retrieved 14 May 2021.
- Chapin, Emerson (1972). "Men and Politics in Post-Sato Japan". Journal of International Affairs. 26 (2): 167–178. JSTOR 24356508. Retrieved 15 June 2021.
- Oren, Eitan; Brummer, Matthew (Fall 2020). "Reexamining Threat Perception in Early Cold War Japan". Journal of Cold War Studies. 22 (4): 71–112. doi:10.1162/jcws_a_00948. Retrieved 14 May 2021.
- Takeda, Yu; Kim, Ju Hyung (17 March 2021). "Japan and the Creation of the NPT Regime". Wilson Center. Retrieved 14 May 2021.
- Tan, Andrew T.H. (1989). "Japan's defence: Development Amidst Constraints". Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 3 (1): 49–69. doi:10.1080/09557578908400024. Retrieved 15 June 2021.