Jump to content

United States v. Crimmins

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Legalskeptic (talk | contribs) at 17:56, 3 November 2017 (removed Category:United States Court of Appeals case articles without infoboxes). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

United States v. Crimmins
CourtUnited States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Full case name United States v. Crimmins
DecidedNovember 3, 1941
Citation123 F.2d 271
Court membership
Judges sittingLearned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, Augustus Noble Hand
Case opinions
MajorityL. Hand, joined by a unanimous court

United States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1941)[1] was a case before the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals about conspiracy to transport stolen securities in interstate commerce § 415, Title 18, U.S.C.A. John D. Crimmins, a lawyer practicing in Syracuse, New York, was convicted for his part in a conspiracy where he bought stolen securities from a confederate who also lived in New York. Crimmins appealed on the grounds that he did not know the bonds had been transported across state lines.

Judge Learned Hand wrote the court's opinion. He reasoned that a jury may have found Crimmins guilty for the substantive offense of using interstate commerce in the commission of a crime since he knowingly bought stolen bonds even if he didn't know where they were from, but that "It is never permissible to enlarge the scope of the conspiracy itself by proving that some of the conspirators, unknown to the rest, have done what was beyond the reasonable intendment of the common understanding".[1] According to Hand, people can only be charged for the actions of co-conspirators that were mutually agreed upon. He gave the analogy, "While one may, for instance, be guilty of running past a traffic light of whose existence one is ignorant, one cannot be guilty of conspiring to run past such a light, for one cannot agree to run past a light unless one supposes that there is a light to run past".[1]

In United States v. Feola (1975), the Supreme Court rejected Hand's analogy, holding that conspiracy to assault a federal agent required no greater mens rea than the substantive crime of assault.

References

  1. ^ a b c United States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1941).

Further reading

  • Stephen A. Saltzburg, et al. Criminal Law-Cases and Materials (2008, Third Ed.) Newark, NJ: LexisNexis. pp 752–53.