Implementability (mechanism design)
In mechanism design, implementability is a property of a social choice function. It means that there is an incentive-compatible mechanism that attains ("implements") this function. There are several degrees of implementability, corresponding to the different degrees of incentive-compatibility, e.g:
- A function is dominant-strategy implementable if it is attainable by a mechanism which is dominant-strategy-incentive-compatible (also called strategyproof).
- A function is Bayesian-Nash implementable if it is attainable by a mechanism which is Bayesian-Nash-incentive-compatible.
See [1] for a recent reference. In some textbooks, the entire field of mechanism design is called Implementation theory.[2]
References
- ^ "Monotonicity and Implementability". Econometrica. 78 (5): 1749–1772. 2010. doi:10.3982/ECTA8882.
- ^ Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein: A Course in Game Theory (1994).