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Latitudinarianism (philosophy)

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Latitudinarianism, in at least one area of contemporary philosophy, is a position concerning de dicto and de re (propositional) attitudes. Latitudinarians think that de re attitudes are not a category distinct from de dicto attitudes; the former are just a special case of the latter.

The term was introduced into discussions of de dicto and de re attitudes by Roderick Chisholm in his "Knowledge and Belief: 'De Dicto' and 'De Re'" (1976). Latitudinarianism has since also sometimes been called an "unrestricted exportation" view.

References and further reading

  • Baker, Lynne Rudder (1982). "De Re Belief in Action" The Philosophical Review, Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 363–387.
  • Chisholm, Roderick (1976). "Knowledge and Belief: 'De Dicto' and 'De Re'" Philosophical Studies 29, pp. 1-20.
  • Quine, W.V. (1956). "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes" Journal of Philosophy 53. Reprinted in Quine's Ways of Paradox (1976), pp. 185–196.
  • Sosa, Ernest (1995). "Fregean Reference Defended" Philosophical Issues, Vol. 6, Content, pp. 91–99.