Chemical game theory
Chemical game theory is an alternative model of game theory that represents and solves problems in strategic interactions, or contested human decision making. Differences with traditional game theory concepts include the use of metaphorical molecules called “knowlecules”,[1][2] which represent choices and decisions among players in the game.[3] Using knowlecules, entropic choices and the effects of preexisting biases are taken into consideration. A game in chemical game theory is then represented in the form of a process flow diagram consisting of unit operations. The unit operations represent the decision-making processes of the players, and have similarities to the garbage can model of political science.[4][5]
A game of N players, N being any integer greater than 1, is represented by N reactors in parallel. The concentrations that enter a reactor corresponds to the bias that a player enters the game with.[3] The reactions occurring in the reactors are comparable to the decision making process of each player. The concentrations of the final products represent the likelihood of each outcome given the preexisting biases and pains for the situation.
References
- ^ Razeto-Barry, Pablo; Veloz, Tomas; Veloz, Tomas; Razeto-Barry, Pablo (2017-03-01). "Reaction Networks as a Language for Systemic Modeling: Fundamentals and Examples". Systems. 5 (1): 11. doi:10.3390/systems5010011.
- ^ Moore, M. K. Relationship between Learner-Centeredness and Self-Esteem in Two Middle Schools. Ph.D. Thesis, The Pennsylvania State University, 2002. This thesis, under the direction of Professor Kyle Peck, has the first known use of the word “knowlecule”.
- ^ a b Velegol, Darrell; Suhey, Paul; Connolly, John; Morrissey, Natalie; Cook, Laura (2018-09-14). "Chemical Game Theory". Industrial & Engineering Chemistry Research. 57 (41): 13593–13607. doi:10.1021/acs.iecr.8b03835.
- ^ Cohen, Michael D.; March, James G.; Olsen, Johan P. (1972-03-01). "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice". Administrative Science Quarterly. 17 (1): 1–25. doi:10.2307/2392088. ISSN 0001-8392. JSTOR 2392088.
- ^ W., Kingdon, John (1984). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies. Boston: Little, Brown. ISBN 978-0316493918. OCLC 10277820.
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