Cult of the offensive
Cult of the offensive refers to a strategic military dilemma, where leaders believe that offensive advantages are so great that a defending force would have no hope of repelling the attack; consequently, all states choose to attack. It is most often used in context of explaining the causes of World War I and the subsequent heavy losses, on all sides, during the fighting on the Western Front.
Military theory
Under the cult of offensive, military leaders believe that the first one to strike will score victory over the enemy forces.
International politics
In the area of international relations, cult of offensive feeds the security dilemma and offensive realism theories, arguing that conquest is easy and security difficult to obtain from defensive posture. Liberal institutionalists argue that it is a commitment problem[1], and that preemptive war which results from the security dilemma is fairly rare.[2]
World War I
Cult of the offensive was the dominant line of thought among many military and political leaders before World War I, and it significantly contributed to the escalation of hostilities, becoming one of the main causes of World War I, as those leaders argued in favor of declaring war and launching an offensive, believing they could cripple their opponents, and fearing that if they waited, they in turn would be defeated.
Military theorists of the time generally held that seizing the offensive was extremely important. This theory encouraged all belligerents to strike first in order to gain the advantage. Most planners wanted to begin mobilization as quickly as possible to avoid being caught on the defensive. Some analysts have argued that mobilization schedules were so rigid that once it was begun, they could not be cancelled without massive disruption of the country and military disorganization. Thus, the window for diplomacy was shortened by this attitude, and the diplomatic overtures conducted after the mobilizations had begun were ignored. This phenomenon was also referred to as "war by timetable".
An example of such an approach was the German Schlieffen Plan, based on the pro-offensive approach of officers such as Helmuth von Moltke the Younger. It was executed to near victory in the first month of the war; however, a French counterattack on the outskirts of Paris, the Battle of the Marne (combined with surprisingly speedy Russian offensives), ended the German offensive and resulted in years of trench warfare. Notably, it was not only Germany who followed the cult of the offensive; the French army, among others, was also driven very strongly by this doctrine, supported among others by Ferdinand Foch, Joseph Joffre and Loyzeaux de Grandmaison; officers of that period were indoctrinated that "The French Army, returning unto its traditions, no longer knows any law other than the offensive".
As things would turn out, however, the fighting in World War I ultimately favored defensive strategies; cult of the offensive led to heavy losses during the fighting on the Western Front, as infantry the forces that were assaulted, or could expect attack, prepared elaborate defense positions (trenches with machine guns). It would not be until World War II that offensive strategies would prove a reliable method of gaining the upper hand; interestingly, at that time much of military thought was influenced by the lessons of the WWI and tacticians, particularly among the Western Allies in the early phase of the war, tried to avoid offensive at all cost (what became known as the cult of the defensive, see Phony War).
Notes
- ^ Powell, Robert. 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem." http://polisci.ucsd.edu/~bslantch/courses/pdf/powell-io2005.pdf
- ^ Reiter, Dan. 1995. "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen." http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-2889(199523)20%3A2%3C5%3AETPKMP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F [JSTOR access required]
References
- Stephen Van Evera, The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War, International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer, 1984), pp. 58-107, [1], JSTOR
- Jack Snyder, Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984, International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer, 1984), pp. 108-146$, JSTOR
- Echevarria II A.J., The 'Cult of the Offensive' Revisited: Confronting Technological Change Before the Great War, Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 25, Number 1, March 2002 , pp. 199-214(16), IngentaConnect
- Azar Gat, The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century, Oxford University Press, 1992, ISBN 0198202466, Google Print, p.114
- John R. Carter, Airpower and the Cult of the Offensive
- http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFCujCmp1RQ Online Lecture of the Cult of the Offensive