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Land reform in North Vietnam

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Main article: Land reform in Vietnam

Land reform in North Vietnam (Vietnamese: Cải cách ruộng đất tại miền Bắc Việt Nam) can be understood as an agrarian reform in northern Vietnam throughout different periods, but in many cases it only refers to the one within the regime of Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in the 1950s. Land reform in North Vietnam is one of the most important economic and political programs launched by Viet Minh government during the years 1953-1956.

Background

The project of land reform in North Vietnam was a product of the interplay of complex internal and external factors. On 9 March 1945, several years after occupation in Indochina, Japan took a military coup, threw away the French administration in Indochina and established a puppet indigenous government headed by Tran Trong Kim. However, five months later, Japan unconditionally surrendered. Taking the political vacuum, Viet Minh seized power by launching nationwide revolution, and founded DRV in Hanoi in September 2.

Soon after that, Vietnam saw influx of big power. KMT’s Chinese armies accepted surrender of Japan in the northern Vietnam of 17 parallel, while the British in the south. Both of them negotiated and facilitated the French return. After negotiation between Viet Minh and the French broke down, the war between them started from late 1946 until 1954, this is called the First Indochina war (1946-1954).

In the whole of the 1940s, Viet Minh fought solely against the French army. In terms of military capability, Viet Minh was in position of clear-cut disadvantage, this did not change until the establishment and involvement of PRC.

During this period of time, DRV government was dominated by Viet Minh who was popular among indigenous political force, its domestic policy was to unite all possible forces for resistance war.[1] but it also embraced peasants, workers, students and some merchants and intellectuals.[2] On 11 November 1945, ICP declared itself dissolution, aiming at downplaying the role of communist ideology by dissolving ICP into underground for garnering more support from mass.[3]

In October 1949, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established PRC by overtaking its political rivalry KMT, which had a numerous impact on the political landscape of the region in general and Vietnam in particular.[4]

From CCP’s perspective, Chinese revolutionary model was intended to be exported to the Asian countries and Vietnam included.[5] What is more, increasing influence in its southern periphery was also for national defense and security.[6] From the perspective of DRV, communist China was a good ally who shared the same ideology and similar approaches to complete communist revolution. They were glad to conduct a binary revolution at the same time: externally anti-colonialism and internally anti-feudalism. Thus Ho plead proactively for Chinese aid[7] After establishing formal diplomatic relations with PRC in early 1950, Luo Guibo became the first Chinese ambassador in DRV, and Chinese aid also flood into DRV, one of the most significant which was that Chinese advisory group was later sent to North Vietnam in the same year.

Basically, Chinese advisory groups had double mission. The most important one was to provide advice on military affairs. After winning military victory in series of military campaign with considerable help from August 1950 onward, DRV not only gradually turned around the war situation but also expanded its controlling areas. This conducive environment facilitated DRV to carry out its land reform plan.

As a government dominated by the communists, land reform was an integral part of its revolution. After its first trial failed in the 1930s, Vietnamese communists never had a real chance to carry out it, even during a long time after the foundation of DRV. For the sake of war, communist slogans were even diminished. Instead, they needed support from landowners and landlords. However, Chinese assistance outweigh domestic support from feudal classes and communism was re-emphasized. Indochinese party was divided along national lines and the Vietnamese Worker’s party (VWP) was officially formed in the early 1951.[8] Simultaneously, land reform was put on its agenda. More comprehensive and stricter land policies were formulated, and class struggle was emphasized as inseparable from the military struggle for the first time.[9]

On the other hand, the French and American-sponsored Quoc Gia Viet Nam (the State of Vietnam) emerged and was recognized by western powers. Particularly after the Bao Dai solution, DRV faced a competent rivalry regime which contest its monopolistic representation of the Vietnamese people. In this situation, Truong Chinh in his report to the party Congress in 1951 pointed out that as soon as the Bao Dai regime was set up, the landlord class aligned itself with the State of Vietnam.[10]

Except international and domestically political factors, as Bernard B. Fall pointed out, land reform was also necessary for economic reasons. 90 percent of population lived by agriculture but the problem was that the enormous population pressure upon the relatively small fertile areas. In the Red River delta, 9 million people were crowded into an area of 5790 square miles.[11] The majority of population under DRV were peasants but did not have land to till, which was an unjust situation.[12]

Since the end of WWII in Indochina, people suffered a lot from famine and lack of enough food because of continuous wars. Improving their welfare can consolidate Viet Minh’s regime by garnering more support. Collective ownership as a palliative to landlessness has been a century-old practice throughout Vietnam and for individuals, they were deprived of rice field and had to turn to support to the communal land.[13]

In Vietnam, there is a saying called “Phép Vua Thua Lệ Làng”, literally meaning that the emperor is secondary to village customs and implicitly indicating that national rule at the village was given a way to autonomous rule by village itself. This was also true for the DRV government, their influence in the grass root is relatively weak. Land reform served a good way to cement its power at the grass level.

Implementation

Land reform in North Vietnam was a grand project. At the beginning, it was a relatively mild campaign; later on, it was radicalized and caused serious effects. When the top leaders notices the side effects, they tried to rectify the caused errors.

Pre-1953 Communist Land Policy in DRV

Social revolution is part of revolution led by the communist party. However, for a long time, the regime failed to grasp the essential tasks of Vietnamese national democratic revolution and placed too much emphasis on unity with landlords in the interest of national resistance, and did not pay much attention to the peasant and land issues.[14] What they did was to adopt a middle way: landlords agreed to decrease the land rent and the peasants still needed to pay rent but with a lower rate. The land rent reduction was formulated in July 1949.[15]

Also, all pre-1953 policy had failed in breaking through the landlord’s economic and political power and in serving the interests of the peasants. According to VWP’s mouthpiece Nhan Dan, even landlords were allowed to join the party, which somehow dominated the party chapters in many areas.[16] DRV gradually abandoned its former policy toward landlords and peasants. From 14 to 23 November 1953, VWP organized a national conference, in this meeting, anti-feudalism was put much emphasis on.The most important change was that a new approach was adopted, which was mass mobilization for class struggle.

Land reform constituted two successive campaigns: land rent reduction campaign (1953-1954) and land reform campaign proper (1954-1956). The first campaign included eights waves and the second had five waves.[17] According to Hoang Van Chi who was a former member of DRV and fled to South Vietnam in the mid-1950s, these two campaigns had but one purpose, namely the liquidation of the landowning class and the subsequent establishment of a proletarian dictatorship in the countryside. The only notable difference between them was the degree of violence and the nature of the wealth confiscated.[18]

Land Rent Reduction Campaign

After being trained by Chinese, through the local party-cell, Vietnamese cadres were sent to the village and lived with a few landless peasants. They practiced the “Three Together System”, namely, worked together, ate together and lived together. By doing so for two to three months, they had amassed much information of the peasants and that village, and also arouse awareness of social class by posing questions to the peasants like why they were poor.

After this survey by professionally trained cadres, the reduction campaign officially began, and there were six successive stages. The first stage was to classify population during which peasants were categorized according to their possession, this was followed by classification of landlords. Theoretically speaking, there were three classes of landlords: traitorous; ordinary; resistance and “democratic personalities”. Those landlords, if found not comply with rent reduction decree, would be arrested. In this case, they had to pay back the excess land rent within time limit, this is the third stage of extortion of money and valuables. The fourth stage is crime revelation, the peasants were made to attend a special course and taught how to publicly reveal crimes of landlords, and they would have a role of denouncing crimes in the front of a number of people in the fifth stage, but the problem was that they denounced for appearing faithful and obedient to the party, so they may denounce as much as they can rather than considered the reality.[19]

On 12 April 1953, a special people’s tribunal court, composed of peasants who knew nothing about law, was formed according to decree 150/SL.[20] Sentences varied from the death penalty to years’ hard labor, for this point, the most well-known case was Nguyen Thi Nam, a patriotic landlord who joined the resistance war against the French but was sentenced to death.

The label of landlord is dangerous. According to Hoang’s memoir, as soon as a man was defined as landlord, he and his family were isolated from their fellow human beings and nobody was permitted to talk to them or even have any contact with them. This policy of isolation even caused a number of deaths.[21]

Land Reform Campaign Proper

In the year of 1953, a series of decrees and laws on land reform were released. VWP central committee assessed the possibility of moving on to the last phase of land revolution: redistribution of agricultural land,[22] which was followed by the most crucial land reform law publicized on 19 December 1953,[23] which can be regarded as the platform for land reform. Very soon after the law was passed in national congress, the experimental wave of land reform took place between December 1953 and March 1954 in Thai Nguyen province.[24] This experiment was fruitful according to the official, and a Central Land Reform Committee was established on 15 March 1954 which was headed by Pham Van Dong.[25]

Land reform then expanded to larger areas by five waves (see the table below[26]).

Five Waves Period Numbers of xa covered Location
Wave 1 25 May 1954- 20 September 1954 53 Thai Nguyen (47 xa); Thanh Hoa (6 xa)
Wave 2 23 October 1954- 15 January 1955 210 Thai Nguyen (22 xa); Phu Tho (100 xa); Bac Giang (22 xa); Thanh Hoa (66 xa)
Wave 3 18 February 1955- 20 June 1955 466 Phu Tho (106 xa); Bac Giang (100 xa); Vinh Phuc (65 xa);

Son Tay (22 xa); Thanh Hoa (115 xa); Nghe An (74 xa)

Wave 4 27 June 1955- 31 December 1955 859 Phu Tho (17 xa); Bac Giang (16 xa); Vinh Phuc (111 xa);

Bac Ninh (60 xa); Son Tay (71 xa); Ha Nam (98 xa);

Ninh Binh (47 xa); Thanh Hoa (207 xa); Nghe An (5 xa); Ha Tinh (227 xa)

Wave 5 25 December 1955- 30 July 1956 1657 Bac Ninh(86 xa); Ninh Binh(45 xa); Ha Dong(163 xa); Nam Dinh(171 xa);

Thanh Hoa (19 xa); Nghe An(250 xa); Ha Tinh (6 xa); Quang Binh (118 xa);

Vinh Linh(21 xa); Hai Duong(217 xa); Hung Yen(149 xa); Thai Binh (249 xa);

Kien An(85 xa); Ha Noi (47 xa); Hai Phong (9 xa); Hong Quang(40 xa)

Compared to the prior campaign, land reform campaign proper was carried out more violently and in larger areas especially after the Geneva Conference because the VWP leaders realized that the Geneva Agreement was impossible to be implemented; and feared that Diem’s “March North” may start a fire at its backyard.[27] Five times the number of landlords than the first campaign was fixed by the party, thus it provoked increased internal conflict.[28] According to Hoang, the DRV authorities never stated the number of dispossessed landlords in any of their official publications. Expropriation was occasional during the first campaign but it was universally practiced during the second.[29] As soon as the confiscation ceremony was over, an exhibition of the confiscated personal belongings of the landlord was organized, and in doing so, class awareness was intentionally provoked by illustrating the sharp contrast in living standards between peasants and landlords.[30] However, this is not the end, the next big question was the apportionment of land and other properties. Normal practice should distribute them among peasants, however, it lacked accurate information.

Chinese Involvement

Due to the traditionally close connection between China and Vietnam in general, and the enormous tie between Chinese and Vietnamese communists since 1949 in particular, right from the early 1950s onward, communist China’s influence over DRV increased dramatically. There were three kinds of Chinese advisory groups in North Vietnam providing assistance in the aspect of military, politics and logistics. Chinese military advisory group was headed firstly by Wei Guoqing (July 1950- May 1951) providing directly consultation to the top commander of DRV. Chinese political advisory group was headed by Luo Guibo. Land reform was part of political issue, and Luo played a big role in it. Under political advisory group, a financial team was established in early 1951 to help North Vietnam formulate regulations on how to collect tax and rice.[31]

Since 1953, for facilitating mass mobilization and rent reduction campaign, more than 100 North Vietnamese cadres was sent to China to participate training class. Later on in spring 1953, a particular institution exclusively in charge of helping DRV to conduct land reform was called the Land Reform and Party Consolidation Section which was headed by Zhang Dequn.[32] According to his memoir, more land reform specialists of Chinese cadres was responsible for training. Similar to Chinese experience, social organizations such as peasant, youth, and women’s league were established. Cadres were trained to practice Vietnamese version of Chinese “three together system” (三共,san gong) while peasants were mobilized and encouraged to “pour out grievances suffering from landlords and French collaborators” (诉苦,su ku).

For the case of North Vietnam, some soldier was also affected due to their family background, and among the army, there were some degree of dissatisfaction. Considering this and from Chinese experience, Chinese advisors proposed to carry out a land reform education campaign among DRV’s army. On February 1953, Luo Guibo sent a report to the Chinese leadership proposing a political consolidation campaign (整军,zheng jun) in order to make them aware of class distinction.[33] On December 1953, the third National Congress passed land reform law which put forward route of land reform: step by step wipe out feudal system by relying on poor peasants, uniting middle and rich peasants.[34]

The Chinese pattern of land reform in DRV was successful in meeting the need of the poor peasants for land and thus increased the prestige of the new Communist authorities. However, it also produced significant negative consequences for the party due to that Mao’s pattern of land reform emphasized the excessive class struggle and repression. This was an important reason for the later Vietnamese criticism of the Chinese model.[35]

Repression

The reform led to allegations of many villagers being executed, land being taken away from middle peasants, and of paranoia among neighbors. Several foreign witnesses testified to mass executions.[36][37][page needed] Following the official condemnation of the excesses of Land Reform, the party newspaper Nhan Dan reported that 30% percent of all convictions were erroneous.[38] By 1957, some 12,000 wrongly convicted prisoners were released.[39]

Executions and imprisonment of persons classified as "landlords" or enemies of the state were contemplated from the beginning of the land reform program. A Politburo document dated 4 May 1953 said that executions were "fixed in principle at the ratio of one per one thousand people of the total population." That ratio would indicate that communist Vietnam contemplated the execution of about 15,000 "reactionaries and evil landlords" in carrying out the program.[40]

On July 9, 1953, the first landlord executed was the woman Nguyễn Thị Năm, who had in fact been an active supporter of the Vietnamese Communist resistance.[41]

The scale of the ensuing repression has proved difficult and controversial to quantify, with estimates of the number of executions ranging from 3,000 to 200,000. Testimony from North Vietnamese witnesses suggested a ratio of one execution for every 160 village residents, which extrapolated nationwide would indicate nearly 100,000 executions. Because the campaign was concentrated mainly in the Red River Delta area, a lower estimate of 50,000 executions became widely accepted by scholars at the time.[42][43] A Saigon communique put the figure at 32,000 executions (12,000 party members and 20,000 others), based on the testimony of an ex-party member involved in the campaign.[44] Economist Vo Nhan Tri reported uncovering a document in the central party archives which put the number of wrongful executions at 15,000. From discussions with party cadres, Vo Nhan Tri concluded that the overall number of deaths was considerably higher than this figure.[45]

Gareth Porter wrote The Myth of the Bloodbath, where he estimated that the death toll was only in the thousands[46] but was criticized by historian Robert F. Turner for relying on official communist sources. Turner argued that the death toll "was certainly in six digits."[47] Historian Edwin Moise, who estimated that over 8,000 people were executed during the land reform,[48] has defended this practice, noting that newspapers North Vietnamese sources publicly discussed and condemned the repressive measures, even before they became a casus belli for the South.[49] According to Balazs Szalontai, declassified statistics provided by the North Vietnamese government to Hungarian officials generally support Moise's lower estimates.[50] János Radványi, who visited Hanoi in 1959 as a member of the Hungarian Party-State delegation, was told that 60,000 people had been executed during the campaign.[42]

Outcomes

As soon as the reform was completed by 1956 and the so-called peasants’ authority well-established in the villages, the party quite unexpectedly admitted to having made many serious mistakes during the reform when the “masses” had been “given a free hand”.[51]

VWP developed a campaign called Rectification of Errors from January 1957 till mid-1957. This campaign was divided into three phases. The first phase was a crash operation to survey the damage done and release from prison incorrectly classified peasants and falsely accused cadres. The second phase, more deliberate and the real heart of the campaign, was divided into two steps. Step I was the re-classification of peasants, and step II was the restitution of property erroneously expropriated or else making suitable compensation. The third phase of the mistakes correction was to be a review, inventory and concentrated re-indoctrination of local personnel.[52]

As for the outcome of the reform, there is a debate on it. On the one side, most scholars hold a strong view that DRV’s land reform was a bloodbath causing huge human cost and deaths, which is almost universally accepted. On the other hand, a few others with sympathy over the communist DRV argued that the bloodbath is a myth created by those wearing cold war lens who supported US intervention in Vietnam.

The most typical supporter of bloodbath narrative is Daniel E. Teodoru. In his article, he painted a radical picture of land reform by arguing that violence was an integral part of the reform. According to him, between 960 thousand and 1.2 million people were condemned; and 288 to 360 thousand were executed but according to Hoang Van Chi, about half a million deaths resulted directly or indirectly from land reform was conservative.[53]

The most typical supporter of anti-bloodbath narrative is D. Gareth Porter. Contrary to Teodoru, his viewpoint on the role of violence during land reform was that violence was not an integral part of the Party's land reform, but rather an undesirable byproduct of an unfortunate loss of control over the peasants by the land reform cadres.[54] He accused the previous literature of misinterpreting primary sources in three main themes: why land reform; land reform policies; errors, and quantifying the “myth”, and “bloodbath” myth was created for “maintaining the US military presence in Vietnam”. On the contrary, land reform “bring the peasants into political process would be a positive development over the long run”.[55]

Putting aside this debate, the reform also reached very considerable ends in terms of economic and social transformation. Economically speaking, collective ownership prevailed and the rural population was more or less equal. From the perspective of social transformation, it radically changed the traditional pattern of village: formerly, the landlords played a leading role in the village affairs but now they were eliminated and replaced by peasants.[56] However, partly due to the land reform and others radical campaign, nearly one million population moved to the South.[57]

Significance

As one of the most important events of DRV in the 1950s, as well as the first radical political campaigns of Vietnamese communists as an exclusive power-holder, this program has produced much controversial effect on North Vietnamese society, the regime itself, as well as relations between peasants and the DRV regime.

Because of the use of violence and excessive emphasis over class struggle, land reform in the 1950s caused much negative impact. For this reason, it is still a sensitive topic even today.[58] It also constitutes a considerable part of oversea Vietnamese political dissents criticizing today’s communist party of Vietnam and its dependence on China.

The aims of the reform were military, economic, political and social, the most important of which, until the decisive victory at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, was the military objective. Ho Chi Minh once listed in 1956 achievements of land reform, nearly ten million peasants had received land; tens of thousands of new cadres had been trained in the countryside. The organization of the Party, the administration and peasants’ associations in the communes have been readjusted.[59]

Having said that, no matter what their positions are, both sides of the bloodbath debate have a common ground that Viet Minh regime gained its control over the grass village and its ability to influence and mobilize the mass was consolidated. Land reform is an agrarian project but also a political campaign. Through mass mobilization and classification, anti-revolutionary and reactionary enemies were suppressed economically and politically.[60]

This had a nearly profound impact for wars in the latter years. One, this paved the way for the socialist construction in the North, which could provide southern communists with logistical support. Two, the reform can be regarded as a preparatory step for a large-scale war: people’s war against US imperialist aggression. The regime opened the door to enlightenment by completely altering the existing patterns of production; but also provided the masses with an ideology which would modify their attitude to work even before the economic conditions were fundamentally changed.[61]

See also

References

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  12. ^ Ngoc-luu Nguyen. Peasants, Party and Revolution the Politics of Agrarian Transformation in Northern Vietnam 1930-1975, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1987, p. 257.
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  17. ^ Lê Quỳnh Nga. Quan điểm tiến hành cải cách ruộng đất ở Việt Nam trong những năm 1945-1956 qua các nghị quyết Trung Ương Đảng [The VCP’s Views of the Land Reform Process Seen from the Resolutions of the Party Central Committe 1945-1956]. See: http://www.hids.hochiminhcity.gov.vn/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=ab315600-73a5-4c2b-b062-f7966e824087&groupId=13025.
  18. ^ Hoàng Văn Chí. From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of North Vietnam. London: Pall Mall, 1964, p. 162.
  19. ^ Hoàng Văn Chí. From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of North Vietnam, pp. 171-189.
  20. ^ The law is called 233/SL. This document can be found at the official website of Vietnamese government. See: http://www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/chinhphu/hethongvanban?class_id=1&mode=detail&document_id=1104.
  21. ^ Hoàng Văn Chí. From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of North Vietnam, pp. 189-191.
  22. ^ Nguyen Ngoc-luu. Peasants, Party and Revolution the Politics of Agrarian Transformation in Northern Vietnam 1930-1975, p. 276.
  23. ^ The law is called 197/SL. This document can be found at the official website of Vietnamese government. See: http://moj.gov.vn/vbpq/Lists/Vn%20bn%20php%20lut/View_Detail.aspx?ItemID=1106.
  24. ^ Vickerman, Andrew. The Fate of the Peasantry: Premature "Transition to Socialism" in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1986, p. 82.
  25. ^ Nguyen Ngoc-luu. Peasants, Party and Revolution the Politics of Agrarian Transformation in Northern Vietnam 1930-1975, p. 284.
  26. ^ Nguyen Ngoc-luu. Peasants, Party and Revolution the Politics of Agrarian Transformation in Northern Vietnam 1930-1975, pp. 307-308.
  27. ^ Qiang Zhai. China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975. University of North Carolina Press, First Edition, 2000, p. 75.
  28. ^ Trần Phương (ed.). Cách Mạng Ruộng Đất Ở Việt Nam [The Land Revolution in Vietnam]. Hanoi: Khoa Học Xã Hội, 1968, pp. 185-188.
  29. ^ Hoàng Văn Chí. From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of North Vietnam, pp. 195-197.
  30. ^ Hoàng Văn Chí. From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of North Vietnam, p. 200
  31. ^ 李树泉.《中国共产党口述史料丛书(第4卷)》[Series of Oral History of CCP, Vol. 4], 中共党史出版社, 2013, p, 383.
  32. ^ Qiang Zhai. China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975, p. 39.
  33. ^ Qiang Zhai. China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975, pp. 40-41.
  34. ^ 李树泉.《中国共产党口述史料丛书(第4卷)》, pp. 384-385.
  35. ^ Qiang Zhai. China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975, p. 42
  36. ^ Tongas, Gérard. J'ai vécu dans l'enfer communiste au Nord Viet-Nam. Paris, Nouvelles Éditions Debresse, (1960).
  37. ^ Boudarel, Georges. Cent fleurs écloses dans la nuit du Vietnam: communisme et dissidence, 1954-1956. Paris: J. Bertoin, (1991).
  38. ^ Gittinger, J. Price, "Communist Land Policy in Viet Nam", Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 29, No. 8, 1957, p. 118.
  39. ^ Time, July 1, 1957, p. 13
  40. ^ "Politburo's Directive Issued on May 4, 1953, on some Special Issues regarding Mass Mobilization," Journal of Vietnamese Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2010), p. 243. Downloaded from JSTOR.
  41. ^ Vo, Alex-Thai D. (2015). "Nguyễn Thị Năm and the Land Reform in North Vietnam, 1953". Journal of Vietnamese Studies.
  42. ^ a b Turner, Robert F. (1975). Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development. Hoover Institution Publications. p. 143. ISBN 0817964312. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help); Unknown parameter |ignore-isbn-error= ignored (|isbn= suggested) (help)
  43. ^ Bernard B. Fall (1967), The Two Vietnams: A Political and Military Analysis (London: Pall Mall Press, 2nd rev. ed.), p. 156.
  44. ^ Dommen, Arthur J. (2001), The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans, Indiana University Press, p. 340.
  45. ^ Nhan, Vo Tri (1990). Vietnam's Economic Policy Since 1975 (1 ed.). Institute for Southeast Asian Studies. pp. 2–3. ISBN 981-3035-54-4. Retrieved 8 July 2015.
  46. ^ Porter, Gareth (1973). The Myth of the Bloodbath: North Vietnam's Land Reform Reconsidered. "Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars", September 1973, pp. 2-15
  47. ^ Turner, Robert F. "Expert Punctures 'No Bloodbath' Myth". Human Events, November 11, 1972. See also Turner, "Myths of the Vietnam War: The Pentagon Papers Reconsidered", Southeast Asian Perspectives, No. 7 (Sep., 1972), pp. i-iv, 1-55: "Although no official figures were made public, the best estimates are that about fifty thousand people were executed, and several hundred thousands more died as a result of the "policy of isolation.""[dubious – discuss]
  48. ^ Moise, Edwin E. (1983), Land Reform in China and North Vietnam: Consolidating the Revolution at the Village Level, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. See also Triumph Revisited: Historians Battle for the Vietnam War (2010), Routledge, pg. 97.
  49. ^ Edwin E. Moise, "Land Reform and Land Reform Errors in North Vietnam," Pacific Affairs, Spring 1976, pp70-92; also Land Reform in China and North Vietnam (University of North Carolina Press, 1983).
  50. ^ Szalontai, Balazs (November 2005). "Political and Economic Crisis in North Vietnam, 1955–56". Cold War History. 5 (4): 395–426.
  51. ^ Hoàng Văn Chí. From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of North Vietnam, p. 207.
  52. ^ Gittinger, J. Price. Communist Land Policy in North Viet Nam. Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 28, No. 8 (Aug., 1959), pp. 113-126.
  53. ^ Teodoru, Daniel E. The Bloodbath Hypothesis: The Maoist Pattern in North Vietnam's Radical Land Reform. Southeast Asian Perspectives, No. 9 (Mar., 1973), pp. i-iii, 1-79.
  54. ^ Teodoru, Daniel E. The Bloodbath Hypothesis: The Maoist Pattern in North Vietnam's Radical Land Reform, pp. i-iii, 1-79.
  55. ^ Porter, D. Gareth. The Myth of the Bloodbath North Vietnam Land Reform Reconsidered. Cornell University, International Relations of East Asia Project, Interim report, 1972.
  56. ^ Tran Nhu Trang. The Transformation of the Peasantry in North Vietnam, pp. 290-291.
  57. ^ Tran Nhu Trang. The Transformation of the Peasantry in North Vietnam, p. 274.
  58. ^ Alex-Thai D. Vo. Nguyễn Thị Năm and the Land Reform in North Vietnam, 1953, pp. 1-62.
  59. ^ Christine Pelzer White. Land reform in North Vietna. Washington: Agency for International Development, 1970, pp. 34-35.
  60. ^ Nguyen Ngoc-luu. Peasants, Party and Revolution the Politics of Agrarian Transformation in Northern Vietnam 1930-1975, p. 333
  61. ^ Gerard Chaliand. The Peasants of North Vietnam, translated from the French by Peter Wiles. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969, p. 242.

Further reading

  • Bernard B. Fall, The Two Vietnams: A Political and Military Analysis (London: Pall Mall Press, 2nd rev. ed., 1967)
  • The History of the Vietnamese Economy (2005), Vol. 2, edited by Dang Phong of the Institute of Economy, Vietnamese Institute of Social Sciences.
  • Gittinger, J. Price, "Communist Land Policy in Viet Nam", Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 29, No. 8, 1957, p. 118
See also: Land reform in South Vietnam
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