Operation Osoaviakhim

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Operation Osoaviakhim was a Soviet operation which took place on 22 October 1946, with NKVD and Soviet army units forcibly (at gunpoint) recruiting more than 2,000 German technical specialists and scientists from the Soviet occupation zone of post-World War II Germany for employment in the Soviet Union.[1] Much related equipment was moved too, the aim being to literally transplant research and production centres, such as the relocated V-2 rocket centre at Mittelwerk Nordhausen, from Germany to the Soviet Union, and collect as much material as possible from test centres such as the Luftwaffe's central military aviation test centre at Erprobungstelle Rechlin, taken by the Red Army on 2 May 1945. The codename "Osoaviakhim" was the acronym of a Soviet paramilitary organisation, later renamed DOSAAF.

The operation was commanded by NKVD deputy Colonel General Serov, outside the control of the local Soviet Military Administration (which in a few cases, such as Carl Zeiss AG, tried to prevent the removal of specialists and equipment of vital economic significance for the occupation zone,[2] unsuccessfully, as it turned out, with reportedly only 582 of 10,000 machines left in place at Zeiss[3]). Planned some time in advance to take place after the zone's elections on 20 October, to avoid damaging the Bloc of the Anti-Fascist Democratic Parties Unity List's result, the operation took 92 trains to transport the specialists and their families (perhaps 10,000-15,000 people in all[4]) along with their furniture and belongings.[5] Whilst those removed were offered contracts (the specialists were told that they would be paid on the same terms as equivalent Soviet workers[2]), there was little doubt that failing to sign them was not a realistic option.

A major consideration of the Soviet decision to undertake the operation was fear of the German economy and technological potential re-acclimatizing amidst the cooperation of Soviet and German technical experts after the war, and the simultaneous desire to cultivate this technological potential for the Soviet Union's benefit (especially as it concerned the nascent rocket program thereof).[6] In particular, A. G. Myrkin of the Soviet artillery directorate wrote a letter to the head of NKVD operations in Germany complaining about the prominence of German scientists in important state-secure work.[7] Another possible reason for the operation was the Soviet fear of being condemned for noncompliance with Allied Control Council agreements on the liquidation of German military installations.[citation needed] New agreements were expected on four-power inspections of remaining German war potential, which the Soviets supported, being concerned about developments in the western zones.[8] The operation has parallels with Allied operations such as Operation Overcast, Operation Paperclip, and Operation Alsos, in which the Allies brought military specialists, notably Wernher von Braun, from Germany (primarily to the United States).

Notes

  1. ^ Exorcising Hitler; The Occupation and Denazification of Germany, Frederick Taylor, Bloomsbury Press
  2. ^ a b Naimark, p. 223
  3. ^ Naimark, p. 229
  4. ^ Naimark, p. 227
  5. ^ Naimark, p. 220
  6. ^ Naimark
  7. ^ Dyadin
  8. ^ Naimark, p. 225

References

  • Dyadin, G.V. (2001). Pamyatnye Staty. TsIPK.
  • Naimark, Norman (1995). The Russians in Germany. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-78405-5.