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Perez v. Campbell

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Perez v. Campbell
Argued January 19, 1971
Decided June 1, 1971
Full case namePerez v. Campbell
Citations402 U.S. 637 (more)
29 L. ed. 2d, 91 S. Ct. 1704, 39 Law Week 4618
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
Hugo Black · William O. Douglas
John M. Harlan II · William J. Brennan Jr.
Potter Stewart · Byron White
Thurgood Marshall · Harry Blackmun
Case opinions
MajorityWhite, joined by Black, Douglas, Brennan, Marshall
Concur/dissentBlackmun, joined by Burger, Harlan, Stewart
Laws applied
U.S. Const. art. VI

Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that Arizona's law suspending a driver's license was unconstitutional due to its conflict with the federal Bankruptcy Act under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.[1][2]

Background

The plaintiffs, Mr. Adolfo and Mrs. Emma Perez, were licensed uninsured motorists in the state of Arizona. Insurance was not required under Arizona law.[3] Mr. Perez was involved in a traffic accident and, unable to pay the associated costs, soon filed for bankruptcy. Arizona, under its financial responsibility laws, withdrew the Perez' licenses, and the couple filed suit in district court, where their claim was denied. The Perez family's appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was denied, and they subsequently appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.[1]

Opinion of the Court

Justice White delivered the five-justice majority opinion, which held that the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act interfered with the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act § 17, a purpose which included giving those exiting bankruptcy the chance for a "clear field for future effort, unhampered by ... pre-existing debt."[4][5]

This decision overruled precedent in Keeler v. Department of Public Safety, 269 US 153 (1962) and Reitz v. Mealey, 314 US 33 (1941),[1] stating that those rulings "have no authoritative effect to the extent they are inconsistent with the controlling principle that state legislation that frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is invalidated by the Supremacy Clause.",[6] and was seen as reinforcing "the Hines test", the rule specified for identifying Supremacy Clause violations in Hines v. Davidowitz (1941).[7]

Justice Blackmun, writing for a four-member minority, concurring in part and dissenting in part, would have upheld Keeler and Reitz, suggesting that the primary purpose of the Arizona law was not bankruptcy, but motorist responsibility.[8]

References

  1. ^ a b c Young, Rowland L. (August 1971). "Supreme Court Report: Bankruptcy Act Bars Motorist Responsibility Act". ABA Journal. p. 810. Retrieved 9 January 2013.
  2. ^ "(title unclear)". Journal - State Bar of California. 46. State Bar of California: 641. 1971.
  3. ^ Arizona Law Review. College of Law of the University of Arizona. 1971. p. 749.
  4. ^ Navarra, Albert (2011-01-01). The Elements of Constitutional Law: A Guide to America's Most Timeless and Powerful Document. Law Book Press LLC. pp. 86–. ISBN 9780984478606. Retrieved 9 January 2013.
  5. ^ "A Summary of Supreme Court Actions". The New York Times. June 2, 1971. p. 18. Retrieved 9 January 2013.
  6. ^ *Court Opinion at Justia
  7. ^ Bratton, Jr., William W. (April 1975). "The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court". Columbia Law Review (3). 75: 638. JSTOR 1121775.
  8. ^ States, United (2004). The Constitution Of The United States Of America: Analysis and Interpretation; Analysis Of Cases Decided By the Supreme Court Of the United States To June 28, 2002. Government Printing Office. pp. 304–. ISBN 9780160723797. Retrieved 9 January 2013.