User talk:Trust Is All You Need

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  1. Archive 1 (April – September 2009)
  2. Archive 2 (September – November 2009)
  3. Archive 3 (November 2009 – February 2010)
  4. Archive 4 (February 2010)
  5. Archive 5 (February – December 2010)
  6. Archive 6 (January – December 2011)
  7. Archive 7 (December 2011 – June 2012)
  8. Archive 8 (June 2012 – July 2013)
  9. Archive 9 (August 2013 – May 2014)
  10. Archive 10 (May – December 2014)

Xi Jinping[edit]

I started a subpage at User:Colipon/Xi Jinping for Xi Jinping infobox. Please contribute if you have time. This man has too many titles. Colipon+(Talk) 22:32, 16 December 2014 (UTC)

@Colipon: I can, and I will. Will be a bit slow, with work and all, and my search for scholarly writings on the CPC control system. Its strange, no one, and I say no one (in English at least), has ever written a big scholar work focusing on communist control system, and I'm not saying just China. Analyzed their working, membership or anything for that matter. Its a loophole that is stunning to say the least, but it probably due to the fact that, according to liberal thought, its impossible for such efforts to succeed, so why bother studying failure? Back to the point, I will look at it, but may be a bit slow moving since its Christmas and all for people like me... As for you're reversion of my edit at the CPC Constitution; they did not diminish centralism by abolishing the Chairman, since they re-established the General Secretary. If thats true, which I doubt, it at least needs a source, because its more complicated then just abolishing a post. The North Koreans abolished the chairmanship, buts its not like the system was less centralized when Kim Il-sung became General Secretary. Of course the CPC is not the WPK, but still.. --TIAYN (talk) 14:04, 17 December 2014 (UTC)
Thanks for your response. I am not trigger happy when it comes to reversions and am happy to discuss at any time. With regards to centralism, yes and no. Do note in my reverted version, I say the CPC attempted to reduce centralism - not that it actually had the effect of reducing centralism. Also it is not under dispute that after Deng, no one held supreme personal power until Xi Jinping. Jiang was closely checked by Li Peng, Li Ruihuan, and Zhu Rongji, while Hu basically had an entire Standing Committee of near-equivalent political stature not to mention occasional interference from Jiang. Of course whether the changes in the constitution facilitated this is debateable - it seems like 'decentralization' was largely attempted under Deng's personal fiat - but there is no doubt that the CCP attempted this de-centralization experiment and that abolishing the Chairman was part of this. Colipon+(Talk) 15:29, 17 December 2014 (UTC)
In the world of Communist arcana, names really do matter. For example recall when the Soviet party changed their "Politburo" to a "Presidium", in effect making the body seem more "supreme", and then reverted back to "Politburo" later on. I agree that more literature in this area is needed. By the way, I seem to recall that with Vietname, Ho Chi Minh did not have nearly as large of a cult of personality as Stalin or Mao. They seemed to have decentralized quite a bit since Ho's death. Colipon+(Talk) 15:32, 17 December 2014 (UTC)
By the way, I think the Hu infobox is 'ready to go'. Shall we migrate it to article space? Colipon+(Talk) 15:38, 17 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: OK, seems reasonable. ... Seems reasonable, I've moved it into main space. Vietnam is similar to Yugoslavia, it just doesn't fit in the generalized picture of how a communist system works. Vietnam was organized on Stalinist lines, but Ho was never a one-man show. Truong Chinh led the agricultural collectivization of North Vietnam in the 1950s, and Le Duan and Le Duc Tho (with others) conceived of the military strategy to defeat the Americans. Ho was the charismatic man who held the party together, but even he began losing power to Le Duan at the end of his life (this situation, of course, never happened to Stalin or Mao since people were afraid of them).. In the 1970s and 1980s it looked and still looks that the CPV developed into a Brezhnevite party, but the power struggles were bigger and more controversial, and the centre was losing control over the provinces and localities. For instance, rural collectivization in South Vietnam was an utter failure; even forced collectivization didn't suceed in collectivization agriculture... During the 1990s, because of the economic reforms, the centre lost even more power to the localities - with some scholars arguing that in certain areas, the centre was unable to appoint the heads of the party organizations on decree alone. This is probably why a delegate at the 8th Congress was actual able to persuade the congress delegates to vote against the establishment of a Politburo Standing Committee on the lines of the CPC (he hadn't been appointed by the centre, but by a locality). Le Kha Phieu was even removed from power because he tried to strengthen the position of the leader - Xi would not have lasted long in Vietnam. The CPV shares more similarities with the CPSU in the late 1910s, and early 1920s then with Stalinism. The CPC is similar to Hungary and Poland; its dynamic Stalinism. People tend to forget that private entrepreneurs sat in the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party; economic reforms would probably have gone further if not for undynamic stalinism in the USSR.
To names: best examples, Chen Yun became First Secretary of the CCDI (instead of just secretary like his predecessors and successors), and Stalin upon his appointment as head of the Secretariat was given the title General Secretary (instead of Responsible Secretary as his predecessors). --TIAYN (talk) 15:57, 17 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: I resolved the problem with the large infobox (thinking of the test Xi infobox). --TIAYN (talk) 19:06, 17 December 2014 (UTC)
Thanks for all your hard work. Do you think it may be preferable to list Xi's existing 'portfolios' ("Deepening Reform", "Military Reform", "Internet Security", "Foreign Affairs LG", "Finance LG" etc.) outside of the collapsable list? Ideally we want to make information that readers are looking for more apparent. Colipon+(Talk) 21:20, 17 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: We can make a third column; Current post held. Then we rename the other column, to read Former posts held. Thats the only thing I can think of it. It would look strange to have the show signs begin below the office heading when it doesn't to it for the Members, central institutions column.. You decide. --TIAYN (talk) 21:34, 17 December 2014 (UTC)
An option is to separate the central coordination bodies with the "offices held", as being a "leader" of a "leading group" is not really the same as holding an office. Many of these groups are of an ad hoc nature anyhow. Let me experiment and show you a revision once I am done. Colipon+(Talk) 21:38, 17 December 2014 (UTC)
By the way, it may be worthwhile to explore the option of creating an "Infobox Communist leader" so we can begin using the template for other Communist leaders, but I am not an expert in the code. Also our "Hu Jintao" rendition of the infobox looks pretty on a browser, but does not look good on Mobile. Who would we contact to get code for this developed? Colipon+(Talk) 14:06, 18 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: I don't see the need for Infobox Communist leader if the current one works. Secondly, I don't have the fantasy to actual know how such an infobox would look.. What I think we need, however, is an Infobox for communist party agencies (or simply party agencies in general). The ones we currently have don't work, simple as that. I can try to find out, but you have to tell me how you think a Communist Leader infobox should look like. --TIAYN (talk) 21:16, 18 December 2014 (UTC)
I should have clarified what exactly I meant. I don't want to create an entirely new infobox that departs from the "infobox officeholder" paradigm, I just want to fix the bottom portion that you and I have conjured together with HTML table code into something that is part of a proprietary Wikipedia infobox template variation. This way it will be easier to use this template for others.
As for the agencies, today I took the "infobox organization" and experimented with it here: Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms. I think you will like it. :) Colipon+(Talk) 21:27, 18 December 2014 (UTC)
You can ask on the talk page if an admin is willing to add it in as a example as to how to use the infobox. It looks good, but still feel it is needed. For more complex bodies, such as the CC, that template won't do. --TIAYN (talk) 12:58, 19 December 2014 (UTC)

CC Organization[edit]

I took some time today to organize the list of organizations and policy coordination bodies that directly report into the CPC Central Committee. Have a look here and let me know your thoughts. I'm hoping to incorporate some of these bodies into the "CPC Central Committee" Navigation template. Colipon+(Talk) 18:51, 18 December 2014 (UTC)

@Colipon: I've been thinking of the same thing, but I found it too difficult. For instance, were does the Central Financial Work Commission (English searches don't say much...). Of course, you know Chinese, so its probably easier for you. At the sametime you seemed a bit confused about what is what too; Qiushi is published by the Central Party School and is not directly subordinate to the CC (the Central Party School is directly subordinated however...) ... I'll be honest, I can try and help, but I probably wouldn't be of much help, but I'll try... As for the edit I reversed on the CPC article, its because Its wrong (its true), but its because it lacks a reference (considering that the article is a GA, to many of those edits will lead it to lose its GA-status.. ) --TIAYN (talk) 21:16, 18 December 2014 (UTC)
This page was mostly translated from its corresponding Chinese article, so its lack of accuracy can be blamed there. It is true that there will be some problematic cases such as in the case of Central Financial Work Commission, but in the Hu years these "Central Leading Groups" seem to have streamlined quite a bit. Hu made it part of his mandate to publicize the work of these Leading Groups, as well as their membership. Since then the CLGs have emerged as a somewhat distinctive feature of the CPC as compared against other Marxist-Leninist parties (correct me if I'm wrong), and is an interesting feature of the Chinese political system. Anyway, since Xi came to power he has started three new CLGs which are ostensibly at a higher level than what Hu's CLGs were intended to be, including "Deepening Reforms", "Military Reform" and "Internet Security"; these CLGs, especially "Deepening reform", has a large contingent full-time staff and sometimes acts as an executive agency rather than just a policy coordination body as CLGs were intended to be. He also created the National Security Commission which is not a CLG and seems to have extraordinary decision making power. Colipon+(Talk) 21:34, 18 December 2014 (UTC)
You're right, its unique. The closest thing I could think of is when the Politburo established commissions (but they were not permanent; only established to study cases). Question, do you know when the CLG system established? It doesn't seem Dengist to me, but I may be wrong.. Another problem, what is the National Security Commission.. It is a Politburo organ or a CC organ. I just wonder, because I never found out what it is. It was established by the Central Committee, but so was the CCDI. The same problem could be said of the CLGs - they are organized by the Politburo... I guess what I'm saying is that this is a definitional question. I also wonder if you can claim that the CLG are subordinate to the CC, its an ad-hoc body; why would that need to be directly subordinate to one institution? In Soviet studies you talk of organs directly subordinate to the Central Committee Apparatus (or simply the Central Committee Apparat). The CPC has no term for apparat, from what I know at least.. According to Xinhua [1] there are 27 instuttions directly subordinated to the CC. I admit, some of these I have never heard of, such as Central Organizing Committee (not the Organization Department) and the COmmunications Office... But for all my questions, there probably is just one answer; the CPC must have a list somewhere, right? --TIAYN (talk) 12:54, 19 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: Sorry If I sound a bit to pessimistic; its possible, I've just created a list for all the offices within the CCDI and the institutions directly subordinate to it here. If I can do it for the CCDI, it should be much easier to find for the CC. --TIAYN (talk) 13:21, 19 December 2014 (UTC)
I myself am not sure, academic work in this area is very hard to come by. According to this article, by the author of the only full academic treatise on CLGs ever written published in 2010, CLGs were formed in the mid 1950's. The first was ostensibly the "Leading Group for Taiwan" established in July 1954, the second was a group on nuclear power. In any case, these groups don't appear to be institutionalized whatsoever and do not appear in the party constitution; some of them are remarkably ad-hoc bodies founded and dissolved within a few years, others are essentially permanent bodies with full complement of staff, probably most notable is the CLG on Taiwan. Only since Hu Jintao have the regular workings of these groups been published in official media sources. It seems their main role is to 'discuss and consult' on matters of concern to that portfolio, submit the report to the Politburo, so that the Politburo could make more informed decisions; essentially the final resolution from a CLG is considered the consensus of members of that group, and therefore the most optimal policy, as it would be tough for members of the Politburo to upstage this consensus. Therefore some CLGs have a remarkable amount of power. It is also notable that Xi's CLGs all went thru full ratification of the 3rd and 4th Plenums of the 18th CC, I am not sure if Hu's CLGs went through the same process or were simply 'commissioned' by fiat of the Politburo.
Another important distinction is that between a CLG and a "Commission", which unfortunately bears the same translation as a "Committee". A commission is an officially mandated body reporting directly to the CC (in reality the Politburo), examples include the Commission on Political and Legal Affairs (probably the most well-known), on "Spiritual Civilization", on "Social Management", on "Restructuring Institutions", and to answer your question above, also on "National Security". It is interesting though that Political+Legal, Social Management, and National Security Commissions will all have somewhat overlapping mandates, since they all have something to do with domestic control. Also notable is that some of the General Offices reporting to a CLG, such as the Taiwan Affairs Office, do appear on the official org-charts of the CC, but the CLG does not. Colipon+(Talk) 14:40, 19 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: The problems with scholars from the West (or more general, scholars from liberal democracies) is that they believe institutions generally don't play a very important role in dictatorships, and if they do, its generally very few. For instance, I don't know if you've read Fukuyama's new book, but he claims that China has strong institutions (but the only institutions which are strong are those copied from the West). We don't believe in a dictatorships ability to renew itself because we consider that a monopoly of democracy (and in the few cases its done, it doesn't last forever).. Its stupidity, and worst of all, its ideology clouding over the social sciences. To the point, I don't think leading small groups are CC organs. To use the definition from the Organization of the Communist Party of China article (which is referenced); "A Central Leading Group, also translated as a "Leading Small Group", (领导小组; lǐngdǎo xiǎozǔ) is an ad hoc supra-ministerial coordinating and consulting body formed to build consensus on issues that cut across the government, party, and military systems when the existing bureaucratic structure is unable to do so." Such an organ by definition can't only be a CC organ can it? I'm guesing the reason why these groups are so important for Xi is that they "centralizes" the discussion even further, and gives him more power to control it. The few times they've met they haven't actually done anything. Of course, the last part is just a theory of mine... I think you got the answer right there "notable is that some of the General Offices reporting to a CLG, such as the Taiwan Affairs Office, do appear on the official org-charts of the CC, but the CLG does not." I think a separate list for central leading groups should be created. --TIAYN (talk) 15:33, 19 December 2014 (UTC)
I just read the full section on "Organization of the CPC" and checked the references. The section is not accurate. For instance it conflates Party Groups of non-party institutions (i.e., dangzu) with Central Leading Groups (i.e. lingdao xiaozu) which are two totally distinct concepts; therefore that section will require some editing. It seems from my reading of Chinese-language sources and the Chinese wikipedia, particularly the article I linked you above, that the first CLGs were created formally as a result of the 4th Plenum of the 8th CC, and therefore are not government organs. Also they always incorporate the word "Central" (i.e., zhongyang), which can imply it is part of the Central Committee, but you are right that this is not totally clear, since the term dangzhongyang (i.e., the Party Centre) is thrown around very liberally whether it means the Politburo, PSC, or the CC. In the case of Leading Groups, it seems that they report, de facto, into the Politburo, not the CC, but we currently list on Wikipedia the formal structure, not the actual structure, as seen on the navbox template for "Organization of the CPC". Nowadays, CLGs belong to either the government or the party, never both. Party CLGs always have a PSC member as its head, while Government CLGs always have the Premier or Vice-Premier as its head. Party CLGs are meant to formulate policies, while government CLGs are for the implementation of the same policies. I hope this clarifies things a little more. Colipon+(Talk) 19:06, 19 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: The 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee reestablished the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, but the CCDI is not an institution of the Central Committee.. Central could also imply the government; as in the Central People's Government (I'm guessing this term is still used...) ... I'm pretty sure that the central leading groups reports to the Central Committee when its in session (just as the party leadership "reports" on its duties to the delegates of the National Congress). And an even better arguement, politburos were established to represent and take decisions in the name of the central committee (since it contained to many members). These decisions were later looked at by the CC in plenary session. The formal procedure even existed under Stalin, of course, I say formal... You clearly know more about this than I. Its a field of Chinese politics which is barely mentioned, but its a unique innovation. Instead of reforming the party structure, they've created bodies to spread the discussions which goes on in one sector to others. Instead of reforming democratic centralism, they've cheated it.. But I don't know enough about this to help you; its always mentioned in passing, and as you say, no one has actually written about it (the exception being of course in language I don't understand).... I can help you with the CC problem, but not the CLG problem... But I know something you can help me with; helping me write a CCDI Standing Committee (no one in the English language have written about this Standing Committee in any detail, but I'm guessing plenty of Chinese have).
Number two, I'll see if the university library has access to the Directory of Officials and Organizations in China (published in 2003), it may hold some answers. --TIAYN (talk) 23:09, 19 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: Yes they have it, but the 1998 one. It may still help. Thirdly, is the Xi infobox finished? --TIAYN (talk) 23:11, 19 December 2014 (UTC)
At last, [ according to this you're right it seems]. --TIAYN (talk) 23:41, 19 December 2014 (UTC)
Hello, that is a great find! Also, looks like you've done a great job at the "CCDI" article. My favourite is the Wei Jianxing quote - speaks volumes. I also spent some time over the weekend to read over your "ideology of the CPC" article, which is very well done! Looks like you figured out the "Standing Committee" part of the CCDI article as well, do you still need more help there?

The Xi infobox is basically done. I'm happy to put it up and revise later if need be directly in the article itself. Colipon+(Talk) 02:48, 22 December 2014 (UTC)

@Colipon: Thanks! ... I agree about the Wei quote, but from what I learn the CPC is slowly moving in the right direction. Secondly, should the Ministry of Supervision article be merged with the CCDI? Its internal functions were merged with the CCDI in 1993, but the internal functions and department structures are CCDI and not MOS. Any thoughts? Thirdly, if you can expand on the Standing Committee I would appreciate. It currently has three lines, but not on what it does. I don't even have a source for what a CCDI plenum does. I have a faint idea of course, but still. It doesn't say anywhere. Fourth, future project for you, the Central Leading Group for Inspection Work (there nothings written about it in English, but it apparently controls the central inspection teams (it was a merger of the Organization Department and the CCDI teams pre-2011). Fifth, go ahead, the Xi infobox looks great. --TIAYN (talk) 14:56, 22 December 2014 (UTC)
I don't think the Minister of Supervision should be merged, as they are not quite "One organ, two nameplates". While they do work from the same office building, the MOS is mandated with investigating any corruption files involving non-Communist Party civil servants, and technically the CCDI cannot interfere in this as it is a party organ. In addition the Minister of Supervision is totally distinct from the CCDI chief, whereas in the case of the party and state CMCs they are clearly one in the same. I can write up the article on CLG for Inspection Work for sure - do you think any of the other CLGs are worth writing about?

By the way, on the CCDI article, I have two questions. 1. Are you ok to remove "of the Communist Party of China" from the article title? I don't think it usage of "Central Commission for Discipline Inspection" is ambiguous and we should be as brief as possible as long as the name is unambiguous. 2. Do you reasonably forsee articles ever being created for the section "Offices" and "Offices and "Institutions subordinate to the CCDI"? If not maybe it is best to remove those red links. Personally I do see a point in creating maybe one or two articles from that list but that's about it. Colipon+(Talk) 21:45, 22 December 2014 (UTC)

@Colipon: In addition the Minister of Supervision is totally distinct from the CCDI chief; this is were you're wrong, the current MOS chief Huang Shuxian is a CCDI Deputy Secretary, and therefore responsible to the CCDI's decisions, right? .. And as said, maybe not clear enough in the article, the offices within the MOS were merged into the CCDI's offices (that is the MOS offices were abolished, and the MOS staff began working for CCDI's offices). And as the Chinese WP website makes clear, the MOS' headquarters is the CCDI office.. "do you think any of the other CLGs are worth writing about" — I'm guessing those which have existed for a while, and are held by Politburo Standing Committee members (of course, few exceptions, such as the Central Leading Group for Activities of Deepening the Study and Practice of the Outlook of Scientific Development)... But it all depends, the Central leading group for Inspection Work could just as easily have its own section in the CCDI article - its not like the article will be anything more then a stub or start (considering how the Chinese press write very little about leading groups in general) .. " Are you ok to remove "of the Communist Party of China" from the article title? " — I just asked an admin if he would be willing to move the article (its impossible to move without an admin currently).. "2. Do you reasonably forsee articles ever being created for the section "Offices" and "Offices and "Institutions subordinate to the CCDI"? .. THose offices are clearly not notable enough, but the journals and the institutions probably are. But red link, no link — I know one thing, I'm not creating those articles. But I don't really care. I've never had a problem with red links, but if you have, just remove them. --TIAYN (talk) 21:58, 22 December 2014 (UTC)
You're right about MOS & CCDI, I think a good reason to maintain separate articles is that the MOS and CCDI have different institutional histories. I don't think I will be creating an article for "Central Leading Group for Activities of Deepening the Study and Practice of the Outlook of Scientific Development", it was a temporary thing, and I don't think Xi will be "studying" the Scientific Outlook any time soon. As for CLG for Inspection, there is actually a good reason to build out the article, as there has been quite a few "Circuit Groups" that report into the CLG for Inspection that have been doing some major work of late in Xi's anti-corruption campaign. FWIW, I'm not ordinarily bothered by redlinks unless I am reasonably sure there will never be an article for that link. Colipon+(Talk) 23:27, 22 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: Good enough for me :) ... The Organization of the Communist Party of China article defines a leading group as an ad-hoc consulting body. This can't be the case if the Central leading group for Inspection Work actually control the central inspection teams (and not the CCDI). The summary of what a leading group is is missing something. Or am I missing something? --TIAYN (talk) 16:09, 23 December 2014 (UTC)
Like I said before, that section is quite inaccurate. In reality the purpose of the CLGs seem to differ for every leader, also the 'permanent' CLGs such as "Foreign Affairs" and "Finance & Economics" are totally different in function from the 'temporary' CLGs such as "Study Scientific Development" or "Beijing Olympics". "Deepening Reforms" is said to be expiring in 2020 when its goals have been accomplished. In addition, some of the General Offices of the CLGs have significant institutional power and permanent staff. In any case, we will have to re-write that section. As for the inspection teams, I'm not sure if you are referring to the Xunshi CLG? The Chinese article for what I think is the Central Leading Group for Inspection is here, which lists all the recent "inspection teams" dispatched after the 18th Congress; I checked the sources and they do not explicitly mention whether these 'teams' report into the CCDI or the CLG for Inspection, I only assume the latter because it is a group whose specific task is inspection. You also imply that the Inspection CLG has been around for a while, but the Chinese article says it has only been around since 2009. Colipon+(Talk) 21:30, 23 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: The CLGIW was created in 2009, but its "predecessor" (if you could even call it that) was the joint collaboration between the Organization Department and the CCDI, and it was this collaboration which formed the basis for the current CLGIW, right? Thats my understanding of it at least, but there is a large enough possibility that I'm wrong on this. --TIAYN (talk) 22:05, 23 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: The one copied from Chinese WP is correct. --TIAYN (talk) 09:13, 24 December 2014 (UTC)
Indeed you're correct. I have now written the article for the Central Leading Group for Inspection Work, now only a handful more to go before we complete the 'major' CLGs. You are welcome to make changes as you see fit. :) Colipon+(Talk) 16:34, 24 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: Great work. I will check it out. --TIAYN (talk) 20:45, 25 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: I have reached the conclusion that having a separate article on bodies under the CC may not be such a good idea. The reason? Simply because all these institutions could easily be mentioned in a CC article which is expanded. I think it should be a matter of improving the original CC article, and if that's not enough, we could probably make a list of CC institutions.... Secondly, how do you transliterate "李正亭".. I've used countless of engines, but all of them translate it into "A Statement".. I need it for the Deputy Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Thanks. --TIAYN (talk) 09:35, 26 December 2014 (UTC)


Those three characters transliterate into "Li Zhengting". The "Bodies under CC" article would be a 'list' and would correspond with the Chinese wiki, the CC article can mention some of the more important bodies but the more obscure ones probably only belong under a separate article. What do you think? Colipon+(Talk) 19:33, 26 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: Thanks, now the article/list is complete (I hope...). .. Thats OK of course. My layout (for the CC article) would be something like this;
  • History
    • Mao years
    • Deng–Jiang years
    • Hu to present
  • Powers, procedures and role
    • Duties and responsibilities
    • Democratic centralism
    • Election of CC
    • Informal politics
    • Sessions
  • Membership
  • Apparatus (for the lack of a better word...)
    • The offices of chairman and general secretary
    • Permanent bodies (again, for the lack of a better word)
      • Central Military Commission (is it?)
      • Politburo
        • Politburo Standing Committee
      • Secretariat
    • Central leading groups
    • Commissions and departments
    • Party education system
    • Ideology
    • Media
      • People's Daily (maybe...)
    • Military and police control
  • Non-CC bodies
    • Control over the state
    • Relation to the CCDI
Any suggestions, or better thoughts? --TIAYN (talk) 20:11, 26 December 2014 (UTC)
Looks pretty good. My concern is that parts of it will become redundant with the "Communist Party of China" article or the "Organization of the CPC" article - those two articles already overlap about 80%... Colipon+(Talk) 18:58, 28 December 2014 (UTC)
@Colipon: Sorry for the postponed response, was thinking on the problems (for longer then I should :P).. Anyhow, you're right, the CPC and the CPC Organization articles are, to be honest, exact copies (minus one section). The reason being that, when I created the CPC Organization article, I thought it would be better to have an organization article then no organization article at all... The Ideology of the Communist Party of China suffers from the same problem, but not as extensively. First, the CC article will dwell on the issues of CC organs more thorough then the CC organization will. The CPC article won't expand on organizational issues, unless it has to (if for example a new central organ is established) or if radial institutional reform of the CPC takes place (which doesn't seem likely).. The CPC Organization article can expand on all fields (and should), but most emphasize should be on expanding the lower-levels organization section. Someone (probably going to be me :P) should expand it and give more focus on each level, such as provincial, city and such ... In general, much more space will be given to the subordinate organs of the CC in the CC article then in the CPC organization article because of page constraints (therefore, that section should not be expanded)... I share you're worries, but I see a solution in sight. First, the CPC Organization article needs to be expanded, and when that is done, the CC should be expanded article. In this area I'm a Gorbachevian; that is, always the eternal optimist. A solution will be found. --TIAYN (talk) 18:43, 29 December 2014 (UTC)
I like your optimism! For me, I would like to cut down on the details at the "Communist Party of China" article, but you are probably reluctant since I know that was your 'baby' that got taken to GA status. Ideally people should click on the link to the "Organization" article if they want to find out more about what this office does and what leading groups are and so on. As you probably see I have been busy working on some articles related to recent changes in the provincial ranks (these are largely administrative changes which are boring but always necessary), but you are free to dig into the article at "Central Committee" and I'll assist when I can. Also do note I created an article for Party Standing Committee - I'm not sure if Vietnam or former Soviet Union had these at the local level so excuse me for writing from a "Chinese perspective" yet again. These bodies are very powerful locally but there is no article in the English wikipedia that deals with it at all. Colipon+(Talk) 20:24, 1 January 2015 (UTC)
@Colipon: I agree, certain parts of the CPC article could be shortened (I'm thinking mostly of "History" and "Organization". I moved the subordinate organs section to the CPC Organization article, and thinking of shortening the CPC members section. I find it bit more difficult to shorten the sections on the central organs (since most of them are small to begin with), but this can of course be fixed.... The Vietnamese have standing committees, the Soviets had the same, but called them bureaus (different names for the same thing.).. I believe it would be best to either move it to "Standing committee of the Communist Party of China", or, in the future, create a Lower-level organizations of the Communist Party of China (the articles on provinicial committees and those below won't be very long due to a combination of a lack of interest by scholars and WP editors in general I would argue).... But I'm still not finished with the CCDI article; currently reading "Objective Responsibility vs. Subjective Responsibility: A Critical Reading of the CCP's Internal Supervision Regulation" and "The Evolvement of the Chinese Communist Party Discipline Inspection Commission in the Reform Era", and trying to get access to "The Party Discipline Inspection in China: Its Evolving Trajectory and Embedded Dilemmas" and "The Dual Nature of Anti-corruption Agencies in China" (which I hope the university have access to, if not, I'll buy at least one of them)... I must admit, I consider myself to have above average knowledge of Chinese politics, but I've never heard of the "Internal Supervision Regulation" before I read the aforementioned article, and its extremely important (at least as a hallmark) it seems, since its the first published regulation on the party's internal control/inspection system.. Have you heard of it? --TIAYN (talk) 21:25, 1 January 2015 (UTC)
China is full of Standing Committees, literally everywhere. All the legislatures are modeled after the Standing Committee model of the Central Committee of the CPC, including the National People's Congress, the CPPCC, and all provincial and local subsidiaries thereof. The CCDI and all provincial CDIs have SCs. All party committees down to the township level have a standing committee. All real power is the vested in the Standing Committee. The larger committee that the SC represents, whatever it may be, convenes very rarely and does more ratifying and legitimizing than actually discussing, I'm sure you're well aware. Anyway I have no idea what "internal supervision regulation" refers to, my best guess would be that it's non-publicized rules about how to carry out inspections and anti-corruption efforts and things like Shuanggui, because they became so out of control as local governments did whatever they pleased when carrying out directives from superiors, such as torturing their subjects and so on. Also I'd add that local government is actually much more important in affecting people's lives, and that, at least before Xi, many local governments operated largely by their own fiat and often ignored decisions of the centre altogether. Chen Liangyu's Shanghai, Shanxi for most of its post-Cultural Revolution history, and Bo Xilai's Chongqing stand out as the most notable examples. This is why I think Hu's "Harmonious Society" and "Scientific Perspective" sounded good in theory but they had a very difficult time implementing this vision. Anyways, this is digressing. I do agree that having a bigger article about lower-level organizations is preferable to having separate articles. How is CCDI article coming along? Colipon+(Talk) 18:32, 4 January 2015 (UTC)
@Colipon: I get that, I do. But I've changed my mind, the article should be left as it is (and a section should be added about the Vietnamese and Laotian standing committee; it could work like a sort of a disambig page), and the lower-level article should still be created sometime in the future. But there is SO much to do.. You would have thought the largest organization by members would get more attention on WP, but no :p .....
I've read the articles (and the university had access)! Very good articles, and they show (some better then others) the Dengist approach to formalize procedures, defining what discipline breaches and creating formal accountability (not saying people and institutions should just do stuff, and not write/publish a regulation or anything about it as happened during the Mao era/in the Soviet Union)... I've stated that Deng was not a radical institutional reformer too you before (and while when it comes to the leading party bodies that assessment is right), he did push for the formalization of supervision procedures; for instance, regulations defined a breach of party discipline being to uphold collective leadership, while under Mao it was usually defined as being a good communist (and that last idea led to the Cultural Revolution).. The "Internal Supervision Regulation" was the first regulation/party by-law to formalize the CPC's inner-party supervision system (and is the first regulation by any ruling communist party to formalize its control system), how it worked, what procedures needed to be taken by lower-level party members to report higher ups for corruption (and how they are protected from the accused), defining breaches of party discipline (last time that had been done was in the 1980s), the role of the CCDI and the CDIs, etc. Every ruling communist party have, with the exception of the 1980s Yugoslav party, adherred to their party by-laws in the breach (and the CPC still does this with the CC) but the formalisation of procedures and duties, and the relation between the CCDI and other institutions, make that much more difficult. This is good, what is bad is that it formalized the "dual leadership" system and what made the CCDI so ineffective in the first place. But of the system is reformable, and the CPC is reforming the system, albeit very slowly'... The articles are good reads; if you're ever interested I could send them too you.
I'm writing at least three more section; "Inner-party supervision", "Defining discipline breaches" and "CCDI–state relations". After that I need to give the article a decent copyedit, but thats all (I think). The history section is finished, and I can't find much information on its central organization. Did you know that it is "alleged" that both Wei Jianxing and Wu Guanzheng tendered their resignation in protest of the CCDI's institutional weakness? It seems both far-fetched, and realistic at the same time. They were probably the men who were criticized for the party's poor handling of the anti-corruption strategy, and none of the two could respond to the situation in any meaningful way because of the system itself. That these men were the first to call for reform of the system is not very surprising, or is it? Anyhow, to answer the question, its going well. The only being that I don't have access to academic work from Hong Kong, but I can't complain.--TIAYN (talk) 21:52, 4 January 2015 (UTC)
Thanks for your response, I appreciate it. I am very surprised to hear about Wei Jianxing and Wu Guanzheng threatening to quit and it is certainly the first time I've heard of it. What is the source? One expects that Wang Qishan is having a pretty good time right about now and won't be considering the same thing any time soon (if you know what I mean)! It's very nice to see how thoroughly you conduct your research. In any case, I agree that there is too much work left to do. There's a couple of more things that I wanted to ask you if you've come across in your research, first is, what exactly is specifically defined as a "violations of discipline"? It seems from the recent sweeping crackdown on officials that the most oft-cited "violations" are "abuse of power for the illicit gain of others, taking large amounts of bribes" and curiously, "adultery". So the party considers extramarital relationships in and of itself an offense...? Secondly, I know there's a lot of controversy about Shuanggui, some say they torture subjects to extract forced confessions, yet others say that it is really the only way to ensure that all the facts are established without interference from the guanxi of the subject, particularly in the form of intervention from patrons. But my question for you is, when it comes to Shuangui'ing top officials like Zhou Yongkang, what exactly is the procedure?? And do these centrally mandated "targets" of Shuanggui also face the same "enhanced interrogation techniques" as their lower-level counterparts? Colipon+(Talk) 03:03, 5 January 2015 (UTC)
@Colipon: Its mentioned in the "Ma, Stephen K. (March 2008). "The dual nature of anti-corruption agencies in China". Crime, Law and Social Change 49 (2) (Springer Netherlands). pp. 153–162" source. The article sources an article from Cheng Ming Monthly. The magazine is the "most widely-read political magazine in Hong Kong" according to themselves. But of course, the article says "alleged".
According to "Gong, Ting (2009). "Chapter 3: Dual dimensions of responsibility: The internal disciplinary regulations of the Chinese Communist Party". In Li, Linda Chelan. Towards Responsible Government in East Asia: Trajectories, Intentions and Meanings. Routledge. pp. 50–67. ISBN 041545316X" the "Internal Supervision Regulation" stated that these eighth points were subject to permanent institutional oversight; "(1) adhering to the Party Constitution, general policies, and decisions; (2) obeying the law; (3) practicing democratic centralism; (4) respecting members' rights; (5) implementing the Party's personnel policies; (6) staying in close touch with the public and working for their basic interests; and (7) observing professional integrity.". There are others too, but Ting Gong doesn't care to mention all of them.... Zhou, and Bo to a certain extent, both violated at least point 1 and 3 (dictatorial), 2 (corruption), and 7 (adultery). Adultery is a problem since its a breach of professional integrity . For instance, these two women were expelled from the party on charges of adultery, but they were not prosecuted by the state (because they never broke any state laws). As the article says, the CDIC "said adultery was not against law, but was regarded as unacceptable behaviour for party members".
In "Guo, Xuezhi (September 2014). "Controlling Corruption in the Party: China's Central Discipline Inspection Commission". The China Quarterly 219 (Cambridge University Press for the School of Oriental and African Studies). pp. 597–624" its stated (without any doubts it seems) that its the local CDIs which are the problem, and the not the CCDI. Torture is illegal in Shuanggui. The three people who died last year in shuanggui, Yu Qiyi, Jia Jiuxiang and Qian Guoliang, were tortured to death in shuanggui controlled by local CDIs in Huangmei in Hubei, Wenzhou in Zhejiang and Sanmenxia in Henan. He notes, somewhat drily, that this is to be blamed on poor training and the fact that the operation itself is carried away from any lawful oversight... According to Guo, all form of cadres are sent to shuanggui, and they are treated as "comrades" until proven guilty. The problem here of course is that those three probably never admitted corrupt behaviour (or even worse, were never guilty in the first place), but the inspectors were certain that they had gotten the correct men. If Guo is right in that its the local CDIs and not the CCDI which breaches these rules, then I'm guessing that Zhou and Bo were not tortured physically, but there is of course tremendous psychological pressure since every party officials fears the shuanggui system itself - just being there in the first place is torture in itself I guess. To answer the question, torture is illegal in China, and in shuanggui is not a special case. The "enhanced interrogation techniques" are not supposed to happen in the first place, but does since the person (and the local CDIs it seems) are effectively closed out from outside supervision. Torturing high-level officials would not make sense. The party is trying to portray itself as of late as a law-abiding institution. Having a tortured Zhou show up in court would not help Xi's cause of establishing the "rule of law", and Bo was clearly not tortured (I don't believe a tortured man would try to defend himself in court). This is were Xi's rule of law reforms come in; if the centre amasses more power over the judiciary and the CDIs, the chances of these things happening will be reduced. Xi's reform is not so much about "rule of law" as trying to create a system in which only the party centre can breach the law if needs be (centralizing power). --TIAYN (talk) 12:39, 5 January 2015 (UTC)

Hu Jintao[edit]

Look at what I actually did before reverting. You obviously didn't.

You also didn't actually *read* what I said.. The way the infobox was, it took up 1/2 the page in the browser. That is not normal. It also wasn't accessibility friendly. Bgwhite (talk) 08:42, 24 December 2014 (UTC)

Ah, just say your message on my page. Not fun when we are typing at the same time. Thank you. Bgwhite (talk) 08:46, 24 December 2014 (UTC)

Seasonal Greets![edit]

Wikipedia Happy New Year.png Merry Christmas and a Prosperous 2015!!!

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Happy editing,
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please help[edit]

original version
messed up current version

in Template:Infobox political party the results bars are seperated to far vertically from each other, the original version looked aesthetically better can you please help me? Dannis243 (talk) 16:10, 3 January 2015 (UTC)

hello?! Dannis243 (talk) 12:40, 4 January 2015 (UTC)
@Dannis243: I'm not good at infoboxes, sorry. My advice is simple, create a sandbox, User:Dannis243/Sandbox, and revert all the changes you made to the current version, and move you're current version to the sandbox (and when you've fixed the problem, you can move the sandbox version to the page). That's literally the best thing I can do. I'm not a "infobox dude", its not were I "shine". --TIAYN (talk) 12:49, 4 January 2015 (UTC)

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Talk:Hafizullah Amin[edit]

Please could you use the article talk page to discuss your objections to recent edits.-- Toddy1 (talk) 07:53, 12 February 2015 (UTC)

Vietnamese articles[edit]

Hello, TIAYN. I want to inform you that, for a past few days, user Phuchoang92 (user contributions - [2]) is making some edits on articles related to Vietnamese officeholders to which I can't agree. Firstly, he tried to put list of Vietnamese presidents to article President of Vietnam, although that article isn't for list, but for description of office (he did exactly the same thing in the July of last year, with this edit - [3], and you reverted it). Next, he uploads a number of non-free images and put them to articles, lists, etc although its known that such images aren't appropriate for that. In the end, and most important, he apparently wants to remove section about the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam from List of Presidents of Vietnam and List of Prime Ministers of Vietnam. I really can't agree with that, that section should remain a part of those lists (as both Democratic Republic and Provisional Revolutionary Government formed the current Vietnamese state in 1976)... Also, I think he doesn't edit just as Phuchoang92, but also as Nariko92 (user contributions - [4]). Is that a sock puppetry? I assume he's also using a number of IP addresses... I reverted him several times, but I have no intention to go to edit war with him. I also left a message on his talk page, but he didn't respond. I felt obliged to inform you about this issue, because you spend a great deal of time working on these Vietnamese articles, and I wanted to know what you think about all of this. Cheers! --Sundostund (talk) 13:29, 23 February 2015 (UTC)

Commission for Building Spiritual Civilization[edit]

Hello, haven't seen you around very often lately. What is your next big project? I am curious, what do you know about the so-called "Commission for Building Spiritual Civilization"? Why was this commission ever created and what is it supposed to achieve? If it is basically a propaganda group, then how does it differ from the leading group for Propaganda Work? Is "spiritual civilization" a Marxist concept or is it purely a CPC creation? Colipon+(Talk) 15:41, 23 February 2015 (UTC)

@Colipon: Several reasons, after working on the CCDI for such a long period I felt I needed a rest from Wikipedia. Secondly, real life has been keeping me busy. My plan is the same; fix the CPC organization article, then the CPC Central Committee article... Spiritual Civilization is a CPC term to denote the Marxist concept of superstructure. It came to prominence under Deng.
The CPC has argued over the years that China has an advanced spiritual/superstructural relations, but a backward material/production relations (this idea is based on the Marxist concept of uneven development). This line has been policy since 1949, and explains the policies New Democracy (but also the Soviet line during the 1920s of New Economic Policy). However, Mao came to believe that spiritual/superstructural relations could dominate the material base (the economy) and therefore that the economy could jump from feudalism, low-staged capitalism straight to socialist production if the superstructural relations (that is, the people, the political system etc) were socialist. The official party-line is that this failed, and was un-Marxist (which it was). Marx claimed that the material base (the economy) reproduces a superstructure; for instance, feudalism, capitalism or socialism will inevitably produce a political system which safeguards its interests. To quote Marx; "Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past." Example, if a person is born poor doesn't mean he will stay poor, but he will confront a "culture" (for a lack of a better word) which belongs to the poor and therefore have views which delineate from that; the same goes for the rich, the capitalist, the worker. In short, circumstances matter.
Marx did believe that superstructural relations could affect the material base, but he did not believe that superstructural relations could force "jumps through stages" - such a view was condemned as idealism. The main contradiction in China, according to Deng, was that the material base was lagging behind the spiritual base (uneven development). According to Marx France was undergoing uneven development in the aftermath of the French Revolution (its spiritual base was more developed then its material base). In France, an advanced bourgeoise capitalist culture had developed, but the economy was still not an advanced capitalist economy (like Britain). In present-day China the concept of spiritual civilization is linked to the theory of the primary stage of socialism; China has a low material base and therefore has to use capitalist methods to develop the productive forces and the relations of production (in non-Marxist terms; China has to develop the economy, which leads to technological change, and which will over time change labour relations), but it has an advanced spiritual base (proven by the fact that the CPC still rules and its ideology dominates the ideological landscape, see cultural hegemony). The problem for the CPC is that Marxism states that the material base dominates the rest; this means that the non-socialist elements in present China are a threat to the socialist superstructural relations. The Commission for Building Spiritual Civilization is probably responsible for disseminating what the party considers socialist ideology so as to combat non-socialist ideological penetration. Xi's campaign against Western values is probably an example of this, but also Hu's "Socialist Concepts on Honours and Disgraces". The belief that material forces produce superstructural changes (for instance, electricity leads to the radio, the radio leads to music, and the music is, to but it crudely, the music of the level in which the productive forces [the economy] have reached) still dominates Chinese thought. As the The New Emperors: Power and the Princelings in China notes Liu Yunshan believes that the material base dominates and changes the superstructural base (it should be noted that the author himself does not seem to understand that this is Marxism and seems to consider such a view strange, and only strange).
Short answer: its a very important concept in CPC discourse. If this concept is proven false, the whole course set by Deng is wrong. If this is wrong, then China should have a political system which protects capitalism and not socialism. Its one of the few pure Marxist concept left which CPC officials always refer to (Xi's speeches, Hu's speeches are/were always peppered with references to the material and spiritual civilizations; its even mentioned in the state constitution). The commission was probably established to keep conservatives and Marxist theoreticians happy (since it could just as easily be a subdivision within the CPC Propaganda Department). .. Sorry for a long answer, but you did not ask a small question. --TIAYN (talk) 16:43, 23 February 2015 (UTC)

Central Commission for Discipline Inspection[edit]

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Hi, I started a draft, you may have noticed already, at my sandbox on the "anti-corruption campaign". Feel free to contribute if you have time. Colipon+(Talk) 19:35, 27 February 2015 (UTC)

@Colipon: I will, but now. I've just downloaded 30-40 articles on CPC organizational system below the central level. I will of course; you gave me a helping hand with the CCDI articles so I owe you. --TIAYN (talk) 21:41, 27 February 2015 (UTC)
The article is somewhat complete now and can be migrated into mainspace should you be around to copyedit and comment. Colipon+(Talk) 20:28, 5 March 2015 (UTC)


You still working on your redo of the Stalin article? If so, want any help. or would you prefer just to get on with it yourself? --YeOldeGentleman (talk) 20:41, 4 March 2015 (UTC)

I would love some help! ... But I havn't started yet. I haven't been that active for a while. Due to exam and real life. Currently, I have two things on my plate, rewriting the Organization of the Communist Party of China article and helping Colipon write an article on Xi Jinping's current anti-corruption campaign. I'll probably work on these through March. I have all the sources I need (and finding new ones aren't that difficult either) so it shouldn't be that difficult to start. --TIAYN (talk) 10:18, 5 March 2015 (UTC)

Numbering the Soviet Central Committees[edit]

While it is absolutely (whispering) original I nevertheless really like your approach of numbering of the Central Committees to match the RKP/VKP/CPSU Congresses that elected them. I do question your leaving out the extremely important Central Control Commissions in lieu of including the obscure Central Auditing Committees, however, and think it would probably be best if you rethought the ummmm (whispering) originality of the naming protocol. A change to List of party officials elected by the 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (for example) could include the CCC as well and would not run into the what seems to me inevitable big problem of, ummmm, (whispering) originality. Best regards and keep up the good work! —Tim //// Carrite (talk) 17:53, 13 March 2015 (UTC)

@Carrite: Thanks. I'm not finished. I got all the info from this site. As you know copying names is boring, so I suddenly found other things to do (I know, I lack discipline). In any case, is it original? The communist parties of China, Laos and Vietnam number their central committees, and the Workers' Party of Korea used to . Anyhow, that would probably be better names. I'll fix it when I have time. --TIAYN (talk) 20:31, 13 March 2015 (UTC)
I've never seen the Soviet Central Committees numbered like that anywhere in the literature. My initial reaction was: What the fuck?!?!?!?!?' I think the idea is sound but you have to take care not to invent a numbering system and install that as if it is official terminology, because eventually some Russian history expert will call you on it and there is no way to defend it against OR charges if someone pushes hard enough. Simple phrasing should do the trick — "Central Committee (10) (12)" rather than "(10th) (12th) Central Committee" in the info boxes and a rename and expansion along the lines of what I have outlined above would put you on solid ground, in my estimation. best, —Tim /// Carrite (talk) 21:36, 13 March 2015 (UTC)

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excellent stuff on 中纪委 piece[edit]

i was reading through the careful account of the history of the zhongjiwei and its various incarnations and splinters, the control commission, and all such things. I was quite surprised that wikipedia had such detailed, granular information on such a (to most) recondite topic -- with what excellent references, to boot. so i obviously had to poke through the history and find out who'd gone to the trouble. great work! the feeling i have - simple respect for honest intellectual labor done anonymously - is exactly the one i wish to engender in other readers. better get to work. Happy monsoon day 22:50, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

Don't really know what I can say (I seldom get compliments). Anyhow, I didn't do it all on my own (Colipon helped me). Anyhow, thanks. --TIAYN (talk) 07:33, 7 April 2015 (UTC)
its an obscure area so that makes sense. regarding this - do you think readers will know precisely what 'central-level' means?Happy monsoon day 12:34, 7 April 2015 (UTC)
changed to Central Committee. --TIAYN (talk) 21:51, 7 April 2015 (UTC)
but is that really the case? I thought the CCDI was unified under the pbsc and pb. anyway, if we had to source that sentence, what would the ref be? Happy monsoon day 13:36, 8 April 2015 (UTC)
The Politburo, the PSC are Central Committee institutions... Without the Central Committee, no PB or PSC. Without the PB and PSC there would still exist a Central Committee. The composition of the CEntral COmmission for Discipline Inspection is elected by the national congress and needs to be ratified by the 1st plenary session of the Central Committee. --TIAYN (talk) 14:39, 8 April 2015 (UTC)

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Xi template[edit]

Hi, when you have some time, please help put more things onto Template:Xi Jinping. Anything that you think deserves an article please inject it to the template, so that we have something to 'work towards'. Thanks, Colipon+(Talk) 16:05, 16 April 2015 (UTC)

OK. --TIAYN (talk) 11:09, 19 April 2015 (UTC)

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Moving Soviet CC pages[edit]

Hi, could you please explain your rationale for moving Soviet Central Committee pages from xxth Central Committee to Central Committee elected by xx Congress?? Colipon+(Talk) 21:26, 10 June 2015 (UTC)

@Colipon: Because the Soviets, unlike the Chinese and Vietnamese for instance, simply referred to the Central Committee and never the term of the Central Committee (the idea of a "term" was alien to the Soviet system it seems)—see Carrite's post "Numbering the Soviet Central Committees" above... In Soviet pronouncements the Central Committee was a permanent institution, which members were elected too. Therefore, the Central Committee was renewed, but never dissolved and reestablished (as the Chinese do). --TIAYN (talk) 21:36, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
Ok, I see, makes sense! It does make for extremely lengthy names though. Colipon+(Talk) 21:44, 10 June 2015 (UTC)
@Colipon: I agree, but I currently lack imagination to come up with a better name. If you do, tell me. --TIAYN (talk) 07:56, 11 June 2015 (UTC)

TFL notification[edit]

Hi, TIAYN. I'm just posting to let you know that Chairman of the National Assembly of Vietnam – a list that you have been heavily involved with – has been chosen to appear on the Main Page as Today's featured list for July 3. The TFL blurb can be seen here. If you have any thoughts on the selection, please post them on my talk page or at TFL talk. Regards, Giants2008 (Talk) 21:27, 12 June 2015 (UTC)

@Giants2008: OK, but I have a question. How was this decided? --TIAYN (talk) 22:10, 12 June 2015 (UTC)
The TFL director (myself) or delegates have the right to select lists to be featured on the Main Page. I'd rather select lists from suggestions at WP:TFLS if possible, but we are no longer receiving enough nominations to rely only on lists from that page. In picking your list, I looked at the Politics section of WP:FL for an appropriate page, as we haven't had a political TFL in a while. There were many that were showing signs of age, but then I found this one and saw that it appeared to be in good shape, so I picked it. Giants2008 (Talk) 02:11, 14 June 2015 (UTC)


You make an interesting assertion on the ITN candidates page that "while it sounds normal for us that people are incarcerated and jailed when investigated for corruption, this has not been normal under communism (of any type)", can I ask, did the Soviet Union ever carry out the anti-corruption campaigns that China seems to be carrying out? Did Vietnam? Does Laos? Does Cuba? What happens when corrupt officials are caught in these countries? Colipon+(Talk) 18:18, 13 June 2015 (UTC)

@Colipon: Chinese proverb "The mountains are high and the emperor is far away" is a better description of latterday USSR then present-day China. The Soviet Asian republics were literally lost to corruption. Brezhnev's children, Galina and Yuri were involved in corruption, and Yuri was arrested (and Galina's husband, Yuri Churbanov). Churbanov was involved with the Sharof Rashidov case. Beginning in 1978 Yuri Andropov initiated an anti-corruption campaign without Brezhnev's consent which would brings thousands of officials down (including those mentioned). This campaign was continued under Mikhail Gorbachev. But corruption had become ingrained in certain areas; for instance, Rashidov died in 1983 and was succeeded by Inomjon Usmonxo‘jayev, but Usmonxo‘jayev was himself indicted of corruption in 1988 (and became the first republican first secretary to be arrested for corruption)... Andropov's anti-corruption campaign should be seen as a bid to consolidate power, and gain support from the elite. The "Uzbek Mafia", as the criminal network created by Rashidov was known, had total control over Uzbek SSR Politburo, Secretariat and the Central Committee (that is, they had a majority, and people who tried to report it to Moscow simply disappeared)... Eduard Shevardnadze famously became Georgian Communist Party First Secretary when he left Georgia with several documents which proved the utter corruption of the Georgian party leadership (he personally handed them to Brezhnev)—this led to Vasil Mzhavanadze (he was denounced by the media, but nothing else). fall from power.. Another case if that of Sergei Medunov, who it was proven had embezzlement the state as a provincial first secretary within the Russian SFSR, but he retired with all his honours and state awards intact (because of Chernenko, who succeeded Andropov, put an end to the criminal investigation). Dinmukhamed Konayev, the Communist Party of Kazakhstan first secretary, was forced out of office on accusation of corruption (but was never punished) and Heydar Aliyev, the former Communist Party of Azerbaijan first secretary, was removed when several accusations of him came to light in 1987 (he was asked to resign voluntarily or stand by his word, he opted to resign)....
A similar anti-corruption campaign has been initiated in Vietnam,but according to a Vietnamese I know:

"I wish the anti-corruption campaign in Viet Nam could be as successful as that in China. With all the shortcomings and limitations there are in the China's anti-corruption struggle, the one in Viet Nam achieved even much less. The anti-corruption campaign in Viet Nam is lead by the Party's General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong. In my opinion, he may be a clean fellow with a good heart and intention, but he does not wield the economic power (maybe because he's too clean). Also, I have a feeling that he is the weakest general secretary ever in the history of the Party, and so his political power is also limited. There are two recent corruption cases involving a former inspector-general of the Central Government and a former head of a provincial public security service, both having giant and luxurious mansions amid much poorer neighbourhoods and many other real estates. They were punished by having to return all these wrongly-claimed lands and dismantle their mansions, and that was it. With as much anger as the Vietnamese public have about China's aggression, they still wish the Vietnamese government could show more discipline among its ranks like China.

There is a case of Nguyen Phu Trong being the "weakest general secretary ever in the history of the Party"; when he proposed to the Central Committee to punish Nguyen Tan Dung (the prime minister) the Central Committee rather opted to collectively punish the entire Politburo for ineffectiveness. When he proposed two candidates for membership in the Politburo, the CC rejected both of them and voted two others in instead. When he insisted upon a vote of confidence on Nguyen Tan Dung, a vote (a poll) on who had the highest/lowest approval rating in the Politburo were held (according to one, the CC had very low approval of Nguyen Phu Trong). Cuba is generally seen as being clean (being one of the least corrupt countries in Latin America, but that doesn't say much since the whole region is plagued by corruption).. General Arnaldo Ochoa was accused of corruption in the 1980s, and received the death penalty for it.... In Laos during Khamtai Siphandon's general secretary/chairmanship corruption grew rampant, especially within the Lao People's Armed Forces and the officer corps (with some even stating that everyone, even Khamtai, were involved with corruption one way or another during the 1990s)... Its been said that the Lao People's Armed Forces gain most of their revenue from illegal smuggling of goods (we are talking about selling timber or other natural resources below market prices to countries such as Thailand).. The major problem with Laos, however, is that they have very few laws and regulation which define what corruption actually is (a normal problem in many developing countries). They lack basic institutional structures to keep corruption in check. The young up-start Bouasone Bouphavanh was generally seen as being hard on corruption, but he resigned as prime minister in 2010 (but heads the party's economic commission till this day).

'Short answer: Xi is unique but Gorbachev comes close. There are several variables, but I think the most important is that none of these states have an institution similar to the CDIC; the USSR had the Central Auditing Commission (which power on paper at least) and the Control Commission (which had power on paper, but only focused on maintaining party unity). Interestingly, none of these institutions (as far I know) ever expelled a central-level cadre because of corruption, that power lay in the Politburo. It should also be noted that Gorby reached the conclusion that corruption was not the problem,but that the system was. --TIAYN (talk) 10:59, 14 June 2015 (UTC)
Very interesting, thanks for writing that response. Seems like the PRC is indeed the only country that has attempted to tackle systemic corruption on a wide scale, especially in the current campaign. I'd say the CCDI advanced incrementally during Hu's time but has made huge strides since Xi ascended to power, so much so that the institution (as you pointed out) is entirely unprecedented in the history of any Communist state. Do you think the Vietnamese model is sustainable? Seems like there is an awful lot of factionalism in the highest echelons and not much of a cohesive agenda.
On another topic entirely, have you noticed the way mandated retirement age has been strongly entrenched in the Chinese system? For instance if you look at CC members they are almost all born between 1950 and 1955 (some before 1950, but usually in higher offices), and the CC alternate members are generally born between 1955 and 1965 (these can be considered up-and-coming); Shengwei Changwei are also usually born between 1955 and 1965, if they do not hold the offices of governor or party chief. The mandated retirement age is 60 for deputy minister-level and 65 for minister level, and the CPC seems to be following this rule very precisely, note, for example, the recent retirements of Zhang Baoshun, Wu Xinxiong, and Cai Wu, all of whom retired at exactly 65 years of age. There are some exceptions, but they are few and far in between (Lou Jiwei's exception was said to have reached the Politburo for his "extended retirement" to be "approved", and even he will have to go in a few years I'm sure.) I take it this feature is also unique to China and has not been instituted in any other Communist states (or any countries at all, for that matter?). Seems like an "innovation" much like the Central Leading Groups. Do you think this is a positive feature of the system? Colipon+(Talk) 21:14, 16 June 2015 (UTC)
Actually, now that I look at the Vietnam CC, I see they are of similar age groups so maybe Vietnam has also instituted mandatory retirement age? Their alternate members are actually somewhat younger than China (the youngest is born in 1976??; compare that to Lu Hao (born 1967), who is the youngest member of the CC, full and alternate.) Colipon+(Talk) 21:21, 16 June 2015 (UTC)
@Colipon: Thanks... If I think the Vietnamese model is sustainable? In some ways its a less authoritarian version of the Soviet Central Committee under Lenin and for a few years after. It really depends on what perspective you look from. If, for instance, Nguyen Tan Dung is able to be promoted from prime minister to General Secretary at the 12th National Congress, power will again become more centralised (and unity at the top can lead to tougher anti-corruption; of course, this depends on the leadership). Again, if its sustainable? Its difficult to answer, but the major strength (and now its main weakness) is that the CPV has been able to spread power evenly throughout institutions (which has led to the Central Committee's "comeback" into the political stage, first by bringing about the downfall of Le Kha Phieu despite the Politburo voting in his favour and now by backing Nguyen Tan Dung, or in the very least, by not supporting Nguyen Phu Trong). While this is very good for party democracy, the present lack of party unity actually has led to the breakdown of the decision-making process in certain areas (most prominently in the anti-corruption campaign)—again, it depends on the next leadership and how divided it is. If it keeps on this path, corruption will only grow worse. Party democracy is an undeniable good thing (and I'd argue debate will always lead to dynamism somehow), but in period of troubles it may be less effective then the Chinese variant of backstage dealings between the Politburo Standing Committee and officials below them on the rankings... I also feel part of the problem is that, as a Communist Party, the leadership does not know how to handle the situation—it's unique since the party currently lacks a strong centre.
As for China and age policy, they have introduced age-limits on promotions, but members of the Communist Youth League are discriminated positively (that is, for a non-CYL member, the age limit is 40, but for a former CYL its 45). The article "“Sprinting with Small Steps” Towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System" deals with this; its very good (if you want I can send it to you if you want; you do have a WP mail account?)... Recently (this year, or last year, can't remember) the CPV Central Committee chose 30 of its "brightest" young officials (maybe not to bright, as their was a hint of nepotism; Nguyen Tan Dung's son was included in the group) and sent them to provincial posts to make them ready for a future in the central government (it could also been seen as a test to see if they are qualified). But unlike the CPC they don't have term limits (only age limits). The impetus for these changes was Le Duan's rule but also the creation of the gerontocracies of the Eastern Bloc (Nguyen Phu Trong, having been educated in the USSR, probably experienced these problems with his own eyes).
I agree with the gists of you're comments about the CCDI. It is unique, but if the Soviet Central Auditing Commission and the Control Commission were merged it would have the same responsibilities. I believe that what makes the CCDI unique is the regularisation of politics and the sort of institutional independence which is currently practiced (in the Soviet Union party unity was in theory antithetical to institutional interests, this is not the case in China). Stalin crushed any signs of different institutional interests, everything were to be united behind one goal (more often then not, his goals), and after his death, while institutional interests were brought back (without a proper seat in the Politburo) institutions could seldom advance its interests. By supporting such a view, however, I'm also saying that in communist politics, more often then not, officials are united in supporting institutional interests rather then factional ones.--TIAYN (talk) 14:14, 17 June 2015 (UTC)


I read an incredibly interesting paper called Drawing an Age Line: Rejuvenation or Exclusion by Yu-shan Wu which actually argues (fairly convincingly) that the current age system will lead to its own undoing. He makes a few key points, some of which you allude to above, such as Youth League cadres getting a five-year 'advantage' for promotion which leads them to be stacked in the top ranks of the party. Also, given that age-based promotion requirements are instituted throughout the hierarchy, it has become unduly constraining for the vast majority of officials for vie for higher office unless they can ensure a regular pace of promotions starting in their thirties (perhaps this is was a factor in the suicide of Chen Gang??). It is precarious, too, that the number of CC full members born after 1960 is less than a dozen. Of course, the most fundamental assumption from this paper is that cadres in this system are driven by their self interest and that continuous promotion is everyone's foremost goal. But it does really highlight the fundamental flaw that merit, experience, and political clout don't count for anything should the age requirement not be met, easily contesting the idea that the CPC is a true meritocracy. This is why one of the biggest questions (and institutional risks) of the Xi era will be whether or not he dismantles the age system and how his successor will be chosen. Colipon+(Talk) 17:36, 17 June 2015 (UTC)

@Colipon: Great article, very well written. But he seems to overlook one essential (or at least I think at least). While the incoming central officials might become frustrated, as Bo did, if they don't get promoted who is to say they won't get even more frustrated if, as the article says is a possibility, Xi decides to annul the rule (or serve another term) to get his chosen successor in office—and I might add, the majority of the CC is not composed of princelings, so such plans would meet with frustration (but also exclusion, since nothing would change for them). What would these officials get from Xi hanging on to power to appoint his chosen successor? The rules of the game are always oppressive (and irritating), but what is truly annoying is when somebody cheats (or takes the "short-cut") Yu-Shan Wu seems to say that the system is choking leading officials (which might be true), but seems open to the possibility that cheating (or making an exception to the rule) would be accepted by the system (which contains the 99 percent of officials who would consider it as privilege or patronage and not fair to them).
Secondly, he uses self-interest as the driving force, which will in the majority of cases lead to frustration. But individuals do have memories; if they consider the old system of cadre promotion unfair they will in all probability support the rationale, and legitimacy, of the current system (the interesting thing here of course, how do people who have not experienced the old system react to the current?) I mean, we've all heard the stories; how the old generation complains about the new generation because they didn't experience that, and that, and that etc... But to Xi, doesn't he want to be presented as an institution-builder? From what I've understood, the basic premise of the anti-corruption campaign is take so many as possible, and when the worst of them are gone, establish a framework so as to ensure corruption won't "sprout" when the anti-campaign is over, and after that, establish a framework that can contain corruption so it won reach the same heights. In this Xi is very Dengist—he believes in the regularisation of politics, but as Yu-Shan Wu notes, authoritarian self-interests may override his beliefs. Max Weber wrote that only charismatic leaders can overturn the legal-rationale order (the modern bureaucratic state)—Xi is certainly charismatic, and more importantly, he wants to be perceived as charismatic.
As for Bo and the losers, isn't this the plan? From the looks of it it seems that Hu Chunhua has been groomed, but rather then being given a seat in the Politburo, he's the only choice available. A quiet way of doing things. Or in other words, a very Hu like-way of doings things. In addition, this system helps the Communist Youth League (and as I remember) it was set up by Deng to help them get up the ladder—they will fight for the current system until the bitter end. But of course the author is right, if what he says about Bo is true (which I believe he is). Certain individuals won't accept the rules, but the rules will either become more sacred or sacrilege over time. I can think of three different scenarios; (1) a Bo scenario (but I don't believe this is likely in the near future because people will remember his downfall for a very long), (2) Xi scenario (we will have to wait and see) and (3) a elite-rebellion of sorts, either through the Central Committee (unlikely, the CC has never had a history as an independent institution of the Politburo in CPC history as far I know) or provincial elites (but I doubt this to because the central leadership transfers leaders often from province to province to safeguard from "independent kingdoms"). But there are too many variables, Stalin would not have become undisputed leader if he began working towards that goal in the 1930s (instead of beginning after Lenin's death)—since the system and the ways to handle things would have had time to gain legitimacy)—and Slobodan Milošević would not have been able to initiate the Anti-bureaucratic revolution (a bid to gain a majority within the Presidency of the Yugoslav Communist Party) without ethnic unease within the country. Bo was similar to Milošević, while Milošević based his campaign on nationalist identity Bo rode the band-wagon of social inequality. What will the next charismatic fellow campaign on? --TIAYN (talk) 22:32, 17 June 2015 (UTC)
Interesting. Judging by the logic presented in the article, it is already possible to predict the exact membership of the next standing committee minus perhaps one member. It will be, Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Wang Yang (two-term politburo), Li Yuanchao (two-term politburo), Hu Chunhua (next party leader), Sun Zhengcai (next premier). Interestingly, out of the ten or so members of the CC born after 1960, none of them reliably identifies as a princeling or a "Xi confidante", but there is also no choice but to elevate most of these people to the Politburo level (Zhou Qiang, Su Shulin, Zhang Qingwei, Nur Bekri?) since there are so few of them! The last spot will be between (in order of likelihood) Li Zhanshu, Liu Qibao, Zhao Leji, and Wang Huning. Unless, of course, Xi totally breaks convention and decides to appoint some of his trusted confidantes directly to the PSC, like Chen Xi, Liu He (politician), or Cai Qi, some of whom are not even full CC members, but like you said, this may well lead to a backlash among those who regard these promotions as "unfair". I'm inclined to say that Xi has a track record of promoting officials under him on the basis of merit and not personal loyalty, as by all indications so far he has been very anathema to the Jiang-style patronage appointment system. And you are right that Xi is attempting to institutionalize in true Dengist form, with Deng's level of charisma. I believe the slogan they are using for corruption "creating an environment where officials do not want to be corrupt, do not dare to be corrupt, and do not have the means to be corrupt." (it sounds somewhat more poetic in Chinese: 不想腐、不敢腐、不能腐; buxiang fu, bugan fu, buneng fu.) Colipon+(Talk) 03:00, 18 June 2015 (UTC)

@Colipon: I will add that Hu Chunhua and Sun Zhengcai are the only successors who may be chosen legitimately (if legitimately is defined as "according to the rules"). The CPC constitution states that a official has to serve at least one term in the Politburo to be elected to the PSC. Hu failed this requirement and so did Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang. The party is of course aware of this, and probably explains why Hu and Sun reached the top so early—the only way for them to go through the stages without breaking the rules. So not only do they have the right age (which can give legitimacy and, as the author states, to them being discredited by those who were born too late to even make it as a candidate), they have done it by following the procedures. Hu gave in to Jiang's succession plan, but Jiang will in all probability not live until 2022 therefore making Hu the strongest individual in backroom dealings. Hu will probably argue in favour of the current system, and why its legitimate, rather than sounding subjective and stating his support for the leaguers. Of course, Xi has precedence. If Jiang parachuted Zhu from alternate CC membership whose to say Xi can't do the same? I think Xi will do as Hu did; he'll lick his wounds and promote the successors of Hu and Sun—and if Xi accepts the role he'll have to play and the larger perspective of things (as good communists often try but seldom do) he'll control the succession in 2032, and by that time Hu may very well be dead so he'll be in control of the succession. The future recipe for Chinese succession? leaguers → princelings → leaguers → princelings etc (of course if Hu is in top condition even in 2032, he'll probably try to make it leaguers → leaguers etc. for all of eternity, lets call this the Hu model). If the Hu model ever gets formalised that would be a good thing for the CPC, as it would increase its legitimacy amongst normal folks—some might well begin to think that "If I had joined the Communist Youth League when I was a kid I could actually have become a leader, the leader."

If Nur Bekri gets elected I'll be surprised, but I guess it just goes to show that its better to belong to an ethnic minority then to be a women in the CPC. I think you're right on the other PSC candidates–the others (that is; minus GS, premier and the two successors) have always, as far as I know, been elected in accordance with the rules (is it an institution that has become sacred over time?). In any case, those waiting their "whole life" for PSC membership won't be happy if Xi screws it up for them! --TIAYN (talk) 07:34, 18 June 2015 (UTC)

You spurred some more thoughts. Regarding Zhu, yes, I suppose if we open up the alternate member list to Politburo contention then there are several more candidates Xi must be willing to consider, Li Qiang (born 1959) comes to mind; half of the Politburo are expected to keep their membership in 2017, with some like Wang Huning and Zhao Leji theoretically able to serve until 2027, this means less than a dozen seats are "up for grabs" by existing CC or alternate CC members. I am not aware of any cases where Politburo members are forced out of the body even though they meet age requirements (if we don't count cases like Chen Liangyu due to corruption). Another notable 'institutional' feature in recent years is that it is increasingly unclear whether important regional offices receive ex officio Politburo membership (Guo Jinlong, Han Zheng), or Politburo members are selected then parachuted down to the regional offices (Sun Chunlan, Bo Xilai). Guo and Han rose to the Politburo solely by virtue of their holding regional offices at the time of a party congress, while Bo's Politburo membership came first and foremost, before he was sent to Chongqing.
In the context of the "rules", it's actually quite logical how the 18th PSC was selected, everyone got there by virtue of their seniority, the only one who did not meet this rule was Liu Yandong, which probably had to do with the fact that she was female... (no female has ever held PSC membership). So I was not surprised when Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang were not selected, since the 'deal' was probably for them to enter the 19th PSC. What's not clear to me is how Sun Zhengcai made it so far in such a short span of time, as Hu Chunhua had been groomed since as early as 2005.... Xi's end game is still somewhat unpredictable; he is certainly building up institutions on the anti-corruption and legal reform front, and in spite of his charisma he is still up against some fairly powerful interest groups. Colipon+(Talk) 12:58, 18 June 2015 (UTC)

@Colipon: If Xi opens the alternate CC he can't make him CPC General Secretary. Zhu Rongji was most likely appointed by Deng. I would assume that if Xi did promote more than one alternate to the PSC, the Politburo would rebel (since it would be the oldest members who would lose out)... I'm guessing Sun Zhengcai was groomed by both Hu and Wen (if the tuanpai–princeling divide is as important as they say it is, then Hu probably saw no reason against it)... As for Xi, we'll have to see but I'm fairly certain that the corrupt cadres and interest groups are on the defensive. If Xi continues to push I feel fairly certain that their role in picking the PSC in 2017 and 2022 will be minimal.

I've always thought the former, that the Politburo parachuters PB members to the provinces—If I remember correctly Bo was not pleased with his transfer to Chongqing. There is a possibility that Guo and Han were appointed to their designated areas because the leadership already knew they would be elected to the Politburo (for instance, CMC vice chairmen are elected before the 1st CC plenary session)... These things are decided by the leadership; for instance from Khrushchev until Gorby Central Asian first secretaries were members of the Politburo, and then Gorby stopped it. Of course the CPC and CPSU are different, but in general the Politburo deems what areas are important (but their are certain exceptions, such as the capitol, cities such as Shanghai etc). Its been normal in most communist parties that the head of the capitol city is a member of the Politburo; its the case in Vietnam, Cuba (in which the Havana secretary is a women) and in Laos Soukanh Mahalath was a member of the Secretariat (but since his death in 2014, the Vientiane Committee Secretary has not been represented in the party's higher bodies, but his successor is fairly young so he'll probably get elected to the Politburo or the Secretariat in 2016. I presume that in Laos the Vientiane Committee Secretaryship functions as a test, since Soukanh Mahalath was young (born in the 1950s) compared to his colleagues, and leader Choummaly Sayasone who is born 1930s.. --TIAYN (talk) 14:47, 18 June 2015 (UTC)

I thought the Soviets were very well known for their ethnic diversity - Stalin after all was not even ethnically Russian, neither was Anastas Mikoyan, Jānis Rudzutaks or Grigory Ordzhonikidze; I don't think they were the only non-Russians on the Politburo, either. Perhaps this changed after the war? Are any of the post-Soviet states incumbents former Soviet politburo members? Like Nursultan Nazarbayev perhaps (maybe they were too young then)? Which Communist country had the best female political participation rate? More ethnic minorities have been given prominent roles during Xi's term, this has actually been cited as evidence that Xi's philosophy is to promote based on merit alone, regardless of gender or ethnicity (minorities and women who are not part of the "old boys club" can still make it under this system). Recent examples include Bayanqolu, party chief of Jilin, Nur Bekri, head of the National Energy Administration, Cui Yuying, Tibetan and deputy propaganda department head who deserves an article, and of course Yang Jing, sec-gen of the state council (Mongol). Bayanqolu worked with Xi in Zhejiang and he is the first post-reform ethnic minority party chief. Colipon+(Talk) 17:19, 18 June 2015 (UTC)

@Colipon: Yes, ethnic minorities were represented in the PB under every leader, but considering that by the early 1980s nearly half of the population of the USSR were non-Russian you do wonder why they made up collectively below 10 percent of any CC, Secretariat or Politburo... While its true Stalin was a Georgian, he adamantly pushed through Russification policies as if he was a Russian himself (or at least, that's what they accuse him off). Every non-Russian republican first secretary had a Russian deputy (Second Secretary) who would in theory keep him in check (of course, more often then not the Russian deputy went native). Under Brezhnev non-Russian ethnicities lost out to Russians, this can best be seen in the Brezhnev Era CCs in which the share of non-Russians continued to decline with every CC (despite, as I said in the beginning, the number of Russians in the country actually declining)... During the Brezhnev Era several non-Russian European officials gained PB membership (most notably Ukrainians and Belarusians), but Central Asian republican members (who were all republican first secretaries, which meant they did not attend Politburo sessions often since they were headquartered in the republics) were few-and-far between and served more often than not as candidate members... The Russians were presented in Soviet propaganda, from Stalin's time until Gorby, as the big brother who guided the other fraternal brother nationalities... At last, nationalist uprisings played a key role in the breakdown of Soviet institutions (the sudden growth of nationalism took the Soviet establishment by surprise)—for instance, the appointment of Gennady Kolbin (who succeeded the corrupt Dinmukhamed Konayev) led to the Jeltoqsan riots (this became a common feature of Gorby era politics). Several former communist cadres, such as Karimov and Aliyev, claim the USSR to be an evil empire which repressed their native countries (of course, these people are playing to the crowds)... Despite this, the picture is not black-and-white. The proof here is the present condition in Ukraine. The fact that several Ukrainians, be they fighting alongside the Russians or fighting against them, are fighting for or against the Soviet legacy. To take an example, Petro Poroshenko recently made communism a crime an made it illegal to blacken the nationalist World War II Ukrainian narrative (and the narrative is easy to blacken since the nationalists collaborated with the Nazis in fighting the Soviets and in exterminating Jews)... Nazarbayev became a member of the 28th Politburo (but every republican first secretary became so since Gorby changed the rules; from 28th congress on only the general secretary, the deputy general secretary and the republican first secretaries were members of the politburo)... Nazarbayev and the Central Asian republic supported the August coup and actively fought against the dissolution of the USSR as a state (see Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics)—Nazarbayev supported the Gorby line, a weaker state with the powers to set foreign, military and monetary policy.


Best communist state for women? Cuba and Vietnam. Cuba currently has one women in the Politburo and one women in the Secretariat. Vietnam currently has two women in the Politburo (one of which is very powerful, since she concurrently holds a seat in the Secretariat). Nguyễn Thị Kim Ngân, the aforementioned women, is considered a possible candidate as Chairman of the National Assembly in the next leadership transition. Every vice president in Vietnam since 1987 has been a women (of course this is a ceremonial post, but compared to communist politics in other countries this is fairly radical). Their is also the fact that in the cabinet, women are often appointed to stereotypical posts (they always serve health minister, social affairs ministers or something similar)—the traditional role of women is strengthened, like in China, through the Women's Federation... In Cuba, out of 26 ministers 9 are women (and they hold the offices of Minister of Finance and Prices and Minister of Justice for instance). Cuba and Vietnam easily ease in front of the rest of the field—as far as I know no other communist states come close.

I'll be rooting for Cui Yuying, a women and a Tibetan? How in gods name did she get that far! She has to be good, very good... That's good, and I hope thats true. In either case, China is different from the USSR. 90 percent of the population are made up of Han Chinese, right? Russians barely made up 50 percent... How many ethnic minorities are in the CC? --TIAYN (talk) 00:04, 19 June 2015 (UTC)

On the 18th CC, the only ethnic minorities with full membership are: Wang Zhengwei (Hui), Quan Zhezhu (Korean), Chen Qiufa (Miao), Bayanqolu (Mongol), Bagatur (Mongol), Yang Jing (Mongol), Padma Choling (Tibetan), Nur Bekri (Uyghur), and Ma Biao (Zhuang). That makes 9 out of 205 members, barely 5% of the body. To my knowledge every post-Cultural Revolution CC to date has included at least one Hui, one Mongol, one Tibetan, one Uyghur, and one Zhuang, and in most of these cases, they serve as the government leaders of their respective autonomous regions. In the 18th CC, the only people with non-stereotypical ethnic roles are Yang Jing (sec-gen of the State Council, very powerful post, and on the Secretariat), Bayanqolu (party leader in Jilin, a very rare instance of an ethnic minority leading the party in a non-ethnic province; he was previously party chief in Ningbo, a bustling coastal city far from Mongolia), Chen Qiufa (governor of Liaoning, again very rare for a minority to serve in this kind of position outside of their home region), and Nur Bekri, who heads up the National Energy Administration, which, despite its vice-ministerial rank, is a very important agency. Ethnic minorities who served in leading government posts are usually sent to the NPC or CPPCC to become Vice-chairs after they reach retirement age, for example Ma Biao is a CPPCC vice chair now. In recent memory, other ethnic minorities that have held substantial roles include Ulanhu (Mongol, vice-premier), Ismail Amat (Uyghur, state councilor), Dai Bingguo (Tujia, state councilor), Hui Liangyu (Hui, vice-premier). That the Mongols have such high representation may simply be a testament of how integrated they are with the Han Chinese populations; I'm not sure, for instance, whether or not Yang Jing even speaks the Mongolian language, so one could argue that he may as well be considered a Han Chinese for all intents and purposes. Colipon+(Talk) 19:32, 17 July 2015 (UTC)

@Colipon: Interesting. Why do you think the CPC appoints so few ethnic minorities to its CC? Is it prejudice? Or is it iron-law of tradition? --TIAYN (talk) 16:20, 18 July 2015 (UTC)

My best guess for this question (and this applies to women as well as ethnic minorities) is that not that there is a shortage of talent for ethnic minority and female officials but that since relationship-building (guanxi) plays such a strong role in the promotion of cadres, it is difficult for these people to 'break in' to the proverbial "old boys club." In fact the CPC runs awfully like a Fortune 500 corporation in that regard. The top executives are dominated by old white (cf. Han Chinese) men. Especially when it comes to promotion at the higher levels, securing patronage of top officials is very key. Xi himself was said to have gotten there because he was well-liked by Hu and Jiang and the remainder of the old guard, at least, he was the closest compromise everyone could agree on. Bo Xilai on the other hand, one could argue he had a lot of achievements but he was widely disliked. Yu Zhengsheng and Liu Yunshan were said to have made it to the PSC because they were the most agreeable candidates (that is, they were well-liked, but had no real achievements).
Like at the top, promotions at the grassroots work in a similar fashion. In order to be selected for the CYL positions for instance, you will have to do your share of relationship-building with the school's party administration (again see Suicide of Chen Gang for an extreme case). If you look at the county level, many party leadership members are appointed on the basis of their relationship with the party chief; chances are, the party chief is a man and he is friends with men. In fact I am under the impression that there are artificial quotas for both women and minorities just to maintain a bare minimum presence of about 1 in 10 leading figures in any jurisdiction, as every party standing committee has an unspoken rule about including a female (they are, more often than not, United Front or Discipline secretaries). Indeed if you look at the 18th CC very few women hold positions of actual power (apart from Liu Yandong and Sun Chunlan, I'm not sure there is another example of a woman holding a bona fide power office). Colipon+(Talk) 19:54, 29 July 2015 (UTC)

CC VKP(b)[edit]

Either name works. Shorter makes more sense — it is a mouthful, I agree. Carrite (talk) 13:46, 19 June 2015 (UTC)

@Carrite: But this doesn't work; "Inner composition elected by the Central Committee of the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks)", but whats the alternative? --TIAYN (talk) 21:35, 19 June 2015 (UTC)
Instead of "inner composition" I would call it "party leadership"... Party leadership after the 16th Congress of the VKP(b), which sort of cheats on the title by using an abbreviation... Still, that's an esoteric enough page that the name would probably be fine, sort of like 3rd World Congress of the Comintern is fine... Carrite (talk) 00:26, 20 June 2015 (UTC)

A barnstar for you![edit]

Gerald Shields leading the masses to improve Wikimedia one cosmetically fashionable photograph at a time. North Korean Fashion Watch Barnstar
The Ministry of Fun awards you the North Korean Fashion Watch Barnstar for your continuing efforts leading the masses to improve Wikimedia by adding reliable and poignant text in North Korean articles, such as Juche. Geraldshields11 (talk) 14:11, 24 June 2015 (UTC)
Thanks! :) --TIAYN (talk) 14:22, 24 June 2015 (UTC)

Your GA nomination of Central Commission for Discipline Inspection[edit]

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Your GA nomination of Central Commission for Discipline Inspection[edit]

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Your GA nomination of Central Commission for Discipline Inspection[edit]

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Send on behalf of The Wikipedia Library using MediaWiki message delivery (talk) 04:31, 7 July 2015 (UTC)

Some original research[edit]

I have been conducting some 'original research' in the field of Chinese political tea-leaf reading, and found something very interesting. Of the current 31 provincial-level committee secretaries, amazingly 23 of them have had experience as a governor (or governor equivalent) prior to ascending to the party chief position. The remaining 8 held ministerial-level positions in the centre prior to being 'parachuted' to take charge of provinces, this includes DepSecGen of SC You Quan, former transport minister Zhang Chunxian, former agriculture minister Sun Zhengcai, former Hong Kong office director Peng Qinghua, former Zhengfawei Sec-Gen Zhou Benshun, former Institutional Organization office chief Wang Dongming, and two former leaders of the National School of Administration - Li Jianhua and Jiang Yikang. With the exception of Politburo members Hu Chunhua and Sun Zhengcai, they are all born in the 1950s. The reason this is interesting is: 1. age is king. 2. the ladder is very limited - one needs to be promoted to governor before getting the nod as party chief, or, barring that, still need to be a minister-level official. 3. With few exceptions, almost all departing party chiefs will be succeeded by their current deputies (governors). The ones born in 1950 must relinquish their posts this year.
Party chiefs are especially interesting positions as they are positions of power; next to Politburo members and some leading group office chiefs, they are the most powerful officials in the country. Being a provincial party chief is in turn a pre-requisite for entry into the politburo and the PSC. The implication here is that all the provincial governors born in the 1960s who are currently in office will with certainty enter the upper echelons of the party at the 19th Party Congress - this narrows the field to Su Shulin, Zhang Qingwei, Lu Hao (born 1967), and Hao Peng (PRC). Colipon+(Talk) 17:16, 8 July 2015 (UTC)

Great work! The future PSC line-up... Of course, age doesn't mean everything; Wang Zhaoguo was a rising (and very young) star under Deng, and ended up heading China's trade union body. But age is more important now than ever before.. Impressive.. The only thing I can add is that of those four, two of them have worked for the Communist Youth League in one capacity and another, and that alternate members born after 1962 seems to split evenly between those working in CYL and those working in the fields of science, economics etc. But I honestly don't know if this is a norm, a coincident ... I see that you've done you're homework—I have a lot of catching up to do! ... --TIAYN (talk) 20:06, 8 July 2015 (UTC)

Wang Zhaoguo - do you know why he was not chosen? He didn't even make it to the PSC in fact. I have been writing some ideology-related articles on the {template:Xi Jinping} by the way - I am looking forward to seeing your article on socialist core values system - if you ever do plan to do that.:) Colipon+(Talk) 20:58, 8 July 2015 (UTC)
I can, and I will if its on demand! :) .. As for Wang, I honestly do not know. He was Hu Jintao's senior in the Communist Youth League, and he headed the CC General Office for a period.. But two reasons come to mind; either he was demoted because of his close ties to Hu Yaobang (who helped him rise in the CYL) or because he "failed the test" (in 1987 he was sent to Fujian, either as a demotion or to give him work experience). In either case, he returned to Beijing in the 1990s and headed the United Front Work Department for a while, and was than promoted to head the Taiwan Affairs Office.. Of course, Wen Jiabao faced similar problems and he did alright... On another note, we should go through the articles of the 16th and 17th CC (those articles are outdated; even the Wen Jiabao article referred to the Hu–Wen administration as "incumbent"... This is a problem) --TIAYN (talk) 21:13, 8 July 2015 (UTC)
You really motivated me to do some more research on why Wang Zhaoguo was demoted... and the result was a better article! :) Colipon+(Talk) 02:52, 9 July 2015 (UTC)

A few points to raise[edit]

Greetings from Chinese Wikipedia, and thanks for your long-term efforts for contributing on socialism-related contents (in fact some of them are translated into Chinese by me and others and even achieved the status of FL or GA). However, the purpose I'm here is not just for appraisal, but also to raise a few points regarding various articles in that theme. Hope it will not bother you, and your advise would be appreciated:

  • Regarding 1976 Conference of Communist and Workers Parties of Europe, the explanatory notes quoted Santiago Carrillo's speech - "The past and present sufferings of our parties and the time spent in the catacombs have created among our rank and file an alloy made out of scientific socialism and a kind of mysticism based on sacrifice and a sense of predestination. ..." Though knowing that it is a religious metaphor and the meaning of the subsequent part, I feel confused, can't get what it means. English is not my first language, I doubt that does this sentence have a sentence structure that I'm not familiar with: "xxx and yyy have created among our rank and file a www."
  • Regarding Chairman of the National Assembly of Vietnam, which I've begun to translate, the core reference for informations of each officeholders is a dead link, though in my translation I managed to substitute it with sources from Renmin Ribao, Tập Chí Cộng Sản and etc. Such works are still going on. For the office's name, I note that before 1981 the position was first referred as Trưởng ban Thường trực Quốc hội, and after 1960 Chủ tịch Ủy ban Thường trực Quốc hội. FYI, in Chinese, it was referred as 國民大會常務委員會主席 (Guómíndàhuì Chángwù wěiyuánhuì Zhǔxí, see this) at first, then 國會常務委員會委員長 (Guóhuì Chángwù wěiyuánhuì Wěiyuánzhǎng, see this). All these can be roughly translated into English as "Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly of Vietnam", just as the list shown. The Chinese need not to be supplemented in the Featured List, though I think that it is an option to list the alternative names they used before. Moreover, in the explanatory notes, it wrote that "Another example being Tô Huy Rứa of the 10th Politburo, he was ranked lowest because he received the lowest approval vote of the 10th Central Committee when he standing for election for a seat in the Politburo. This system was implemented at the 1st plenum of the 10th Central Committee." The point is that the reference was published before the 9th Plenum of the CPV's Central Committee, when Rứa is co-opted as a Politburo member, thus the reference does not tell us about this (I know that it does mention about the mechanism of Politburo ranking and why Lê Hồng Anh was placed as No.2). Also hard for me to understand is how a 1983 publication is used to illustrate facts happened in this decade.
  • Regarding the 10th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, I've just tagged a dead link. The reference is used to support the part about the five-year plan, the ten-year Socio-economic planning, and it required approval of the National Assembly. I once read articles about the five-year plan and the ten-year plan, but not sure if they are still available. PS. According to my extra findings, now the Vietnamese Government pledged to have Vietnam industrialised by 2020.

Apologies for my possibly inaccurate English, and wish you a good health and a pleasant editing experience. Feel free to help and/or reply underneath. Cheers,--Spring Roll Conan ( Talk · Contributions ) 15:01, 15 July 2015 (UTC)

  1. @春卷柯南: English is not my first language either.. My interpretation of it is "The past and present sufferings of our parties and the time spent in the catacombs [no mans land; he's referring the anti-communist repressive policies of Franco and his clique and the transition to democracy that was occurring 1976–77] have created among our rank and file an alloy [which means metal of some sorts.. guessing he means shield, defence] made out of scientific socialism and a kind of mysticism [means ideological conviction] based on sacrifice and a sense of predestination".. So i'd write The past and present sufferings of our parties and the time spent in the catacombs have created among our rank and file a shield made out of scientific socialism and a kind of ideological conviction based on sacrifice and a sense of righteousness in our beliefs".
  2. Its been a long time since I last edited extensively on Vietnam-related articles... My original plan was to create pages for every national congress (I still have scholarly sources for the first ten)... The official name has always been Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, as far as I know.. As for the Chinese transliteration, the official name of the Secretariat is the "Secretariat of the Communist Party of China Central Committee" and the official name of the Politburo is "Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee" .. This is in contrast to other ruling communist parties, in which the standard naming practice was/is [body, Secretariat for instance] of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of ... This probably explains why refer to it as Chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee.. As for the other, I'm guessing informal writing... Tô Huy Rứa was never in the reference (I just wanted to give a more up-to-date example) Part of the reason I stopped working on Vietnam related articles is because of a lack of proper writing (that I had access too)—the 1983 reference is a result of that. In addition work of any kind on the current Vietnamese political situation are woefully lacking... There are some very good books though, like Changing Worlds by David Elliott, The Vietnamese Communist Party's Agenda for Reform (I haven't found a copy), Vietnam: The Politics of Bureaucratic Socialism, Politics in Contemporary Vietnam (which is heavily influenced by Shambaugh's great book China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation), Vietnam: Rethinking the State (a very good book, but with certain weaknesses), Vietnam Rising Dragon and Renovating the Vietnamese Communist Party: Nguyen Van Linh and the Programme for Organizational Reform—the problem is that these are the only books available that are good, and not written before 1990, in English... If I were you, I'd try to contact a Vietnamese user. I'd suggest Tuantintuc17 (he's more active on Vietnamese WP, but not very active their either); I've not had the best working relationship with him and he does not possess the best English either, but he's knowledge of Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian politics is extensive, and maybe more importantly, he's Vietnamese so he can track down Vietnamese references (if he bothers).
  3. That's why I hate using URL references... URL links will sooner or later, 99 percent of the time, go dead.... I'll try and fix it.
  4. Funny. I never noticed that before you told me. I've never nominated an article to WP:FA status until very recently (nominating Central Commission for Discipline Inspection), so that's nice to hear... Sorry that I couldn't help you more. You're English is very good, no reason to worry about it. --TIAYN (talk) 18:28, 15 July 2015 (UTC)
Sorry for typo mistakes - it should be GA, not FA. then:
  1. From my extra findings from Youdao, I have find out what does "file an alloy ..." means. Also I know what "The past and present sufferings of our parties and the time spent in the catacombs" means, prior to this discussion. But still cannot get well about the sentence strucure. The subject seems to be "The past and present sufferings of our parties and the time spent in the catacombs". But what does "xxx and yyy have created among our rank" mean, for me, is still not clear. Though your interpretation provides a useful reference for me to continue the translation.
  2. CPV's National Congress is also within my interest, though I don't tend to finished the series until I can master Vietnamese (thus provide a better condition to work on it, though efforts will be spared by further study, researches and a simultaneous interest to expand coverage of Vietnamese music in zhwp). But one thing for sure: CPV had started to prepare for the 12th Congress one or two years ago, with units for personnel appointment and documents' drafting established. Not being in a institution specified in Asian Studies, so unable to acquire new bibliography about Vietnamese politics, though still able to have some forementioned books read from the public library. Though I've learnt some from various sources, though some are considered as rumours (eg. North-South rivalry in the CPV). Even when no new books available for this topic, I wonder if ISEAS's annual review on Southeast Asia, yearly report on Vietnam's situation by Guangxi Academy of Social Science and other scholarly journal serves well. My Vietnamese is not that good, by the date some grammatical features in Vietnamese are yet for me to grip. Possible misunderstanding on Vietnamese Wikipedia, the user's inactivity and my identity as a ethnic Chinese (Vietnam and China is having a sour relationship, while the government and Party of Vietnam vowed to safeguard the disputed islands) may proved as challenges in building links with him/her.
I've nothing to say besides what I wrote above. Nevertheless, I'll be glad if you're willing to reply. Cheers, --Spring Roll Conan ( Talk · Contributions ) 14:44, 16 July 2015 (UTC)
  1. @春卷柯南: I assume the problem is that a direct transliteration is impossible, if not very problematic.
  2. Impressive, I don't know Vietnamese.. Through the University of Oslo I have access to several Asian studies journals (including some published by ISEAS), articles el cetra.. I have tons of articles on my computer (all of them in English), if interested I can send them to you by mail (if you want of course; we are talking about an estimated 100 articles here).... You're lucky you're Chinese, I'm from Norway and Vietnam is just too far away for researchers to give a damn.. In theory thats true, and he may be worse than most; as he wrote "Communist Party of China is Imperialism".. I'd in any case try to contact a Vietnamese; a smart Vietnamese will be able to differentiate between a citizen of China, and the Chinese party–state. --TIAYN (talk) 08:40, 17 July 2015 (UTC)
Thanks for the reply, the first problem has gone. As Vietnamese politics is not the key priority for my plan of coverage expansion, presently the essays are yet to be necessary to browse, though it's well if you don't mind share these articles with me upon request. In where I live people always said that it's hard to predict the man is kind or not just after had a glance of his/her face (even when there is AGF, there're still unkind people there). As I learn Vietnamese (and having further research, if everything goes well), undoubtedly I'll have to encounter ethnic Vietnamese (actually I've meet some, but their political views are different - one is from Orange County, one is a member of HCM Communist Youth Union). Find a real specialist on that area for advise is perfect, though it will be very tough and unfeasible. Politics are sensitive issues, I don't talk much about it with them, or they may have biased comments on it given their political view even if it is useful. One last thing before conclusion of this talk. May I offer help for your draft on the list of full/alternate members of the 17th Central Committee of the CPC? As a Chinese I can fill the missing names and years of birth on the tables - of course with your permission first. In my cognition editing others' userpage without permission is rude (though sometimes I'll tolerate, esp. if s/he's my friend). --Spring Roll Conan ( Talk · Contributions ) 03:10, 18 July 2015 (UTC)

@春卷柯南: OK, that's fine by me.. Alternately we can create a shared Google Drive account, in which I can upload the Vietnam articles, and if you have an article which you feel interests me, you can upload it there too.. Sounds like a very big step, but the only thing we would do is to share work sources.... In either case, I have a question. And I've never found a satisfying answer. Do lower level cadres of the China CP and the Vietnam CP feel ideological solidarity? Despite everything both countries are ruled by communist parties, and I wonder how that effects China–Vietnam relations on an ideological level. Of course, I don't know if you're a member of the party, but you've met Communist Youth Union officials so.. Would you be able to give a satisfying answer?

Go ahead. Worst case scenario I will revert you're edits and send you a message explaining why I did what I did. But I doubt that will happen. Comradely working relations are important to get things done around here. --TIAYN (talk) 16:16, 18 July 2015 (UTC)

Featured lists[edit]

Please don't try and shortcut the process by adding pre-existing tags to star any of the featured processes (as you did here). Next time please follow the process titled "Nomination procedure" at WP:FLC. Bots do a series of unseen steps which ensures the process works smoothly - which it hasn't in the case of your nom. - SchroCat (talk) 09:00, 20 July 2015 (UTC)


Hi, TIAYN. I just finished checking the article. It's an interesting one (just as I actually expected); I think it may be a good WP:TFA if it gets the bronze star. From now on, I'll be there to check if the remaining issues have been solved. I'd like to ask you for a favor and review a FAC I have at the moment, ununseptium. While it may seem all that difficult if you're not familiar with the topic, I did my best to make it interesting and readable by non-experts, and you certainly won't be scared away in the very beginning. The article is quite short, just two sections long, so I hope you'll give it a look :)--R8R (talk) 13:21, 20 July 2015 (UTC)

@R8R Gtrs: Will do, but I've never reviewed an FA before (but I'll try my best). --TIAYN (talk) 19:41, 22 July 2015 (UTC)
Thanks! Much appreciated.--R8R (talk) 21:06, 22 July 2015 (UTC)

Sorry about that ..[edit]

I attempted to revert one bad edit, but the history is more complex than I thought. I'll leave you to sort it out .. Philip Trueman (talk) 08:25, 27 July 2015 (UTC)

A kitten for you![edit]

Kitten in a helmet.jpg

After so much abusive spam, I thought a kitten might make a pleasant change.

YeOldeGentleman (talk) 07:54, 29 July 2015 (UTC)