Worcester v. Georgia: Difference between revisions
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The ''Worcester v. Georgia'' case is highly significant in that it constituted a striking departure from the Supreme Court's earlier treatment of claims involving [[Indians in the United States|Indians]]. The majority opinion was in stark contrast to [[John Marshall]]'s previous opinion in ''[[Johnson v. M'Intosh]]'', where the Court held that the United States had the right to the title of the land within its boundaries and that the Indians were but residents. It also differed significantly from Marshall's opinion in ''[[Cherokee Nation v. Georgia]]'', where the Court willingly ceded its jurisdiction over matters involving Indian tribes.<ref>Marshall concluded his opinion by remarking that "If it be true that the Cherokee nation have rights, this is not the tribunal in which those rights are to be asserted. If it be true that wrongs have been inflicted, and still greater are to be apprehended, this is not the tribunal which can redress the past or prevent the future." (''See'' {{ussc|30|1|1831}} at 20.) As Swindler suggests, Marshall’s explicit refusal to permit the Court to become entangled in Indian matters and to thus thrust itself into the middle of the political and social turmoil that resolved around the issue at that time can only be explained by Marshall’s concern with "avoiding, even if only postponing, the ultimate political issue." ''See'' {{cite journal |last=Swindler |first=William F. |authorlink= |coauthors= |year=1975 |month= |title=Politics as Law: The Cherokee Cases |journal=American Indian Legal Review |volume=3 |issue= |pages=6 |id= |url= |accessdate= |quote=}} At p. 13.</ref> However, the judicial outcome that was apparently favorable to the claims of the Cherokee was subsequently precluded by a hostile Congress and the equally hostile President [[Andrew Jackson]]. |
The ''Worcester v. Georgia'' case is highly significant in that it constituted a striking departure from the Supreme Court's earlier treatment of claims involving [[Indians in the United States|Indians]]. The majority opinion was in stark contrast to [[John Marshall]]'s previous opinion in ''[[Johnson v. M'Intosh]]'', where the Court held that the United States had the right to the title of the land within its boundaries and that the Indians were but residents. It also differed significantly from Marshall's opinion in ''[[Cherokee Nation v. Georgia]]'', where the Court willingly ceded its jurisdiction over matters involving Indian tribes.<ref>Marshall concluded his opinion by remarking that "If it be true that the Cherokee nation have rights, this is not the tribunal in which those rights are to be asserted. If it be true that wrongs have been inflicted, and still greater are to be apprehended, this is not the tribunal which can redress the past or prevent the future." (''See'' {{ussc|30|1|1831}} at 20.) As Swindler suggests, Marshall’s explicit refusal to permit the Court to become entangled in Indian matters and to thus thrust itself into the middle of the political and social turmoil that resolved around the issue at that time can only be explained by Marshall’s concern with "avoiding, even if only postponing, the ultimate political issue." ''See'' {{cite journal |last=Swindler |first=William F. |authorlink= |coauthors= |year=1975 |month= |title=Politics as Law: The Cherokee Cases |journal=American Indian Legal Review |volume=3 |issue= |pages=6 |id= |url= |accessdate= |quote=}} At p. 13.</ref> However, the judicial outcome that was apparently favorable to the claims of the Cherokee was subsequently precluded by a hostile Congress and the equally hostile President [[Andrew Jackson]]. |
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==The Case== |
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[[Georgia (U.S. state)|Georgia]] law required all whites living in Cherokee Indian Territory to obtain a state license. Seven missionaries refused to obey the state law and were arrested, convicted, and sentenced to four years of hard labor for violating the state licensing law. They also refused to obey the military when they were asked to leave the state. They appealed their case to the Supreme Court of the United States, arguing that the laws they had been convicted under were unconstitutional because states have no power or authority to pass laws concerning sovereign Indian Nations. |
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The missionaries [[Samuel Worcester|Samuel Austin Worcester]] and Elizur Butler were targeted by Georgia because of their influence with and support of Cherokee resistance against [[Indian Removal|removal]]. It was understood that had they applied for state licenses to reside among the [[Cherokees]], the licenses would have been denied. The Georgia state courts had previously been deferential to Worcester because of his federal appointment as postmaster to [[New Echota]], the Cherokee capital. However, the governor of Georgia, [[George Rockingham Gilmer]], personally persuaded the [[Federal government of the United States|federal government]] to withdraw Worcester's appointment as postmaster in order to make him subject to arrest. |
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Chief Justice Marshall lays out in this opinion the relationship between the Indian nations and the United States is that of nations. He argues that the United States, in the character of the federal government, inherited the rights of Great Britain as they were held by that nation. Those rights, he states, are the sole right of dealing with the Indian nations to the exclusion of any other European power, and not the rights of possession to their land nor political dominion over their laws. He acknowledges that the exercise of conquest and purchase can give political dominion, but those are in the hands of the federal government and not the states. |
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The court ruled that the Cherokee nation was a "distinct community" with self-government "in which the laws of Georgia can have no force," establishing the doctrine that the national government of the United States, and not individual states, had authority in Indian affairs. |
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== Response to the Decision == |
== Response to the Decision == |
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Revision as of 16:56, 10 October 2008
| Worcester v. Georgia | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Argued February 20, 1832 Decided March 3, 1832 | |
| Full case name | Samuel A. Worcester, Plaintiff in Error v. The State of Georgia |
| Citations | 31 U.S. 515 (more) 8 L. Ed. 483 |
| Case history | |
| Prior | Plaintiff convicted in Gwinnett County, Georgia by the Georgia Superior Court (Sept. 15, 1831) |
| Subsequent | None |
| Holding | |
| States were not permitted to redraw the boundaries of Indian lands or forbid residence in those territories, because the Constitution granted sole authority to Congress to regulate relations with sovereign Indian tribes. Superior Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia reversed and remanded. | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Marshall, joined by Johnson, Duvall, Story, Thompson |
| Concurrence | McLean |
| Dissent | Baldwin |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. art. I | |
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that Cherokee Native Americans were entitled to federal protection from the actions of state governments which would infringe on the tribe's sovereignty. It is considered one of the most influential decisions in law dealing with Native Americans.
Background
The Worcester v. Georgia case is highly significant in that it constituted a striking departure from the Supreme Court's earlier treatment of claims involving Indians. The majority opinion was in stark contrast to John Marshall's previous opinion in Johnson v. M'Intosh, where the Court held that the United States had the right to the title of the land within its boundaries and that the Indians were but residents. It also differed significantly from Marshall's opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, where the Court willingly ceded its jurisdiction over matters involving Indian tribes.[1] However, the judicial outcome that was apparently favorable to the claims of the Cherokee was subsequently precluded by a hostile Congress and the equally hostile President Andrew Jackson.
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Response to the Decision
In reaction to this decision, President Andrew Jackson has often been quoted as defying the Supreme Court with the words: "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it!" Arguably because of a legal loophole, he had no grounds for becoming involved unless the Georgia courts formally defied the Supreme Court. That did not happen since Georgia simply ignored the ruling and refused to release Worcester from prison. What Jackson actually said was that "the decision of the supreme court has fell still born, and they find that they cannot coerce Georgia to yield to its mandate." Jackson's opponents criticized him for failing to act against Georgia, but even if he had wanted to intervene—and he did not—it is questionable whether he had any legal authority to do so.[2]
Perhaps fearing the possibility of a showdown between the Supreme Court and the Executive, and realizing the real likelihood of Jackson refusing to adhere to the Court’s pro-Cherokee decision, the Justices did not follow the standard procedure of requiring federal marshals to carry out the decision.[3] In doing so, the Supreme Court implicitly permitted Andrew Jackson not to carry out the decision, thus avoiding the possibility of a political conflict between two branches, while also retaining the pro-Cherokee decision of Worcester as good precedent for subsequent cases and presidents.[4]
There can be no question that Jackson was politically supportive of Georgia in its efforts to relocate the Cherokees. Despite winning their case in the Supreme Court, Worcester and Butler remained imprisoned until 1833, when a new governor, Wilson Lumpkin, persuaded them to accept pardons on condition that they would have nothing further to do with the Cherokees. Worcester and Butler were reluctant to accept pardons under such a condition but were eventually pressured to do so by the combined efforts of their lawyers, their missionary organization, and Governor Lumpkin.
According to Chused, Worcester and Butler did return to the Cherokees.[5] Further, they never accepted a formal pardon and they were not given one. Rather, they were released on a general proclamation issued in January 14, 1833.
Subsequent history
In 1835, a dissident faction of Cherokees signed a removal treaty, the Treaty of New Echota. Jackson actively lobbied the U.S. Senate to ratify the treaty in 1836, where it passed by a majority of one vote. In 1838, under President Martin Van Buren, this led to the forcible relocation by the U.S. Army of the Cherokees to Indian Territory (part of present-day Oklahoma) in what would become known as the Trail of Tears.
Subsequent judicial impact
Marshall's decision set a strong rule that was followed in future judicial opinions. They are
-U.S. v. Holiday (70 U.S. 407, 1866)~ Holding that a Congressional ban on selling liquor to the Indians was Constitutional.
-In re Heff (197 U.S. 488, 1905)~ Holding that Congress has the power to place the Indians under state law if it chooses, and the ban on selling liquor does not apply to Indians subject to the Allotment acts.
-Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe (455 U.S. 130, 1982)~ Holding that Indian Nations have the power to tax Non-Native Americans based on their power as a nation and treaty rights to exclude others. This right can only be curtailed by Congress. -Maynard v. Narrangansett Indian Tribe (798 F. Supp. 94, 1992)~ Holding that tribes have sovereign immunity against state tort claims.
-Wisconsin Potowatomies of Hannahville Indian Community v. Houston (393 F. Supp. 719)~ Holding that tribal law and not state law governs the custody of children domiciled on reservation land.
-Iron Crow v. Ogallala Sioux Tribe (129 F. Supp. 15, 1955)~ Holding that tribes have power to create and change their court system, and that power is only limited by Congress and not the courts.
-Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska (798 F. Supp. 94)~ Holding that tribes have power to recognize and legislate adoptions.
-Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council (272 F.2d 131)~ Holding that the 1st Amendment does not apply to Indian nations unless it is applied by Congress.
-American Indian Agricultural Credit Consortium, Inc. v. Fredericks (551 F. Supp. 1020, 1982)~ Holding that state courts do not have jurisdiction over tribal members, but federal courts do.
-Teague v. Bad River Band (236 Wis. 2d 384, 2000)~ Holding that tribal courts deserve full faith and credit since they are the court of an independent sovereign, however, in order to stop confusion, cases that are filed in state and tribal courts require consultation of both courts before they are decided.
See also
References
- ^ Marshall concluded his opinion by remarking that "If it be true that the Cherokee nation have rights, this is not the tribunal in which those rights are to be asserted. If it be true that wrongs have been inflicted, and still greater are to be apprehended, this is not the tribunal which can redress the past or prevent the future." (See 30 U.S. 1 (1831) at 20.) As Swindler suggests, Marshall’s explicit refusal to permit the Court to become entangled in Indian matters and to thus thrust itself into the middle of the political and social turmoil that resolved around the issue at that time can only be explained by Marshall’s concern with "avoiding, even if only postponing, the ultimate political issue." See Swindler, William F. (1975). "Politics as Law: The Cherokee Cases". American Indian Legal Review. 3: 6.
{{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters:|month=and|coauthors=(help) At p. 13. - ^ Prucha (1984), p. 212.
- ^ Berutti, Ronald A. (1992). "The Cherokee Cases: The Fight to Save the Supreme Court and the Cherokee Indians". American Indian Law Review. 17: 291.
{{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters:|month=and|coauthors=(help) At pp. 305–306. - ^ Lytle, Cliford M. (1980). "The Supreme Court, Tribal Sovereignty, and Continuing Problems of State Encroachment into Indian Country". American Indian Law Review. 8: 65.
{{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters:|month=and|coauthors=(help) At p. 69. - ^ Chused, Richard (1999). Cases, Materials, and Problems in Property (2nd edition ed.). New York: M. Bender. ISBN 0820541354.
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Further reading
- Burke, Joseph C. (1969). "The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality". Stanford Law Review. 21: 500. doi:10.2307/1227621.
{{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters:|month=and|coauthors=(help) - Prucha, Francis Paul (1984). The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians. Vol. I. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 0803236689.
{{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter:|coauthors=(help) - Smith, Jean Edward (1996). John Marshall: Definer Of A Nation. New York: Henry Holt & Company. ISBN 080501389X.
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External links
- Text of Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) is available from: Findlaw Justia
- Article in the New Georgia Encyclopedia