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Jeff Colgan has characterized international order as entailing multiple subsystems.<ref name=":16">{{Cite book |last=Colgan |first=Jeff D. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=g3U-EAAAQBAJ&newbks=0&hl=en |title=Partial Hegemony: Oil Politics and International Order |date=2021 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-754640-6 |language=en}}</ref> These subsystems can experience drastic change without fundamentally changing the international order.<ref name=":16" />
Jeff Colgan has characterized international order as entailing multiple subsystems.<ref name=":16">{{Cite book |last=Colgan |first=Jeff D. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=g3U-EAAAQBAJ&newbks=0&hl=en |title=Partial Hegemony: Oil Politics and International Order |date=2021 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-754640-6 |language=en}}</ref> These subsystems can experience drastic change without fundamentally changing the international order.<ref name=":16" />

==Liberal international order==
{{Main|Liberal international order}}

The liberal international order describes a set of global, rule-based, structured relationships based on [[political liberalism]], [[economic liberalism]] and [[liberal internationalism]] since the late 1940s.<ref name=":32">{{Cite journal |last1=Lake |first1=David A. |last2=Martin |first2=Lisa L. |last3=Risse |first3=Thomas |date=2021 |title=Challenges to the Liberal Order: Reflections on International Organization |journal=International Organization |language=en |volume=75 |issue=2 |pages=225–257 |doi=10.1017/S0020818320000636 |issn=0020-8183 |doi-access=free}}</ref> More specifically, it entails international cooperation through [[Multilateralism|multilateral]] institutions (like the [[United Nations]], [[World Trade Organization]] and [[International Monetary Fund]]) and is constituted by [[human equality]] (freedom, rule of law and human rights), [[Open market|open markets]], [[Collective security|security cooperation]], promotion of [[liberal democracy]], and monetary cooperation.<ref name=":32" /><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Ikenberry |first=G. John |date=2018 |title=The end of liberal international order? |url=https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/inta94_1_2_241_ikenberry.pdf |journal=International Affairs |volume=94 |issue=1 |pages=7–23 |doi=10.1093/ia/iix241 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200702021057/https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/inta94_1_2_241_ikenberry.pdf |archive-date=2 July 2020 |via=OpenScholar @ Princeton |doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Norrlof |first1=Carla |last2=Poast |first2=Paul |last3=Cohen |first3=Benjamin J |last4=Croteau |first4=Sabreena |last5=Khanna |first5=Aashna |last6=McDowell |first6=Daniel |last7=Wang |first7=Hongying |last8=Winecoff |first8=W Kindred |date=2020 |title=Global Monetary Order and the Liberal Order Debate |url=https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ekaa001 |journal=International Studies Perspectives |volume=21 |issue=2 |pages=109–153 |doi=10.1093/isp/ekaa001 |issn=1528-3577}}</ref> The order was established in the aftermath of [[World War II]], led in large part by the [[United States]].<ref name=":32" /><ref>{{Cite news |last=Wright |first=Thomas |date=12 September 2018 |title=The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable |work=The Atlantic |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/liberal-international-order-free-world-trump-authoritarianism/569881/ |url-status=live |access-date=23 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200702020627/https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/liberal-international-order-free-world-trump-authoritarianism/569881/ |archive-date=2 July 2020}}</ref>

The nature of the liberal international order, as well as its very existence, has been debated by scholars.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Ikenberry |first=G. John |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7t1s5 |title=After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars |date=2001 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-05090-4 |jstor=j.ctt7t1s5}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Mearsheimer |first=John J. |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv5cgb1w |title=Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities |date=2018 |publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=978-0-300-23419-0 |jstor=j.ctv5cgb1w}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Barnett |first=Michael |date=2019 |title=The End of a Liberal International Order That Never Existed • The Global |url=https://theglobal.blog/2019/04/16/the-end-of-a-liberal-international-order-that-never-existed/ |url-status=live |access-date=2021-02-23 |website=The Global |language=en-US}}</ref><ref name=":32" /> The LIO has been credited with expanding free trade, increasing capital mobility, spreading democracy, promoting human rights, and collectively defending the West from the Soviet Union.<ref name=":32" /> The LIO facilitated unprecedented cooperation among the states of North America, Western Europe and Japan.<ref name=":32" /> Over time, the LIO facilitated the spread of economic liberalism to the rest of the world, as well as helped consolidate democracy in formerly fascist or communist countries.<ref name=":32" />

Origins of the LIO have commonly been identified as the 1940s, usually starting in 1945.<ref name=":32" /> [[John Mearsheimer]] has dissented with this view, arguing that the LIO only arose after the end of the Cold War.<ref name=":62">{{Cite journal |last=Mearsheimer |first=John J. |date=2019 |title=Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order |journal=International Security |volume=43 |issue=4 |pages=7–50 |doi=10.1162/isec_a_00342 |issn=0162-2889 |doi-access=free}}</ref> Core founding members of the LIO include the states of North America, Western Europe and Japan; these states form a [[security community]].<ref name=":32" /> The characteristics of the LIO have varied over time.<ref name=":32" /> Some scholars refer to a Cold War variation of the LIO and a post-Cold War variation.<ref name=":9">{{Cite journal |last1=Börzel |first1=Tanja A. |last2=Zürn |first2=Michael |date=2021 |title=Contestations of the Liberal International Order: From Liberal Multilateralism to Postnational Liberalism |journal=International Organization |language=en |volume=75 |issue=2 |pages=282–305 |doi=10.1017/S0020818320000570 |issn=0020-8183 |doi-access=free}}</ref> The Cold War variation was primarily limited to the West and entailed weak global institutions, whereas the post-Cold War variation was worldwide in scope and entailed global institutions with "intrusive" powers.<ref name=":9" />

Aspects of the LIO are challenged internally within liberal states by [[populism]], [[protectionism]] and [[nationalism]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Flaherty |first1=Thomas M. |last2=Rogowski |first2=Ronald |date=2021 |title=Rising Inequality As a Threat to the Liberal International Order |journal=International Organization |language=en |volume=75 |issue=2 |pages=495–523 |doi=10.1017/S0020818321000163 |issn=0020-8183 |doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Broz |first1=J. Lawrence |last2=Frieden |first2=Jeffry |last3=Weymouth |first3=Stephen |date=2021 |title=Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash |journal=International Organization |language=en |volume=75 |issue=2 |pages=464–494 |doi=10.1017/S0020818320000314 |issn=0020-8183 |doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":62" /><ref name=":12">{{Cite journal |last1=Goldstein |first1=Judith |last2=Gulotty |first2=Robert |date=2021 |title=America and the Trade Regime: What Went Wrong? |journal=International Organization |language=en |volume=75 |issue=2 |pages=524–557 |doi=10.1017/S002081832000065X |issn=0020-8183 |doi-access=free}}</ref> Scholars have argued that [[embedded liberalism]] (or the logics inherent in the [[Double Movement]]) are key to maintaining public support for the planks of the LIO; some scholars have raised questions whether aspects of embedded liberalism have been undermined, thus leading to a backlash against the LIO.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Ruggie |first=John Gerard |date=1982 |title=International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order |journal=International Organization |volume=36 |issue=2 |pages=379–415 |doi=10.1017/S0020818300018993 |issn=0020-8183 |jstor=2706527 |doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Mansfield |first1=Edward D. |last2=Rudra |first2=Nita |date=2021 |title=Embedded Liberalism in the Digital Era |journal=International Organization |language=en |volume=75 |issue=2 |pages=558–585 |doi=10.1017/S0020818320000569 |issn=0020-8183 |ssrn=3719975 |doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":12" />

Externally, the LIO is challenged by [[Authoritarianism|authoritarian states]], [[Illiberal state|illiberal states]], and states that are discontented with their roles in world politics.<ref name=":62" /><ref name=":14">{{Cite journal |last1=Farrell |first1=Henry |last2=Newman |first2=Abraham L. |date=2021 |title=The Janus Face of the Liberal International Information Order: When Global Institutions Are Self-Undermining |journal=International Organization |language=en |volume=75 |issue=2 |pages=333–358 |doi=10.1017/S0020818320000302 |issn=0020-8183 |doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":10">{{Cite journal |last1=Weiss |first1=Jessica Chen |last2=Wallace |first2=Jeremy L. |date=2021 |title=Domestic Politics, China's Rise, and the Future of the Liberal International Order |journal=International Organization |language=en |volume=75 |issue=2 |pages=635–664 |doi=10.1017/S002081832000048X |issn=0020-8183 |doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":11">{{Cite journal |last1=Adler-Nissen |first1=Rebecca |last2=Zarakol |first2=Ayşe |date=2021 |title=Struggles for Recognition: The Liberal International Order and the Merger of Its Discontents |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/struggles-for-recognition-the-liberal-international-order-and-the-merger-of-its-discontents/2CA314390EAC48EA619D7834C3A71CA4 |journal=International Organization |language=en |volume=75 |issue=2 |pages=611–634 |doi=10.1017/S0020818320000454 |issn=0020-8183 |s2cid=234364938}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Cooley |first1=Alexander |last2=Nexon |first2=Daniel |date=2021-04-29 |title=The Illiberal Tide |language=en-US |work=Foreign Affairs |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-03-26/illiberal-tide |access-date=2021-12-08 |issn=0015-7120}}</ref> China and Russia have been characterized as prominent challengers to the LIO.<ref name=":62" /><ref name=":10" /><ref name=":11" /><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Kristinsson |first=Thorsteinn |date=2021 |title=Networks of order in East Asia: Beyond hegemonic theories of the Liberal International Order |url=https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00361-w |journal=International Politics |language=en |doi=10.1057/s41311-021-00361-w |issn=1740-3898 |s2cid=240415250}}</ref><ref name=":15">{{Cite news |last=Beckley |first=Michael |date=2022-02-15 |title=Enemies of My Enemy |language=en-US |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2021-02-14/china-new-world-order-enemies-my-enemy |access-date=2022-02-19 |issn=0015-7120 |quote=The liberal order, like all international orders, is a form of organized hypocrisy that contains the seeds of its own demise. To forge a cohesive community, order builders have to exclude hostile nations, outlaw uncooperative behaviors, and squelch domestic opposition to international rule-making. These inherently repressive acts eventually trigger a backlash.}}</ref> Some scholars have argued that the LIO contains self-undermining aspects that could trigger backlash or collapse.<ref name=":14" /><ref name=":15" />


==See also==
==See also==

Revision as of 18:42, 16 April 2022

"World Order" redirects here. For the band, see World Order (band). For the book, see World Order (book).

In international relations, international order refers to patterned or structured relationships between actors on the international level.[1][2][3]

Definition

David Lake, Lisa Martin and Thomas Risse define "order" as "patterned or structured relationships among units".[2]

Michael Barnett defines an international order as "patterns of relating and acting" derived from and maintained by rules, institutions, law and norms.[4] International orders have both a material and social component.[4][5] Legitimacy (the generalized perception that actions are desirable, proper or appropriate) is essential to political orders.[4][6] George Lawson has defined an international order as "regularized practices of exchange among discrete political units that recognize each other to be independent."[7] John Mearsheimer defines an international order "an organized group of international institutions that help govern the interactions among the member states."[8]

In After Victory (2001), John Ikenberry defines a political order as "the governing arrangements among a group of states, including its fundamental rules, principles and institutions."[9]

The United Nations has been characterized as a proxy for how states broadly perceive the international order.[10]

Jeff Colgan has characterized international order as entailing multiple subsystems.[11] These subsystems can experience drastic change without fundamentally changing the international order.[11]

Liberal international order

Main article: Liberal international order

The liberal international order describes a set of global, rule-based, structured relationships based on political liberalism, economic liberalism and liberal internationalism since the late 1940s.[12] More specifically, it entails international cooperation through multilateral institutions (like the United Nations, World Trade Organization and International Monetary Fund) and is constituted by human equality (freedom, rule of law and human rights), open markets, security cooperation, promotion of liberal democracy, and monetary cooperation.[12][13][14] The order was established in the aftermath of World War II, led in large part by the United States.[12][15]

The nature of the liberal international order, as well as its very existence, has been debated by scholars.[16][17][18][12] The LIO has been credited with expanding free trade, increasing capital mobility, spreading democracy, promoting human rights, and collectively defending the West from the Soviet Union.[12] The LIO facilitated unprecedented cooperation among the states of North America, Western Europe and Japan.[12] Over time, the LIO facilitated the spread of economic liberalism to the rest of the world, as well as helped consolidate democracy in formerly fascist or communist countries.[12]

Origins of the LIO have commonly been identified as the 1940s, usually starting in 1945.[12] John Mearsheimer has dissented with this view, arguing that the LIO only arose after the end of the Cold War.[19] Core founding members of the LIO include the states of North America, Western Europe and Japan; these states form a security community.[12] The characteristics of the LIO have varied over time.[12] Some scholars refer to a Cold War variation of the LIO and a post-Cold War variation.[20] The Cold War variation was primarily limited to the West and entailed weak global institutions, whereas the post-Cold War variation was worldwide in scope and entailed global institutions with "intrusive" powers.[20]

Aspects of the LIO are challenged internally within liberal states by populism, protectionism and nationalism.[21][22][19][23] Scholars have argued that embedded liberalism (or the logics inherent in the Double Movement) are key to maintaining public support for the planks of the LIO; some scholars have raised questions whether aspects of embedded liberalism have been undermined, thus leading to a backlash against the LIO.[24][25][23]

Externally, the LIO is challenged by authoritarian states, illiberal states, and states that are discontented with their roles in world politics.[19][26][27][28][29] China and Russia have been characterized as prominent challengers to the LIO.[19][27][28][30][31] Some scholars have argued that the LIO contains self-undermining aspects that could trigger backlash or collapse.[26][31]

See also

References

  1. ^ Lascurettes, Kyle M.; Poznansky, Michael (2021). "International Order in Theory and Practice". Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.673. ISBN 978-0-19-084662-6.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  2. ^ a b Lake, David A.; Martin, Lisa L.; Risse, Thomas (2021). "Challenges to the Liberal Order: Reflections on International Organization". International Organization. 75 (2): 225–257. doi:10.1017/S0020818320000636. ISSN 0020-8183.
  3. ^ Lascurettes, Kyle M. (2020). Orders of Exclusion: Great Powers and the Strategic Sources of Foundational Rules in International Relations. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-006854-7.
  4. ^ a b c Barnett, Michael (2021). "International Progress, International Order, and the Liberal International Order". The Chinese Journal of International Politics. 14 (1): 1–22. doi:10.1093/cjip/poaa019. ISSN 1750-8916. PMC 7989545.
  5. ^ Martha Finnemore (2009). "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked Up to Be". World Politics. 61 (1): 58–85. doi:10.1353/wp.0.0027. ISSN 1086-3338.
  6. ^ Martha Finnemore (2009). "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked Up to Be". World Politics. 61 (1): 58–85. doi:10.1353/wp.0.0027. ISSN 1086-3338.
  7. ^ Lawson, George (2016). The rise of modern international order (PDF). Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/hepl/9780198739852.003.0002. ISBN 978-0-19-185085-1. Archived from the original on 2021. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |archive-date= (help)
  8. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2019). "Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order". International Security. 43 (4): 7–50. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00342. ISSN 0162-2889.
  9. ^ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars. Princeton University Press. pp. 23, 29–31. ISBN 978-0-691-05091-1.
  10. ^ Barnett, Michael (1995). "The New United Nations Politics of Peace: From Juridical Sovereignty to Empirical Sovereignty". Global Governance. 1 (1): 79–97. ISSN 1075-2846.
  11. ^ a b Colgan, Jeff D. (2021). Partial Hegemony: Oil Politics and International Order. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-754640-6.
  12. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Lake, David A.; Martin, Lisa L.; Risse, Thomas (2021). "Challenges to the Liberal Order: Reflections on International Organization". International Organization. 75 (2): 225–257. doi:10.1017/S0020818320000636. ISSN 0020-8183.
  13. ^ Ikenberry, G. John (2018). "The end of liberal international order?" (PDF). International Affairs. 94 (1): 7–23. doi:10.1093/ia/iix241. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2 July 2020 – via OpenScholar @ Princeton.
  14. ^ Norrlof, Carla; Poast, Paul; Cohen, Benjamin J; Croteau, Sabreena; Khanna, Aashna; McDowell, Daniel; Wang, Hongying; Winecoff, W Kindred (2020). "Global Monetary Order and the Liberal Order Debate". International Studies Perspectives. 21 (2): 109–153. doi:10.1093/isp/ekaa001. ISSN 1528-3577.
  15. ^ Wright, Thomas (12 September 2018). "The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on 2 July 2020. Retrieved 23 July 2020.
  16. ^ Ikenberry, G. John (2001). After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-05090-4. JSTOR j.ctt7t1s5.
  17. ^ Mearsheimer, John J. (2018). Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-23419-0. JSTOR j.ctv5cgb1w.
  18. ^ Barnett, Michael (2019). "The End of a Liberal International Order That Never Existed • The Global". The Global. Retrieved 2021-02-23.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  19. ^ a b c d Mearsheimer, John J. (2019). "Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order". International Security. 43 (4): 7–50. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00342. ISSN 0162-2889.
  20. ^ a b Börzel, Tanja A.; Zürn, Michael (2021). "Contestations of the Liberal International Order: From Liberal Multilateralism to Postnational Liberalism". International Organization. 75 (2): 282–305. doi:10.1017/S0020818320000570. ISSN 0020-8183.
  21. ^ Flaherty, Thomas M.; Rogowski, Ronald (2021). "Rising Inequality As a Threat to the Liberal International Order". International Organization. 75 (2): 495–523. doi:10.1017/S0020818321000163. ISSN 0020-8183.
  22. ^ Broz, J. Lawrence; Frieden, Jeffry; Weymouth, Stephen (2021). "Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash". International Organization. 75 (2): 464–494. doi:10.1017/S0020818320000314. ISSN 0020-8183.
  23. ^ a b Goldstein, Judith; Gulotty, Robert (2021). "America and the Trade Regime: What Went Wrong?". International Organization. 75 (2): 524–557. doi:10.1017/S002081832000065X. ISSN 0020-8183.
  24. ^ Ruggie, John Gerard (1982). "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order". International Organization. 36 (2): 379–415. doi:10.1017/S0020818300018993. ISSN 0020-8183. JSTOR 2706527.
  25. ^ Mansfield, Edward D.; Rudra, Nita (2021). "Embedded Liberalism in the Digital Era". International Organization. 75 (2): 558–585. doi:10.1017/S0020818320000569. ISSN 0020-8183. SSRN 3719975.
  26. ^ a b Farrell, Henry; Newman, Abraham L. (2021). "The Janus Face of the Liberal International Information Order: When Global Institutions Are Self-Undermining". International Organization. 75 (2): 333–358. doi:10.1017/S0020818320000302. ISSN 0020-8183.
  27. ^ a b Weiss, Jessica Chen; Wallace, Jeremy L. (2021). "Domestic Politics, China's Rise, and the Future of the Liberal International Order". International Organization. 75 (2): 635–664. doi:10.1017/S002081832000048X. ISSN 0020-8183.
  28. ^ a b Adler-Nissen, Rebecca; Zarakol, Ayşe (2021). "Struggles for Recognition: The Liberal International Order and the Merger of Its Discontents". International Organization. 75 (2): 611–634. doi:10.1017/S0020818320000454. ISSN 0020-8183. S2CID 234364938.
  29. ^ Cooley, Alexander; Nexon, Daniel (2021-04-29). "The Illiberal Tide". Foreign Affairs. ISSN 0015-7120. Retrieved 2021-12-08.
  30. ^ Kristinsson, Thorsteinn (2021). "Networks of order in East Asia: Beyond hegemonic theories of the Liberal International Order". International Politics. doi:10.1057/s41311-021-00361-w. ISSN 1740-3898. S2CID 240415250.
  31. ^ a b Beckley, Michael (2022-02-15). "Enemies of My Enemy". ISSN 0015-7120. Retrieved 2022-02-19. The liberal order, like all international orders, is a form of organized hypocrisy that contains the seeds of its own demise. To forge a cohesive community, order builders have to exclude hostile nations, outlaw uncooperative behaviors, and squelch domestic opposition to international rule-making. These inherently repressive acts eventually trigger a backlash.
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