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In psychology, the human mind is considered to be a cognitive miser due to the tendency of humans to think and solve problems in simpler and less effortful ways rather than in more sophisticated and more effortful ways, regardless of intelligence.^[1] Just as a miser seeks to avoid spending money, the human mind often seeks to avoid spending effort. The cognitive miser theory is an umbrella theory of cognition that brings together previous research on heuristics and attributional biases to explain how and why people are cognitive misers.^[2]^[3]

The term cognitive miser was first introduced by Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor in 1984. It is an important concept in social cognition theory and has been influential in other social sciences including but not exclusive to economics and political science.^[2]

Background

The naïve scientist and attribution theory

Before Fiske and Taylor's cognitive miser theory, the predominant model of social cognition was the naïve scientist. First proposed in 1958 by Fritz Heider in The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations, this theory holds that humans think and act with dispassionate rationality whilst engaging in detailed and nuanced thought processes for both complex and routine actions.^[4] In this way, humans were thought to think like scientists, albeit naïve ones, measuring and analyzing the world around them. Applying this framework to human thought processes, naïve scientists seek the consistency and stability that comes from a coherent view of the world and need for environmental control.^[5]^{[page needed]}

In order to meet these needs, naïve scientists make attributions.^[6]^{[page needed]} Thus, attribution theory emerged from the study of the ways in which individuals assess causal relationships and mechanisms.^[7] Through the study of causal attributions, led by Harold Kelley and Bernard Weiner amongst others, social psychologists began to observe that subjects regularly demonstrate several attributional biases including but not limited to the fundamental attribution error.^[8]

The study of attributions had two effects: it created further interest in testing the naive scientist and opened up a new wave of social psychology research that questioned its explanatory power. This second effect helped to lay the foundation for Fiske and Taylor's cognitive miser.^[5]^{[page needed]}

Heuristics

Much of the cognitive miser theory is built upon work done on heuristics in judgment and decision-making,^[9]^{[page needed]} most notably Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman results published in a series of influential articles.^[10]^[11]^[12] Heuristics can be defined as the "judgmental shortcuts that generally get us where we need to go—and quickly—but at the cost of occasionally sending us off course."^[13] In their work, Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated that people rely upon different types of heuristics or mental short cuts in order to save time and mental energy.^[12] However, in relying upon heuristics instead of detailed analysis, like the information processing employed by Heider's naïve scientist, biased information processing is more likely to occur.^[5]^{[page needed]} Some of these heuristics include the representativeness heuristic (the inclination to assign specific attributes to an individual the more he/she matches the prototype of that group),^[10] availability heuristic (the inclination to judge the likelihood of something occurring because of the ease of thinking of examples of that event occurring)^[5]^{[page needed]}^[10] and anchoring heuristic (the inclination to overweight the importance and influence of an initial piece of information).^[12] The frequency with which Kahneman and Tversky and other attribution researchers found the individuals employed mental shortcuts to make decisions and assessments laid important groundwork for the overarching idea that individuals and their minds act efficiently instead of analytically.^[9]^{[page needed]}

The cognitive miser theory

The wave of research on attributional biases done by Kahneman, Tversky and others effectively ended the dominance of Heider's naïve scientist within social psychology.^[9] Fiske and Taylor, building upon the prevalence of heuristics in human cognition, offered their theory of the cognitive miser. It is, in many ways, a unifying theory which suggests that humans engage in economically prudent thought processes, instead of acting like scientists who rationally weigh costs and benefits, test hypothesis, and update expectations based upon the results of the experiments that are our everyday actions.^[2] In other words, humans are more inclined to act as cognitive misers using mental short cuts to make assessments and decisions, about issues and ideas about which they know very little as well as issues of great salience. Fiske and Taylor argue that acting as cognitive misers is rational due to the sheer volume and intensity of information and stimuli humans intake^[2]^[14] However, other psychologists also argue that the cognitively miserly tendency of humans is a primary reason why "humans are often less than rational".^[3]

Implications

The implications of this theory raise important questions about both cognition and human behavior. In addition to streamlining cognition in complicated, analytical tasks, cognitive misers are also at work when dealing with unfamiliar issues as well as issues of great importance.^[2]^[14] Voting behavior in democracies are an arena in which the cognitive miser is at work. Acting as a cognitive miser should lead those with expertise in an area to more efficient information processing and streamlined decision making.^[15] However, as Lau and Redlawsk note, acting as cognitive miser who employs heuristics can have very different results for high-information and low-information voters. They write, "...cognitive heuristics are at times employed by almost all voters, and that they are particularly likely to be used when the choice situation facing voters is complex... heuristic use generally increases the probability of a correct vote by political experts but decreases the probability of a correct vote by novices."^[15] In democracies, where no vote is weighted more or less because of the expertise behind its casting, low-information voters, acting as cognitive misers, can have broad and potentially deleterious choices for a society.^[15]

Updates and later research

Later models suggest that the cognitive miser and the naïve scientist create two poles of social cognition that are too monolithic. Instead, Fiske, Taylor, and Arie W. Kruglanski and other social psychologists offer an alternative explanation of social cognition: the motivated tactician.^[2] According to this theory, people employ either shortcuts or thoughtful analysis based upon the context and salience of a particular issue. In other words, this theory suggests that humans are, in fact, both naive scientists and cognitive misers.^[5]^{[page needed]}

References

^ Stanovich, Keith E. (2009). "The cognitive miser: ways to avoid thinking". What intelligence tests miss: the psychology of rational thought. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 70–85. ISBN 9780300123852. OCLC 216936066. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f Fiske, Susan T.; Taylor, Shelley E. (1991). Social cognition (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. ISBN 0070211914. OCLC 22810253.
^ ^a ^b Toplak, Maggie E.; West, Richard F.; Stanovich, Keith E. (April 2014). "Assessing miserly information processing: an expansion of the Cognitive Reflection Test". Thinking & Reasoning. 20 (2): 147–168. doi:10.1080/13546783.2013.844729.
^ Heider, Fritz (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations (1st ed.). New York: John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 0898592828. OCLC 225326.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e Crisp, Richard J.; Turner, Rhiannon N. (2014). Essential social psychology (3rd ed.). New York: Sage Publications. ISBN 9781446270769. OCLC 873005953.
^ Kassin, Saul; Fein, Steven; Markus, Hazel Rose (2016). Social psychology (10th ed.). Cengage Learning. ISBN 9781305580220. OCLC 952391832.
^ Ross, Lee (1977). "The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: distortions in the attribution process". In Berkowitz, Leonard (ed.). Advances in experimental social psychology. Vol. 10. New York: Academic Press. pp. 173–220. ISBN 012015210X. OCLC 1283539.
^ Jones, Edward E.; Harris, Victor A. (1967). "The attribution of attitudes". Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 3 (1): 1–24. doi:10.1016/0022-1031(67)90034-0.
^ ^a ^b ^c Barone, David F.; Maddux, James E.; Snyder, Charles R. (1997). Social cognitive psychology: history and current domains (1st ed.). New York: Plenum Press. ISBN 0306454750. OCLC 36330837.
^ ^a ^b ^c Kahneman, Daniel; Tversky, Amos (1973). "On the psychology of prediction". Psychological Review. 80 (4): 237–251. doi:10.1037/h0034747.
^ Tversky, Amos; Kahneman, Daniel (1973). "Availability: a heuristic for judging frequency and probability". Cognitive Psychology. 5 (2): 207–232. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9.
^ ^a ^b ^c Tversky, Amos; Kahneman, Daniel (1974). "Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases". Science. 185 (4157): 1124–1131. doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124. PMID 17835457.
^ Gilovich, Thomas; Savitsky, Kenneth (1996). "Like goes with like: the role of representativeness in erroneous and pseudoscientific beliefs" (PDF). The Skeptical Inquirer. 20 (2): 34–40.
^ ^a ^b Scheufele, Dietram A.; Lewenstein, Bruce V. (17 May 2005). "The public and nanotechnology: how citizens make sense of emerging technologies". Journal of Nanoparticle Research. 7: 659–667 [660]. doi:10.1007/s11051-005-7526-2.
^ ^a ^b ^c Lau, Richard R.; David P. Redlawsk (4 Oct 2001). "Advantages and disadvantages of cognitive heuristics in political decision making". American Journal of Political Science. 45: 951–971. doi:10.2307/2669334. JSTOR 2669334.

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+In [[psychology]], the human mind is considered to be a '''cognitive miser''' due to the tendency of humans to think and solve problems in simpler and less effortful ways rather than in more sophisticated and more effortful ways, regardless of intelligence.<ref name="Stanovich2009">{{cite book |last=Stanovich |first=Keith E. |authorlink=Keith Stanovich |date=2009 |chapter=The cognitive miser: ways to avoid thinking |title=What intelligence tests miss: the psychology of rational thought |location=New Haven |publisher=[[Yale University Press]] |pages=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2SQvleDwn9YC&pg=PA70 70–85] |isbn=9780300123852 |oclc=216936066 |ref=harv}}</ref> Just as a [[miser]] seeks to avoid spending money, the human mind often seeks to avoid spending effort. The cognitive miser theory is an umbrella [[theory]] of [[cognition]] that brings together previous research on [[heuristic]]s and [[attributional bias]]es to explain how and why people are cognitive misers.<ref name="Fiske&Taylor1991">{{cite book |last1=Fiske |first1=Susan T. |authorlink1=Susan Fiske |last2=Taylor |first2=Shelley E. |authorlink2=Shelley Taylor |year=1991 |title=Social cognition |edition=2nd |location=New York |publisher=[[McGraw-Hill]] |isbn=0070211914 |oclc=22810253}}</ref><ref name="ToplakWestStanovich2014">{{cite journal |last1=Toplak |first1=Maggie E. |last2=West |first2=Richard F. |last3=Stanovich |first3=Keith E. |authorlink3=Keith Stanovich |date=April 2014 |title=Assessing miserly information processing: an expansion of the Cognitive Reflection Test |journal=Thinking & Reasoning |volume=20 |issue=2 |pages=147–168 |doi=10.1080/13546783.2013.844729}}</ref>
-Within [[social psychology]], '''cognitive miser''' is an umbrella [[theory]] of [[social cognition]] that brings together previous research on heuristics and attributional biases.<ref name=Fiske&Taylor1991>{{cite book|author1=Fiske, S.T. |author2= Taylor, S.E. |last-author-amp=yes|year=1991|title=Social Cognition|edition=2nd |location=New York|publisher=McGraw-Hill|isbn=0070211914}}</ref> The theory suggests that humans, valuing their mental processing resources, find different ways to save time and effort when negotiating the [[social world]]. The term '''cognitive miser''' was first introduced by [[Susan Fiske]] and [[Shelley Taylor]] in 1984. It is an important concept in social cognition theory and has been influential in other [[social science]]s including but not exclusive to [[economics]] and [[political science]].<ref name= "Fiske&Taylor1991"/>
+The term ''cognitive miser'' was first introduced by [[Susan Fiske]] and [[Shelley Taylor]] in 1984. It is an important concept in [[social cognition]] theory and has been influential in other [[social science]]s including but not exclusive to [[economics]] and [[political science]].<ref name="Fiske&Taylor1991"/>
 ==Background==
-===The Naïve Scientist and Attribution Theory===
+===The naïve scientist and attribution theory===
-Before Fiske and Taylor's '''cognitive miser''' theory, the predominant model of social cognition was the [[naïve scientist]]. First proposed in 1958 by [[Fritz Heider]] in ''The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations,'' this theory holds that humans think and act with dispassionate [[rationality]] whilst engaging in detailed and nuanced thought processes for both complex and routine actions.<ref>{{cite book|author=Heider, Fritz|year=1958|title=The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations|edition=1st |location=New York|publisher=John Wiley & Sons|isbn=0898592828}}</ref>  In this way, humans were thought to think like scientists, albeit naïve ones, measuring and analyzing the world around them. Applying this framework to human thought processes, naïve scientists seek the consistency and stability that comes from a coherent view of the world and need for environmental control.<ref name="CrispTurner2010">{{cite book|author1=Crisp, Richard J.  |author2=Turner, Rihannon N.|year=2010|title=Essential Social Psychology|edition=1st |location=New York|publisher=Sage Publications|isbn= 1849203865}}</ref>
+Before Fiske and Taylor's cognitive miser theory, the predominant model of social cognition was the naïve scientist. First proposed in 1958 by [[Fritz Heider]] in ''The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations,'' this theory holds that humans think and act with dispassionate [[rationality]] whilst engaging in detailed and nuanced thought processes for both complex and routine actions.<ref>{{cite book |last=Heider |first=Fritz |authorlink=Fritz Heider |year=1958 |title=The psychology of interpersonal relations |edition=1st |location=New York |publisher=[[John Wiley & Sons]] |isbn=0898592828 |oclc=225326}}</ref> In this way, humans were thought to think like scientists, albeit naïve ones, measuring and analyzing the world around them. Applying this framework to human thought processes, naïve scientists seek the consistency and stability that comes from a coherent view of the world and need for environmental control.<ref name="CrispTurner2014">{{cite book |last1=Crisp |first1=Richard J. |last2=Turner |first2=Rhiannon N. |year=2014 |title=Essential social psychology |edition=3rd |location=New York |publisher=[[Sage Publications]] |isbn=9781446270769 |oclc=873005953}}</ref>{{Page needed|date=October 2016}}
-In order to meet these needs, naïve scientists make [[attribution (psychology)|attribution]]s.<ref name="KassinFein&Markus2008">Kassin, Fein, Markus. ''Social Psychology''. Wadsworth: Cengage Learning, 2008</ref> Thus, attribution theory emerged from the study of the ways in which individuals assess causal relationships and mechanisms.<ref>{{cite book |last=Ross |first=L. |year=1977 |chapter=The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process |editor-first=L. |editor-last=Berkowitz |title=Advances in experimental social psychology |volume=10 |pages=173–220 |location=New York |publisher=Academic Press |isbn=0-12-015210-X }}</ref> Through the study of causal attributions, led by [[Harold Kelley]] and [[Bernard Weiner]] amongst others, social psychologists began to observe that subjects regularly demonstrate several attributional biases including but not limited to the [[fundamental attribution error]].<ref name="JonesHarris67">{{cite journal |last=Jones |first=E. E. |last2=Harris |first2=V. A. |year=1967 |title=The attribution of attitudes |journal=Journal of Experimental Social Psychology |volume=3 |issue=1 |pages=1–24 |doi=10.1016/0022-1031(67)90034-0 }}</ref>
+In order to meet these needs, naïve scientists make [[attribution (psychology)|attribution]]s.<ref name="KassinFein&Markus2016">{{cite book |last1=Kassin |first1=Saul |authorlink1=Saul Kassin |last2=Fein |first2=Steven |authorlink2=Steven Fein |last3=Markus |first3=Hazel Rose |authorlink3=Hazel Rose Markus |date=2016 |title=Social psychology |edition=10th |publisher=[[Cengage Learning]] |isbn=9781305580220 |oclc=952391832}}</ref>{{Page needed|date=October 2016}} Thus, attribution theory emerged from the study of the ways in which individuals assess causal relationships and mechanisms.<ref>{{cite book |last=Ross |first=Lee |authorlink=Lee Ross |year=1977 |chapter=The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: distortions in the attribution process |editor-first=Leonard |editor-last=Berkowitz |title=Advances in experimental social psychology |volume=10 |pages=173–220 |location=New York |publisher=[[Academic Press]] |isbn=012015210X |oclc=1283539}}</ref> Through the study of causal attributions, led by [[Harold Kelley]] and [[Bernard Weiner]] amongst others, social psychologists began to observe that subjects regularly demonstrate several attributional biases including but not limited to the [[fundamental attribution error]].<ref name="JonesHarris67">{{cite journal |last=Jones |first=Edward E. |last2=Harris |first2=Victor A. |year=1967 |title=The attribution of attitudes |journal=[[Journal of Experimental Social Psychology]] |volume=3 |issue=1 |pages=1–24 |doi=10.1016/0022-1031(67)90034-0}}</ref>
-The study of attributions had two effects: it created further interest in testing the naive scientist and opened up a new wave of social psychology research that questioned its explanatory power. This second effect helped to lay the foundation for Fiske and Taylor's '''cognitive miser'''.<ref name= "CrispTurner2010"/>
+The study of attributions had two effects: it created further interest in testing the naive scientist and opened up a new wave of [[social psychology]] research that questioned its explanatory power. This second effect helped to lay the foundation for Fiske and Taylor's cognitive miser.<ref name="CrispTurner2014"/>{{Page needed|date=October 2016}}
 ===Heuristics===
-Much of the '''cognitive miser''' theory is built upon work done on [[Heuristics in judgment and decision making|heuristics]],<ref name=BaroneMadduxSnyder1997>{{cite book|author1=Barone, David F. |author2=Maddux, James E. |author3= Snyder, C.R. |last-author-amp=yes |year=1997|title=Social Cognitive Psychology: History and Current Domains |edition=1st |location=New York|publisher=Plenum Press|isbn= 0306454750}}</ref> most notably [[Amos Tversky]] and [[Daniel Kahneman]] results published in a series of influential articles.<ref name=Kahneman&Tversky1973>{{Cite journal | doi = 10.1037/h0034747 | last1 = Kahneman | first1 = D. | last2 = Tversky | first2 = A. | year = 1973 | title = On the psychology of prediction | url = | journal = Psychological Review | volume = 80 | issue = 4| pages = 237–251 }}</ref><ref name=Tversky&Kahneman1973>{{Cite journal | doi = 10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9 | last1 = Tversky | first1 = A. | last2 = Kahneman | first2 = D. | year = 1973 | title = Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability | url = | journal = Cognitive Psychology | volume = 5 | issue = 2| pages = 207–232 }}</ref><ref name=Tversky&Kahneman1974>{{Cite journal | doi = 10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 | last1 = Tversky | first1 = A. | last2 = Kahneman | first2 = D. | year = 1974 | title = Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases | url = http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/185/4157/1124?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=Judgment+Under+Uncertainty%3A+Heuristics+and+Biases&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT | journal = Science | volume = 185 | issue = 4157| pages = 1124–1131 | pmid = 17835457 }}</ref> Heuristics can be defined as the, “judgmental shortcuts that generally get us where we need to go – and quickly – but at the cost of occasionally sending us off course.” <ref name="Gilovich&Savitsky1996">{{cite journal|last1=Gilovich|first1=Thomas|last2=Savitsky|first2=Kenneth|title=Like goes with like: the role of representativeness in erroneous and pseudoscientific beliefs|journal=The Skeptical Inquirer|date=1996|volume=20|issue=2|pages=34–40 |url=http://wayback.archive.org/web/20160307104353/https://web.viu.ca/burnleyc/Psychology%20331/Like%20Goes%20with%20Like.pdf}}</ref> In their work, Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated that people rely upon different types of heuristics or mental short cuts in order to save time and mental energy.<ref name= "Tversky&Kahneman1974"/> However, in relying upon heuristics instead of detailed analysis, like the information processing employed by Heider's naïve scientist, biased information processing is more likely to occur.<ref name= "CrispTurner2010"/> Some of these heuristics include the [[representativeness heuristic]] (the inclination to assign specific attributes to an individual the more he/she matches the prototype of that group),<ref name="Kahneman&Tversky1973"/> [[availability heuristic]] (the inclination to judge the likelihood of something occurring because of the ease of thinking of examples of that event occurring)<ref name= "CrispTurner2010"/><ref name="Kahneman&Tversky1973"/> and [[anchoring]] heuristic (the inclination to overweight the importance and influence of an initial piece of information).<ref name="Tversky&Kahneman1974"/> The frequency with which Kahneman and Tversky and other attribution researchers found the individuals employed mental shortcuts to make decisions and assessments laid important groundwork for the overarching idea that individuals and their minds act efficiently instead of analytically.<ref name= "BaroneMadduxSnyder1997"/>
+Much of the cognitive miser theory is built upon work done on [[heuristics in judgment and decision-making]],<ref name=BaroneMadduxSnyder1997>{{cite book|last1=Barone |first1=David F. |last2=Maddux |first2=James E. |last3=Snyder, Charles R. |authorlink3=Charles R. Snyder |year=1997|title=Social cognitive psychology: history and current domains |edition=1st |location=New York |publisher=[[Plenum Press]] |isbn=0306454750 |oclc=36330837}}</ref>{{Page needed|date=October 2016}} most notably [[Amos Tversky]] and [[Daniel Kahneman]] results published in a series of influential articles.<ref name=Kahneman&Tversky1973>{{Cite journal |doi=10.1037/h0034747 |last1=Kahneman |first1=Daniel |authorlink1=Daniel Kahneman |last2=Tversky |first2=Amos |authorlink2=Amos Tversky |year=1973 |title=On the psychology of prediction |url=|journal=[[Psychological Review]] |volume=80 |issue=4| pages=237–251}}</ref><ref name=Tversky&Kahneman1973>{{Cite journal |doi=10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9 |last1=Tversky |first1=Amos |authorlink1=Amos Tversky |last2=Kahneman |first2=Daniel |authorlink2=Daniel Kahneman |year=1973 |title=Availability: a heuristic for judging frequency and probability |url=|journal=Cognitive Psychology |volume=5 |issue=2| pages=207–232}}</ref><ref name=Tversky&Kahneman1974>{{Cite journal |doi=10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 |last1=Tversky |first1=Amos |authorlink1=Amos Tversky |last2=Kahneman |first2=Daniel |authorlink2=Daniel Kahneman |year=1974 |title=Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases |journal=[[Science (journal)|Science]] |volume=185 |issue=4157| pages=1124–1131 |pmid=17835457}}</ref> Heuristics can be defined as the "judgmental shortcuts that generally get us where we need to go—and quickly—but at the cost of occasionally sending us off course."<ref name="Gilovich&Savitsky1996">{{cite journal |last1=Gilovich |first1=Thomas |authorlink=Thomas Gilovich  |last2=Savitsky |first2=Kenneth |title=Like goes with like: the role of representativeness in erroneous and pseudoscientific beliefs |journal=The Skeptical Inquirer |date=1996 |volume=20 |issue=2 |pages=34–40 |url=http://wayback.archive.org/web/20160307104353/https://web.viu.ca/burnleyc/Psychology%20331/Like%20Goes%20with%20Like.pdf}}</ref> In their work, Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated that people rely upon different types of heuristics or mental short cuts in order to save time and mental energy.<ref name="Tversky&Kahneman1974"/> However, in relying upon heuristics instead of detailed analysis, like the information processing employed by Heider's naïve scientist, biased information processing is more likely to occur.<ref name="CrispTurner2014"/>{{Page needed|date=October 2016}} Some of these heuristics include the [[representativeness heuristic]] (the inclination to assign specific attributes to an individual the more he/she matches the prototype of that group),<ref name="Kahneman&Tversky1973"/> [[availability heuristic]] (the inclination to judge the likelihood of something occurring because of the ease of thinking of examples of that event occurring)<ref name="CrispTurner2014"/>{{Page needed|date=October 2016}}<ref name="Kahneman&Tversky1973"/> and [[anchoring]] heuristic (the inclination to overweight the importance and influence of an initial piece of information).<ref name="Tversky&Kahneman1974"/> The frequency with which Kahneman and Tversky and other attribution researchers found the individuals employed mental shortcuts to make decisions and assessments laid important groundwork for the overarching idea that individuals and their minds act efficiently instead of analytically.<ref name="BaroneMadduxSnyder1997"/>{{Page needed|date=October 2016}}
-==The Cognitive Miser Theory==
+==The cognitive miser theory==
-The wave of research on attributional biases done by Kahneman, Tversky and others effectively signaled the death knell for the dominance of Heider's naïve scientist within social psychology.<ref name= "BaroneMadduxSnyder1997"/> Fiske and Taylor, building upon the prevalence of heuristics in human cognition, offered their theory of the cognitive miser. It is, in many ways, a unifying theory which suggests that humans engage in economically prudent thought processes, instead of acting like scientists who rationally weigh costs and benefits, test hypothesis, and update expectations based upon the results of the experiments that are our everyday actions.<ref name= "Fiske&Taylor1991"/> In other words, humans are more inclined to act as cognitive misers using mental short cuts to make assessments  and decisions, about issues and ideas about which they know very little as well as issues of great salience. Fiske and Taylor argue that acting as cognitive misers is rational due to the sheer volume and intensity of information and stimuli humans intake<ref name= "Fiske&Taylor1991"/><ref name=nano>{{cite journal|last=Scheufele|first=Dietram A.|author2=Bruce V. Lewenstein|title=The public and nanotechnology: How citizens make sense of emerging technologies|journal=Journal of Nanoparticle Research|date=17 May 2005|volume=7|pages=659–667|doi=10.1007/s11051-005-7526-2}}</ref> In addition to streamlining cognition in complicated, analytical tasks, cognitive misers are also at work when dealing with unfamiliar as well as issues of great salience.<ref name= "Fiske&Taylor1991"/><ref name=nano/>
+The wave of research on attributional biases done by Kahneman, Tversky and others effectively ended the dominance of Heider's naïve scientist within social psychology.<ref name="BaroneMadduxSnyder1997"/> Fiske and Taylor, building upon the prevalence of heuristics in human cognition, offered their theory of the cognitive miser. It is, in many ways, a unifying theory which suggests that humans engage in economically prudent thought processes, instead of acting like scientists who rationally weigh costs and benefits, test hypothesis, and update expectations based upon the results of the experiments that are our everyday actions.<ref name="Fiske&Taylor1991"/> In other words, humans are more inclined to act as cognitive misers using mental short cuts to make assessments and decisions, about issues and ideas about which they know very little as well as issues of great salience. Fiske and Taylor argue that acting as cognitive misers is rational due to the sheer volume and intensity of information and stimuli humans intake<ref name="Fiske&Taylor1991"/><ref name=nano>{{cite journal |last=Scheufele |first=Dietram A. |last2=Lewenstein |first2=Bruce V. |title=The public and nanotechnology: how citizens make sense of emerging technologies |journal=Journal of Nanoparticle Research |date=17 May 2005 |volume=7 |pages=659–667 [660] |doi=10.1007/s11051-005-7526-2}}</ref> However, other psychologists also argue that the cognitively miserly tendency of humans is a primary reason why "humans are often less than rational".<ref name="ToplakWestStanovich2014"/>
 ===Implications===
-The implications for this theory are profound and raise important questions about both [[cognition]] and [[human behavior]]. In addition to streamlining cognition in complicated, analytical tasks, cognitive misers are also at work when dealing with unfamiliar issues as well as issues of great importance.<ref name= "Fiske&Taylor1991"/><ref name=nano/> One can look to voting behavior in democracies as an arena in which the cognitive miser is at work. Acting as a cognitive miser should lead those with expertise in an area to more efficient information processing and streamlined decision making.<ref name=LauRedlawsk2001>{{cite journal|last=Lau|first=Richard R.|author2=David P. Redlawsk|title=Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making|journal=American Journal of Political Science|date=4 Oct 2001|volume=45|pages=951–971|jstor=2669334|doi=10.2307/2669334}}</ref> However, as Lau and Redlawsk note, acting as cognitive miser who employs heuristics can have very different results for high-information and [[low-information voter]]s. They write, "...cognitive heuristics are at times employed by almost all voters, and that they are particularly likely to be used when the choice situation facing voters is complex...heuristic use generally increases the probability of a correct vote by political experts but decreases the probability of a correct vote by novices."<ref name= "LauRedlawsk2001"/> In democracies, where no vote is weighted more or less because of the expertise behind its casting, low-information voters, acting as cognitive misers, can have broad and potentially deleterious choices for a society.<ref name= "LauRedlawsk2001"/>
+The implications of this theory raise important questions about both [[cognition]] and [[human behavior]]. In addition to streamlining cognition in complicated, analytical tasks, cognitive misers are also at work when dealing with unfamiliar issues as well as issues of great importance.<ref name="Fiske&Taylor1991"/><ref name=nano/> Voting behavior in democracies are an arena in which the cognitive miser is at work. Acting as a cognitive miser should lead those with expertise in an area to more efficient information processing and streamlined decision making.<ref name=LauRedlawsk2001>{{cite journal |last=Lau |first=Richard R. |author2=David P. Redlawsk |title=Advantages and disadvantages of cognitive heuristics in political decision making |journal=[[American Journal of Political Science]] |date=4 Oct 2001 |volume=45 |pages=951–971 |jstor=2669334 |doi=10.2307/2669334}}</ref> However, as Lau and Redlawsk note, acting as cognitive miser who employs heuristics can have very different results for high-information and [[low-information voter]]s. They write, "...cognitive heuristics are at times employed by almost all voters, and that they are particularly likely to be used when the choice situation facing voters is complex... heuristic use generally increases the probability of a correct vote by political experts but decreases the probability of a correct vote by novices."<ref name="LauRedlawsk2001"/> In democracies, where no vote is weighted more or less because of the expertise behind its casting, low-information voters, acting as cognitive misers, can have broad and potentially deleterious choices for a society.<ref name="LauRedlawsk2001"/>
 ==Updates and later research==
-Later models suggest that the '''cognitive miser''' and the naïve scientist create two poles of social cognition that are too monolithic. Instead, Fiske, Taylor, and [[Arie W. Kruglanski]] and other social psychologists offer an alternative explanation of social cognition: the [[motivated tactician]].<ref name= "Fiske&Taylor1991"/> According to this theory, people employ either shortcuts or thoughtful analysis based upon the context and salience of a particular issue. In other words, this theory suggests that humans are, in fact, ''both'' naive scientists and '''cognitive miser'''s.<ref name= "CrispTurner2010"/>
+Later models suggest that the cognitive miser and the naïve scientist create two poles of social cognition that are too monolithic. Instead, Fiske, Taylor, and [[Arie W. Kruglanski]] and other social psychologists offer an alternative explanation of social cognition: the [[motivated tactician]].<ref name="Fiske&Taylor1991"/> According to this theory, people employ either shortcuts or thoughtful analysis based upon the context and salience of a particular issue. In other words, this theory suggests that humans are, in fact, ''both'' naive scientists and cognitive misers.<ref name="CrispTurner2014"/>{{Page needed|date=October 2016}}
 ==See also==
-* [[Confirmation bias]]
-* [[Motivated reasoning]]
 * [[Bounded rationality]]
-* [[Motivated Tactician]]
+* [[Motivated reasoning]]
+* [[Representativeness heuristic]]
-* [[Social Psychology]]
-* [[Social Cognition]]
-* [[Cognition]]
-* [[Human behavior]]
-* [[Representativeness heuristic]]
-* [[Availability Heuristic]]
-* [[Anchoring]] Heuristic
-* [[Heuristic]]
-* [[Amos Tversky]]
-* [[Daniel Kahneman]]
-* [[Susan Fiske]]
-* [[Shelley Taylor]]
-* [[Arie W. Kruglanski]]
 ==References==
 {{reflist}}
-===Bibliography===
+==Further reading==
-* {{cite journal | last1 = Fiske | first1 = S.T. | year = 1992 | title = Thinking is for doing: Portraits of social cognition from Daguerrotypes to Laserphoto | url = | journal = Journal of Personality and Social Psychology | volume = 63 | issue = | pages = 877–839 | doi=10.1037/0022-3514.63.6.877}}
+* {{cite journal |last1=Barr |first1=Nathaniel |last2=Pennycook |first2=Gordon |last3=Stolz |first3=Jennifer A. |last4=Fugelsang |first4=Jonathan A. |date=July 2015 |title=The brain in your pocket: evidence that smartphones are used to supplant thinking |journal=[[Computers in Human Behavior]] |volume=48 |pages=473–480 |doi=10.1016/j.chb.2015.02.029}}
+* {{cite journal |last1=De Neys |first1=Wim |last2=Rossi |first2=Sandrine |last3=Houdé |first3=Olivier |date=April 2013 |title=Bats, balls, and substitution sensitivity: cognitive misers are no happy fools |journal=[[Psychonomic Bulletin & Review]] |volume=20 |issue=2 |pages=269–273 |doi=10.3758/s13423-013-0384-5 |pmid=23417270}}
+* {{cite book |last=Stanovich |first=Keith E. |authorlink=Keith Stanovich |date=2011 |chapter=The cognitive miser and focal bias |title=Rationality and the reflective mind |location=New York |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |pages=[https://books.google.com/books?id=CDAmuKTE8BsC&pg=PA65 65–71] |isbn=9780195341140 |oclc=648932780 |doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341140.003.0004}}
+{{Biases}}
 [[Category:Cognition]]

v t e Biases
Cognitive biases	Acquiescence Ambiguity Affinity Anchoring Attentional Attribution Actor–observer Correspondence Authority Automation Availability Mean world Belief Blind spot Choice-supportive Commitment Confirmation Compassion fade Congruence Cultural Distinction Dunning–Kruger Egocentric Curse of knowledge Emotional Extrinsic incentives Fading affect Framing Frequency Frog pond effect Halo effect Hindsight Horn effect Hostile attribution Impact Implicit In-group Illusion of transparency Mean world syndrome Mere-exposure effect Negativity Normalcy Omission Optimism Out-group homogeneity Outcome Overton window Precision Present Pro-innovation Response Restraint Self-serving Social comparison Social influence bias Spotlight Status quo Substitution Time-saving Trait ascription Turkey illusion von Restorff effect Zero-risk In animals
Statistical biases	Estimator Forecast Healthy user Information Psychological Lead time Length time Non-response Observer Omitted-variable Participation Recall Sampling Selection Self-selection Social desirability Spectrum Survivorship Systematic error Systemic Verification Wet
Other biases	Academic Basking in reflected glory Funding FUTON Inductive Infrastructure Inherent In education Liking gap Media False balance Vietnam War Norway South Asia Sweden United States Arab–Israeli conflict Ukraine Net Political bias Publication Reporting White hat
Bias reduction	Cognitive bias mitigation Debiasing Heuristics in judgment and decision-making
Lists: General Memory