Battle of Carrhae

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Battle of Carrhae Part of the Roman-Persian Wars A Parthian returning Legio X standard captured at Carrhae, on a Roman coin struck in 19 BC Date 53 BC Location Near Carrhae (Harran) Result Decisive Parthian victory Belligerents Roman Republic Parthian Empire Commanders Marcus Licinius Crassus †, Publius Licinius Crassus † Surena Strength 35,000 legionaries, 4,000 cavalry, 4,000 light infantry 9,000 horse archers, 1,000 cataphracts Casualties and losses 20,000 dead, 10,000 captured, 4,000 wounded Reportedly very light

v • d • e Roman-Persian Wars Carrhae – Battle of Cilician Gates - Battle of Amanus Pass - Battle of Mount Gindarus – Mark Antony's campaigns – Armenian War of 58–63 – Trajan's Parthian campaign – 1st Ctesiphon – 2nd Ctesiphon – Nisibis – Resaena – Misiche – Barbalissos – Edessa – Singara – Amida – 3rd Ctesiphon – Samarra – Anastasian War – Iberian War – Lazic War – War of 572–591 – Antioch – Jerusalem – Chalcedon – Egypt – Issus – Sarus – Constantinople – Nineveh

The Battle of Carrhae in 53 BC was a decisive victory for the Parthian Spahbod Surena over the Roman general Marcus Licinius Crassus near the town of Carrhae (now the present-day ruins of Harran, Turkey).

Contents 1 Political background in Rome 2 Buildup to war 3 The battle 4 Aftermath 5 Legacy 6 Further reading 7 References 8 Sources 9 External links

[edit] Political background in Rome

The war in Parthia resulted from political arrangements intended to be mutually beneficial for Crassus, Pompeius Magnus, and Julius Caesar — the so-called First Triumvirate. In March and April 56 BC, meetings were held at Ravenna and Luca, in Caesar's province of Cisalpine Gaul, to reaffirm the weakening alliance formed four years earlier. It was agreed that the triumvirate would marshal their supporters and resources to secure legislation for prolonging Caesar's Gallic command and to influence the upcoming elections for 55 BC, with the objective of a second joint consulship for Crassus and Pompeius.^[1] The leaders of the triumvirate aimed to expand their faction's power through traditional means: military commands, placing political allies in office, and advancing legislation to promote their interests. Pressure in various forms was brought to bear on the elections: money, influence through patronage and friendship, and the force of a thousand troopers brought from Gaul by Crassus's son Publius. The faction secured the consulship and most, though not all, of the other offices sought. Legislation passed by the tribune Trebonius (the lex Trebonia) granted extended proconsulships of five years, matching that of Caesar in Gaul, to the two outgoing consuls. The Spanish provinces would go to Pompeius; Crassus arranged to have Syria, with the transparent intention of going to war with Parthia.^[2]

The notoriously wealthy Marcus Crassus was around sixty and hearing-impaired when he embarked on the Parthian invasion. Greed is often regarded by the ancient sources, particularly his biographer Plutarch, as his major character fault and also his motive for going to war.^[3] Historian of Rome Erich Gruen believed that Crassus's purpose was to enrich the public treasury, since personal wealth was not what Crassus himself most lacked.^[4] Other modern historians tend to view envy and rivalry as his motivation, since Crassus’s long-faded military reputation had always been inferior to that of Pompeius, and after five years of war in Gaul, to that of Caesar. His major military achievement had been the defeat of Spartacus nearly 20 years earlier, and before that he had seen limited action, most notably the Battle of the Colline Gate.^[5] The proconsular assignments also represented a balance of power among the three: Pompeius's military presence in Spain counterbalanced Caesar's in Gaul, while Crassus in Syria could temper Pompeius's influence in the East.^[6] Plutarch notes^[7] that Caesar wrote to Crassus from Gaul, endorsing the plan to invade Parthia — an indication that he regarded Crassus's military campaign as complementary and not merely rivalrous to his own.

Cicero, however, suggests an additional factor: the ambitions of the talented Publius Crassus, who had commanded successful campaigns in Gaul under Caesar. Upon his return to Rome as a highly decorated officer, Publius took steps to establish his own political career. In his mid-twenties, he was too young to enter the cursus honorum by running for election as quaestor, but he held the preliminary office of monetalis ("moneyer"), secured co-option into the college of augurs, and married one of Rome's most patrician and desirable heiresses. Roman sources view the Battle of Carrhae not only as a calamity for Rome and a disgrace on the record of Marcus Crassus, but a tragedy of Publius Crassus in cutting short a promising career.^[8]

Some Romans objected to the war against Parthia. Cicero calls it a war nulla causa (“with no justification”), on the grounds that Parthia had a treaty with Rome.^[9] The tribune Ateius Capito put up strenuous opposition, and infamously conducted a public ritual of execration as Crassus prepared to depart.^[10]

Despite protests and dire omens, Marcus Crassus left Rome on November 14, 55 BC.^[11] Publius Crassus joined him in Syria during the winter of 54–53 BC, bringing with him the thousand Celtic cavalry troopers from Gaul who remained loyal to their young leader until death.

[edit] Buildup to war

Crassus arrived in Syria in late 55 BC and immediately set about using his immense wealth to raise an army. With the aid of Hellenic settlements in Syria and support from Artavasdes, the Armenian king, Crassus marched on Parthia. Artavasdes advised him to take a route through Armenia to avoid the desert, but Crassus refused. In response, the Parthian king Orodes II divided his army and he took most of the soldiers, mainly foot archers with a small amount of cavalry, to punish the Armenians and sent the other half to scout. It is unlikely that the King anticipated that the general whom he gave command of this force, Surena, would destroy Crassus. Surena decided that a force entirely of cavalry units would be better able to defeat Crassus and detached all his infantry. The two armies clashed near the town of Carrhae. Though demoralized by the hot climate, Crassus' troops heavily outnumbered the Parthians.

[edit] The battle

For more on the battle, see Publius Crassus: The Parthian campaign.

A Parthian force of 1,000 cataphracts and 9,000 horse archers under general Surena met the Romans at Carrhae. This was not Parthia's main army, which was campaigning in Armenia under Orodes II, but an advance force sent to scout out and delay the Romans, and only defeat them if they were weak enough. Crassus' cavalry was screening^{[citation needed]} ahead of the main force when they were engaged by the cataphracts, and the weapons his cavalry employed were not capable of piercing the cataphracts' armor. His cavalry was soon surrounded and routed, and his son Publius killed. Meanwhile the horse archers surrounded the Roman infantry, taunting them. Crassus immediately formed his legionaries into a large, hollow square to prevent from being outflanked by the more mobile Parthian forces. Surena covered his "cataphracts"' armor with cloth, marched his army to in front of the Romans. At a prearranged signal, the cataphracts revealed their shining armor. Surena was impressed by what little effect this had on the Roman army, and judged that the cataphract charge would not be enough to break them at this point. Thus, he sent his horse archers to bombard the Roman legionaries with arrows. However, Crassus ordered the legionaries into the testudo formation to prevent being hurt by arrowfire. Most of the shots were non-fatal shots on the arm and leg. However, considering the sheer number of arrows fired, the rapid rate of fire of the horse archers, and finally the fact that the arrows were fired from a composite bow, at the legionaries' armor, the lorica hamata, the barrage eventually wore down the Romans.

Crassus's plan was to have his legionaries endure the archer fire until the horse archers ran out of arrows. However, Surena managed to keep up a steady barrage for several hours, by using camels as mobile reloads for the horse archers. After several hours, the legionaries began to collapse from heat exhaustion and thirst as well as from the constant stream of missiles. The Romans were completely surrounded. The testudo formations were holding up well, but the testudo was very poor in hand-to-hand combat. This inspired Surena to charge. The cataphracts' charge split the Roman army, and the Roman soldiers began to rout. Crassus was able to withdraw, but he had to leave behind thousands of wounded, who were executed by the Parthians. Surena then offered to have peace negotiations with Crassus. Crassus's men heard of this and threatened to mutiny if Crassus did not accept. Crassus was forced to attend. The meeting turned violent, and Crassus was killed. Molten gold was poured down his throat as a symbolic gesture to Crassus's renowned greed. It was one of the greatest defeats Rome would ever suffer, with about 20,000 soldiers dead, and half again as many captured. The Parthians suffered very light casualties.^[5]

[edit] Aftermath

Rome was humiliated by this defeat, and this was made even worse by the fact that the Parthians had captured several Legionary Eagles.^[12] It is also mentioned by Plutarch that the Parthians found the Roman prisoner of war that resembled Crassus the most, dressed him as a woman and paraded him through Parthia for all to see. This, however, could easily be Roman propaganda. Orodes II, with the rest of the Parthian Army, defeated the Armenians and captured their country. However, Surena's victory invoked the jealousy of the Parthian king, and he ordered Surena's execution. Following Surena's death, Orodes II himself took command of the Parthian army and led an unsuccessful military campaign into Syria. The Battle of Carrhae was one of the first major battles between the Romans and Parthians. This battle also created the myth—both in Rome, Parthia, and today—that Rome's legions could not combat the Parthian army. This myth was not dispelled even when the Parthian capital was sacked twice. It was this belief that led Parthia to invade Syria and Armenia several times, usually unsuccessfully.

For several centuries previous to this battle - in fact, ever since winning the Second Punic War - the Romans had seemed, to themselves as to others, unstoppable. They had defeated, and eventually conquered and absorbed, every^{[citation needed]} country which they encountered. At least in the eastward direction, this centuries-long march of conquest came to an end with the Battle of Carrhae; though the Romans would continue fighting with Parthia and later with its Sassanid succesor for hundreds of years, they would never either aim at or achieve their eastern rival's conquest and subjugation.

Gaius Cassius Longinus, a quaestor under Crassus, led approximately 10,000 surviving soldiers from the battlefield back to Syria, where he governed as a proquaestor for two years, defending Syria from Orodes II's further attacks. He received praise from Cicero for his victory. Cassius later played a key role in the conspiracy to assassinate Julius Caesar in 44 B.C.

[edit] Legacy

The capture of the golden aquilae (legionary battle standards) by the Parthians was considered a grave moral defeat and evil omen for the Romans. At the time of his assassination, Caesar was planning a retaliatory war. The Parthians are said to have feared especially harsh retribution if Caesar won, because the surviving son of Crassus would be among the Roman forces.^[13] Marcus Antonius made an attempt, but suffered another defeat by the Parthians. It required a generation of diplomacy^{[citation needed]} before the golden eagles were returned. Their restoration was considered a great triumph by Augustus, and celebrated like a military victory.

The battle is also believed to have eventually led to the first Sino-Roman relations. According to Pliny, in 53 BC, after losing at the battle of Carrhae, 10,000 Roman prisoners were sent by the Parthians to Margiana to help guard the eastern frontier of the Parthian Empire. The Han Chinese later captured this area and the Roman prisoners were likely among the first Europeans to meet the Chinese directly.^[14]

However, the most immediate effect of the battle was that Carrhae was an indirect cause for the fall of the Republic, and thus the beginning of imperial monarchy at Rome. Sulla's first march on Rome in 88 BC had begun the collapse of the republican form of government, but the death of Crassus and the loss of his legions utterly destabilized the balance of power at Rome.^[15] Along with the death of Pompey's wife and Caesar's daughter Julia, Crassus' death severed the ties between Caesar and Pompey; the first Triumvirate no longer existed. As a result, civil war broke out, Caesar won, and the Republic quickly became an autocratic dictatorship.

Lastly, when the Roman empire divided into eastern and western, the eastern half adopted the cataphracts into their legions. Later, when the Eastern Roman Empire became the Byzantine empire, the cataphracts that were used later found their way into middle and western Europe. Of the nine cataphract cavalry units listed in the late antique Notitia Dignitatum, two have a Gallic civitas affiliation.^[16] After years of evolution they eventually became the famous Medieval knights.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Further reading

• A.D.H. Bivar, "The Campaign of Carrhae," in The Cambridge History of Iran (Cambridge University Press, 1983) vol. 3, pp. 48–56, limited preview online.
• Martin Sicker, "Carrhae," in The Pre-Islamic Middle East (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000), pp. 149–151 online.
• Philip Sidnell, Warhorse: Cavalry in Ancient Warfare (Continuum, 2006), pp. 237–242, detailed discussion of the battle from a cavalry perspective, limited preview online.

[edit] References

[edit] Sources

• Weir, William. 50 Battles That Changed the World: The Conflicts That Most Influenced the Course of History. Savage, Md: Barnes and Noble Books. ISBN 0-7607-6609-6. 

[edit] External links

The only two ancient records of the battle:

• Plutarch's Life of Crassus, 23–27 (Online)
• Cassius Dio's Roman History, 40:21–4 (Online)

An in-depth description:

• Battle of Carrhae