Pseudoskepticism

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Pseudoskepticism (or pseudoscepticism) refers to arguments which use scientific-sounding language to disparage or refute given beliefs, theories, or claims, but which in fact fail to follow the precepts of conventional scientific skepticism. The term was coined by Marcello Truzzi, who argued that scientific skepticism is agnostic to new ideas, making no claims about them but waiting for them to satisfy a burden of proof before granting them validity. Pseudoskepticism, by contrast, involves "negative hypotheses" - theoretical assertions that some belief, theory, or claim is factually wrong - without satisfying the burden of proof that such negative theoretical assertions would require.[1][2][3][4]

Pseudoskepticism is related to the more common term 'pseudoscience': the term was originally used to refer to rhetorical arguments which relied on 'non-proof' as a demonstration of 'disproof', usually made in opposition to an assortment of questionable claims (from UFOs and paranormal phenomena to alternative medical practices to religious ideas). The term has gradually been expanded to include any unsubstantiated invalidation of a theory.

The term 'pseudoskepticism', like the term 'pseudoscience', is generally considered pejorative because it implies poor scientific reasoning. Accordingly, those labeled as practicing or advocating pseudoskepticism normally dispute the characterization.

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[edit] Truzzi's characterization of pseudoskeptics

In 1987, while working as a professor of sociology at Eastern Michigan University, Truzzi gave the following description of pseudoskeptics in the journal Zetetic Scholar (which he founded):

In science, the burden of proof falls upon the claimant; and the more extraordinary a claim, the heavier is the burden of proof demanded. The true skeptic takes an agnostic position, one that says the claim is not proved rather than disproved. He asserts that the claimant has not borne the burden of proof and that science must continue to build its cognitive map of reality without incorporating the extraordinary claim as a new "fact." Since the true skeptic does not assert a claim, he has no burden to prove anything. He just goes on using the established theories of "conventional science" as usual. But if a critic asserts that there is evidence for disproof, that he has a negative hypothesis—saying, for instance, that a seeming psi result was actually due to an artifact—he is making a claim and therefore also has to bear a burden of proof.

Marcello Truzzi, "On Pseudo-Skepticism", Zetetic Scholar, 12/13, pp3-4, 1987[1]

Truzzi attributed the following characteristics to pseudoskeptics:[1]

  • The tendency to deny, rather than doubt
  • Double standards in the application of criticism
  • Tendency to discredit, rather than investigate
  • Presenting insufficient evidence or proof
  • Assuming criticism requires no burden of proof
  • Making unsubstantiated counter-claims
  • Counter-claims based on plausibility rather than empirical evidence
  • Suggesting that unconvincing evidence is grounds for completely dismissing a claim

Truzzi characterized true skepticism as:[1]

  • Doubt rather than denial; nonbelief rather than belief
  • An agnostic position, one that says the claim is not proved rather than disproved
  • Maintaining that science need not incorporate every extraordinary claim as a new "fact"
  • Lack of a burden to prove anything
  • Upon discovering an opportunity for error in an experiment, taking the position that such an experiment is less evidential and usually unconvincing, and rejecting the claim that the experiment was "airtight" against error, but not assuming that the possible error disproves the anomaly claim

[edit] Contemporary usage

[edit] Describing believers in pseudoscience

According to Richard Cameron Wilson, some advocates of discredited intellectual positions (such as AIDS denial and Holocaust denial) engage in pseudoskeptical behavior when they characterize themselves as "skeptics" despite cherry picking evidence that conforms to a preexisting belief.[5] Wilson argues that the characteristic feature of false skepticism is that it "centres not on an impartial search for the truth, but on the defence of a preconceived ideological position".[6]

Psychiatrist Richard Kluft noted that pseudoskepticism can inhibit research progress:

".. today genuine skepticism of the benign sort that looks evenly in all directions and encourages the advancement of knowledge seems vanishingly rare. Instead, we find a prevalence of pseudo-skepticism consisting of harsh and invidious skepticism toward one's opponents' points of view and observations, and egregious self-congratulatory confirmatory bias toward one's own stances and findings misrepresented as the earnest and dispassionate pursuit of clinical, scholarly, and scientific truth."[7]

[edit] Criticizing scientific skepticism

The term has found occasional use as a counter-criticism against scientific skepticism, particularly in fringe science fields in which opposition from those within the scientific mainstream or from scientific skeptics is strong. One critic of scientific skepticism argues that those involved in "organized skepticism", which generally rejects paranormal claims, "become adherents of scientism"."[8]

In 1994, Susan Blackmore, a parapsychologist who became more skeptical and eventually became a CSICOP fellow in 1991, described what she termed the "worst kind of pseudoskepticism":

There are some members of the skeptics’ groups who clearly believe they know the right answer prior to inquiry. They appear not to be interested in weighing alternatives, investigating strange claims, or trying out psychic experiences or altered states for themselves (heaven forbid!), but only in promoting their own particular belief structure and cohesion.[9]

Hugo Anthony Meynell from Department of Religious Studies at the University of Calgary, labels the "extreme position that all significant evidence supporting paranormal phenomena is a result of deception or lies" as pseudoskepticism.[10]


[edit] See also

[edit] Notes and references

  1. ^ a b c d Truzzi, Marcello (1987). "On Pseudo-Skepticism". Zetetic Scholar (12/13): 3–4. http://www.anomalist.com/commentaries/pseudo.html. Retrieved 2008-10-10. 
  2. ^ "Marcello Truzzi: Helped form the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal", The San Diego Union Tribune, February 15, 2003
  3. ^ "Marla vs. Pollock: Who’s the Fraudiest?" LA Weekly, October 10, 2007
  4. ^ "The plain truth about legal truth" Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, January 1, 2003
  5. ^ Richard Wilson, "Against the Evidence", New Statesman, 18 September 2008
  6. ^ Richard C. Wilson, "Don't get fooled again: the sceptic's guide to life", Icon, 2008, ISBN 1848310145, 240 pages
  7. ^ Kluft, Richard P., "Editorial: Building upon our foundations" (June 1994) in Dissociation, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 079-080, publ. Ridgeview Institute and the International Society for the Study of Dissociation
  8. ^ Leiter, L. David (2002). "The Pathology of Organized Skepticism". Journal of Scientific Exploration (Society for Scientific Exploration). http://www.scientificexploration.org/journal/jse_16_1_leiter.pdf. 
  9. ^ JE Kennedy, "The Capricious, Actively Evasive, Unsustainable Nature of Psi: A Summary and Hypotheses", The Journal of Parapsychology, Volume 67, pp. 53–74, 2003. See Note 1 page 64 quoting Blackmore, S. J. (1994). Women skeptics. In L. Coly & R. White (Eds.), Women and parapsychology (pp. 234–236). New York: Parapsychology Foundation.
  10. ^ Michael Stoeber, Hugo Anthony Meynell, Critical Reflections on the Paranormal, SUNY Press, 1996, ISBN 0791430634, 9780791430637 page 16
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