Talk:Martin Heidegger/Archive 2

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Emphasizing Heidegger the Nazi vs. Heidegger the Philosopher. Are both POVs?

Someone objected to adding the dates of Heidegger's Nazi Party membership (May 1933 to May 1945) along with the comment that Heidegger remained a party member until the Party disbanded.

The information as to the dates of Heidegger's membership includes a footnote on where the information is located (in Ettinger's book Martin Heidegger/Hannah Arendt.) No source for Heidegger's party membership appears elsewhere in the article.

I removed the commment that the Nazi Party disbanded in May 1945, as most would have assumed that was the case anyway.

Jonathansamuel (talk) 05:17, 22 September 2008 (UTC)

Heidegger Quote incorrect

I have tried to find the quote attributed to Martin Heidegger which states: "We pursue that which retreats from us" which no Heidegger scholar can find as of late. I can only assume Heidegger never said this. If anybody has information on this please advise. This quote is probably one of the most tossed around Heidegger quotes among the mainstream than any other. See Wiki article on Tao Of Steve --LAgurl 06:33, 15 October 2007 (UTC)

I'm pretty sure that quote was 1) misattributed to Heidegger or 2) severely butchered if it was Heidegger. if the latter it could be a distillation of the para. on uncanniness in Sein und Zeit, II.3, p. 322- McQuarrie and Robinson trans. Platypusjones (talk) 18:53, 20 November 2007 (UTC)

Archive Created April 5th 2005

  • The Discussion archive is available here, and issues raised in the archive may be copied to this page if a editor wishes to reassert or quote a prior comment topic. --Mikerussell 02:38, 9 April 2006 (UTC)/Archive 1

Updated with appended items to end of April 2006. Lucas

Influences

Why is Holderlin not in influences?

Dazine...

This article misses the point and crux of Heidegger work. Which is his concept of dazine "Being there". His phenomenology isn’t really address either? Why? Dazine is in each of us "the mine" Being here in the midst of the universe. To understand it is to understand the universe. He didn’t explore consciousness, subjectivity, ego, or the mind because he realized it was pointless to do so... How far down the animal ladder do they go? There is no way to know so he chooses not to waste time on it. There are many ways of perceiving the world and ours, he said, isn’t particularly the best. He pushed humanity to answer the big ontological questions.

We muddy the water by focusing on the fact that he was beguiled by of Nazi Germany. What is important is his philosophical work and its impact on the existentialism. Why, instead are we wasting our time of the readers… its stupid pettiness born out of ignorance. Its like focusing on the majority of the article of Einstein on his contribution to the development of the nuclear bomb—which would be equally ignorant. H0riz0n 05:03, 1 May 2006 (UTC)

I definitely agree. The article needs to spend more time discussing Da-sein (which I believe is colloquial German for everyday existence), and his hermeneutic phenomenology. While I do think that it is important for the Nazi section to be addressed, and I don't think that it can be properly separated from his philosophy (unfortunately), it seems absurd to spend more time on that than on the bigger philosophical concepts. Drifter 14:43, 1 May 2006 (UTC)
First it is "national socialist" not "Nazi" (which is a slang term). But I agree that one needs to have separate section on Heideggers involvement into that movement or ideology. Besides that one should also identify what Heideggers own political views really are. National Socialism itself was an extremely diverse movement unifiying different ideologies.

—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 41.241.133.124 (talk) 11:24, 13 December 2006 (UTC).


-I think there is a disproportionate amount of attention given to Heidegger's politics as oppossed to his thought in this article. Furthermore, Derrida's thoughts on the topic, expressed in his book Of Spirit, are probably the most noted, yet they are not really adressed in this article. HR


-Additionally, its Dasein, not 'Dazine,' it seems that a lot of people involved in this article don't know what they're talking about. This article just does not have enough on Heidegger's thinking. Where is discussion on 'origin of the work of art,' 'onto-theology', or his destruction of the history of metaphysics, what or historicality? This article is in serious need of detail. HR

Yeah, at least I have no idea what I'm talking about. My knowledge of Heidegger is very limited (unfortunately), and so too is my knowledge of German. But, I don't know about anyone else. Of course, if we grant your comment that a lot of the people involved in this article don't know what they're talking about, it is curious that you should be truly wondering about why there is no discussion on "Origin of the Work of Art," "Onto-theology," the "clearing," metaphysics, and historicity. Of course, the statement is also misused. If someone talks about Da-sein, and all that it means, etc., they may know what they are talking about. All that you can correctly say is that a lot of people involved in this article don't know what you're talking about. How do you know we don't know what Da-sein is (of course we may not)? All that is certain is that, at least I have confused Dazine for Da-sein. And while I may not know what I'm talking about, all that follows from your point is that I don't know what you're talking about, at least until you pointed out my ineptitude in recognizing Heidegger's German. Besides that, however, I still agree that there needs to still be more in-depth analysis of Being-there, mineness, being-towards-death, and the array of Heidegger's later philosophy dealing with onto-theology, the destruction of metaphysics, the clearing, technology, and Gestell, etc. Drifter 01:27, 18 April 2007 (UTC)
The Wikipedia article declares that Dasein is "…the being for whom being is a question, a being who is not man but who is nothing other than man." On looking in The Origin of the Work of Art (Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes), I find in a footnote that Dasein is "Heidegger's name, in Being and Time, for man as well as for man's manner of being." So, the article says that Dasein is not man and the footnote says that Dasein is man. Is this an example of Hegelian logic in which the Law of Contradiction (~(p^~p)) is broken, and a = not–a ? If so, it makes for difficulty in communication.Lestrade 04:03, 5 August 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

Heidegger appropriated the word Dasein for his own use. It had been used for many years to mean to exist or to be present there. He decided to take possession of the word and insist that it designate some concept that he wanted to communicate, or seem to communicate. He did not feel the necessity of creating a totally new word as a sign for his concept, even though Dasein had already had a conventionally accepted meaning. [User:Lestrade|Lestrade]] 12:49, 15 August 2007 (UTC)Lestrade


opening paragraph

i restructured the opening paragraph without making major content changes for oine major reason: 1) the most recent version stated the Heidegger's name and birth and went right to influences. Covention suggests that when one is coming to an encyclopedia, one wants to know first who this person is rather than who they influenced. a brief description of who and and what heidgger did should come before anything else, so i changed it. no other substantial change.Platypusjones 18:32, 25 May 2006 (UTC)

concrete or abstract?

In the section titled "Influences", in the context of a paragraph describing Heidegger and Husserl, a sentence reads The bulk of Being and Time is an abstract description of Dasein. It is unclear of whether this statement refers to a Husserlian criticism of Being and Time or is a general claim about Being and Time. If the former, it should be noted. If the latter, a discussion on whether Being and Time is abstract or "concrete" might be in order. i would argue that Heidegger may use an abstruse language, but is offering a radically concrete description of the average everydayness of dasein viz. phenomenology, which favors the things themselves instead of concepts (e.g. mathematical representations). any thoughts? Platypusjones 14:50, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

I agree. Insofar as Heidegger was reorienting his phenomenology from the realm of transcendental egos and epistemological noemas, and towards that of the ontological question of "being", it would seem that his theories would be, at least compartively, more concrete. Drifter 16:33, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

Thanks Drifter. I'll wait briefly to see if anyone else offers an opinion. If not i will make a change and point to this discussion if there is concern. Platypusjones 17:13, 1 June 2006 (UTC)
I agree. "abstract" undoubtedly referred to the writing style. — goethean 19:13, 1 June 2006 (UTC)
Upon review, i determined that the statement really had no bearing on the paragraph at hand, and rather than trying to rephrase it, removed it. I added a brief quote from Husserl's "Phenomenology and Anthropolgy" to support the claims made prior, which included reference to the concrete-wordliness of dasein. no other change in this section. Thanks all. Platypusjones 20:09, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

Heidegger one of most influential, not "considered by some"

I removed the words "considered by some to be" from phrases about Heidegger being "one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century." I challenge anyone to mount a case that he was anything but. Perhaps this unjustified qualifier was a bit of wishful thinking on the part of somebody who would have preferred it not to be the case. paulreeve 12:10, 8 June 2006 (UTC)

it's typically the case that those vague qualifiers are added because the subsequent claims are subjective claims that cannot be measured in any standardized way. it's like saying the rolling stones are one of the best rock bands of the 20th century. according to whom? by what criteria? rather than challenging someone to say that he's not, the most appropriate avenue as an alternative to the qualifier is to cite a source, or at least an opinion (ex. John Smith, etc. considered Heidegger to be one of the most...). if you can't, let it stand. anyone else?Platypusjones 19:14, 8 June 2006 (UTC)
There is no question that Heidegger was one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century. I write this as someone with very little / no sympathy to Heidegger. The right analogy to the Stones is that they were one of the most *popular* bands of the 20th century, also an indisputable statement. Just as the second statement is consistent with the POV that the Stones were a bad rock band, the first is consistent with the POV that Heidegger's philosophy was wrong or meaningless. Crust 15:20, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
Popularity does not equal influence. Influence here mean "influencing philosophers (and writers, and artists)". With the Stones, it means "influencing musicians". I agree with Mr. Jones that what is needed here is a reference: in x, y says that H is the greatest philosopher ever, etc. — goethean 17:14, 9 June 2006 (UTC)
I'll side with Crust first -- Heidegger is probably the single most influential philosopher of the 20th century, for better or worse. Going by the truckloads of secondary literature about him, his imitators in linguistics, in psychology and in postmodernism generally -- this must be added to his profound influence upon Jean-Paul Sartre's, famous Being and Nothingness, (1950) and the global Existentialist movement. I'll side with Goethean next -- the popularity of Heidegger helps to explain why 20th century philosophy degenerated into postmodern Literary production. His lack of grounding in the science of Philosophy (shown by his neologisms) also helps to explain why Heidegger sought to revive Nietzsche. They shared a lack of logical method, of systematic grounding, of any reference to the dialectics of their contemporary field -- and it's that laziness that made them so wildly popular. "If they can evade the current philosophical issues, broadcast their opinions, substitute irony for dialectics and make up words as they go along, then so can we." There's the postmodern folly. Petrejo 04:42, 13 June 2006 (UTC)
I'll side with Goethean next
Huh? Please refrain from drafting me into your anti-Heidegger crusade...thx. — goethean 14:33, 26 June 2006 (UTC)


Re PHILOSOPHIA. You are all off track. Never mind the "influential". Was Heidegger a PHILOSOPHER? As long as no proof can be found for this, all we can say is that he is considered by some to have been a philosopher. Which brings us to the question: Who, exactly, are these SOME? And why should we accept their word sight unseen?--BZ(Bruno Zollinger) 09:19, 27 June 2006 (UTC)

Re PHILOSOPHER? To elaborate on Bruno's somewhat cryptic question, I believe that he means to say that Heidegger would not consider himself a philosopher. Indeed, one of Heidegger's crucial works is "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking", in Zeit und Sein. Heidegger considered philosophy, or metaphysics, to be at an end, as (I am very sketchy on this article, given the fact that I am combining hazy memory with abstruse writing) the question of being, the fundamental question of philosophy (according to Heidegger [?]), has been resolved (?). However, I think it would only be correct (if we want to get into the pedantics of it) to say that in Heidegger's 'later' work, he is not doing the work of philosophy. As far as I understood it, Heidegger's immanent criticism of Sein und Zeit was that it was framed through a metaphysical, and thus philosophical, framework. If we consider that a great deal of Heidegger's early works were concerned with decidedly ontological matters, and were framed through a philosophical/metaphysical discourse, I think that it would not be totally incorrect to say that Heidegger was, at least at times, and at some of the most significant times (if we are to believe, as many purport, that Sein und Zeit is Heidegger's masterpeice á la magnum opus) a philosopher, or at least that those works are philosophical. I think Heidegger would (or did), to his chagrin, admit this. Please, if I am incorrect in any of my factual statements, namely regarding the content of "The End of Philosophy", please forgive me by correcting me. Thanks, Drifter 17:41, 27 June 2006 (UTC)


Re PRIORITIES. First things first, Drifter. Your opinion on whether Heidegger was a philosopher or not is very interesting, and even more so is the reasoning behind it. But first we want to know the names of the scholars whose point of view is or, if this is not identical, ought to be reflected in the article according to you.--BZ(Bruno Zollinger) 13:41, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

Out of curiosity, what exactly constitutes "proof" that someone is a philosopher? iggytalk 15:53, 2 July 2006 (UTC)


Re PROOF. You mean that as long as we cannot clearly define this, we have to assume that Heidegger was a philosopher?--BZ(Bruno Zollinger) 08:59, 3 July 2006 (UTC)

Not necessarily. However, since you raise the question of whether Heidegger can be considered a philosopher, I was wondering what, exactly, would constitute proof that Heidegger was a philosopher? As far as I am aware, it is virtually unknown for anyone to offer any sort of evidence that some person is a philosopher. What makes Heidegger's status as a philosopher particularly questionable? iggytalk 04:02, 4 July 2006 (UTC)


Re QUESTION. Where on earth did I "raise the question of whether Heidegger can be considered a philosopher"?? Of course he can be. And he is, too. By SOME! The question is whether he was. And in order to answer this question we'd first have to know who these SOME are whose opinion we are to accept.--BZ(Bruno Zollinger) 08:47, 4 July 2006 (UTC)

Universities of Marburg, Freiburg and Berlin, where he held - or in the last case, was offered and declimed - the chair in Philosophy. Also, all librarians everywhere who shelve his works under the classmark for philosophy. A non-issue.

I don't understand why you critics don't analyze the word philosopher to find out what it means to be one, ofcourse though you would also have to understand how itr's used in everyday despite it's actual meaning. More to the point though, philo means truth, sophy would mean i think wisdom, or knowledge of that truth. Therefore a philosopher is someone who seeks, or sheds light on this truth, or states what truth is or not alltogether. If one believes that heidegger fits this category, then he is a philosopher, if you believe he doesn't than he is not, This is obviously all based on subjective grounds, kind of like securing objectivity with a secured subjectivity. -currie

Actually Currie, the word is from the Greek
Philo = The love of
sophy = Wisdom
So not far off. PS. Someone has been vandalising pages from your I.P. address, i dont know what it has to do with you, but you should probably create a Wikipedia account for all further legitimate contributions. Orgone 20:08, 23 February 2007 (UTC)
thanks for that orgone I have created an account, also thank you for correcting my definition of philosphy, but I also am going to say that it is objective that Heidegger was influential, it doesn't matter wether or not one find that his influence was good or bad, that is subjective. Obviously though Heidegger did influence philosophy, considering that he influenced hermeneutics, all of Existentialism and changed ontology I'd say that is a an influence. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Currie1234 (talkcontribs) 03:11, 25 February 2007 (UTC).

Criticism section

I erased the reference to Rorty's apologia in the section on criticism because it isn't criticism but an apologia. A defense of Heidegger should have it's own section. Petrejo 04:28, 13 June 2006 (UTC)

The criticism section of the article mentions Farias' work, but then fails to properly discuss it, even though Farias' book was what caused a huge fuss in France and in North America. Why? Because Farias' book wasn't just a political critique. His argument is that the concept of Dasein can only be authentically expressed via a people grounded in a unique heimat, which is to say, the German people; which means that, in Farias' view, there are truly deep connections between the ideology of National Socialism and Heidegger's thought. The two are a natural fit, so to speak. This needs much more than the superficial mention it is given in this section, and if Farias is mentioned, his book needs to be placed in the booklist under "Criticism." I would also consider adding the book, "Heidegger and Silence" to the critics list.Theonemacduff 15:07, 12 April 2007 (UTC)

away from metaphysics?

Heidegger was arguably the most important metaphysician (certainly as an academic philosopher) of the twentieth century. Are the authors of this page unaware that ontology is the central subject matter of metaphysics?

Didn't Heidegger attempt to move away from metaphysics? — goethean 14:30, 26 June 2006 (UTC)
Yep — it posses a bit of a problem unless one has actually read any of Heidegger's various notions of metaphysics to see what he is distancing himself from (the determination of the being of beings, as opposed to the letting-be-seen of beings as they reveal themselves, for example). Heideggerian ontology, on Heidegger's account then, is something that he has "freed" from the grasp of metaphysics. Hence, according to Heidegger, what passes for ontology (i.e. "metaphysics") and what ontology really is (the revelation of the being of beings) are two very different things. iggytalk 22:16, 27 June 2006 (UTC)
I think you're getting confused by the fact that Heidegger seems to refute himself by using the same term differently in varying contexts. What Heidegger is moving away from is the 'Western Metaphysic' that was established by Plato/Aristotle and was then 'completed' by Nietszche's Zarathrustra. His philosophy, rooted in ontology, is metaphysical, but Heidegger is attempting to signal a break in his philosphy from what has gone before, (and a reversion to a more fundamental ontology/understanding), by his use of 'metaphsyics' as a pejorative when applied to the Western tradion, with the implicit understanding that, yes, his philosophy is metaphysics. The confusion only arises when we use 'our' generic terms to properly describe his philosophy, while his use of descriptive labels, (compare with his notion of correctness versus truthful), is often for rhetorical effect, or to be more kind, philosophical distinctions. Tsop 09:37, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

The Heideggerian move away from traditional metaphysics lies, most clearly, in the abandonment of the subject-object distinction. The theme here is that the essence of Da-sein is not characterized by substantiality, and the subsequent primacy of theoria over praxis. Hence we see in Sein und Zeit that we are engaging in an existential analytic of Da-sein that finds its ground in ecstatic Temporality, expressed as being-in-the-world. The average everydayness that Da-sein in which finds itself deals with beings, and from its association with them articulates itself according to them. The term 'metaphysics' or the things that come after the study of physics, necessarily finds itself investigating beings that it finds in nature. The difference between ontology and metahysics then is the universality of ontology, the study of the being of being.

Editing "Being and Time"

Changed "Being and Time (German title: Sein und Zeit), published in 1927, is considered by many to be Heidegger's most influental work" to most important work. This should be obvious - 'influence' is not something that can be directly measured, quantatively or qualitatively.

Changed "In later philosophical works, Heidegger changed his views on several points made in Being and Time." to

While Heidegger's philosophy is traditionally divided into 'earlier' and 'later' thought, the former consisting most prominently of Being and Time and lectures such as 'What is Metaphysics?', while his later thought is said to begin around 1935, circa 'The Origin of the Work of Art'. Scholarly interpretation differs as to what degree of continuity exists between Heidegger's later philosophy and the earlier. While there is a clear change, Heidegger himself talking of the 'Kehre', or 'turn', there exist certain similarities, and thus some interpretations see the 'earlier' philosophy as a 'mistaken path', taken by Heidegger, through which he saw his error; or, one can interpret Being and Time as a nascent version of Heidegger's philosophy, which then develops appropriately into a more wide-ranging survey of 'the question of Being'. It is worth mentioning that it is also possible to hold the opinion that it is only Heidegger's Being and Time that has any real value, and that his subsequent output represents a lapse into mysticism and obscurantism.

Please feel free to edit/discuss with regards to accuracy and the general continuity of the page

Tsop 10:24, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

It might be a good idea to add reference of H's work on that of Jacques Lacan. (though I read this very quickly, and it may be in here already).

Good Article

The article failed GA nomination due to the fact that his no references. Don't even try debating it. --GoOdCoNtEnT 07:17, 10 August 2006 (UTC)


Oh yeah? Well, well...you know what?....er...um...oh forget it I give up.


Subjectivity

Can someone take a look at the "Philosophy" section? The beginning says that Heidegger refused to acknowledge concepts such as "subjectivity" but then later on it says that he considered ethics "purely subjective." How can he describe something using a word/concept he does not recognize?

Loopytune 00:24, 24 October 2006 (UTC)Loopytune


This whole paragraph ought to be rewritten since its oversimplification misrepresents. Nowhere does Heidegger refuse to acknowledge the concepts listed - he examines them at length, how they formed and transformed in the history of philosophy. An example of where he addresses "I" as subject, as well as ethics is in section 63, 311-316 of Being and Time. He never says, at least not directly, that ethics is purely subjective. The problem for Heidegger is with securing a starting point in philosophy - a nearly impossible task at any period. To paraphrase SZ 316, starting philosophy from the point of a 'worldless I' (such as the subjectivity of Descartes) is as short-sighted as is starting philosophy from a position of immersion in practical matters. That is where he places ethics, the position of already being immersed so closely in things that there is no stepping back to look at the larger picture. But there is more to it - largely drawing upon Kant as the object of his critique, he sees philosophers as artificially tacking an ethics onto a "theoretische Subjekt". It could be argues that the problem of ethics for him is that it is not integrated with ontology. In fact I would argue this since several works he points out as a part of the "forgetting of Being" the post-Platonic split in philosophy into separate disciplines of logic, ethics, and physics. He does say ethics is existentiell, but that is not the same thing for him as 'subjective' it is just secondary in investigation of existential structures of Dasein rather than a primary starting point. Of course, the strongest critique of all of this was by Levinas, but even he has to play down some points to make Heidegger a Hegelian with the appearance of being devoid of Other. Zeusnoos 01:29, 24 October 2006 (UTC)
The whole paragraph is largely meaningless, and where it is not meaningless it is inaccurate. Not one claim in it is true, right down to the very last error which suggests that dasein rather than in-der-welt-Sein means Being-in-the-world. The comments by Zeusnoos are correct, but you need just a basic, plausible summary of Heidegger's thought before getting into that kind of detail. And this is the only paragraph about his philosophy in the section (the other two are vague stuff about influences). Scrap it and start again - KD

I think the section "Philosophy" is not too bad, no worse than any other encyclopedic entry on this matter. The paragraph you (KD) refer to, I quote here:

Heidegger's philosophy refused to recognize concepts such as consciousness, subjectivity, ego, the mind or other fact-value distinctions, because he saw them as fundamentally immeasurable, indefinable and easily subject to multiple interpretations. For example: consciousness vs. "what?" Ego as opposed to "what?" He criticises our reliance on modern science and our subjugation to technology, and he did not see the point to include an "ethical" dimension to his theory; he suggested that "ethical" dimensions are purely "subjective" and only result in a fundamental misunderstanding of his holistic unified experience of "being in the world" which he called dasein.

This seems like a fair summary for an overview. Might I reply that your empty ejections such as: "not one claim is true" and that it is "meaningless" are more applicable to your own comment (and grammar) than they are to the article! --Lucas


RESPONSE: Well, I don't know what's wrong with my grammar, but then I don't know what an 'empty ejection' is either. The summary is immeasurably inferior to Wikipedia entries on other philosophers - Wittgenstein, for example. The paragraph in question is hopeless, and I am happy to offer details:

"Heidegger's philosophy refused to recognize concepts such as consciousness, subjectivity, ego, the mind or other fact-value distinctions..."

The fact-value distinction signifies, if anything, the logical disconnect between factual observations and value judgments; the old problem about how to derive an "ought" from an "is". None of the concepts which precede it in the sentence have anything to do with it. I can't imagine what "refused to recognize" means in this context - Heidegger spends hundreds of pages discussing consciousness and subjectivity in his books and published lectures; is the sentence supposed to claim that Heidegger denied the existence of minds?

"...because he saw them as fundamentally immeasurable, indefinable and easily subject to multiple interpretations."

I have no idea where Heidegger sets out to "measure" subjectivity, for example, let alone where he fails. To the extent Heidegger objects to Descartes' or Husserl's understanding of subjectivity, the objection is based on their taking an everyday concept of subjectivity for granted rather than examining it in it's being - as Heidegger would say. He has no complaints about these terms being "indefinable" or "subject to multiple interpretations". Maybe that's someone else's issue - it's not Heidegger's.

"For example: consciousness vs. "what?" Ego as opposed to "what?" [sic]

I have no idea what that means, and I have taught this subject at university level.

"He criticises our reliance on modern science and our subjugation to technology,..."

No he doesn't. He explains that the sway of technology in the modern world is something which has been sent - transmitted - across history by an ancient misunderstanding of the meaning of being. The technological understanding of the world is a fateful outcome of Dasein's forgetfulness of being. If anything, one might speak of the world's "subjugation" to modern Dasein - which cannot be discussed as if it is something separate and apart from modern technology.

"...and he did not see the point to include an "ethical" dimension to his theory; he suggested that "ethical" dimensions are purely "subjective" and only result in a fundamental misunderstanding of his holistic unified experience of "being in the world" which he called dasein."

Nowhere...nowhere...does Heidegger say anything resembling this. Heidegger's views on ethics are to be found in the "Brief uber den Humanismus". The idea that Heidegger would regard ethics as "subjective" is ludicrous - he was not a logical positivist.

Listen, I am sorry if anyone has pride of authorship, but it's lousy. Get rid of it. KD november 13.

Fact-value distinctions are refused by Heidegger in that presumed facts such as consciousness, subject-object, etc. are not distinct from values, they come from an over valuation of presence. In B&T he refuses to use these terms in an attempt to get beyond this presumption of them as facts. They are not facts but biases that have occurred in a misguided metaphysics, by avoiding them he is not precisely trying to contradict them.
Consciousness is not measurable, rather being-in-the-world is not measurable, it is not something that can be put before a microscope, or subjected to a science of measure. They are indefinable in the sense that they are what do or think the defining. They are multiply interpreted by the various sciences. Only under the concept of Being can one get at a philosophy that goes beyond these already misformed concepts.
"Consciousness Vs what", is the question that points out that consciousness Vs world is the failed division that traditionally defines consciousness. One must go beyond this division to being-in-the-world.
You say he does not criticism technology yet in the next sentence you say it came from a misunderstanding of being, surely a criticism. In his work on Descartes he pointedly criticises his failure to answer the main questions of Descartes' time. I don't believe he considered it as deterministic and unavoidable, but due to mistakes made by certain thinkers.
The point about an ethical theory refers to Being and Time. His ethics in Humanism are very far from what is normally considered ethics. His avoidance of the topic is easily seen in his overall ethic regarding the truth of being, how can one address ethics when one sees such a gigantic mistake in the very understanding of the world. As to them being subjective, well perhaps this was a misreading also attributable to Sartre.
By the way, I had no problem with your grammar, I was referring to the previous comment.
I didnt write these paragraphs and don't disagree that they could be improved. It was from your extreme comments that I assumed you might want to re-write it in a very personal way that would not give such an overview, since I think it important to mention his re-orientation of concepts such as consciousness, his view of technology and how ethics is covered (as I read it ethics for him is also a kind of dead word like consciousness or God, that only serves to put an end to thinking about them).
--Lucas


RESPONSE:

My own suggested rewrite is in the rewrite section above. Far from being extremely personal, I think it's much what you'd expect to see in an encyclopaedia entry about Heidegger. I don't want to be rude about your take on Heidegger, but I think it would be unrecognizable to most Heidegger scholars. I think you have kind of got some of his points, but you state them in such a way that it's hard to tell. Heidegger certainly took the position, for example, that there is no world qua world in the absence of Dasein, and similarly no Dasein which is not at the same time in-der-Welt-sein (being-in-the-world) - but no-one could guess that that is what's meant by "Consciousness Vs what". I don't want to repeat all my criticisms - suffice to say that neither "ethics" nor "God" are in any sense "dead" words for Heidegger, and the fact-value distinction is a specific term in moral philosophy which still has nothing whatsoever to do with the issues raised in the draft. KD


Heidegger didn't create continental philosophy

Lucaas, I noticed you were trying to clean the criticism section, but skirted around this statement: "Continental philosophy is a subject he is even said by some to have created,"

I don't know who would say Heidegger created continental philosophy - you can't understand contemporary continental without studying his works, but the "by some" should be sourced. Even if it can be sourced, I think it should be removed since continental claims Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, even Kant, hermeneuticians such as Dilthey and Schleiermacher, personalists such as Scheler, religious existentialists such as Berdjaev, etc, etc, etc. We're talking about philosophers over a great span of time, not Heideggerian and post-Heideggerean thought alone. Zeusnoos 19:21, 17 November 2006 (UTC)

Don't think I put this in, was it not there already. I know all these other 19th C thinkers are valued in the continental tradition but prior to Heidegger one might say that they belonged to both "traditions" (nascent, lets say) or were ignored by both, eg, by Frege and by Husserl. Heidegger, in a way, though he was hugely critical and wanted to destruct the tradition, also leads to the inclusion of these 19C figures, and to a certain realisation of their unavoidability in the warped history of metaphysics. A historical point that the Analytic tradition does not grant. Also there was not much English opposition to Husserl but with, Being and Time, and all its neologisms, the opposition became (and remains) quite prominent. So let me say that prior to Heidegger, one (English or otherwise) might have read Hegel, Kierkegaard or Nietzsche etc. as a philosopher in their own right, whereas after Heidegger, they become philosophers taken up academically in a broad and historical way, and not just in their own right, and this happens only within the continental tradition. --Lucas
I am not sure if I fully understand the above exchange, but the suggestion that a distinction between analytical and contintental philosophy dates from the publication of Being and Time, overlooks the importance of Russell and Moore's earlier break with Hegelianism. --KD
This is not really overlooked, since you also have at the time of Moore and Russell Husserl and Frege in Germany reading Bretano and the formation of phenomenology which is also a break from Hegel. But I think that all of the just mentioned names were still doing philosophy without being self-consciously Analytic or Continental. For a fuller account of this division refer to the page itself Analytic and Continental Philosophy, I think it is reasonable enough to make this statement here on the page about Heidegger, since it helps to indicate the importance of his work in really pushing the division, I suppose on Russell's page one might see a similar comment about his creating of Analytic philosophy.
--Lucas
Without wishing to be too disrespectful, the article to which you linked is itself absolutely awful.  ::--KD
Yes I know, but it is the only one, fix it! --Lucas

Largely the notion of a 'continental' philosophy is to some degree an inadequate appelation; while it can be thought of as a geographical grouping this is obviously false -generally it is thought of as the philosophy that followed Kant that was not Frege. Thus, idealism, Hegelianism, Kirkegaard, Schopenhauer etc. There is also a definite emphasis on the problems of the geistwissenschaften {"humanities'). However the idea that Heidegger 'created' continential philosophy is not so strange when one knows the underlying story, which was a lecture 'argument' he had with the neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer in 1929.It was also at this time that Heidegger entered into an 'acrimonious' debate with Rudolph Carnap, in which Carnap rubbished his What is Metaphysics? as being without meaning etc (the basic analytical criticism of H. that continues to this day). And as the public loves a good argument, it displayed for all to see the gulf between continental and 'analytical' philosophy. So in many ways this was the birth of contintal philosophy - and it was since then that the gulf widened -according to some commentators-, i.e. the practice of separating the two 'philosophies' into different departments at universities etc. So the issue is one that has a fair ammount of truth in it, but one must remember first and foremost that the 'continental tradition' is only a label, and one that has been applied ex post facto to those we consider 'continental' philosophers. This was not a notion that existed in the 19th century.

As a further note, one can say (Rorty does) that Heidegger was responsible for 'discovering' Nietzsche as a philosopher; that prior to Heidegger's reading of him he was thought of mostly as a literary creature, and was read for this reason. Again, this 'truth' becomes truer due to the language used: Nietzsche might have been read as a literary author by those that read books in that time (i.e. 1880-1930}, but then many of them would have also read Schopenhauer and other 'philosophers' -it is only a distinction we make in this modern era and assume it applies directly to previous ones. Read Foucault! Tsop 12:37, 19 January 2007 (UTC)

This article needs a re-write

I'm afraid this article is just too filled with factual errors regard Heidegger's philosophy to justify its existence. A reader new to Heidegger looking at this will walk away with serious misconceptions about his philosophical project. For example, even in the first paragraph there are major errors. Heidegger did not try to direct philosophy away from metaphysics towards ontology. He believed that true philosophy is metaphysics, and that true metaphysics is ontology, or the study of "Being" as such. Phenomenology is the method by which you do proper ontology. Additionally, there is too much about his politics (and Heidegger was in no way a political thinker), and too little about his views on art, poetry, language, and the empirical sciences. Where is a discussion of Eriegnis, or Clearing and Presence, what of 'What calls for thinking?" and his re-reading of Aristotelian temporality? Someone more familiar with Heidegger's philosophy should consider re-writing this article.

-Bloom

As a Heidegger scholar, I agree, although this discussion page is hilarious. The entry as it stands wouldn't pass muster as an undergraduate essay. I am not convinced that a specialist subject like Heidegger's philosophy can be addressed by an unqualified committee. As for whether he was a philosopher, I might point out that he was, of course, professor of philosophy at Freiburg University. I apologize if that's just my POV. - KD

Well go for it then, make the changes! --Lucas

I think the point was that he was waiting for someone more familiar with Heidegger's work to re-write the article. I myself have only read selections of Heidegger (I think it is best for me to wait to read the whole of Sein und Zeit for when I can do so with a professor). However, I think I do have a good idea of what Heidegger is trying to do, at least in Sein und Zeit. I will try and add some stuff. But I am busy and may not get around to it. I invite anyone who actually has read a great deal of Heidegger to re-write this article. It also focuses over-proportionally on his politics. Now, I am not saying that his philosophy does not flow from his politics. In fact, any philosophy for anyone does. And for Heidegger, Bourdieu tries to show that concepts such as authenticity flow from his Nazism and anti-liberalism (?). But still, not only does the article not provide this connection, treating his politics and his philosophy separately, or at least not making appropriate connections to how they are connected and in what way this connection is manifest, but it is over-proportionally involved with his politics. Heidegger is among, perhaps the most, influential philosopher/thinker of the 20th century. This warrants that one do due justice to Heidegger's philosophy. Drifter 05:19, 21 September 2006 (UTC)

      • i've been reading Heidegger for a good while, and would be willing to work with others on re-writing this entry, or at least restructuring it. there is some great info, but i also agree with many of the criticisms presented (e.g. focusing too much on politics - though nonetheless significant- and not enough on the thought). so, if anyone wants to collaborate on a structure and organizational flow, please let me know here.Platypusjones 15:08, 16 October 2006 (UTC)
IMO, the structure of this article is broken because of its lack of unity. Its a committee product with a weakness for political correctness. That is, in an attempt to transcend a POV, it merely glues together multiple POVs. The trouble may be that Heidegger is not only a political controversy but also a famous person, and fame can distort even scholarly writing.
IMO, the critics of Heidegger can see beyond the fame toward an objective appraisal of his academic content. Advocates of Heidegger tend to emphasize how influential he was, although that influence is compromised when advocates say, for example, that "X" was greatly influenced by Heidegger but didn't really understand Heidegger, or that anybody who criticized Heidegger never really understood him. See how fame gets in the way?
IMO, to preserve the objectivity of the article and help it regain some unity, the critics of Heidegger -- who are the growing minority in this literature -- should provide the structure. Don't make the reader guess about the content of Being and Time; portray Heidegger's actual thought in all its simplistic glory. Quote Professor Tom Rockmore more. Display Heidegger's terminology briefly in something like this:
(1) A human being is a (Dasein) who interacts in-the-world with four basic moods: fear, boredom, joy and anxiety.
(2) Dasein finds an outside world and interacts in the mode of Care (much or little). Dasein is Here and the world is Yonder. The world consists of Things and Other human beings, or simply, the Other. Dasein interacts with the Other in three modes of Solicitude: catching-up with the Other, suppressing the Other, and authenticity.
(3) As for Things, Heidegger interchanges four terms to describe them: Things, Gear, Ready-at-Hand, and Pragmata. Dasein interacts with Things in the mode of Concern and Directionality. Dasein regards broken Things as Conspicuousness.
(4) Dasein Cares for the abstract Other (Them or They) in the modes of Falling, Inauthenticity, Alienation, Scattering. Simply put, 'They' influence Dasein to be inauthentic.
(5) These, then, are the facts of life, or Facticity of Dasein. We are thrown into this world, and this is our Thrownness. The aim of the life of Dasein is to resist the forces of 'They' and strive to be Authentic.
The superficiality of Heidegger's thought should be intuitively obvious to the objective reader. This suggests, on its own weight, that such an amateur effort in Philosophy could not have gained global fame without the Nazi period. If this article is structured around an objective criticism of Heidegger, it will regain its unity. Petrejo 12:22, 31 January 2007 (UTC)
              • I am sufficiently distressed by the Philosophy section that I have prepared a re-write designed to give a basic, uncontroversial summary of the work. This is intended to replace the entire section under Philosophy, the first two paras of which are unacceptable. If people want to keep the third para, which is relatively unimportant in my view, feel free. Understand: this is basic. There is much more to be said - the complete works are some 80 volumes - but you need a start. I am an accredited Heidegger scholar (KD November 2006):

"Heidegger was one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century, and his ideas have penetrated into many areas. Because his discussion of ontology (the study of the meaning of being) is rooted in an analysis of the mode of existence of individual human beings (Dasein, or being-there), his work has often been associated with existentialism - an association he found uncongenial because his conception of Dasein is not reducible to the free subjective interiority of the human being described, for example, in the early works of Sartre. Nevertheless, among the major philosophical works inspired by Heidegger's thought was Sartre's Being and Nothingness, although Heidegger insisted that Sartre misunderstood him. His philosophical work was also taken up throughout Germany, France, Japan and elsewhere, and has gained, since the 1970s, a following in North America as well. Heidegger's thought was attacked or dismissed, however, by many of his contemporaries, including Theodor Adorno, and Anglo-American philosophers such as Bertrand Russell and A. J. Ayer.

Heidegger's philosophical approach owed much in its origins to the work of the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl, who he served as an assistant and to whom he dedicated his 1927 masterpiece, Being and Time. Husserl sought to find philosophical certainty about the world in what he believed was the unquestionable truth of certain data presented, not to the individual subject, but to an abstract subject he called the 'transcendental ego'. Reviving the question of the meaning of Being, which had long since ceased to be an important topic in mainstream philosophy, Heidegger critically examined the "being" of both subject (or ego) and world, arguing that Husserl had taken the sense of these terms largely for granted. In Being and Time, and his lecture courses from the same period, Heidegger brilliantly shows that the manner of being of the subject (Dasein) is inextricably linked with the being of the world, understood as the surrounding, understood environment which is the field of Dasein's concern. To be human IS to be in a world, and - perhaps controversially - to be a world is to be an environment occupied and manipulated by human beings (or by beings relevantly like human beings - Heidegger was never a species-ist). The analyses did much to undermine the subject/object dichotomy in philosophy.

Some have argued that Heidegger's thought after Being and Time exhibits a 'turn' in his thinking (der Kehre). He denied this in a letter published by W.J. Richardson in his Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (1963), stating that, if there had been a turn a turn at all, it simply went deeper into the same matters. In his later work, Heidegger largely abandons the account of Dasein as a pragmatic, engaged worldly agent, and instead discusses the other elements necessary to an understanding of being, notably language, the earth (as the almost ineffable foundation of world) and the presence of the gods. Nevertheless, Dasein (or 'mortals' as he later says) remains a crucial part of the coming-about or event (Ereignis) of being. In his work on technology, Heidegger sought to show that our understanding and use of the world as a kind of standing warehouse of stock equipment is based in a forgetting of the original sense of being - that of Dasein and world as inextricably interlinked in a relationship of care: on this basis, Heidegger has been adopted by many as an apostle of environmentalism. His essays on language, poetry, and technology, and his discussions of ancient Greek philosophy, are couched in an increasingly hermetic and almost mystical style, in comparison to the unusual and ungainly, but relatively unambiguous, style of Being and Time. Heidegger wrote little on ethics, the most important text being the "Letter on Humanism" (1946)."

KD, How does one become an 'accredited' Heidegger scholar? Nevermind. I'm very glad, and would, too, like to see the letter to Richardson in this article. The whole Kehre thing is completely out of hand, and recently, at a conference with Caputo in the audience, Caputo noted that he still endorses one or two turns. Ugh. If Heidegger had completely abandoned Dasein he wouldn't have still been talking about it (albeit in the transformed hyphenated form) in Beitraege and late works such as On Time and Being. Zeusnoos 19:13, 8 November 2006 (UTC) (not exactly a Heidegger novice, but not having read the whole Gesamtausgabe)
Doctorate on Heidegger's philosophy and a publication, is all. And no, I haven't read the eighty (is it?) volumes, but a fair few. The debates on detail are fascinating, but Wikipedia really should get the abc right, as it has for other philosophers. Mine may not be perfect, but the existing entry is hopeless - KD.
The draft above is an improvement, but still needs more clarity. There are too many poorly understood buzzwords -- "free subjective interiority" etc. -- and POV endorsements like "brilliantly shows". The existing introductory paragraphs are my free time attempt at the direction this article should go. I'd also trim or spin-off the extraneous stuff about French Heideggerianism. Above all it must be an encyclopedia entry intelligible to readers outside the Continentalist cloisters. Also, KD, you might consider getting a User name. 271828182 22:05, 8 November 2006 (UTC)


No, KD's re-write is quite good. Certainly a great start for what should be at least an accurate article, regardless of whether or not wikipedia users will understand it. If they interested enough to read the article, perhaps it will persuade them to go beyond. -Bloom.

If it can't be understood, why will anyone be interested to read more about it? And how will anyone know if it's accurate? As I said, KD's rewrite is an improvement but even so it is still rife with semi-relevant verbiage. (I notice Bloom didn't respond to either of the specific criticisms I raised.) A more extended example: half the second paragraph dithers inconclusively about the relationship between Heidegger's and Husserl's ideas, before belatedly getting around to the subject, where we finally get this: "In Being and Time, and his lecture courses from the same period, Heidegger brilliantly shows that the manner of being of the subject (Dasein) is inextricably linked with the being of the world, understood as the surrounding, understood environment which is the field of Dasein's concern." The first 16 words of this sentence are padding. The rest of the sentence is packed with technical terms that are unclear. The crucial verb -- "linked" -- tells the reader nothing specific (though the polysyllabic adverb pretends otherwise). A Thomist, a Marxist, a Spinozist, or an eliminative materialist could all agree with the commonplace that human existence is always linked to its environment. The concept of Heidegger's In-der-Welt-Sein is vaguely alluded to in the last clause, and the following two sentences are on the right track, but a novice reader will completely miss the point. Time permitting, I'll rewrite this article over the holiday. 271828182 19:17, 5 December 2006 (UTC)

To respond specifically to your complaints, I agree that "brilliantly" should be removed since it violates POV. However, the French Heideggerianism can stay. Anyone who knows anything about 20th century continental philosophy knows that Heidegger influenced a great bulk of the French. On a more important point though, I find it often the case that Wiki values concision and clarity over rigour and accuracy when dealing with philosophy or more abstruse topics. This policy should change if it interferes with the value of preserving the integrity of the thinkers' work. -Bloom

No one would dispute that Heidegger has strongly influenced French philosophy. But then, no one disputed that. I argue that the section on French Heideggerianism, while not entirely unimportant, is irrelevant to an article on Heidegger. Most of the events therein occurred late in Heidegger's life and in any case had little or no effect on Heidegger's philosophy. Yet this section commands a disproportionate amount of space, especially compared to the article's scanty and only intermittently accurate coverage of Heidegger's own works. A separate article on the reception of Heidegger's thought in France would be more appropriate.
As for your "more important" point, the current article is neither concise nor clear nor rigorous nor accurate -- as I pointed out in detail w.r.t. a representative sentence above. Perhaps if it ever attains any of these virtues, we can debate their relative proportions. 271828182 04:14, 7 December 2006 (UTC)

Perhaps you misunderstood. With a philosopher as difficult to understand as Heidegger, we simply need to forfeit clarity for the sake of accuracy and rigour. Perhaps you can be of service, but I remain skeptical.-Bloom


We must forfeit clarity? I disagree. Is there anything in the 'Introduction' (which I wrote) that is inaccurate? Further, the problem I raised -- which none of your comments have gainsaid -- is that the revision on 'Philosophy' still has all the rigor of a boiled noodle, as I have shown above. 271828182 10:26, 8 December 2006 (UTC)

I don't have too many problems with the intro, though it would be better if you had cited some sources. Also, I would replace "bombastic" with "obscure." I think the larger problem with the intro is that it fails to mention Heidegger's attempt to re-orient western philosophy back towards the question 'what is the meaning of being?' This is clearly delimited in the opening of Being and Time. Just think it should be in the intro. As to the philosophy re-write, I think it just needs touching up, and some references, but it is far better than the rest of the article.-Bloom

Citing sources would be impractical for so general a summary -- what would the footnote say, "see Sein und Zeit, passim"? And I chose "bombastic", in part, because it is citable -- Peter Singer uses that adjective on his blurb for Edwards's Heidegger's Confusions.
The problem with talking about the "meaning of being" is that it is, like too much Continental philosophy, a vague buzzword. It sounds profound, but what the hell is it saying? What's the difference between asking the question of the Sinn von Sein and NOT asking that question (or not being "oriented" toward the question)? If you cannot answer that, then you don't know what you're saying. And to a novice reader making a first approach to H. through a Wikipedia article, it is simply a baffling incantation.
Much of the current rewrite by KD suffers from the same affliction -- ritual phrases that Continental writers use as if they had meanings (e.g., "free subjective interiority", "to be a world"), but which are thoroughly obscure and never clearly explained. Now, they may indeed be meaningful technical terms. But they communicate nothing if they are not explained. Such explanations call for more than "touching up", they indicate that the present article fails to be a good encyclopedia article. 271828182 02:24, 9 December 2006 (UTC)

-The need to restate the question of 'the meaning of Being' is not a vague Continental philosophy "buzzword." Heidegger clearly dilineates the need in the first section of Being and Time (Section I, The Necessity, Structure, and Priority of the Question of Being), this stretches back to the question raised in Plato's Sophist, which Heidegger knew well, and wrote about at great lenght. The term is meaningful and pertinent for the article, though it cannot be explained. Heidegger himself admitted that he was unable to fully explain it even after after the 400 plus pages composed in Being and Time and numerous other texts. I'm not so sure you are really familiar enough with Heidegger to continue working on this article.-Bloom.

So "the term [...] cannot be explained" but it's not a vague buzzword. If you can't explain it, how do you know it's not vague? And if you can't explain it, how do you know how accurate and rigorous this article is?
And how do you know how familiar I am with Heidegger? I've supported my edits with references to the original text, and specific arguments. You've evaded almost every concrete criticism I've raised. 271828182 02:26, 10 December 2006 (UTC)


As I have written in the section below, this discussion is becoming personal and the users engaged in the argument should make it a point to stop editing here for a day or so. Take a break, and when returning, try to make sure that any posts here, or edit summaries are devoid of pointed, accusatory remarks. The content on a talk page should be devoted to the content of the article, not statements about other editor's intentions or knowledge-bases. Again, like I offered below, perhaps after taking a break we can work to come up with a version that merges the editing efforts of everyone, instead of editing and reverting an article-change in its entirety. - Sam 03:22, 10 December 2006 (UTC)

Well, the Philosophy section is much improved - thank you. A specific disagreement with the following:
"Rather, Husserl argued that all that philosophy could and should be was a description of experience (hence the phenomenological slogan, “to the things themselves”). For Heidegger, this meant understanding that experience is always already situated in a world and in ways of being."
As my derided rewrite pointed out, Heidegger's strategy of locating experience - or Dasein - as always already thrown into a world was a stark overturning of and departure from Husserl's position (to be fair, Husserl in his later work attempted to take account of some of the problems Heidegger pointed out). Husserl's ego is above all transcendental, and he struggles tirelessly to try to build a bridge back from the ego to the actual world. Heidegger's approach is the opposite. The current rewrite suggests Heidegger adopted his approach from Husserl.
Less specifically, the section on time is a good try, but since it doesn't explain what Heidegger meant by 'authentic' time, I don't believe a reader will be able to understand it. It's an immensely difficult subject to tackle in a short article which everyone insists must be easily intelligible, but the starting point has to be Heidegger's claim that "care" is the essential structure of Dasein. Sorry if that's not much help. KD
The re-write above is weak, IMO, because of its one-sidedness. The Nazi uprising, which also explains Sartre's participation in Heidegger, and his surpassing of Heidegger through the French Resistance, is central to the upsurge of Heidegger, the decline of Husserl, the long trek of Heidegger through Nietzsche, the conquest of French Philosophy, and the Existentialist revolt. The entire aspect of the NEGATIVE of Heidegger is downplayed in this re-write, and so the re-write continues to sound 50 years old. Petrejo 12:30, 31 January 2007 (UTC)

Sorry, but I don't think it is correct to say that Heidegger's philosophy is essentially a marriage between two insights. I still think the philosophy section has major problems.

-Bloom —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.13.81.121 (talk) 20:33, 22 December 2007 (UTC)