User:Hcberkowitz/Sandbox-Scientific intelligence

This article is a subset article in a series under intelligence collection management. For a This discipline covers aspects of intelligence collection management and intelligence analysis management and intelligence analysis under the hierarchical list of articles, see the intelligence cycle management hierarchy.

Scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) reveals more than the foreign equipment itself. It is "the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign scientific and technical information that covers:

• a.foreign developments in basic and applied research and in applied engineering techniques;
• b. scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems, and materiel; the research and development

related thereto; and the production methods employed for their manufacture. It may deal with significant new equipment, but also the new scientific and engineering ideas that make it possible, but the process by which it was developed and produced, the production rate of the country or organization making it, and possibly the economic and other priorities given to the project.

R.V. Jones, DCI Woolsey, Jeannie de Clarens (field officer who provided rocket intelligence & was imprisoned by Nazis

R.V. Jones, who directed World War II British scientific intelligence for both the Air Staff, and later the Secret Intelligence Service, has been called the father of scientific intelligence. Winston Churchill gave credit to Jones and his colleagues in the Battle of Britain.

“ During the human struggle between the British and the German Air Forces, between pilot and pilot, between AAA batteries and aircraft, between ruthless bombing and fortitude of the British people, another conflict was going on, step by step, month by month. This was a secret war, whose battles were lost or won unknown to the public, and only with difficulty comprehended, even now, to those outside the small scientific circles concerned. Unless British science had proven superior to German, and unless its strange, sinister resources had been brought to bear in the struggle for survival, we might well have been defeated, and defeated, destroyed. ”

Jones was the leading World War II British expert on electronic warfare. He was one of the primary analysts of the Oslo Report.

The CIA created the R.V. Jones Intelligence Award in his honor, with Jones himself receiving the first award in 1993. DCI James Woolsey, in presenting the award, said

In the aftermath of three-years' service in the Navy Department, I was appointed to an organization called the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel. I was the far-most junior and least prestigious member of this fine panel, and in a meeting one day in 1980 or 1981, an extremely clever idea was floated combining technical ingenuity and a truly crafty and nefarious twist of mind for dealing with the Soviet submarine threat. Either Albert Woolstetter or Charlie Hertsfeld, who is here today, muttered, "That sounds like an R. V. Jones idea," and I said, "Who is R. V. Jones?" A hush settled over the room. Either Albert or Charlie--I am not sure to this day which one--said, "I thought you were a reasonably well-read young man. You have not read The Wizard War?" I said, "No." He said, "Go read The Wizard War." I said, "All right"; I did.

Technical intelligence, in contrast, deals with specific equipment and its capabilities.

The Farewell Dossier was a covert action against the Soviet Union, based on feeding false information to the Soviet scientific intelligence program.

Given that scientific and technical information is an important part of a nation's competitive position in world markets, S&TI blurs into economic intelligence, which is defined by the U.S. government as "government-sponsored or coordinated intelligence activity designed to unlawfully and covertly obtain classified data and/or sensitive policy or proprietary information from a U.S. Government agency or company, potentially having the effect of enhancing a foreign country's economic competitiveness and damaging U.S. economic security." Porteous identifies two kinds of economic intelligence that are distinct from S&TI:

1. trade negotiation intelligence
2. macro-economic intelligence

National-level policy

The US Economic Espionage Act of 1996 criminalizes two kinds of activity, which may be done either by foreign powers for (18 U.S.C. § 1831–1839) makes the theft or misappropriation of a trade secret a federal crime. To some extent, the Act addresses an international problem, but not all countries regard unauthorized technology transfer as illegal, when done for commercial purposes. Technology transfer that involves militarily critical technologies are more commonly a matter

This law contains two provisions criminalizing two sorts of activity:

1. Theft of trade secrets to benefit foreign powers
2. Theft of trade secrets for commercial purposes

Categorizing an individual act can be complex, as some national intelligence services have provided scientific and technical intelligence to private firms based in their countries. It becomes even more complex when the information is provided to an organization partially or fully owned by that government, and that organization competes in commercial markets. Other complexities arise when the information is not actually stolen, but where the foreign intelligence service (or business) buys one copy of a high-technology product, and then reverse engineers its technology to use in its own products. End user license agreements forbidding reverse engineering are common in software, but less so in other business areas.

Violation of export controls may overlap with information acquisition, or the exported equipment or materials may themselves be things difficult for the offending country to produce.

According to the US National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX), 108 countries tried to obtain US technology in fiscal year 2005. Most of the effort, however, centered around a small number of countries. NCIX named China and Russia among this small number, "just as they have since the CI Community first began systematically tracking foreign technology collection efforts in 1997." By no means, however, is the US the only target, nor are China and Russia the only countries trying to obtain such information. In 2003, Sweden expelled two Russian diplomats over accusations of spying at Ericsson, a major electronics manufacturer whose products include avionics for Swedish Gripen fighter aircraft. Even more sensitive, however, is scientific and technical information-gathering by allies, such as Japan, France, and Israel.

Collection techniques at the national level

In contrast with tactical technical intelligence, national level science and technology information tends to come less from capture of foreign equipment, and more from HUMINT or creative business relationships. There are some national-level attempts to salvage foreign equipment, such as Project Jennifer, a complex and clandestine attempt to recover a sunken Soviet submarine.

Issues in national policy

Porteous raises the question: is commercially oriented, economic/scientific/technical espionage efficient? He observes that some claim intelligence obtained through economic espionage would be "tactically useless" for a number of reasons. Typically, the barriers to potential efficiency are related to an intelligence agency's lack of knowledge of the subject area and to problems associated with the dissemination of intelligence once acquired. These arguments tend to come from individuals who at the same time argue for or accept the need for government to defend against economic espionage engaged in by other governments. It is difficult to support these points simultaneously: if economic espionage is "tactically useless", it is similarly useless to foreign governments that practice it, and thus need not be defended against.

He counters the argument that "lack of direct knowledge of a certain business or its technology has been cited as a significant obstacle to intelligence services engaging in economic espionage. Yet during the Cold War, intelligence services spent significant amounts of time and energy, with some success, trying to obtain intelligence on various complex military technologies of which the case officers would not have had a profound knowledge. If intelligence services were trusted to obtain such information, a shift of focus to complex commercial technologies and intelligence would not be unthinkable. The same techniques used to obtain military secrets could be turned to complex commercial technologies or strategies without too much difficulty."

Another efficiency argument deals with the security of dissemination to industry. National characteristics will be different here; industry-government partnerships, for example, are far more routine in Japan than in the United States. US consortia have been open to foreign firms, and many have shut down, such as the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation and the Corporation for Open Systems (in OSI and ISDN) networking. Some, such as the Open Software Foundation merged with other groups and wound up being international.

Porteous observed "the existence of means to reduce dissemination difficulties will not erase them. Problems will inevitably arise. Those countries considering engaging in or expanding their practice of economic espionage would be well-advised to consider the alleged experience of France in this area. It has recently been suggested that the embarrassing release of information indicating French intelligence service targeting of American companies, which triggered an American boycott of the Paris Airshow, was the work of disgruntled French firms. The companies responsible for releasing the material to the press apparently were unhappy with what they saw as the tendency of the French intelligence service, Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure (DGSE), to favour some French firms over others in distributing material obtained through economic espionage. The incident reportedly cooled relations between the DGSE and certain elements of French industry.

Collection techniques

Perhaps most common are operations that exploit business relationships, including the marketing and sales phase. There are also efforts targeted at individuals with sensitive knowledge. The NCIX said the easiest techniques can be straightforward, including:

• Simply asking complanies for "classified, sensitive, or export-controlled information. In some cases, a single would-be foreign buyer sent out multiple requests to a variety of US companies, searching for a seller willing to ignore or bend export-licensing requirements."
• Joint ventures, perhaps not even on the target technology, but to bring intelligence collectors in contact with people or facilities with sensitive information. Offshoring work from the country with the technology, to other countries where protection may be more difficult, is another approach.
• Offering support services to facilities or contractors with sensitive information. These can include technical support services such as assembly and testing, but also services as mundane as trash collection, hoping the trash may contain information inadequately shredded or otherwise destroyed. Even outsourced administrative services, such as payroll, can give clues to which individuals might be targets for approaches.
• Conventions and trade shows, of course, offer information. It can be quite easy to enter a show for the "industry only", although more difficult if the event requires a verified security clearance.
• Use of spyware or other malicious hacking techniques to penetrate information systems.

Another category starts with agreements of which the hosting government is fully aware, but that may be enforced more or less stringently in specific cases: "Since the mid-1980s, development, production, and marketing of weapon systems has been increasingly internationalized through government-sponsored cooperative development programs and various kinds of industrial linkages, including international subcontracting and teaming arrangements, joint ventures, and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Foreign companies have acquired many U.S. defense companies and have legitimate business interests in them. The U.S. government allows such foreign investment as long as it is consistent with U.S. national security interests."

Multinational programs may be even more common in Europe, such as Panavia (UK-Germany-Italy) and Airbus (Germany-France-Spain, but operating under Dutch law). There are also enterprises owned by a combination of industry and government, such as the French Thales Group.

External links

• U.S. Army Technical Intelligence Chronology