User:Nootiebeans/Brain in a vat

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What Is currently in the article

Human Brain in Vat

Argument from biology

One argument against the BIV thought experiment derives from the idea that the BIV is not – and cannot be – biologically similar to that of an embodied brain (that is, a brain found in a person). Since the BIV is dis embodied, it follows that it does not have similar biology to that of an embodied brain. That is, the BIV lacks the connections from the body to the brain, which renders the BIV neither neuroanatomically nor neurophysiologically similar to that of an embodied brain. If this is the case, we cannot say that it is even possible for the BIV to have similar experiences to the embodied brain, since the brains are not equal. However, it could be counter-argued that the hypothetical machine could be made to also replicate those types of inputs.

Argument from incoherence

A third argument from the philosopher Hilary Putnam attempts to demonstrate the thought experiment's incoherence on the basis that it is self-refuting. To do this, Putnam first argued in favor of a theory of reference that would later become known as semantic externalism. He offers the "Twin Earth" example to demonstrate that two identical individuals, one on our earth and another on a "twin earth", may possess the exact same mental state and thoughts, yet refer to two different things. For instance, when we think of cats, the referent of our thoughts would be the cats that we find here on earth. However, our twins on twin earth, though possessing the same thoughts, would instead be referring not to our cats, but to twin earth's cats. Bearing this in mind, he writes that a "pure" brain in a vat, i.e., one that has never existed outside of the simulation, could not even truthfully say that it was a brain in a vat. This is because the BIV, when it says "brain" and "vat", can only refer to objects within the simulation, not to things outside the simulation it does not have a relationship with. Putnam refers to this relationship as a "causal connection" which is sometimes referred to as "a causal constraint". Therefore, what it says is demonstrably false. Alternatively, if the speaker is not actually a BIV, then the statement is also false. He concludes, then, that the statement "I'm a BIV" is necessarily false and self-refuting. This argument has been explored at length in philosophical literature since its publication. One counter-argument says that, even assuming Putnam's reference theory, a brain on our earth that is "kidnapped", placed into a vat, and subjected to a simulation could still refer to "real" brains and vats, and thus correctly say it is a brain in a vat. However, the notion that the "pure" BIV is incorrect and the reference theory underpinning it remains influential in the philosophy of mind, language and metaphysics.

Draft

A third argument against BIV comes from a direction of incoherence, which was presented by the philosopher Hilary Putnam. He attempts to demonstrate this through the usage of a transcendental argument, in which he tries to illustrate that the thought experiment's incoherence lies on the basis that it is self-refuting. To do this, Putnam first established a relationship that he refers to as a "causal connection" which is sometimes referred to as "a causal constraint".This relationship is further defined, through a theory of reference that suggested reference can not be assumed, and words are not automatically intrinsically connected with what it represents. This theory of reference would later become known as semantic externalism.This concept is further illustrated when Putnam establishes a scenario in which a monkey types out Hamlet by chance; however, this does not mean that the monkey is referring to the play due to the fact that the monkey has no knowledge of Hamlet and therefore can not refer back to it. He then offers the "Twin Earth" example to demonstrate that two identical individuals, one on our earth and another on a "twin earth", may possess the exact same mental state and thoughts, yet refer to two different things. For instance, when we think of cats, the referent of our thoughts would be the cats that we find here on earth. However, our twins on twin earth, though possessing the same thoughts, would instead be referring not to our cats, but to twin earth's cats. Bearing this in mind, he writes that a "pure" brain in a vat, i.e., one that has never existed outside of the simulation, could not even truthfully say that it was a brain in a vat. This is because the BIV, when it says "brain" and "vat", can only refer to objects within the simulation, not to things outside the simulation it does not have a relationship with. Consequently, what it says is demonstrably false. Alternatively, if the speaker is not actually a BIV, then the statement is also false. He concludes, then, that the statement "I'm a BIV" is necessarily false and self-refuting. This argument has been explored at length in philosophical literature since its publication. One counter-argument says that, even assuming Putnam's reference theory, a brain on our earth that is "kidnapped", placed into a vat, and subjected to a simulation could still refer to "real" brains and vats, and thus correctly say it is a brain in a vat. However, the notion that the "pure" BIV is incorrect and the reference theory underpinning it remains influential in the philosophy of mind, language and metaphysics.

Reconstructions of Putnam's argument

An issue that has arisen with Putnam's argument is that even if the premises he laid out is assumed to be true, the only proven fact is that when a brain in a vat states 'I am a BIV' it would be false due to the causal theory of reference. This does not necessarily provide proof that we are not brains in vats, rather it is an argument that is primarily focused on externalist semantics. In order to combat this issue, various philosophers have taken on the task of reconstructing Putnam's argument. Some philosophers like Anthony L. Brueckner and Crispin Wright have taken on approaches that utilize disquotational principles. While others like Ted A. Warfield have taken on approaches that focus on the concepts of self-knowledge and priori.

The Disjunctive Argument

One of the earliest but influential reconstructions of Putnam's transcendental argument was suggested by Anthony L. Brueckner. Brueckner's reconstruction is as follows: "(1) Either I am a BIV (speaking vat-English) or I am a non-BIV (speak- ing English). (2) If I am a BIV (speaking vat-English), then my utterances of 'I am a BIV' are true iff I have sense impressions as of being a BIV. (3) If I am a BIV (speaking vat-English), then I do not have sense impressions as of being a BIV. (4) If I am a BIV (speaking vat-English), then my utterances of 'I am a BIV' are false. [(2), (3)] (5) If I am a non-BIV (speaking English), then my utterances of 'I am a BIV' are true iff I am a BIV. (6) If I am a non-BIV (speaking English), then my utterances of 'I am a BIV' are false. [(5)] (7) My utterances of 'I am a BIV' are false. [(1), (4), (6)]" A key thing to note is that although these premises further define Putnam's argument, it does not in fact prove ' I am not a BIV', due to the fact that although the premises do lay out the idea that ' I am a BIV' is false, it does not necessarily provide any basis on which false statement the speaker is making. There is no differentiation between the BIV making the statement versus a none BIV making the statement. Therefore, Brueckner further strengthens his argument by adding a disquotational principle of "My utterances of ‘I am not a BIV’ are true iff I am not a BIV."

Outline/ what has been changed/added

• During Week 4 added new citation and new sentence within the article
  • Putnam refers to this relationship as a "causal connection" which is sometimes referred to as "a causal constraint".
• Week 5 changes
  • The beginning of argument from incoherence has been reworded and edited, added a component of the usage of a transcendental argument.
  • Added a new citation
  • Added the part where the usage of the reference theory was further defined
  • Added image of human brain in vat
• Possible outline and route
  • Change the formatting for argument from incoherence
    • Have a section for Putnam's argument and how it has been deemed incoherent due to inconsistencies and possible arguments around his conclusion
      • mention his usage of a transcendental argument
    • Have a section for reconstruction of Putnam's argument

List of changes to make after Peer-Review

• Fix comma splice and grammar issue with spacing and period
• Take out excessive 'refer' and reword it based on peers feedback
• continue to strengthen the section of Putnam's argument reconstructed
• possibly add more content, or more background on the Putnam's argument, and further explain that there have been issues with it.