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{{Short description|Conscious event, perception or practical knowledge}}
{{Other uses}}
'''Experience''' refers to [[Consciousness|conscious]] events in general, more specifically to [[perception]]s, or to the practical [[knowledge]] and familiarity that is produced by these [[processes]]. Understood as a conscious event in the widest sense, experience involves a subject to which various items are presented. In this sense, seeing a yellow bird on a branch presents the subject with the objects "[[bird]]" and "[[branch]]", the relation between them and the property "[[yellow]]". Unreal items may be included as well, which happens when experiencing hallucinations or dreams. When understood in a more restricted sense, only sensory consciousness counts as experience. In this sense, experience is usually identified with perception and contrasted with other types of conscious events, like [[thinking]] or [[Imagination|imagining]]. In a slightly different sense, experience refers not to the conscious events themselves but to the practical knowledge and familiarity they produce. Hence, it is important that direct perceptual contact with the [[World#Philosophy of mind|external world]] is the source of knowledge. So an experienced [[hiker]] is someone who has actually lived through many hikes, not someone who merely read many books about hiking. This is associated both with recurrent past acquaintance and the [[Ability|abilities]] learned through them.

Many scholarly debates on the nature of experience focus on experience as conscious event, either in the wide or the more restricted sense. One important topic in this field is the question of whether all experiences are [[Intentionality|intentional]], i.e. are directed at objects different from themselves. Another debate focuses on the question of whether there are non-[[concept]]ual experiences and, if so, what role they could play in justifying beliefs. Some theorists claim that experiences are ''transparent'', meaning that what an experience feels like only depends on the contents presented in this experience. Other theorists reject this claim by pointing out that what matters is not just what is presented but also how it is presented.

A great variety of types of experiences is discussed in the academic literature. Perceptual experiences, for example, represent the external world through stimuli registered and transmitted by the senses. The experience of [[episodic memory]], on the other hand, involves reliving a past event one experienced before. In imaginative experience, objects are presented without aiming to show how things actually are. The experience of thinking involves mental representations and the processing of information, in which ideas or propositions are entertained, judged or connected. [[Pleasure]] refers to experience that feels good. It is closely related to [[Emotion|emotional]] experience, which has additionally evaluative, physiological and behavioral components. [[Mood (psychology)|Moods]] are similar to [[Emotion|emotions]], with one key difference being that they lack a specific object found in emotions. Conscious [[desire]]s involve the experience of wanting something. They play a central role in the experience of agency, in which [[intention]]s are formed, courses of [[Action (philosophy)|action]] are planned, and [[choice|decision]]s are taken and realized. [[Altered state of consciousness|Non-ordinary experience]] refers to rare experiences that significantly differ from the experience in the ordinary waking state, like [[religious experience]]s, [[out-of-body experience]]s or [[near-death experience]]s.

Experience is discussed in various disciplines. [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|Phenomenology]] is the science of the structure and contents of experience. It uses different methods, like [[epoché]] or [[eidetic variation]]. Sensory experience is of special interest to [[epistemology]]. An important traditional discussion in this field concerns whether all knowledge is based on sensory experience, as [[Empiricism|empiricists]] claim, or not, as [[Rationalism|rationalists]] contend. This is closely related to the role of experience in [[science]], in which experience is said to act as a neutral arbiter between competing theories. In [[metaphysics]], experience is involved in the [[mind–body problem]] and the [[hard problem of consciousness]], both of which try to explain the relation between matter and experience. In [[psychology]], some theorists hold that all concepts are learned from experience while others argue that some concepts are innate.

== Definition ==
According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the definition of the term, "experience" can be stated as, "a direct observation of or participation in events as a basis of knowledge."<ref>{{Cite web |date=24 March 2023 |title=Experience |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/experience#:~:text=%3A%20the%20fact%20or%20state%20of,the%20length%20of%20such%20participation |access-date=28 March 2023 |website=Merriam-Webster Dictionary}}</ref> The term "experience" is associated with a variety of closely related meanings, which is why various different definitions of it are found in the academic literature.<ref name="Sandkühler"/> Experience is often understood as a [[consciousness|conscious]] event. This is sometimes restricted to certain types of consciousness, like [[perception]] or sensation, through which the subject attains knowledge of the world.<ref name="Borchert">{{cite book |last1=Borchert |first1=Donald |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BORMEO |chapter=Experience}}</ref> But in a wider sense, experience includes other types of conscious events besides perception and sensation.<ref name="Smith">{{cite web |last1=Smith |first1=David Woodruff |title=Phenomenology: 1. What is Phenomenology? |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/#WhatPhen |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=20 September 2021 |date=2018}}</ref><ref name="Gupta2012">{{cite journal |last1=Gupta |first1=Anil |title=An Account of Conscious Experience |journal=Analytic Philosophy |date=2012 |volume=53 |issue=1 |pages=1–29 |doi=10.1111/j.2153-960X.2012.00545.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/GUPAAO}}</ref> This is the case, for example, for the experience of thinking or the experience of dreaming.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Jorba |first1=Marta |title=Is There a Specific Experience of Thinking? |journal=Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science |date=2010 |volume=25 |issue=2 |pages=187–196 |doi=10.1387/theoria.640 |s2cid=170300928 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/JORITA-6|doi-access=free |hdl=10810/39432 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> In a different sense, "experience" refers not to conscious events themselves but to the [[knowledge]] and practical familiarity they bring with them.<ref name="Borchert"/><ref name="Masiello"/><ref>{{cite book |last1=Mittelstraß |first1=Jürgen |title=Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie |date=2005 |publisher=Metzler |url=https://www.springer.com/de/book/9783476021083 |chapter=Erfahrung |access-date=2021-10-01 |archive-date=2021-10-20 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211020080039/https://www.springer.com/de/book/9783476021083 |url-status=dead }}</ref> According to this meaning, a person with job experience or an experienced hiker is someone who has a good practical familiarity in the respective field. In this sense, experience refers not to a conscious process but to the result of this process.<ref name="Sandkühler"/>

The word "experience" shares a common [[Latin]] root with the word "[[experimentation]]".<ref>{{cite web |title=Experience |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/experience |website=Merriam-Webster |access-date=16 July 2020}}</ref>

=== As conscious event ===
Experience is often understood as a conscious event in the widest sense. This includes various types of experiences, such as perception, bodily awareness, memory, imagination, emotion, desire, action and thought.<ref name="Smith"/> It usually refers to the experience a particular individual has, but it can also take the meaning of the experience had by a group of individuals, for example, of a nation, of a social class or during a particular historical epoch.<ref name="Sandkühler"/> [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|Phenomenology]] is the discipline that studies the subjective structures of experience, i.e. what it is like from the first-person perspective to experience different conscious events.<ref name="Smith"/>

When someone has an experience, they are presented with various items. These items may belong to diverse [[Ontology|ontological]] categories corresponding e.g. to objects, properties, relations or events.<ref name="Gupta2012"/><ref name="Sandkühler"/> Seeing a yellow bird on a branch, for example, presents the subject with the objects "bird" and "branch", the relation between them and the property "yellow". These items can include both familiar and unfamiliar items, which means that  it is possible to experience something without fully understanding it.<ref name="Gupta2012"/> When understood in its widest sense, the items present in experience can include unreal items. This is the case, for example, when experiencing illusions, hallucinations or dreams. In this sense, one can have the experience of a yellow bird on a branch even though there is no yellow bird on the branch.<ref name="Gupta2012"/> Experiences may include only real items, only unreal items, or a mix between the two. Phenomenologists have made various suggestions about what the basic features of experience are. The suggested features include spatial-temporal awareness, the difference in attention between foreground and background, the subject's awareness of itself, the sense of agency and purpose, bodily awareness and awareness of other people.<ref name="Smith"/>

When understood in a more restricted sense, only sensory consciousness counts as experience.<ref name="Honderich"/> In this sense, it is possible to experience something without understanding what it is. This would be the case, for example, if someone experienced a robbery without being aware of what exactly was happening. In this case, the sensations caused by the robbery constitute the experience of the robbery.<ref name="Honderich"/> This characterization excludes more abstract types of consciousness from experience. In this sense, it is sometimes held that experience and thought are two separate aspects of mental life.<ref name="Gupta2012"/> A similar distinction is sometimes drawn between experience and theory.<ref name="Sandkühler">{{cite book |last1=Sandkühler |first1=Hans Jörg |title=Enzyklopädie Philosophie |date=2010 |publisher=Meiner |url=https://meiner.de/enzyklopadie-philosophie-14071.html |chapter=Erfahrung}}</ref> But these views are not generally accepted. Critics often point out that experience involves various cognitive components that cannot be reduced to sensory consciousness.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Strawson |first1=Galen |title=Cognitive Phenomenology: Real Life |journal=Cognitive Phenomenology |date=2011 |pages=285–325 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/STRCPR |publisher=Oxford University Press|doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.003.0013 |isbn=978-0-19-957993-8 }}</ref><ref name="Smith"/> Another approach is to distinguish between internal and external experience. So while sensory perception belongs to external experience, there may also be other types of experience, like remembering or imagining, which belong to internal experience.<ref name="Sandkühler"/>

=== As knowledge and practical familiarity ===
In another sense, experience refers not to the conscious events themselves but to the knowledge they produce.<ref name="Sandkühler"/> For this sense, it is important that the knowledge comes about through direct perceptual contact with the external world.<ref name="Honderich">{{cite book |last1=Honderich |first1=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |chapter=experience}}</ref> That the knowledge is direct means that it was obtained through immediate observation, i.e. without involving any inference. One may obtain all kinds of knowledge indirectly, for example, by reading books or watching movies about the topic. This type of knowledge does not constitute experience of the topic since the direct contact in question concerns only the books and movies but not the topic itself.<ref name="Honderich"/> The objects of this knowledge are often understood as public objects, which are open to observation by most regular people.<ref name="Borchert"/>

The meaning of the term "experience" in everyday language usually sees the knowledge in question not merely as theoretical know-that or descriptive knowledge. Instead, it includes some form of practical [[know-how]], i.e. familiarity with a certain practical matter. This familiarity rests on recurrent past acquaintance or performances.<ref name="Borchert"/><ref name="Sandkühler"/> It often involves having learned something by heart and being able to skillfully practice it rather than having a mere theoretical understanding. But the knowledge and skills obtained directly this way are normally limited to generalized rules-of-thumb. As such, they lack behind the scientific certainty that comes about through a methodological analysis by scientists that condenses the corresponding insights into laws of nature.<ref name="Borchert"/>

== Debates about the nature of experience ==
=== Intentionality ===
Most experiences, especially the ones of the perceptual kind, aim at representing reality. This is usually expressed by stating that they have [[intentionality]] or are about their intentional object.<ref name="Representation in Mind">{{cite book |last1=Jackson |first1=Frank |title=Representation in Mind |date=1 January 2004 |publisher=Elsevier |pages=107–124 |chapter-url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780080443942500099 |language=en |chapter=Chapter 6 - Representation and Experience|doi=10.1016/B978-008044394-2/50009-9 |isbn=9780080443942 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Pitt |first1=David |title=Mental Representation |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-representation/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=24 September 2021 |date=2020}}</ref> If they are successful or veridical, they represent the world as it actually is. But they may also fail, in which case they give a false representation. It is traditionally held that all experience is intentional.<ref name="Smith"/> This thesis is known as "intentionalism".<ref name="Crane">{{cite book |last1=Crane |first1=Tim |title=The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind |publisher=Oxford: Oxford University Press |pages=474–93 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/CRAI-17 |chapter=Intentionalism|year=2009 }}</ref><ref name="Siewert">{{cite encyclopedia |last1=Siewert |first1=Charles |title=Consciousness and Intentionality |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-intentionality/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2017}}</ref> In this context, it is often claimed that all mental states, not just experiences, are intentional. But special prominence is usually given to experiences in these debates since they seem to constitute the most fundamental form of intentionality.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Strawson |first1=Galen |title=Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-927245-7 |url=https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.001.0001/acprof-9780199272457-chapter-3 |chapter=Intentionality and Experience: Terminological Preliminaries}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Kriegel |first1=Uriah |title=Phenomenal intentionality |date=2013 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=New York |isbn=9780199764297 |chapter=Chapter 1: The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program}}</ref> It is commonly accepted that all experiences have phenomenal features, i.e. that there is something it is like to live through them. Opponents of intentionalism claim that not all experiences have intentional features, i.e. that phenomenal features and intentional features can come apart.<ref name="Siewert"/><ref name="Chalmers">{{cite book |last1=Chalmers |first1=David J. |title=The Future for Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |pages=153–181 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/CHATRC |chapter=The Representational Character of Experience|year=2004 }}</ref> Some alleged counterexamples to intentionalism involve pure sensory experiences, like pain, of which it is claimed that they lack representational components.<ref name="Siewert"/> Defenders of intentionalism have often responded by claiming that these states have intentional aspects after all, for example, that pain represents bodily damage.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Park |first1=Thomas |title=Pain, Perception, and the Appearance-Reality Distinction |journal=Philosophical Analysis |date=2017 |volume=2017 |issue=38 |pages=205–237 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/PARPPA-6}}</ref> [[Mystical experience|Mystical states of experience]] constitute another putative counterexample. In this context, it is claimed that it is possible to have experiences of ''pure consciousness'' in which awareness still exists but lacks any object. But evaluating this claim is difficult since such experiences are seen as extremely rare and therefore difficult to investigate.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Forman |first1=Robert Kc |title=The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=8 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/FORIMC-2 |chapter=Introduction: Mysticism, Constructivism, and Forgetting|year=1990 }}</ref>

=== Conceptuality and myth of the given ===
Another debate concerns the question of whether all experiences have conceptual contents.<ref name="SeanKelly">{{cite journal |last1=Kelly |first1=Sean Dorrance |title=Demonstrative Concepts and Experience |journal=Philosophical Review |date=2001 |volume=110 |issue=3 |pages=397–420 |doi=10.1215/00318108-110-3-397 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KELDCA}}</ref> [[Concepts]] are general notions that constitute the fundamental building blocks of thought.<ref name="Concepts">{{cite web |last1=Margolis |first1=Eric |last2=Laurence |first2=Stephen |title=Concepts |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=28 September 2021 |date=2021}}</ref> Conceptual contents are usually contrasted with sensory contents, like seeing colors or hearing noises. This discussion is especially relevant for perceptual experience, of which some empiricists claim that it is made up only of [[sense data]] without any conceptual contents.<ref name="SeanKelly"/><ref name="Alston">{{cite journal |last1=Alston |first1=William P. |title=Sellars and the "myth of the given" |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |date=2002 |volume=65 |issue=1 |pages=69–86 |doi=10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00183.x |jstor=3071107 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3071107}}</ref>

The view that such a type of experience exists and plays an important role in epistemological issues has been termed the "myth of the given" by its opponents.<ref name="Alston"/><ref>{{cite web |title=myth of the given |url=https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100220488 |website=Oxford Reference |access-date=29 September 2021 |language=en }}</ref> The "given" refers to the immediate, uninterpreted sensory contents of such experiences. Underlying this discussion is the distinction between a "bare" or "immediate" experience in contrast to a more developed experience.<ref name="Borchert"/> The idea behind this distinction is that some aspects of experience are directly given to the subject without any interpretation. These basic aspects are then interpreted in various ways, leading to a more reflective and conceptually rich experience showing various new relations between the basic elements.<ref name="Borchert"/> This distinction could explain, for example, how various faulty perceptions, like perceptual illusions, arise: they are due to false interpretations, inferences or constructions by the subject but are not found on the most basic level.<ref name="Borchert"/> In this sense, it is often remarked that experience is a product both of the world and of the subject.<ref name="Gupta2012"/> The distinction between immediate and interpreted aspects of experience has proven contentious in philosophy, with some critics claiming that there is no immediate given within experience, i.e. that everything is interpreted in some way.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Hicks |first1=Michael R. |title=Sellars, Price, and the Myth of the Given |journal=Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy |date=2020 |volume=8 |issue=7 |doi=10.15173/jhap.v8i7.4270 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HICSPA-2|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Alston |first1=William P. |title=Sellars and the "Myth of the Given" |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |date=2002 |volume=65 |issue=1 |pages=69–86 |doi=10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00183.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/ALSSAT}}</ref> One problem with this criticism is that it is difficult to see how any interpretation could get started if there was nothing there to be interpreted to begin with.<ref name="Borchert"/>

Among those who accept that there is some form of immediate experience, there are different theories concerning its nature. Sense datum theorists, for example, hold that immediate experience only consists of basic sensations, like colors, shapes or noises.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Hatfield |first1=Gary |title=Sense Data |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sense-data/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=22 September 2021 |date=2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Coates |first1=Paul |title=Sense-Data |url=https://iep.utm.edu/sense-da/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=22 September 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Adams |first1=E. M. |title=The Nature of the Sense-Datum Theory |journal=Mind |date=1958 |volume=67 |issue=266 |pages=216–226 |doi=10.1093/mind/LXVII.266.216 |jstor=2251112 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2251112 |issn=0026-4423}}</ref> This immediate given is by itself a chaotic undifferentiated mass that is then ordered through various mental processes, like association, memory and language, into the normal everyday objects we perceive, like trees, cars or spoons. [[Naïve realism|Direct realists]], on the other hand, hold that these material everyday objects themselves are the immediate given.<ref>{{cite web |title=Epistemology – Perception and knowledge: Realism |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology/Perception-and-knowledge#ref309072 |website=Encyclopædia Britannica |access-date=22 September 2021 |language=en}}</ref><ref name="Borchert"/> Some philosophers have tried to approach these disagreements by formulating general characteristics possessed by the contents of immediate experience or "the given". It is often held that they are private, sensory, simple and [[Incorrigibility|incorrigible]].<ref name="Borchert"/> Privacy refers to the idea that the experience belongs to the subject experiencing it and is not directly accessible to other subjects. This access is at best indirect, for example, when the experiencer tells others about their experience.<ref name="Sandkühler"/> Simplicity means, in this context, that what is given constitutes basic building blocks free from any additional interpretations or inferences. The idea that the given is incorrigible has been important in many traditional disputes in epistemology.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Crane |first1=Tim |last2=French |first2=Craig |title=The Problem of Perception |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=23 September 2021 |date=2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Lyons |first1=Jack |title=Epistemological Problems of Perception |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-episprob/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=23 September 2021 |date=2017}}</ref> It is the idea that we cannot be wrong about certain aspects of our experience. On this view, the subject may be wrong about inferences drawn from the experience about external reality, for example, that there is a green tree outside the window. But it cannot be wrong about certain more fundamental aspects of how things seem to us, for example, that the subject is presented with a green shape.<ref name="Borchert"/> Critics of this view have argued that we may be wrong even about how things seem to us, e.g. that a possibly wrong conceptualization may already happen on the most basic level.<ref name="Borchert"/>

=== Transparency ===
There is disagreement among theorists of experience concerning whether the subjective character of an experience is entirely determined by its contents. This claim has been called the "transparency of experience".<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Siewert |first1=Charles |title=Is Experience Transparent? |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=2004 |volume=117 |issue=1/2 |pages=15–41 |doi=10.1023/B:PHIL.0000014523.89489.59 |jstor=4321434 |s2cid=170961261 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321434 |issn=0031-8116}}</ref> It states that what it is like to undergo an experience only depends on the items presented in it. This would mean that two experiences are exactly alike if they have the same contents.<ref name="Crane"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chediak |first1=Karla |title=Intentionalism and the Problem of the Object of Perception |journal=Trans/Form/Ação |date=2016 |volume=39 |issue=2 |pages=87–100 |doi=10.1590/S0101-31732016000200005 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/CHEIAT-5|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Gupta2012"/> Various philosophers have rejected this thesis, often with the argument that what matters is not just ''what'' is presented but also ''how'' it is presented. For example, the property of roundness can be presented visually, when looking at a sphere, or haptically, when touching the sphere.<ref name="Crane"/><ref name="Mitchell">{{cite journal |last1=Mitchell |first1=Jonathan |title=Another Look at Mode Intentionalism |journal=Erkenntnis |date=12 September 2020 |volume=87 |issue=6 |pages=2519–2546 |doi=10.1007/s10670-020-00314-4 |language=en |issn=1572-8420|doi-access=free }}</ref> Defenders of the transparency-thesis have pointed out that the difference between the experiences in such examples can be explained on the level of content: one experience presents the property of visual-roundness while the other presents felt-roundness.<ref name="Mitchell"/> Other counterexamples include blurry vision, where the blurriness is seen as a flawed representation without presenting the seen object itself as blurry.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Pace |first1=Michael |title=Blurred Vision and the Transparency of Experience |journal=Pacific Philosophical Quarterly |date=2007 |volume=88 |issue=3 |pages=328–354 |doi=10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00296.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/PACBVA}}</ref> It has been argued that only the universals present in the experience determine the subjective character of the experience. On this view, two experiences involving different particulars that instantiate exactly the same universals would be subjectively identical.<ref name="Gupta2012"/>

== Types of experience ==
=== Perception ===
[[Perception|Perceptual experience]] refers to "an immediate consciousness of the existence of things outside us".<ref name="Crane1">{{cite web |last1=Crane |first1=Tim |last2=French |first2=Craig |title=The Problem of Perception: 1. Our Ordinary Conception of Perceptual Experience |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/#OrdConPerExp |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 October 2021 |date=2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Silins |first1=Nicholas |title=Perceptual Experience and Perceptual Justification |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-justification/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=13 October 2021 |date=2019}}</ref> This [[Mental representation|representation]] of the [[World#Philosophy of mind|external world]] happens through stimuli registered and transmitted by the senses.<ref name="Hirst">{{cite web |last1=Hirst |first1=R. |title=Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Perception |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/medicine/psychology/psychology-and-psychiatry/perception}}</ref> Perceptual experience occurs in different modalities corresponding to the different senses, e.g. as [[visual perception]], [[auditory perception]] or [[haptic perception]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Stokes |first1=Dustin |last2=Matthen |first2=Mohan |last3=Biggs |first3=Stephen |title=Perception and Its Modalities |date=2014 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BIGPAI |chapter=Sorting the senses}}</ref> It is usually held that the objects perceived this way are ''ordinary material objects'', like stones, flowers, cats or airplanes that are presented as public objects existing independent of the mind perceiving them.<ref name="Hirst"/><ref name="Crane1"/> This stands in contrast, for example, to how objects are presented in imaginative experience. Another feature commonly ascribed to perceptual experience is that it seems to put us into ''direct touch'' with the object it presents. So the perceiver is normally not aware of the cognitive processes starting with the stimulation of the sense organs, continuing in the transmission of this information to the brain and ending in the information processing happening there.<ref name="Hirst"/><ref name="Crane1"/> While perception is usually a reliable source of information for the practical matters of our everyday affairs, it can also include ''false information'' in the form of [[illusion]] and [[hallucination]].<ref name="Hirst"/><ref name="Crane1"/> In some cases, the unreliability of a perception is already indicated within the experience itself, for example, when the perceiver fails to identify an object due to blurry vision.<ref name="Hirst"/> But such indications are not found in all misleading experiences, which may appear just as reliable as their accurate counterparts.<ref name="Crane1"/>

This is the source of the so-called "problem of perception". It consists in the fact that the features ascribed to perception so far seem to be incompatible with each other, making the so-characterized perception impossible: in the case of misleading perceptions, the perceiver may be presented with objects that do not exist, which would be impossible if they were in direct touch with the presented objects.<ref name="Crane1"/> Different solutions to this problem have been suggested. [[Sense datum theory|Sense datum theories]], for example, hold that we perceive sense data, like patches of color in visual perception, which do exist even in illusions.<ref name="Coates">{{cite web |last1=Coates |first1=Paul |title=Sense-Data |url=https://iep.utm.edu/sense-da/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2 October 2021}}</ref> They thereby deny that ordinary material things are the objects of perception.<ref name="Crane3"/> [[Disjunctivism|Disjunctivists]], on the other hand, try to solve the problem by denying that veridical perceptions and illusions belong to the same kind of experience.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Fish |first1=William |title=Disjunctivism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/disjunct/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2 October 2021}}</ref> Other approaches include adverbialism and intentionalism.<ref name="Crane3">{{cite web |last1=Crane |first1=Tim |last2=French |first2=Craig |title=The Problem of Perception: 3. Theories of Experience |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/#TheExp |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 October 2021 |date=2021}}</ref><ref name="Coates"/> The problem with these different approaches is that neither of them is fully satisfying since each one seems to contradict some kind of introspective evidence concerning the fundamental features of perceptual experience.<ref name="Hirst"/><ref name="Crane3"/>

=== Episodic memory and imagination ===
The experience of [[episodic memory]] consists in a form of reliving a past event one experienced before.<ref name="Perrin"/><ref name="Gardiner">{{cite journal |last1=Gardiner |first1=J. M. |title=Episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness: a first-person approach |journal=Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences |date=29 September 2001 |volume=356 |issue=1413 |pages=1351–1361 |doi=10.1098/rstb.2001.0955 |pmid=11571027 |pmc=1088519 |issn=0962-8436}}</ref><ref name="Michaelian3">{{cite web |last1=Michaelian |first1=Kourken |last2=Sutton |first2=John |title=Memory: 3. Episodicity |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/memory/#Epis |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 October 2021 |date=2017}}</ref> This is different from [[semantic memory]], in which one has access to the knowledge of various facts concerning the event in question without any experiential component associated with this knowledge.<ref name="Michaelian3"/> In episodic memory, on the other hand, the past event is consciously re-experienced.<ref name="Perrin">{{cite journal |last1=Perrin |first1=Denis |last2=Michaelian |first2=Kourken |last3=Sant’Anna |first3=André |title=The Phenomenology of Remembering Is an Epistemic Feeling |journal=Frontiers in Psychology |date=2020 |volume=11 |pages=1531 |doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01531 |pmid=32719642 |pmc=7350950 |issn=1664-1078|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Gardiner"/> In this sense, it is a form of mental time travel that is not present in non-episodic memory.<ref name="Michaelian3"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Tulving |first1=Endel |title=Learning and Memory: Episodic Memory |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/psychology/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/episodic-memory}}</ref> But this re-experiencing is not an exact copy of the original experience since the experienced event is presented as something in the past seen from one's current perspective, which is associated with some kind of feeling of pastness or familiarity not present in the original experience.<ref name="Perrin"/><ref name="Michaelian3"/> In this context, it is often held that episodic memory provides two types of information: first-order information about the past event and second-order information about the role of this event in the subject's current memory.<ref name="Michaelian3"/> Episodic memory is different from merely imagining the experience of a past event. An important aspect of this difference is that it is part of the nature of episodic memory to try to represent how the original experience was, even if it sometimes fails to do so. Other suggested differences include the degree of vividness and the causal connection between the original experience and the episodic memory.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Michaelian |first1=Kourken |last2=Sutton |first2=John |title=Memory: 4. Mnemicity |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/memory/#Mnem |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 October 2021 |date=2017}}</ref>

[[Imagination|Imaginative]] experience involves a special form of representation in which objects are presented without aiming to show how things actually are.<ref name="Liao">{{cite web |last1=Liao |first1=Shen-yi |last2=Gendler |first2=Tamar |title=Imagination |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/imagination/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=3 October 2021 |date=2020}}</ref> Like memory and unlike perception, the associated mental images are normally not caused by the stimulation of sensory organs.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Russell |first1=Bertrand |title=Sensation and Imagination |journal=The Monist |date=1915 |volume=25 |issue=1 |pages=28–44 |doi=10.5840/monist191525136 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/RUSSAI}}</ref><ref name="Manser">{{cite web |last1=Manser |first1=A. R. |title=Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Imagination |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/medicine/psychology/psychology-and-psychiatry/imagination |access-date=3 October 2021}}</ref> It is often held that both imagination and memory depend on previous perceptual acquaintance with the experienced contents.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Neville |first1=Robert Cummings |title=Encyclopedia of Science and Religion: Imagination |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/medicine/psychology/psychology-and-psychiatry/imagination |access-date=3 October 2021}}</ref> But unlike memory, more freedom is involved in most forms of imagination since the subject can freely vary, change and recombine various of the experienced contents while memory aims to preserve their original order.<ref name="Manser"/> Different theorists focus on different elements when trying to conceptualize the nature of imagination. The  impoverishment view holds that imagination is distinguished from perception and memory by being less vivid and clear. The will-dependence view, on the other hand, centers on the power of the will to actively shape the contents of imagination whereas the nonexistence view focuses on the impression of unreality or distance from reality belonging to imaginative experience.<ref name="Kind">{{cite journal |last1=Kind |first1=Amy |title=Imaginative Experience |journal=Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Consciousness |date=2020 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KINIE |publisher=Oxford University Press}}</ref> Despite its freedom and its lack of relation to actuality, imaginative experience can serve certain epistemological functions by representing what is possible or conceivable.<ref name="Liao"/> This is the case, for example, when imaginatively speculating about an event that has happened or might happen.<ref name="Kind"/> Imagination can happen in various different forms. One difference concerns whether the imagined scenario is deliberately controlled or arises spontaneously by itself. Another concerns whether the subject imagines itself as experiencing the imagined event from the inside, as being one of the protagonists within this event, or from the outside.<ref name="Liao"/> Different imaginative experiences tend to have different degrees to which the imagined scenario is just a reconstruction of something experienced previously or a creative rearrangement.<ref name="Liao"/> Accounts of imaginative experience usually focus on the visual domain, but there are also other, less prominent forms, like auditory imagination or olfactory imagination.<ref name="Kind"/>

=== Thinking ===
The term "[[thinking]]" is used to refer to a wide variety of cognitive experiences. They involve [[mental representation]]s and the processing of information.<ref name="Kazdin">{{cite book |editor1-last=Kazdin |editor1-first=Alan E. |title=Encyclopedia of Psychology |date=2000 |publisher=American Psychological Association |isbn=978-1-55798-187-5 |url=https://www.apa.org/pubs/books/4600100 |chapter=Thinking: An Overview}}</ref> This way, ideas or [[proposition]]s are entertained, judged or connected. It is similar to memory and imagination in that the experience of thinking can arise internally without any stimulation of the sensory organs, in contrast to perception.<ref name="Zajonc">{{cite web |last1=Zajonc |first1=Robert B. |title=International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences: Thinking |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/sociology-and-social-reform/sociology-general-terms-and-concepts/thinking |access-date=5 October 2021}}</ref> But thinking is still further removed from sensory contents than memory and imagination since its contents belong to a more abstract level. It is closely related to the phenomenon of speech, with some theorists claiming that all thinking is a form of inner speech expressed in language.<ref name="BorchertThinking">{{cite book |last1=Borchert |first1=Donald |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BORMEO |chapter=Thinking}}</ref> But this claim is controversial since there seem to be thoughts that are not linguistically fully articulated.<ref name="HonderichThinking">{{cite book |last1=Honderich |first1=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |chapter=Thinking}}</ref> But the more moderate claim is often accepted that thinking is associated with dispositions to perform speech acts. On this view, making a judgment in thought may happen non-linguistically but is associated with a disposition to linguistically affirm the judged proposition.<ref name="HonderichThinking"/> Various theories of the nature of the experience of thinking have been proposed. According to [[Platonism]], it is a spiritual activity in which [[Platonic form]]s and their interrelations are discerned and inspected.<ref name="BorchertThinking"/> Conceptualists, on the other hand, hold that thinking involves entertaining [[concept]]s.<ref name="BorchertThinking"/> On this view, judgments arise if two or more concepts are connected to each other and can further lead to [[inference]]s if these judgments are connected to other judgments.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Frauenstädt |first1=Julius |title=Ein philosophisches Wörterbuch, nach Arthur Schopenhauers sämmtlichen Schriften und handschriftlichem Nachlaß bearbeitet |date=1871 |publisher=Brockhaus |location=Leipzig |url=http://schopenhauers-kosmos.de/Urteil |chapter=Urteil}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Frauenstädt |first1=Julius |title=Ein philosophisches Wörterbuch, nach Arthur Schopenhauers sämmtlichen Schriften und handschriftlichem Nachlaß bearbeitet |date=1871 |publisher=Brockhaus |location=Leipzig |url=http://schopenhauers-kosmos.de/Schließen |chapter=Schließen}}</ref>

Various types of thinking are discussed in the academic literature.<ref name="BritannicaThought">{{cite web |title=Thought - Types of thinking |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/thought/Types-of-thinking |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=9 October 2021 |language=en}}</ref> They are sometimes divided into four categories: [[concept formation]], [[problem solving]], [[judgment]] and [[decision making]], and [[reasoning]].<ref name="Kazdin"/> In concept formation, the features common to the examples of a certain type are learned. This usually corresponds to understanding the meaning of the word associated with this type.<ref name="Kazdin"/><ref name="BritannicaThought"/> In the case of problem solving, thinking has as its goal to overcome certain obstacles by discovering a solution to a problem. This happens either by following an algorithm, which guarantees success if followed correctly, or by using heuristics, which are more informal methods that tend to bring the thinker closer to a solution.<ref name="Kazdin"/><ref name="BritannicaThought"/> Judgment and decision making involve choosing the best course of action among various alternatives.<ref name="Kazdin"/> In reasoning, the thinker starts from a certain set of premises and tries to draw conclusions from them.<ref name="Kazdin"/><ref name="BritannicaThought"/> A simpler categorization divides thinking into only two categories: theoretical contemplation and practical deliberation.<ref name="BorchertThinking"/>

=== Pleasure, emotion and mood ===
[[Pleasure]] refers to experience that feels good.<ref name="Pallies">{{cite journal |last1=Pallies |first1=Daniel |title=An Honest Look at Hybrid Theories of Pleasure |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=2021 |volume=178 |issue=3 |pages=887–907 |doi=10.1007/s11098-020-01464-5 |issn=0031-8116  |s2cid=219440957 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/PALAHL}}</ref><ref name="Lopez">{{cite book |last1=Lopez |first1=Shane J. |title=The Encyclopedia of Positive Psychology |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LOPTEO-2 |chapter=Pleasure|year=2009 }}</ref> It involves the enjoyment of something, like eating a cake or having sex. When understood in the widest sense, this includes not just sensory pleasures but any form of pleasant experience, such as engaging in an intellectually satisfying activity or the joy of playing a game. Pleasure comes in degrees and exists in a dimension that includes negative degrees as well. These negative degrees are usually referred to as pain and suffering and stand in contrast to pleasure as forms of feeling bad.<ref name="Katz">{{cite web |last1=Katz |first1=Leonard D. |title=Pleasure |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pleasure/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=29 January 2021 |date=2016}}</ref> Discussions of this dimension often focus on its positive side but many of the theories and insights apply equally to its negative side. There is disagreement among philosophers and psychologists concerning what the nature of pleasure is. Some understand pleasure as a simple sensation. On this view, a pleasure experience is an experience that has a pleasure-sensation among its contents.<ref name="BorchertPleasure">{{cite book |last1=Borchert |first1=Donald |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BORMEO |chapter=Pleasure}}</ref><ref name="Tomlinson"/> This account is rejected by attitude theories, which hold that pleasure consists not in a content but in a certain attitude towards a content. According to this perspective, the pleasure of eating a cake consists not in a taste sensation together with a pleasure sensation, as sensation-theorists claim. Instead, it consists in having a certain attitude, like desire, towards the taste sensation.<ref name="BorchertPleasure"/><ref name="Katz"/><ref name="Tomlinson"/> A third type of theory defines pleasure in terms of its representational properties. On this view, an experience is pleasurable if it presents its objects as being good for the experiencer.<ref name="Tomlinson">{{cite book |last1=Tomlinson |first1=Lucy |title=Pleasure Three Ways: Phenomenological, Attitudinal, Representational |date=2019 |publisher=University of Manchester |url=https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/files/184626773/FULL_TEXT.PDF |language=en |chapter=0. Introduction: Problems of Pleasure and Contemporary Theories of Pleasure}}</ref>

[[Emotion]]al experiences come in many forms, like fear, anger, excitement, surprise, grief or disgust.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Johnson |first1=Gregory |title=Theories of Emotion |url=https://iep.utm.edu/emotion/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=4 October 2021}}</ref> They usually include either ''pleasurable or unpleasurable aspects''.<ref name="Scarantino">{{cite web |last1=Scarantino |first1=Andrea |last2=de Sousa |first2=Ronald |title=Emotion: 2. Three Traditions in the Study of Emotions: Emotions as Feelings, Evaluations, and Motivations |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotion/#ThreTradStudEmotEmotFeelEvalMoti |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=4 October 2021 |date=2021}}</ref><ref name="Scherer"/> But they normally involve various other components as well, which are not present in every experience of pleasure or pain. It is often held that they also comprise ''evaluative components'', which ascribe a positive or negative value to their object, ''physiological components'', which involve bodily changes, and ''behavioral components'' in the form of a reaction to the presented object.<ref name="Scarantino"/><ref name="Scherer">{{cite journal |vauthors=Scherer KR |s2cid=145575751 |title=What are emotions? And how can they be measured? |journal=Social Science Information |year=2005 |volume=44 |issue=4 |pages=693–727 |doi=10.1177/0539018405058216}}</ref> For example, suddenly encountering a grizzly bear while hiking may evoke an emotional experience of fear in the hiker, which is experienced as unpleasant, which represents the bear as dangerous, which leads to an increase in the heart rate and which may provoke a fleeing reaction.<ref name="Scarantino"/> These and other types of components are often used to categorize emotions into different types. But there is disagreement concerning which of them is the essential component determining the relevant category. The dominant approaches categorize according to how the emotion feels, how it evaluates its object or what behavior it motivates.<ref name="Scarantino"/><ref>{{cite book |last1=Scarantino |first1=Andrea |title=Handbook of Emotions |date=2018 |edition=4th |url=https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxhbmRyZWFzY2FyYW50aW5vc3dlYnNpdGV8Z3g6NzNkYWVhNTMwODg1M2ZhNg |chapter=The Philosophy of Emotions and Its Impact on Affective Science}}</ref> 

While the experience of positive emotions is, to some extent, its own justification, and it is by these experiences or the desire for them that individuals tend to be motivated, the experience of [[negative emotion]]s is sometimes claimed to cause personal growth; and, hence, to be either necessary for, or at least beneficial in, creating more productive and resilient people<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ackerman |first=Courtney |date=27 April 2019 |title=What are Positive and Negative Emotions and Do We Need Both? |url=https://positivepsychology.com/positive-negative-emotions/#:~:text=Positive%20emotions%20are%20emotions%20that,pleasant%20or%20desirable%20situational%20responses%E2%80%A6 |access-date=28 March 2023}}</ref>—though the necessity of resilience in the first place, or of negative experiences ''in re'' growth, has been questioned by others.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Hedonist Imperative {{!}} WorldCat.org |url=https://search.worldcat.org/title/44325836 |access-date=2024-08-27 |website=search.worldcat.org |language=en}}</ref>

[[Mood (psychology)|Mood]]s are closely related to emotions, but not identical to them. Like emotions, they can usually be categorized as either positive or negative depending on how it feels to have them.<ref name="Robinson">{{cite web |last1=Robinson |first1=Jorgianne Civey |title=International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences: Mood |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/literature-and-arts/language-linguistics-and-literary-terms/language-and-linguistics/mood |access-date=5 October 2021}}</ref> One core difference is that emotional experiences usually have a very specific object, like the fear of a bear. Mood experiences, on the other hand, often either have no object or their object is rather diffuse, like when a person is anxious that ''something bad'' might happen without being able to clearly articulate the source of their anxiety.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Scarantino |first1=Andrea |last2=de Sousa |first2=Ronald |title=Emotion: 4. Emotions and Intentional Objects |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotion/#EmotInteObje |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=5 October 2021 |date=2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Siemer |first1=Matthias |title=Mood Experience: Implications of a Dispositional Theory of Moods |journal=Emotion Review |date=2009 |volume=1 |issue=3 |pages=256–263 |doi=10.1177/1754073909103594 |s2cid=145737449 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/SIEMEI}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Fish |first1=William |title=Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173) |date=2005 |publisher=Rodopi NY |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/FISEM |chapter=Emotions, Moods, and Intentionality}}</ref> Other differences include that emotions tend to be caused by specific events, whereas moods often lack a clearly identifiable cause, and that emotions are usually intensive, whereas moods tend to last longer.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lane |first1=Andrew M. |last2=Beedie |first2=Christopher |last3=Terry |first3=Peter C. |title=Distinctions Between Emotion and Mood |journal=Cognition and Emotion |date=2005 |volume=19 |issue=6 |pages=847–878 |doi=10.1080/02699930541000057 |hdl=2436/12841 |s2cid=18437088 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LANDBE|hdl-access=free }}</ref> Examples of moods include anxiety, depression, euphoria, irritability, melancholy and giddiness.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kriegel |first1=Uriah |title=The Intentional Structure of Moods |journal=Philosophers' Imprint |date=2019 |volume=19 |pages=1–19 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KRITIS-2}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Gallegos |first1=Francisco |title=Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods |journal=Philosophia |date=2017 |volume=45 |issue=4 |pages=1497–1513 |doi=10.1007/s11406-017-9820-5 |s2cid=151524606 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/GALMAN-2}}</ref>


=== Desire and agency ===
[[Desire]]s comprise a wide class of [[mental state]]s. They include unconscious desires, but only their conscious forms are directly relevant to experience.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Strandberg |first1=Caj |title=Expressivism and Dispositional Desires: 2. a distinction in mind |journal=American Philosophical Quarterly |date=2012 |volume=49 |issue=1 |pages=81–91 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/STREAD}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Bartlett |first1=Gary |title=Occurrent States |journal=Canadian Journal of Philosophy |date=2018 |volume=48 |issue=1 |pages=1–17 |doi=10.1080/00455091.2017.1323531 |s2cid=220316213 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BAROS-4}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Kriegel |first1=Uriah |title=The Varieties of Consciousness |date=2015 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KRITVO-5 |chapter=2. Conative Phenomenology}}</ref> Conscious desires involve the experience of wanting or wishing something. This is often understood in a very wide sense, in which phenomena like love, intention, and thirst are seen as forms of desire.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Parmisano |first1=S. F. |title=New Catholic Encyclopedia: Desire |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/sociology-and-social-reform/sociology-general-terms-and-concepts/desire |access-date=5 October 2021}}</ref> They are usually understood as attitudes toward conceivable [[states of affairs]].<ref>{{cite web |last1=Pettit |first1=Philip |title=Desire - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/desire/v-1 |website=www.rep.routledge.com |access-date=4 May 2021 |language=en}}</ref> They represent their objects as being valuable in some sense and aim to realize them by changing the world correspondingly. This can either happen in a positive or a negative sense. In the positive sense, the object is experienced as good and the aim is to create or maintain it. In the negative sense, the object is experienced as bad and the aim is to destroy it or to hinder it from coming into existence.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Sandkühler |first1=Hans Jörg |title=Enzyklopädie Philosophie |date=2010 |publisher=Meiner |url=https://meiner.de/enzyklopadie-philosophie-14071.html |chapter=Begehren/Begierde}}</ref> In intrinsic desires, the object is desired for its own sake, whereas in extrinsic desires, the object is desired because of the positive consequences associated with it.<ref name="HonderichDesire"/> Desires come in different degrees of intensity and their satisfaction is usually experienced as pleasurable.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Mele |first1=Alfred R. |title=Motivation and Agency |date=2003 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MELMAA-2 |chapter=7. Motivational Strength}}</ref><ref name="HonderichDesire">{{cite book |last1=Honderich |first1=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |chapter=desire}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Schroeder |first1=Timothy |title=Desire: philosophical issues |journal=WIREs Cognitive Science |date=2010 |volume=1 |issue=3 |pages=363–370 |doi=10.1002/wcs.3 |pmid=26271376 |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/wcs.3 |language=en |issn=1939-5086}}</ref>

[[Agency (philosophy)|Agency]] refers to the capacity to [[Action (philosophy)|act]] and the manifestation of this capacity.<ref name="Schlosser">{{cite web |last1=Schlosser |first1=Markus |title=Agency |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/agency/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=9 October 2021 |date=2019}}</ref><ref name="Mylopoulos">{{cite book |last1=Mylopoulos |first1=Myrto |last2=Shepherd |first2=Joshua |title=The Experience of Agency |date=9 July 2020 |doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.8 |isbn=978-0-19-874967-7 |url=https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198749677-e-8 |language=en}}</ref> Its experience involves various different aspects, including the formation of [[intention]]s, when planning possible courses of action, the decision between different alternatives, and the effort when trying to realize the intended course of action.<ref name="Mylopoulos"/><ref name="Schlosser"/> It is often held that desires provide the [[motivation]]al force behind agency.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Mele AR |title=Motivation: Essentially Motivation-Constituting Attitudes |journal=Philosophical Review |date=1995 |volume=104 |issue=3 |pages=387–423 |doi=10.2307/2185634 |jstor=2185634 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MELMEM}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Miller C |title=Motivation in Agents |journal=Noûs |date=2008 |volume=42 |issue=2 |pages=222–266 |doi=10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00679.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MILMIA-2}}</ref> But not all experiences of desire are accompanied by the experience of agency. This is the case, for example, when a desire is fulfilled without the agent trying to do so or when no possible course of action is available to the agent to fulfill the desire.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Wall |first1=David |title=Are There Passive Desires? |journal=Dialectica |date=2009 |volume=63 |issue=2 |pages=133–155 |doi=10.1111/dltc.2009.63.issue-2 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/WALATP-8}}</ref>

In a more restricted sense, the term "[[sense of agency]]" refers to the impression of being in control and being the owner of one's action.<ref name="Schlosser"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Moore |first1=James W. |title=What Is the Sense of Agency and Why Does it Matter? |journal=Frontiers in Psychology |date=29 August 2016 |volume=7 |pages=1272 |doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01272 |pmid=27621713 |pmc=5002400 |issn=1664-1078|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kawabe |first1=Takahiro |last2=Roseboom |first2=Warrick |last3=Nishida |first3=Shin'ya |title=The sense of agency is action–effect causality perception based on cross-modal grouping |journal=Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences |date=22 July 2013 |volume=280 |issue=1763 |pages=20130991 |doi=10.1098/rspb.2013.0991 |pmid=23740784 |pmc=3774240 |issn=0962-8452}}</ref> It is often held that two components are the central sources of the sense of agency. On the one hand, the agent constantly makes predictions about how their intentions will influence their bodily movement and compares these predictions to the sensory feedback. On this view, a positive match generates a sense of agency while a negative match disrupts the sense of agency.<ref name="Schlosser"/><ref name="Moore"/> On the other hand, when looking backward, the agent interprets their intention as the cause of the action. In the successful case, the intention precedes the action and the action is consistent with the intention.<ref name="Schlosser"/><ref name="Moore">{{cite journal |last1=Moore |first1=James W. |title=What Is the Sense of Agency and Why Does it Matter? |journal=Frontiers in Psychology |date=2016 |volume=7 |pages=1272 |doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01272 |pmid=27621713 |pmc=5002400 |issn=1664-1078|doi-access=free }}</ref>

=== Non-ordinary experience ===
The terms "non-ordinary experience", "anomalous experience" or "[[altered state of consciousness]]" are used to describe a wide variety of rare experiences that significantly differ from the experience in the ordinary waking state.<ref name="Facco">{{cite journal | last1=Facco | first1=Enrico | last2=Pederzoli | first2=Luciano | last3=Tressoldi | first3=Patrizio E. | title=Non-Ordinary Experiences of Consciousness: Expressions of Our True Nature | journal=[[SSRN Electronic Journal]] | publisher=Elsevier BV | year=2019 | issn=1556-5068 | doi=10.2139/ssrn.3510213 | ssrn=3510213}}</ref><ref name="Revonsuo">{{cite journal |last1=Revonsuo |first1=Antti |last2=Kallio |first2=Sakari |last3=Sikka |first3=Pilleriin |title=What is an Altered State of Consciousness? |journal=Philosophical Psychology |date=2009 |volume=22 |issue=2 |pages=187–204 |doi=10.1080/09515080902802850 |s2cid=55819447 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/REVWIA}}</ref> Examples of non-ordinary experiences are [[religious experience]]s, which are closely related to spiritual or [[mystical experience]]s, [[out-of-body experience]]s, [[near-death experience]]s, [[psychotic episode|psychotic episodes]], and [[psychedelic experience]]s.<ref name="Facco"/><ref name="Revonsuo"/>

Religious experiences are non-ordinary experiences that carry religious significance for the experiencer.<ref name="Facco"/><ref name="Webb">{{cite web |last1=Webb |first1=Mark |title=Religious Experience |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religious-experience/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=8 October 2021 |date=2017}}</ref> They often involve some kind of encounter with a divine person, for example, in the form of seeing God or hearing God's command. But they can also involve having an intensive feeling one believes to be caused by God or recognizing the divine in nature or in oneself. Some religious experiences are said to be [[ineffable]], meaning that they are so far away from the ordinary that they cannot be described in words.<ref name="Webb"/><ref name="Wynn">{{cite web |last1=Wynn |first1=Mark |title=Phenomenology of Religion: 1. The phenomenology of religious experience |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology-religion/#PheRelExp |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=8 October 2021 |date=2016}}</ref><ref name="Clark">{{cite web |last1=Clark |first1=Kelly James |title=Religious Epistemology: 3e. Religious Experience |url=https://iep.utm.edu/relig-ep/#SH3e |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=8 October 2021}}</ref> Out-of-body experiences involve the impression of being detached from one's material body and perceiving the external world from this different perspective.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Hayward |first1=Rhodri |title=The Oxford Companion to the Body: Out-of-body experiences |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/medicine/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/out-body-experiences |access-date=8 October 2021}}</ref> In them, it often seems to the person that they are floating above their own body while seeing it from the outside. They can have various different causes, including [[traumatic brain injuries]], [[psychedelic drugs]], or [[sleep paralysis]]. They can also take the form of near-death experiences, which are usually provoked by life-threatening situations and include contents such as flying through a tunnel towards a light, talking to deceased relatives, or a [[life review]], in which a person sees their whole life flash before their eyes.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Fischer |first1=John Martin |last2=Mitchell-Yellin |first2=Benjamin |title=Near-Death Experiences: Understanding Visions of the Afterlife |date=2016 |publisher=Oxford University Press USA |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/FISNEU |chapter=1. Introduction}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Near-death experience |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/near-death-experience |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=8 October 2021 |language=en}}</ref>

It is uncontroversial that these experiences occur sometimes for some people. In one study, for example, about 10% report having had at least one out-of-body experience in their life.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Blackmore |first1=Susan |title=A postal survey of OBEs and other experiences |journal=The Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research |date=1984 |volume=52 |issue=796 |pages=225–244 |url=http://www.susanblackmore.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/JP-1984.pdf}}</ref> But it is highly controversial how reliable these experiences are at accurately representing aspects of reality not accessible to ordinary experience.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Fischer |first1=John Martin |last2=Mitchell-Yellin |first2=Benjamin |title=Near-Death Experiences: Understanding Visions of the Afterlife |date=2016 |publisher=Oxford University Press USA |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/FISNEU |chapter=12. Confirmation Bias}}</ref> This is due to the fact that various wide-reaching claims are made based on non-ordinary experiences. Many of these claims cannot be verified by regular perception and frequently seem to contradict it or each other. Based on religious experience, for example, it has been claimed that a divine creator distinct from nature exists or that the divine exists in nature.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Jäger |first1=Christoph |title=Religious experience and the probability of theism: comments on Swinburne |journal=Religious Studies |date=September 2017 |volume=53 |issue=3 |pages=353–370 |doi=10.1017/S0034412517000191 |s2cid=171523193 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/abs/religious-experience-and-the-probability-of-theism-comments-on-swinburne/4FB6BFE12560DC9D93D28110A3DE5B58 |language=en |issn=0034-4125}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Byerly |first1=T. Ryan |title=The Awe-Some Argument for Pantheism |journal=European Journal for Philosophy of Religion |date=2019 |volume=11 |issue=2 |pages=1–21 |doi=10.24204/ejpr.v11i2.2968 |s2cid=197708001 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BYETAA}}</ref><ref name="Clark"/><ref name="Wynn"/> Out-of-body experiences and near-death experiences, on the other hand, are often used to argue for a [[mind–body dualism]] by holding that the soul can exist without the body and continues to exist after the death of the body.<ref>{{cite web |title=Philosophy of mind - The soul and personal identity |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-mind/The-soul-and-personal-identity |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=8 October 2021 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Fischer |first1=John Martin |last2=Mitchell-Yellin |first2=Benjamin |title=Near-Death Experiences: Understanding Visions of the Afterlife |date=2016 |publisher=Oxford University Press USA |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/FISNEU |chapter=10. Near-Death Experiences, Transformation, and the Afterlife}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lommel |first1=Pim van |title=Near-Death Experience, Consciousness, and the Brain: A New Concept About the Continuity of Our Consciousness Based on Recent Scientific Research on Near-Death Experience in Survivors of Cardiac Arrest |journal=World Futures |date=2006 |volume=62 |issue=1 & 2 |pages=134–151 |doi=10.1080/02604020500412808 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/VANNEC}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Dell’Olio |first1=Andrew J. |title=Do Near-Death Experiences Provide a Rational Basis for Belief in Life After Death? |journal=Sophia |date=2010 |volume=49 |issue=1 |pages=113–128 |doi=10.1007/s11841-009-0154-z |s2cid=145057993 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/DELDNE}}</ref> Defenders of such claims often contend that we have no decisive reason to deny the reliability of such experiences, for example, because they are in important ways similar to regular sensory experience or because there is an additional cognitive faculty that provides us access to knowledge beyond the regular senses.<ref name="Webb"/><ref name="Clark"/>

=== Others ===
A great variety of experiences is discussed in the academic literature besides the types mentioned so far. The term "[[Flow (psychology)|flow]]", for example, refers to experiences in which the agent is fully immersed in a certain activity. This type of experience has various characteristic features, including a clear sense of the activity's goal, immediate feedback on how one is doing and a good balance between one's skills and the difficulty of the task.<ref name="KazdinFlow"/><ref name="LopezFlow"/> A diverse group of activities can lead to flow experiences, like art, sports and computer games.<ref name="KazdinFlow">{{cite book |editor1-last=Kazdin |editor1-first=Alan E. |title=Encyclopedia of Psychology |date=2000 |publisher=American Psychological Association |isbn=978-1-55798-187-5 |url=https://www.apa.org/pubs/books/4600100 |chapter=Flow}}</ref> Flow is of particular interest to [[positive psychology]] because its experience is pleasurable.<ref name="LopezFlow">{{cite book |last1=Lopez |first1=Shane J. |title=The Encyclopedia of Positive Psychology |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LOPTEO-2 |chapter=Flow|year=2009 }}</ref>

Aesthetic experience is a central concept in the [[psychology of art]] and [[experimental aesthetics]].<ref name="Marković">{{cite journal |last1=Marković |first1=Slobodan |title=Components of aesthetic experience: aesthetic fascination, aesthetic appraisal, and aesthetic emotion |journal=i-Perception |date=12 January 2012 |volume=3 |issue=1 |pages=1–17 |doi=10.1068/i0450aap |pmid=23145263 |pmc=3485814 |issn=2041-6695}}</ref> It refers to the experience of [[aesthetic]] objects, in particular, concerning [[beauty]] and [[art]].<ref>{{cite web |last1=Eaton |first1=Marcia Muelder |title=Aesthetic Experience |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/aesthetic-experience |website=www.encyclopedia.com |access-date=12 October 2021}}</ref> There is no general agreement on the fundamental features common to all aesthetic experiences. Some accounts focus on features like a fascination with an aesthetic object, a feeling of unity and intensity, whereas others emphasize a certain psychological distance from the aesthetic object in the sense that the aesthetic experience is disconnected from practical concerns.<ref name="Marković"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Shelley |first1=James |title=The Concept of the Aesthetic: 2.4 Aesthetic Experience |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetic-concept/#AesExp |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=12 October 2021 |date=2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Aesthetics - The aesthetic experience |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/aesthetics/The-aesthetic-experience |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=12 October 2021 |language=en}}</ref>

[[Transformative Experience|Transformative experiences]] are experiences involving a radical transformation that leaves the experiencer a different person from who they were before.<ref name="Paul">{{cite journal |last1=Paul |first1=L. A. |title=Précis of Transformative Experience |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |date=2015 |volume=91 |issue=3 |pages=760–765 |doi=10.1111/phpr.12249 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/PAUPOT}}</ref> Examples of transformative experiences include having a child, fighting in a war, or undergoing a religious conversion. They involve fundamental changes both in one's beliefs and in one's core preferences.<ref name="Paul"/><ref name="Pettigrew"/> It has been argued that transformative experiences constitute counterexamples to [[rational choice theory]] because the person deciding for or against undergoing a transformative experience cannot know what it will be like until afterward. It also may be because it is not clear whether the decision should be grounded in the preferences before or after the transformation.<ref name="Paul"/><ref name="Pettigrew">{{cite journal |last1=Pettigrew |first1=Richard |title=Transformative Experience and Decision Theory |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |date=2015 |volume=91 |issue=3 |pages=766–774 |doi=10.1111/phpr.12240 |hdl=1983/b4796dab-2003-4e0b-99ef-9c3bc276b547 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/PETTEA-2|hdl-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Campbell |first1=Tim |last2=Mosquera |first2=Julia |title=Transformative Experience and the Shark Problem |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=2020 |volume=177 |issue=11 |pages=3549–3565 |doi=10.1007/s11098-019-01382-1 |s2cid=213752362 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/CAMTEA-3|doi-access=free }}</ref>

== In various disciplines ==
=== Phenomenology ===
[[Phenomenology (philosophy)|Phenomenology]] is the science of the structure and contents of experience. It studies [[phenomena]], i.e. the appearances of things from the first-person perspective.<ref name="Smith"/><ref name="JoelSmith">{{cite web |last1=Smith |first1=Joel |title=Phenomenology |url=https://iep.utm.edu/phenom/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=10 October 2021}}</ref> A great variety of experiences is investigated this way, including perception, memory, imagination, thought, desire, emotion and agency.<ref name="Smith2">{{cite web |last1=Smith |first1=David Woodruff |title=Phenomenology: 2. The Discipline of Phenomenology |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/#DiscPhen |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=10 October 2021 |date=2018}}</ref> According to traditional phenomenology, one important structure found in all the different types of experience is [[intentionality]], meaning that all experience is ''experience of something''.<ref name="Smith"/><ref name="JoelSmith"/> In this sense, experience is always directed at certain objects by means of its representational contents. Experiences are in an important sense different from the objects of experience since experiences are not just presented but one lives through them.<ref name="Smith2"/> Phenomenology is also concerned with the study of the [[conditions of possibility]] of phenomena that may shape experience differently for different people. These conditions include embodiment, culture, language and social background.<ref name="Smith"/><ref name="JoelSmith"/>

There are various different forms of phenomenology, which employ different methods.<ref name="Smith2"/><ref name="JoelSmith"/> Central to traditional phenomenology associated with [[Edmund Husserl]] is the so-called [[epoché]], also referred to as [[Bracketing (phenomenology)#Husserl and Epoché|bracketing]]. In it, the researcher suspends their judgment about the external existence of the experienced objects in order to focus exclusively on the structure of the experience itself, i.e. on how these objects are presented.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Beyer |first1=Christian |title=Edmund Husserl: 5. The phenomenological epoché |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/#PheEpo |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=10 October 2021 |date=2020}}</ref><ref name="JoelSmith"/> An important method for studying the contents of experience is called [[eidetic variation]]. It aims at discerning their [[essence]] by imagining the object in question, varying its features and assessing whether the object can survive this imaginary change. Only features that cannot be changed this way belong to the object's essence.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Drummond |first1=John J. |title=Historical Dictionary of Husserl's Philosophy |date=2009 |publisher=Scarecrow Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/DRUHDO |chapter=Eidetic variation}}</ref> [[Hermeneutic phenomenology]], by contrast, gives more importance to our pre-existing familiarity with experience.<ref name="Smith2"/> It tries to comprehend how this pre-understanding brings with it various forms of interpretation that shape experience and may introduce distortions into it.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Laverty |first1=Susann M. |title=Hermeneutic Phenomenology and Phenomenology: A Comparison of Historical and Methodological Considerations |journal=International Journal of Qualitative Methods |date=1 September 2003 |volume=2 |issue=3 |pages=21–35 |doi=10.1177/160940690300200303 |s2cid=145728698 |language=en |issn=1609-4069|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=George |first1=Theodore |title=Hermeneutics: 1. Interpretive Experience |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hermeneutics/#InteExpe |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=10 October 2021 |date=2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Sammel |first1=Ali |title=An Invitation to Dialogue: Gadamer, Hermeneutic Phenomenology, and Critical Environmental Education |journal=Canadian Journal of Environmental Education (CJEE) |date=1 January 2003 |volume=8 |issue=1 |pages=155–168 |url=https://cjee.lakeheadu.ca/article/view/244 |issn=1205-5352}}</ref> [[Neurophenomenology]], on the other hand, aims at bridging the gap between the first-person perspective of traditional phenomenology and the third-person approach favored by the natural sciences. This happens by looking for connections between subjective experience and objective brain processes, for example, with the help of brain scans.<ref name="Smith2"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Bockelman |first1=Patricia |last2=Reinerman-Jones |first2=Lauren |last3=Gallagher |first3=Shaun |title=Methodological lessons in neurophenomenology: Review of a baseline study and recommendations for research approaches |journal=Frontiers in Human Neuroscience |date=2013 |volume=7 |pages=608 |doi=10.3389/fnhum.2013.00608 |pmid=24133430 |pmc=3794193 |issn=1662-5161|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Berkovich-Ohana |first1=Aviva |last2=Dor-Ziderman |first2=Yair |last3=Trautwein |first3=Fynn-Mathis |last4=Schweitzer |first4=Yoav |last5=Nave |first5=Ohad |last6=Fulder |first6=Stephen |last7=Ataria |first7=Yochai |title=The Hitchhiker's Guide to Neurophenomenology – The Case of Studying Self Boundaries With Meditators |journal=Frontiers in Psychology |date=2020 |volume=11 |pages=1680 |doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01680 |pmid=32793056 |pmc=7385412 |issn=1664-1078|doi-access=free }}</ref>

=== Epistemology ===
Experience, when understood in terms of sensation, is of special interest to epistemology. Knowledge based on this form of experience is termed "empirical knowledge" or "knowledge a posteriori".<ref name="Honderich"/> [[Empiricism]] is the thesis that all knowledge is empirical knowledge, i.e. that there is no knowledge that does not ultimately rest on sensory experience. Traditionally, this view is opposed by [[rationalists]], who accept that sensory experience can ground knowledge but also allow other sources of knowledge. For example, some rationalists claim that humans either have innate or intuitive knowledge of mathematics that does not rest on generalizations based on sensory experiences.<ref name="Markie">{{cite web |last1=Markie |first1=Peter |last2=Folescu |first2=M. |title=Rationalism vs. Empiricism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/#Intr |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=21 September 2021 |date=2021}}</ref>

Another problem is to understand how it is possible for sensory experiences to justify beliefs. According to one view, sensory experiences are themselves belief-like in the sense that they involve the affirmation of propositional contents.<ref name="Honderich"/> On this view, seeing white snow involves, among other things, the affirmation of the proposition "snow is white".<ref>{{cite web |last1=Oppy |first1=Graham |title=Propositional attitudes |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/propositional-attitudes/v-1 |website=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=21 September 2021 |language=en}}</ref> Given this assumption, experiences can justify beliefs in the same way as beliefs can justify other beliefs: because their propositional contents stand in the appropriate logical and explanatory relations to each other.<ref name="Honderich"/> But this assumption has many opponents who argue that sensations are non-conceptual and therefore non-propositional. On such a view, the affirmation that snow is white is already something added to the sensory experience, which in itself may not amount to much more than the presentation of a patch of whiteness.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Balog |first1=Katalin |title=Jerry Fodor on Non-Conceptual Content |journal=Synthese |date=2009 |volume=167 |issue=3 |pages=311–320 |doi=10.1007/s11229-009-9585-x |s2cid=18583257 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BALJFO}}</ref> One problem for this [[#Conceptuality and myth of the given|non-conceptualist approach]] to perceptual experience is that it faces difficulties in explaining how sensory experiences can justify beliefs, as they apparently do.<ref name="Honderich"/> One way to avoid this problem is to deny this appearance by holding that they do not justify beliefs but only cause beliefs.<ref name="DiFate"/> On the [[coherence theory of justification]], these beliefs may still be justified, not because of the experiences responsible for them, but because of the way they cohere with the rest of the person's beliefs.<ref name="Honderich"/>

Because of its relation to justification and knowledge, experience plays a central role for empirical rationality.<ref name="Gupta2012"/> Whether it is rational for someone to believe a certain claim depends, among other things, on the experiences this person has made.<ref name="Audi"/><ref name="Rescher"/> For example, a teacher may be justified in believing that a certain student will pass an exam based on the teacher's experience with the student in the classroom. But the same belief would not be justified for a stranger lacking these experiences. Rationality is relative to experience in this sense. This implies that it may be rational for one person to accept a certain claim while another person may rationally reject the same claim.<ref name="Audi">{{cite journal |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=Précis of the Architecture of Reason |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |date=2003 |volume=67 |issue=1 |pages=177–180 |doi=10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00031.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDPOT}}</ref><ref name="Rescher">{{cite book |last1=Rescher |first1=Nicholas |title=Rationality: A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Nature and the Rationale of Reason |date=1988 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/RESRAP |chapter=10. The Universality of the Rational}}</ref><ref name="Gupta2012"/>

=== Science ===
Closely related to the role of experience in epistemology is its role in science.<ref name="Masiello">{{cite book |last1=Masiello |first1=R. J. |title=New Catholic Encyclopedia |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-religion/philosophy/philosophy-terms-and-concepts/experience |chapter=Experience}}</ref><ref name="Sandkühler"/> It is often argued that observational experience is central to scientific experiments. The evidence obtained in this manner is then used to confirm or disconfirm scientific theories. In this way, experience acts as a neutral arbiter between competing theories.<ref name="Crupi">{{cite web |last1=Crupi |first1=Vincenzo |title=Confirmation |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/confirmation/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=13 June 2021 |date=2021}}</ref><ref name="DiFate">{{cite web |last1=DiFate |first1=Victor |title=Evidence |url=https://iep.utm.edu/evidence/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=11 June 2021}}</ref><ref name="ThomasKelly">{{cite web |last1=Kelly |first1=Thomas |title=Evidence |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evidence/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=11 June 2021 |date=2016}}</ref> For example, astronomical observations made by [[Galileo Galilei]] concerning the orbits of planets were used as evidence in the [[Copernican Revolution]], in which the traditional [[geocentric model]] was rejected in favor of the [[heliocentric model]].<ref>{{cite web |title=Copernican Revolution |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/Copernican-Revolution |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=29 September 2021 |language=en}}</ref> One problem for this view is that it is essential for scientific evidence to be public and uncontroversial. The reason for this is that different scientists should be able to share the same evidence in order to come to an agreement about which hypothesis is correct. But experience is usually understood as a private mental state, not as a publicly observable phenomenon, thereby putting its role as scientific evidence into question.<ref name="DiFate"/><ref name="ThomasKelly"/><ref>{{cite book |last1=Gage |first1=Logan Paul |title=Objectivity and Subjectivity in Epistemology: A Defense of the Phenomenal Conception of Evidence |chapter=1. Introduction: Two Rival Conceptions of Evidence|date=2014 |publisher=Baylor University |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/GAGOAS|type=PhD Thesis }}</ref><ref name="Borchert"/>

=== Metaphysics ===
A central problem in [[metaphysics]] is the [[mind–body problem]]. It involves the question of how to conceive the relation between body and mind.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Borchert |first1=Donald |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BORMEO |chapter=Mind–Body Problem}}</ref><ref name="RobinsonHoward"/> Understood in its widest sense, it concerns not only experience but any form of [[mind]], including unconscious mental states.<ref name="RobinsonHoward"/> But it has been argued that experience has special relevance here since experience is often seen as the paradigmatic form of mind.<ref name="Pernu"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Bourget |first1=David |last2=Mendelovici |first2=Angela |title=Phenomenal Intentionality: 2. The phenomenal intentionality theory |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenal-intentionality/#PhenInteTheo |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=11 October 2021 |date=2019}}</ref> The idea that there is a "problem" to begin with is often traced back to how different matter and experience seem to be.<ref name="Pernu">{{cite journal |last1=Pernu |first1=Tuomas K. |title=The Five Marks of the Mental |journal=Frontiers in Psychology |date=2017 |volume=8 |page=1084 |doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01084 |pmid=28736537 |language=English |issn=1664-1078|pmc=5500963 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Kim">{{cite book |last1=Kim |first1=Jaegwon |title=Philosophy of Mind |date=2006 |publisher=Boulder: Westview Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KIMPOM-3 |chapter=1. Introduction|edition=Second }}</ref> Physical properties, like size, shape and weight, are public and are ascribed to objects. Experiences, on the other hand, are private and are ascribed to subjects.<ref name="RobinsonHoward">{{cite web |last1=Robinson |first1=Howard |title=Dualism: 1.1 The Mind–Body Problem |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/#MinBod |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=11 October 2021 |date=2020}}</ref> Another important distinctive feature is that experiences are intentional, i.e. that they are directed at objects different from themselves.<ref name="Smith"/><ref name="Representation in Mind"/> But despite these differences, body and mind seem to causally interact with each other, referred to as psycho-physical causation.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lowe |first1=E. J. |title=The Problem of Psychophysical Causation |journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy |date=1992 |volume=70 |issue=3 |pages=263–76 |doi=10.1080/00048409212345161 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LOWTPO}}</ref><ref name="Robb">{{cite web |last1=Robb |first1=David |last2=Heil |first2=John |title=Mental Causation |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-causation/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=11 October 2021 |date=2021}}</ref> This concerns both the way how physical events, like a rock falling on someone's foot, cause experiences, like a sharp pain, and how experiences, like the intention to make the pain stop, cause physical events, like pulling the foot from under the rock.<ref name="Robb"/>

Various solutions to the mind–body problem have been presented.<ref>{{cite web |title=Philosophy of mind - Traditional metaphysical positions |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-mind/The-soul-and-personal-identity#ref283966 |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=12 October 2021 |language=en}}</ref> Dualism is a traditionally important approach. It states that bodies and minds belong to distinct ontological categories and exist independently of each other.<ref name="RobinsonHoward"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Calef |first1=Scott |title=Dualism and Mind |url=https://iep.utm.edu/dualism/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=12 October 2021}}</ref> A central problem for dualists is to give a plausible explanation of how their interaction is possible or of why they seem to be interacting. Monists, on the other hand, deny this type of ontological bifurcation.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Schaffer |first1=Jonathan |title=Monism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/monism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=12 October 2021 |date=2018}}</ref> Instead, they argue that, on the most fundamental level, only one type of entity exists. According to materialism, everything is ultimately material. On this view, minds either do not exist or exist as material aspects of bodies.<ref>{{cite web |title=Materialism |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/materialism-philosophy |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=12 October 2021 |language=en}}</ref> According to idealism, everything is ultimately mental. On this view, material objects only exist in the form of ideas and depend thereby on experience and other mental states.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Guyer |first1=Paul |last2=Horstmann |first2=Rolf-Peter |title=Idealism: 1. Introduction |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/#Intr |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=12 October 2021 |date=2021}}</ref> Monists are faced with the problem of explaining how two types of entities that seem to be so different can belong to the same ontological category.<ref name="Pernu"/><ref name="Kim"/>

The [[hard problem of consciousness]] is a closely related issue. It is concerned with explaining why some physical events, like brain processes, are accompanied by [[conscious]] experience, i.e. that undergoing them feels a certain way to the subject.<ref name="Weisberg">{{cite web |last1=Weisberg |first1=Josh |title=Hard Problem of Consciousness |url=https://iep.utm.edu/hard-con/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=11 October 2021}}</ref><ref name="Vasilyev">{{cite journal |last1=Vasilyev |first1=Vadim V. |title="The Hard Problem of Consciousness" and Two Arguments for Interactionism |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/VASTHP-2 |journal=Faith and Philosophy |pages=514–526 |doi=10.5840/faithphil200926552 |date=2009|volume=26 |issue=5 }}</ref><ref name="McClelland">{{cite journal |last1=McClelland |first1=Tom |title=The Problem of Consciousness: Easy, Hard or Tricky? |journal=Topoi |date=2017 |volume=36 |issue=1 |pages=17–30 |doi=10.1007/s11245-014-9257-4 |s2cid=145287229 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MCCTPO-36}}</ref> This is especially relevant from the perspective of the [[natural science]]s since it seems to be possible, at least in principle, to explain human behavior and cognition without reference to experience. Such an explanation can happen in relation to the processing of information in the form of electrical signals. In this sense, the hard problem of consciousness points to an explanatory gap between the physical world and conscious experience.<ref name="Weisberg"/><ref name="Vasilyev"/><ref name="McClelland"/> There is significant overlap between the solutions proposed to the mind–body problem and the solutions proposed to the hard problem of consciousness.<ref name="Weisberg"/><ref name="RobinsonHoward"/>

=== Psychology ===
Another disagreement between empiricists and rationalists besides their epistemological dispute concerns the role of experience in the formation of concepts.<ref name="Markie"/> Concepts are general notions that constitute the fundamental building blocks of thought.<ref name="Concepts"/> Some empiricists hold that all concepts are learned from experience. This is sometimes explained by claiming that concepts just constitute generalizations, abstractions or copies of the original contents of experience.<ref name="Gupta2012"/> Logical empiricists, for example, have used this idea in an effort to reduce the content of all empirical propositions to protocol sentences recording nothing but the scientists' immediate experiences.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Uebel |first1=Thomas |title=Empiricism at the Crossroads: The Vienna Circle's Protocol-Sentence Debate Revisited |date=2 November 2015 |publisher=Open Court |isbn=978-0-8126-9929-6 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nq-6CgAAQBAJ |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Logical positivism |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/logical-positivism |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=23 September 2021 |language=en}}</ref><ref name="Borchert"/> This idea is convincing for some concepts, like the concept of "red" or of "dog", which seem to be acquired through experience with their instances. But it is controversial whether this is true for all concepts.<ref name="Borchert"/> [[Immanuel Kant]], for example, defends a rationalist position by holding that experience requires certain concepts so basic that it would not be possible without them. These concepts, the so-called categories, cannot be acquired through experience since they are the ''conditions of the possibility of experience'', according to Kant.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Piché |first1=Claude |title=Transcendental Inquiry: Its History, Methods and Critiques |date=2016 |publisher=Springer International Publishing |isbn=978-3-319-40715-9 |pages=1–20 |url=https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1866/21324/picheC-KantOnTheConditions-TranscendentalInquiry-2016.pdf |language=en |chapter=Kant on the “Conditions of the Possibility” of Experience}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Thomasson |first1=Amie |title=Categories |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/categories/#KanCon |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Wardy |first1=Robert |title=Categories |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/categories/v-1/sections/categories-in-kant |website=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=23 September 2021 |language=en}}</ref>

== See also ==
{{Portal|Philosophy}}
{{Wikiquote}}
{{Wiktionary}}
{{Commonscat|Consciousness}}
* {{annotated link|Customer experience}}
* {{annotated link|Empiricism}}
* {{annotated link|The Experience Economy}}
* {{annotated link|Experiential education}}
* {{annotated link|Engagement marketing|aka=Experiential marketing}}
* {{annotated link|Ideasthesia}}
* {{annotated link|Perception}}
* {{annotated link|Adrenaline junkie|Thrill}}
* {{annotated link|Wisdom#Confucianism}}
** {{annotated link|Human self-reflection|Reflection}}
** {{annotated link|Imitation}}
*  [[Process philosophy]]

==References==
{{Reflist}}

{{Philosophy topics}}
{{Metaphysics}}
{{Epistemology}}
{{Consciousness}}
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Concepts in epistemology]]
[[Category:Concepts in the philosophy of mind]]
[[Category:Consciousness]]
[[Category:Empiricism]]
[[Category:Phenomenology]]
[[Category:Perception]]