Revision as of 12:09, 18 September 2022

Philosophical pessimism is a family of philosophical views that assign a negative value to life or existence. Philosophical pessimists commonly argue that the world contains an empirical prevalence of pains over pleasures, that life is ontologically or intrinsically adverse to living beings, and that existence is fundamentally meaningless or without purpose. Their responses to this condition, however, are widely varied and can be life-affirming. This form of pessimism is not an emotional disposition as the term commonly connotes.

Philosophical pessimism

Philosophical pessimism is not a state of mind or a psychological disposition, but rather it is a worldview or philosophical position that assigns a negative value to life or existence. Philosophical pessimists commonly argue that the world contains an empirical prevalence of pains over pleasures, that life is ontologically or intrinsically adverse to living beings, and that existence is fundamentally meaningless or without purpose.^[1]^[2]^[3]

Philosophical pessimism is not a single coherent movement, but rather a loosely associated group of thinkers with similar ideas and a family resemblance to each other.^[4] In Weltschmerz: Pessimism in German Philosophy, 1860-1900, Frederick C. Beiser states the central thesis of pessimism as "the thesis that life is not worth living, that nothingness is better than being, or that it is worse to be than not be".^[5] For many philosophical pessimists, however, this view of life does not automatically imply the desirability of suicide, but simply the gradual abolishment of suffering through antinatalism, that is, non-procreation.^[6]^[7]^[8]^[9]

Some philosophical pessimists see the self-consciousness of man as a tragic byproduct of evolution that allowed us to contemplate our place in the cosmos and yearn for justice and meaning together with a freedom from pain, aging, sickness and death while simultaneously being aware that nature itself can never satisfy those fundamental needs. According to Peter Wessel Zapffe as well as Terror Management Theory, a feeling of existential terror is born from the juxtaposition of human beings' awareness of themselves as merely transient animals groping to survive in a meaningless universe, destined only to decay and die. For Zapffe, our knowledge of our predicament is repressed through the use of four mechanisms, conscious or not, which he names isolation, anchoring, distraction and sublimation.^[10] For TMT, human beings deal with this existential anxiety through symbolic conceptions of reality that give meaning, order, and permanence to existence; provide a set of standards for what is valuable; and promise some form of either literal or symbolic immortality to those who believe in the cultural worldview and live up to its standards of value.^[11]

References

^ Schopenhauer, Arthur (1966). The World as Will and Representation, Vol. 1. Dover Publications. ISBN 9780486217611.
^ Benatar, David (2017). The Human Predicament: A Candid Guide to Life's Biggest Questions. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0190633813.
^ J. Cabrera, Discomfort and Moral Impediment: The Human Situation, Radical Bioethics and Procreation, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2019. [1] A thirty-page extract on the publisher's website. J. Cabrera, Mal-estar e moralidade: situação humana, ética e procriação responsável, Brasília: UnB, 2018 (original Portuguese edition).
^ Dienstag, Joshua Foa (2009). Pessimism: Philosophy, Ethic, Spirit. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-6911-4112-1.
^ Beiser, Frederick C. (2018). Weltschmerz: Pessimism in German Philosophy, 1860-1900. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0198822653. The philosophical discussion of pessimism in late 19th-century Germany shows a remarkable unanimity about its central thesis. According to all participants in this discussion, pessimism is the thesis that life is not worth living, that nothingness is better than being, or that it is worse to be than not be.
^ Arthur Schopenhauer, Studies in Pessimism, translated by Thomas Bailey Saunders (1913). On the Sufferings of the World, p. 15: "If children were brought into the world by an act of pure reason alone, would the human race continue to exist? Would not a man rather have so much sympathy with the coming generation as to spare it the burden of existence? or at any rate not take it upon himself to impose that burden upon it in cold blood". On Suicide, p. 48: "In my chief work I have explained the only valid reason existing against suicide on the score of mortality. It is this: that suicide thwarts the attainment of the highest moral aim by the fact that, for a real release from this world of misery, it substitutes one that is merely apparent."
^ Benatar, David (2013). "Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics". The Journal of Ethics. 17 (1/2, p. 148): 121–151. doi:10.1007/s10892-012-9133-7. S2CID 170682992. A few of my critics have claimed that I am committed to the desirability of suicide and even speciecide. They clearly intend this as a reductio ad absurdum of my position. However, I considered the questions of suicide and speciecide in Better Never to Have Been and argued that these are not implications of my view. First, it is possible to think that both coming into existence is a serious harm and that death is (usually) a serious harm. Indeed, some people might think that coming into existence is a serious harm in part because the harm of death is then inevitable.
^ Ligotti, Thomas (2011). The Conspiracy against the Human Race: A Contrivance of Horror. Hippocampus Press. p. 50. ISBN 978-0984480272. Simply because someone has reached the conclusion that the amount of suffering in this world is enough that anyone would be better off never having been born does not mean that by force of logic or sincerity he must kill himself. It only means he has concluded that the amount of suffering in this world is enough that anyone would be better off never having been born.
^ Coates, Ken (2016). Anti-Natalism: Rejectionist Philosophy from Buddhism to Benatar. First Edition Design Publishing. ISBN 9781506902401. Anti-natalism can be seen as part of a larger philosophy, described here as Rejectionism, which finds existence – directly or indirectly, i.e. as procreation - deeply problematic and unacceptable.
^ "P.W. Zapffe, The Last Messiah, Philosophy Now, 2004, issue 45".
^ Pyszczynski, T.; Greenberg, J.; Solomon, S.; Arndt, J.; Schimel, J. (2004). "Pyszczynski, Tom & Greenberg, Jeff & Solomon, Sheldon & Arndt, Jamie & Schimel, Jeff. (2004). Why Do People Need Self-Esteem? A Theoretical and Empirical Review. Psychological bulletin. 130. 435-68. 10.1037/0033-2909.130.3.435". Psychological Bulletin. 130 (3): 435–468. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.130.3.435. PMID 15122930.

[:3-1] Schopenhauer, Arthur (1966). The World as Will and Representation, Vol. 1. Dover Publications. ISBN 9780486217611.

[:2-2] Benatar, David (2017). The Human Predicament: A Candid Guide to Life's Biggest Questions. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0190633813.

[3] J. Cabrera, Discomfort and Moral Impediment: The Human Situation, Radical Bioethics and Procreation, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2019. [1] A thirty-page extract on the publisher's website. J. Cabrera, Mal-estar e moralidade: situação humana, ética e procriação responsável, Brasília: UnB, 2018 (original Portuguese edition).

[Dienstag-4] Dienstag, Joshua Foa (2009). Pessimism: Philosophy, Ethic, Spirit. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-6911-4112-1.

[5] Beiser, Frederick C. (2018). Weltschmerz: Pessimism in German Philosophy, 1860-1900. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0198822653. The philosophical discussion of pessimism in late 19th-century Germany shows a remarkable unanimity about its central thesis. According to all participants in this discussion, pessimism is the thesis that life is not worth living, that nothingness is better than being, or that it is worse to be than not be.

[6] Arthur Schopenhauer, Studies in Pessimism, translated by Thomas Bailey Saunders (1913). On the Sufferings of the World, p. 15: "If children were brought into the world by an act of pure reason alone, would the human race continue to exist? Would not a man rather have so much sympathy with the coming generation as to spare it the burden of existence? or at any rate not take it upon himself to impose that burden upon it in cold blood". On Suicide, p. 48: "In my chief work I have explained the only valid reason existing against suicide on the score of mortality. It is this: that suicide thwarts the attainment of the highest moral aim by the fact that, for a real release from this world of misery, it substitutes one that is merely apparent."

[7] Benatar, David (2013). "Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics". The Journal of Ethics. 17 (1/2, p. 148): 121–151. doi:10.1007/s10892-012-9133-7. S2CID 170682992. A few of my critics have claimed that I am committed to the desirability of suicide and even speciecide. They clearly intend this as a reductio ad absurdum of my position. However, I considered the questions of suicide and speciecide in Better Never to Have Been and argued that these are not implications of my view. First, it is possible to think that both coming into existence is a serious harm and that death is (usually) a serious harm. Indeed, some people might think that coming into existence is a serious harm in part because the harm of death is then inevitable.

[8] Ligotti, Thomas (2011). The Conspiracy against the Human Race: A Contrivance of Horror. Hippocampus Press. p. 50. ISBN 978-0984480272. Simply because someone has reached the conclusion that the amount of suffering in this world is enough that anyone would be better off never having been born does not mean that by force of logic or sincerity he must kill himself. It only means he has concluded that the amount of suffering in this world is enough that anyone would be better off never having been born.

[9] Coates, Ken (2016). Anti-Natalism: Rejectionist Philosophy from Buddhism to Benatar. First Edition Design Publishing. ISBN 9781506902401. Anti-natalism can be seen as part of a larger philosophy, described here as Rejectionism, which finds existence – directly or indirectly, i.e. as procreation - deeply problematic and unacceptable.

[10] "P.W. Zapffe, The Last Messiah, Philosophy Now, 2004, issue 45".

[11] Pyszczynski, T.; Greenberg, J.; Solomon, S.; Arndt, J.; Schimel, J. (2004). "Pyszczynski, Tom & Greenberg, Jeff & Solomon, Sheldon & Arndt, Jamie & Schimel, Jeff. (2004). Why Do People Need Self-Esteem? A Theoretical and Empirical Review. Psychological bulletin. 130. 435-68. 10.1037/0033-2909.130.3.435". Psychological Bulletin. 130 (3): 435–468. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.130.3.435. PMID 15122930.

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 '''Philosophical pessimism''' is a family of philosophical views that assign a negative value to life or existence. Philosophical pessimists commonly argue that the world contains an [[Empiricism|empirical]] prevalence of pains over pleasures, that life is [[Ontology|ontologically]] or intrinsically adverse to living beings, and that existence is fundamentally meaningless or without [[Teleology|purpose]]. Their responses to this condition, however, are widely varied and can be life-affirming. This form of pessimism is not an emotional disposition as the term commonly connotes.
+= Philosophical pessimism =
+{{Wikiquote|Philosophical pessimism}}
+[[File:Arthur Schopenhauer Portrait by Ludwig Sigismund Ruhl 1815.jpeg|thumb|319x319px|"''That thousands had lived in happiness and joy would never do away with the anguish and death-agony of one individual; and just as little does my present well-being undo my previous sufferings. Therefore, were the evil in the world even a hundred times less than it is, its mere existence would still be sufficient to establish a truth that may be expressed in various ways, although always only somewhat indirectly, namely that we have not to be pleased but rather sorry about the existence of the world; that its non-existence would be preferable to its existence; that it is something which at bottom ought not to be, and so on''." – [[Arthur Schopenhauer]], ''[[The World as Will and Representation]]'', volume II, chapter XLVI (On the Vanity and Suffering of Life).]]
+Philosophical pessimism is not a state of mind or a psychological disposition, but rather it is a [[worldview]] or philosophical position that assigns a negative value to life or existence. Philosophical pessimists commonly argue that the world contains an [[Empiricism|empirical]] prevalence of pains over pleasures, that life is [[Ontology|ontologically]] or intrinsically adverse to living beings, and that existence is fundamentally meaningless or without [[Teleology|purpose]].<ref name=":3">{{Cite book |last=Schopenhauer |first=Arthur |title=The World as Will and Representation, Vol. 1 |publisher=Dover Publications |year=1966 |isbn=9780486217611 |language=English}}</ref><ref name=":2">{{Cite book |last=Benatar |first=David |title=The Human Predicament: A Candid Guide to Life's Biggest Questions |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2017 |isbn=978-0190633813 |pages= |language=English |quote=}}</ref><ref>J. Cabrera, ''Discomfort and Moral Impediment: The Human Situation, Radical Bioethics and Procreation'', Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2019. [https://www.cambridgescholars.com/discomfort-and-moral-impediment] A thirty-page extract on the publisher's website. J. Cabrera, ''Mal-estar e moralidade: situação humana, ética e procriação responsável'', Brasília: UnB, 2018 (original Portuguese edition).</ref>
+Philosophical pessimism is not a single coherent movement, but rather a loosely associated group of thinkers with similar ideas and a family resemblance to each other.<ref name="Dienstag">{{cite book|last=Dienstag|first=Joshua Foa|title=Pessimism: Philosophy, Ethic, Spirit|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=2009|isbn=978-0-6911-4112-1|location=Princeton, New Jersey}}</ref> In ''Weltschmerz: Pessimism in German Philosophy, 1860-1900'', [[Frederick C. Beiser]] states the central thesis of pessimism as "the thesis that life is not worth living, that nothingness is better than being, or that it is worse to be than not be".<ref>{{Cite book|last=Beiser|first=Frederick C.|title=Weltschmerz: Pessimism in German Philosophy, 1860-1900|publisher= Oxford University Press|year=2018|isbn=978-0198822653|language=English|quote="The philosophical discussion of pessimism in late 19th-century Germany shows a remarkable unanimity about its central thesis. According to all participants in this discussion, pessimism is the thesis that life is not worth living, that nothingness is better than being, or that it is worse to be than not be."}}</ref> For many philosophical pessimists, however, this view of life does not automatically imply the desirability of [[suicide]], but simply the gradual abolishment of suffering through [[antinatalism]], that is, non-procreation.<ref>[[wikisource:Studies in Pessimism|Arthur Schopenhauer, ''Studies in Pessimism'', translated by Thomas Bailey Saunders (1913).]] ''On the Sufferings of the World, p. 15:'' "If children were brought into the world by an act of pure reason alone, would the human race continue to exist? Would not a man rather have so much sympathy with the coming generation as to spare it the burden of existence? or at any rate not take it upon himself to impose that burden upon it in cold blood". ''On Suicide'', p. 48: "In my [[The World as Will and Representation|chief work]] I have explained the only valid reason existing against suicide on the score of mortality. It is this: that suicide thwarts the attainment of the highest moral aim by the fact that, for a real release from this world of misery, it substitutes one that is merely apparent."</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Benatar|first=David|date=2013|title=Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics|url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BENSBN-2|journal=[[The Journal of Ethics]]|volume=17| issue =  1/2, p. 148|pages=121–151|doi=10.1007/s10892-012-9133-7|s2cid=170682992|quote=A few of my critics have claimed that I am committed to the desirability of suicide and even speciecide. They clearly intend this as a ''[[reductio ad absurdum]]'' of my position. However, I considered the questions of suicide and speciecide in ''[[Better Never to Have Been]]'' and argued that these are not implications of my view. First, it is possible to think that both coming into existence is a serious harm and that death is (usually) a serious harm. Indeed, some people might think that coming into existence is a serious harm in part because the harm of death is then inevitable.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Ligotti |first=Thomas |title=The Conspiracy against the Human Race: A Contrivance of Horror. |publisher=Hippocampus Press |year=2011 |isbn=978-0984480272 |pages=50 |quote=Simply because someone has reached the conclusion that the amount of suffering in this world is enough that anyone would be better off never having been born does not mean that by force of logic or sincerity he must kill himself. It only means he has concluded that the amount of suffering in this world is enough that anyone would be better off never having been born.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Coates |first=Ken |title=Anti-Natalism: Rejectionist Philosophy from Buddhism to Benatar |publisher=First Edition Design Publishing |year=2016 |isbn=9781506902401 |language=English |quote=Anti-natalism can be seen as part of a larger philosophy, described here as Rejectionism, which finds existence – directly or indirectly, i.e. as procreation - deeply problematic and unacceptable.}}</ref>
+Some philosophical pessimists see the [[self-consciousness]] of man as a tragic byproduct of [[evolution]] that allowed us to contemplate our place in the cosmos and yearn for justice and meaning together with a freedom from pain, aging, sickness and death while simultaneously being aware that nature itself can never satisfy those fundamental needs. According to [[Peter Wessel Zapffe]] as well as [[Terror management theory|Terror Management Theory]], a feeling of existential terror is born from the juxtaposition of human beings' awareness of themselves as merely transient animals groping to survive in a meaningless universe, destined only to decay and die. For Zapffe, our knowledge of our predicament is repressed through the use of four mechanisms, conscious or not, which he names isolation, anchoring, distraction and sublimation.<ref>{{cite web| url = https://philosophynow.org/issues/45/The_Last_Messiah| title = P.W. Zapffe, ''The Last Messiah'', ''Philosophy Now'', 2004, issue 45}}</ref> For TMT, human beings deal with this existential anxiety through symbolic conceptions of reality that give meaning, order, and permanence to existence; provide a set of standards for what is valuable; and promise some form of either literal or symbolic immortality to those who believe in the cultural worldview and live up to its standards of value.<ref>{{cite journal| url = https://www.researchgate.net/publication/8582423| title = Pyszczynski, Tom & Greenberg, Jeff & Solomon, Sheldon & Arndt, Jamie & Schimel, Jeff. (2004). Why Do People Need Self-Esteem? A Theoretical and Empirical Review. Psychological bulletin. 130. 435-68. 10.1037/0033-2909.130.3.435.| year = 2004| doi = 10.1037/0033-2909.130.3.435| pmid = 15122930| last1 = Pyszczynski| first1 = T.| last2 = Greenberg| first2 = J.| last3 = Solomon| first3 = S.| last4 = Arndt| first4 = J.| last5 = Schimel| first5 = J.| journal = Psychological Bulletin| volume = 130| issue = 3| pages = 435–468}}</ref>
+= References =
+{{reflist}}