Moral skepticism

Moral skepticism is the meta-ethical view that no one has any moral knowledge. Some moral skeptics would even make the stronger modal claim that no one can have any moral knowledge. In either case, moral skepticism is particularly opposed to moral realism--the view that there are objective mind-independent moral truths.

Defenders of some form of moral skepticism include J. L. Mackie (1977), Friedrich Nietzsche, Richard Joyce (2001), Michael Ruse, Joshua Greene, Richard Garner, and the psychologist James Flynn. Strictly speaking, Gilbert Harman (1975) argues in favor of a kind of moral relativism, not moral skepticism. However, it has influenced some contemporary moral skeptics.

Forms of moral skepticism

There are various forms of moral skepticism. Each denies, in one way or another, that no one has moral knowledge. Thus, each claims that there is some necessary condition that is systematically not met with respect to moral beliefs. Moral nihilists argue that we do not possess moral knowledge because all moral beliefs are false, and knowledge requires truth. Non-cognitivists, such as Alan Gibbard (1990), support moral skepticism by arguing that knowledge requires genuine belief, but moral statements are not genuine beliefs, they are some other non-truth-apt entities (for example, expressions of emotion, on par with "Boo!" or "Yuk!"). Still others claim that knowledge requires justification, yet no one is ever justified in believing any moral proposition. Some argue, for example, that the cultural influences on our moral thinking are so strong that all moral beliefs are unavoidably tainted with bias. What unites all of these positions is a suspicion that our moral beliefs are not as defensible as common sense would have us believe.

Weak and strong versions

The strong version of moral skepticism says that the claim that it is wrong to kill, for example, is false because ethical claims implicitly presuppose the existence of objective values, and that these do not exist. The weak form of moral skepticism, however, would go no further than saying that we are not epistemically justified in asserting that it is wrong to kill.

The stronger position is exemplified in J. L. Mackie's book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977). Mackie does not deny that there is moral goodness in the world. His point is that "goodness" of any sort is always relative to certain desires or interests that are relevant to the context. For example, a sharp, durable knife is usually considered a good one, but it counts as good only because knife users have an interest in cutting things, such as food. Sharpness and durability are properties of knives that make them more efficient for such a purpose. Mackie believes that moral discussion typically assumes that there is an objective kind of moral goodness, which transcends any actual desires and interests, and that this assumption is an error.

Mackie's position is also known as an "error theory" of morality. Strictly speaking, a more agnostic position that we simply cannot justify ethical claims is also an error theory, as acknowledged by Richard Joyce, who defends such a theory in The Evolution of Morality (2006). In this case, the alleged error is the common belief that moral claims are justifiable.

Arguments for

Mackie's main argument against the existence of objective values is the argument from queerness--objective values would be metaphysically peculiar entities, fundamentally different from all the other entities in the world. They would have to be something like the Platonic forms (which Mackie considers a "wild product of philosophical fancy") that are intrinsically motivating. Furthermore, how we are supposed to discover these objective values is mysterious.

Another argument for moral skepticism is the argument from evolution. According to Richard Joyce (2001), none of our moral beliefs are justified because we have evolved to hold such beliefs, and we would hold them regardless of whether there were any objective moral truths at all.

There are also two arguments for moral skepticism in general. The regress argument claims that moral beliefs require an infinite regress of justification. The skeptical hypothesis argument claims that our justification for our beliefs in objective moral truths is consistent with either moral realism or moral skepticism; so we are not justified in believing one over the other. This latter argument is intended to resemble the traditional arguments for skepticism about the external world involving, for example, Descartes's evil genius or the brain in a vat case. (See Sinnott-Armstrong 2006a & 2006b for discussion.)

Criticisms

Criticisms of moral skepticism come primarily from moral realists. The moral realist argues that there is in fact good reason to believe that there are objective moral truths and that we are justified in holding many moral beliefs. A typical response to theories like Joyce's, according to which our justification is supposed to be undermined by evolution, is to say that it does not sufficiently disprove moral realism, since there could still be objective moral truths regardless of our evidential situation.

References and further reading

• Butchvarov, Panayot (1989). Skepticism in Ethics, Indiana University Press.
• Gibbard, Allan (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• Harman, Gilbert (1975). "Moral Relativism Defended," Philosophical Review, pp. 3-22.
• Harman, Gilbert (1977). The Nature of Morality. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Joyce, Richard (2001). The Myth of Morality, Cambridge University Press.
• Joyce, Richard (2006). The Evolution of Morality, MIT Press. (link)
• Mackie, J. L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Penguin.
• Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2006a). "Moral Skepticism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (link)
• Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2006b). Moral Skepticisms, Oxford University Press.

External links

• Moral Skepticism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry.

See also

• Moral realism
• Moral relativism and Moral absolutism (opposites)
• Moral nihilism
• Friedrich Nietzsche