Team B: Difference between revisions
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'''Team B''' was part of a [[Competitive analysis (marketing)|competitive analysis]] exercise initiated by the [[United States]] [[Federal government of the United States|government]], and approved by the then [[Director of Central Intelligence]] [[George H. W. Bush]], in the [[1970s]] to analyze intelligence on the [[Soviet Union]]. Team B was a group of "outside experts" who would attempt to counter a group of established intelligence officials of the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] known as Team A.<ref name="Pipes">{{cite journal|first=Richard|last=Pipes|authorlink=Richard Pipes|coauthors=|year=1986|month=|title=Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth|journal=Commentary Magazine|volume=82|issue=4|pages=|id=|url=http://www.commentarymagazine.com/Summaries/V82I4P27-1.htm}}</ref> |
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Team B |
'''Team B''' was a [[Competitive analysis (marketing)|competitive analysis]] exercise commissioned by the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] in the [[1970s]] to analyze threats the [[Soviet Union]] posed to the security of the [[United States]]. Team B, approved by then [[Director of Central Intelligence]] [[George H. W. Bush]], was comprised of "outside experts" who attempted to counter intelligence officials within the CIA known as Team A.<ref name="Pipes">{{cite journal|first=Richard|last=Pipes|authorlink=Richard Pipes|coauthors=|year=1986|month=|title=Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth|journal=Commentary Magazine|volume=82|issue=4|pages=|id=|url=http://www.commentarymagazine.com/Summaries/V82I4P27-1.htm}}</ref> Team B concluded the [[National Intelligence Estimate]] on the Soviet Union, generated yearly by the CIA, underestimated Soviet military power and misinterpreted Soviet strategic intentions. Its findings were leaked to the [[Mass media|press]] shortly after [[Jimmy Carter]]'s [[1976]] [[United States presidential election, 1976|presidential election win]] in an attempt to appeal to conservatives in both parties and not appear partisan.<ref>[[Christopher Andrew]]. ''For the President's Eyes Only''. Page 424.</ref><ref>Dana H. Allin. ''Cold War Illusions: America, Europe, and Soviet Power, 1969-1989''. Page 61.</ref> |
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⚫ | The Team B reports became the intellectual foundation for the idea of "the [[window of vulnerability]]" and of the massive arms buildup that began toward the end of the [[Carter administration]] and accelerated under [[President of the United States|President]] [[Ronald Reagan]].<ref name="neocons">{{cite journal|author=Cahn, Anne Hessing|title=Team B: The trillion-dollar experiment|journal=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists|year=April 1993|volume=49|issue=03|pages=22, 24-27|url=http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=apr93cahn}}</ref> |
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⚫ | The Team B reports became the intellectual foundation for the idea of "the [[window of vulnerability]]" and of the massive arms buildup that began toward the end of the [[ |
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Team B seems to have wildly overestimated the capabilities and resources of the Soviet Union,<ref name="wrong" /><ref name="media" /> but may have shed light on its intentions and strategies<ref name="Pipes" />. |
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==Creation== |
==Creation== |
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In [[1974]] [[Albert Wohlstetter]], a professor at the [[University of Chicago]], accused the CIA of systematically underestimating Soviet missile deployment, in his 1974 [[Foreign relations of the United States|foreign policy]] article entitled "Is There a Strategic Arms Race?" Wohlstetter concluded that the United States was allowing the Soviet Union to achieve military superiority by not closing the [[missile gap]]. Many [[Conservatism|conservative]]s then began a concerted attack on the CIA's annual assessment of the Soviet threat.<ref name="remember"/><ref name="neocons"/> |
In [[1974]] [[Albert Wohlstetter]], a professor at the [[University of Chicago]], accused the CIA of systematically underestimating Soviet missile deployment, in his 1974 [[Foreign relations of the United States|foreign policy]] article entitled "Is There a Strategic Arms Race?" Wohlstetter concluded that the United States was allowing the Soviet Union to achieve military superiority by not closing the [[missile gap]]. Many [[Conservatism|conservative]]s then began a concerted attack on the CIA's annual assessment of the Soviet threat.<ref name="remember"/><ref name="neocons"/> |
Revision as of 18:24, 15 September 2007
Template:TotallyDisputed Team B was a competitive analysis exercise commissioned by the Central Intelligence Agency in the 1970s to analyze threats the Soviet Union posed to the security of the United States. Team B, approved by then Director of Central Intelligence George H. W. Bush, was comprised of "outside experts" who attempted to counter intelligence officials within the CIA known as Team A.[1] Team B concluded the National Intelligence Estimate on the Soviet Union, generated yearly by the CIA, underestimated Soviet military power and misinterpreted Soviet strategic intentions. Its findings were leaked to the press shortly after Jimmy Carter's 1976 presidential election win in an attempt to appeal to conservatives in both parties and not appear partisan.[2][3]
The Team B reports became the intellectual foundation for the idea of "the window of vulnerability" and of the massive arms buildup that began toward the end of the Carter administration and accelerated under President Ronald Reagan.[4]
Creation
In 1974 Albert Wohlstetter, a professor at the University of Chicago, accused the CIA of systematically underestimating Soviet missile deployment, in his 1974 foreign policy article entitled "Is There a Strategic Arms Race?" Wohlstetter concluded that the United States was allowing the Soviet Union to achieve military superiority by not closing the missile gap. Many conservatives then began a concerted attack on the CIA's annual assessment of the Soviet threat.[5][4]
The organization chosen in the administration to challenge the CIA's analysis was the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). PFIAB's Team B was headed by:
- Richard Pipes, a Harvard historian and specialist in Russian history.
- Paul Nitze, who also helped to create the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), the objectives of which were to raise awareness about the Soviets' alleged nuclear dominance and to pressure the American leadership to close the gap.[6]
Team B's members included:
- Clare Booth Luce
- John Connally
- Daniel O. Graham
- Edward Teller
- Thomas Wolf
- Paul Wolfowitz
- William Van Cleave[7]
In 1975 PFIAB members asked CIA Director William Colby to approve the initiative of producing comparative assessments of the Soviet threat. Colby refused, stating it was hard "to envisage how an ad hoc independent group of analysts could prepare a more thorough, comprehensive assessment of Soviet strategic capabilities than could the intelligence community."[6]
When George H. W. Bush became the Director of Central Intelligence in 1976 the PFIAB renewed its request for competitive threat assessments. Although his top analysts argued against such an undertaking, Bush checked with the White House, obtained a go-ahead, and by May 26 signed off on the experiment.[4]
A team of 16 "outside experts" were to take an independent look at highly classified data used by the intelligence community to assess Soviet strategic forces in the yearly National Intelligence Estimates.[4][8]
There were three teams; one studied Soviet low-altitude air defense capabilities, one examined Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) accuracy, and one investigated Soviet strategic policy and objectives.
It is the third team, chaired by Harvard University professor Richard Pipes, that ultimately received considerable publicity and is most commonly referred to as Team B.[4]
Assessments
Part One
- Judgments of Soviet Strategic Objectives Underlying NIE’s and their Shortcomings
The first section of the report dealt with the team’s criticisms of the NIE’s assessment of Soviet strategic objectives. It was the conclusion of the report, that the NIE was mostly wrong to view Soviet strategic actions as primarily a response to its history of being invaded and that the NIE ignored or misinterpreted evidence that most Soviet strategic actions were offensive rather than defensive in nature. The NIE’s conclusion that as the Soviet Union’s grew more powerful and capable its foreign policy would also become less aggressive was also rejected by the report.[9]
Part Two
- A critique of the NIE interpretation of certain Soviet Strategic Developments
The second section of the report was primarily a criticism of the NIE’s conclusions regarding Soviet strategic weapons programs, and how they are integrated into conventional Soviet forces and what impacts they have on Soviet strategic goals and plans. The report argued that the NIE underestimated the threat posed by Soviet strategic weapons programs, and that the development and deployment of several new weapons platforms and advancements in existing technologies would drastically alter the advantages that the United States and NATO had over the Warsaw Pact. The report cited these specific areas to reinforce its assessment:
- Soviet ICBM and SLBM Programs: The report cited the recent development of Soviet MIRV missile technology, coupled with a rapid modernization of ICBM and SLBM targeting capabilities to argue that the NIE was underestimating the impact of the sophistication, effectiveness and threat of numerical superiority that the Soviet strategic missile program was posing. [10]
- Economic Factors: The NIE viewed Soviet military expenditures as being limited to economic activity in a similar manner as in the west. The report also took exception to this conclusion, arguing that, in retrospect, prior estimates of Soviet military budgets were far from accurate. They cited the 1970 NIE’s estimate of the Soviet military budget as being only half of its actual value, and that this number was still being used as a baseline for current estimates. Using these numbers, the report concluded, greatly underestimated the resources available to the Soviet military and consequentially, underestimated potential capability, The report argued that the Soviets did not have the same financial constraints as the West, Guns vs. Butter, because as a dictatorship, the Soviet Union was less accountable for its budget. [11]
- Civil Defense: Both the NIE and the Team B report noted that the level of sophistication, scope and expansion of nuclear civil defense was unmatched. And although the Soviet hardening of military and governmental facilities was covered by the NIE the report argued that this was a significant factor in their determination that the Soviets strategic planning was more focused on an offensive nuclear war rather than a defensive stance or deterence. [12]
- Mobile Missiles: The report also complained that the NIE did not adequately address the issues surrounding the planned Soviet deployment of the SS-X-16 mobile missile system. The SS-X-16, deployed as the SS-16 was the first mobile intercontinental ballistic missile deployed by the Soviet Union. Because it was built off the SS-20 platform (an intermediate range nuclear missile), it was argued that the SS-20 could be quickly and covertly converted into the longer range SS-16 in times of crisis, and would be a backdoor around the SALT I Treaty. [13]
- Backfire Bomber: The recent deployment, and capabilities of the Tupolev Tu-22M, designated the “Backfire” by NATO, was also addressed. As with the mobile ICBS, the NIE was said to have underestimated the current and potential performance of the Backfire, and as such, is designated it as a short range bomber similar to the F-111, in capabilities. The report argued that the potential of the bomber, both in range and armaments, meant that it was more appropriate to classify the bomber as a long range strategic platform, thereby impacting the total Soviet strategic nuclear threat. [14]
- Anti Satellite Capability: The report argued that there was stronger evidence than presented by the NIE of a Soviet intent to develop Anti Satellite Capability and that despite the NIE judgment contrary, the Soviets were combining directed energy research to this end. [15]
- Anti-Submarine Warfare: The report argued that despite the NIE’s assessment in its 10 year forecast that the Soviet Navy was not aggressively developing more accurate ASW detection tools and would not be able to deploy new more advanced ASW capabilities in the next 10 years, the evidence in the NIE suggested that they had significantly ramped up ASW R&D, including non acoustic methods of detection. The report cautioned that to determine the real extent of Soviet ASW development would require significantly more research and access to classified materials, as the US Navy would not release its data to either Team B, or the CIA, they stressed that the probability of advanced Soviet ASW research was greater than zero, as the NIE implied it was. [16]
- Anti-Ballistic Missiles: Although the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, put a halt to further development and deployment of most ABM technology, there were exceptions for ABM systems surrounding Moscow and the Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota. The report argued that since the NIE conceded that Soviet ABM research and development was continuing at a pace similar in size and scope it was before the ABM Treaty in 1972, it was likely that Soviet ABM technology was greater than the NIE concluded it was. [17]
Criticism
According to Dr. Anne Cahn (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1977-1980), Team B's analysis of weapons systems was later proven to be false. "I would say that all of it was fantasy... if you go through most of Team B's specific allegations about weapons systems, and you just examine them one by one, they were all wrong."[18] The CIA director at the time, George H. W. Bush, concluded that the Team B approach set "in motion a process that lends itself to manipulation for purposes other than estimative accuracy."[19][20] Brookings Institute Scholar Raymond Garthoff concurs; he wrote that "In retrospect, and with the Team B report and records now largely declassified, it is possible to see that virtually all of Team B's criticisms ... proved to be wrong. On several important specific points it wrongly criticized and 'corrected' the official estimates, always in the direction of enlarging the impression of danger and threat."[2]
Paul Warnke, an official at the ACDA at the time of the Team B, wrote:
Whatever might be said for evaluation of strategic capabilities by a group of outside experts, the impracticality of achieving useful results by ‘independent' analysis of strategic objectives should have been self-evident. Moreover, the futility of the Team B enterprise was assured by the selection of the panel's members. Rather than including a diversity of views ... the Strategic Objectives Panel was composed entirely of individuals who made careers of viewing the Soviet menace with alarm.[21]
Time Magazine editor Strobe Talbott stated in 1990 that:
Bush allowed a panel of outsiders, deliberately stacked with hard-liners, to second-guess the agency's findings. Not surprisingly, the result was a depiction of Soviet intentions and capabilities that seemed extreme at the time and looks ludicrous in retrospect.[22]
Richard Pipes has offered analysis to the contrary,[1] and in 2003 said:
We dealt with one problem only: What is the Soviet strategy for nuclear weapons? Team B was appointed to look at the evidence and to see if we could conclude that the actual Soviet strategy is different from ours. It's now demonstrated totally, completely, that it was.[23]
References
- ^ a b Pipes, Richard (1986). "Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth". Commentary Magazine. 82 (4).
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(help) - ^ Christopher Andrew. For the President's Eyes Only. Page 424.
- ^ Dana H. Allin. Cold War Illusions: America, Europe, and Soviet Power, 1969-1989. Page 61.
- ^ a b c d e Cahn, Anne Hessing (April 1993). "Team B: The trillion-dollar experiment". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 49 (03): 22, 24–27.
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: CS1 maint: year (link) - ^ Cite error: The named reference
remember
was invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ a b "Anatomy of a Neo-Conservative White House". Canadian Dimension. 39 (03): 46. May 1, 2005.
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: CS1 maint: year (link) - ^ [1]
- ^ Tanenhaus, Sam (November 2, 2003). "The Mind Of The Administration A Continuing Series On The Thinkers Who Have Shaped The Bush Administration's View Of The World". The Boston Globe.
{{cite journal}}
: CS1 maint: year (link)"At times, Team B performed logical somersaults that eerily foreshadowed Bush administration statements on Iraq and weapons of mass destruction. Just because superweapons like a "non-acoustic anti-submarine system" couldn't be found, Pipes's report argued, that didn't mean the Soviets couldn't build one, "even if they appeared to lack the technical know-how." - ^ Team B Report,pg 15
- ^ Team B Report,pg 21
- ^ Team B Report,pg 23
- ^ Team B Report,pg 26
- ^ Team B Report,pg 27
- ^ Team B Report,pg 28
- ^ Team B Report,pg 30
- ^ Team B Report,pg 30-34
- ^ Team B Report,pg 35-37
- ^ Thom Hartmann (December 7, 2004). "Hyping Terror For Fun, Profit - And Power" (HTML). Commondreams.org. Retrieved April 23.
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suggested) (help)CS1 maint: year (link) - ^ Cite error: The named reference
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was invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ Goodman, Melvin A. (November 19, 2004). "Righting the CIA". The Baltimore Sun.
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: CS1 maint: year (link) - ^ See Barry (above),Warnke, Paul C. (January/February 1999). "The B Team: Paul C. Warnke reviews Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA: Cahn, Anne Hessing". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 55 (01): 70.
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(help)CS1 maint: year (link) - ^ Talbott, Strobe (Oct. 14, 1991). "America Abroad The Case Against Gates". TIME Magazine.
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was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
Further reading
- Intelligence community experiment in competitive analysis- soviet strategic objectives: report of team B
- Cahn, Anne H. (September, 1998). Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA. Pennsylvania State University Press. ISBN 0-271-01791-0.
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(help)CS1 maint: year (link)3 ReviewsExcerpts of the bookExcerpt two - Gervasi, Tom (October, 1986). The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy. W W Norton & Co Inc. ISBN 0-393-01776-1.
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(help)CS1 maint: year (link) 2 Reviews - Godson, Roy (1980). Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Analysis and Estimates. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 0-87855-827-6.
- Korb, Lawrence J. (August 18, 2004). "It's Time to Bench 'Team B'". Center for American Progress.
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: CS1 maint: year (link) - Goodman, Melvin A. (July 23, 2003). "As a CIA analyst, I've seen distortions of intelligence before". The Progressive.
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: CS1 maint: year (link) - Husain, Khurram (November/December 2003). "Neocons: The men behind the curtain". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 59 (06): 62–71.
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(help)CS1 maint: year (link) - Prados, John (1982). The Soviet estimate: U.S. intelligence analysis & Russian military strength. Dial Press. ISBN 0-385-27211-1. The problems of accurately gauging the extent of the Soviet nuclear buildup in the 1960s and the politics of the fictitious "missile gap."2 reviews