Ethical naturalism

Naturalism, sometimes also called definism, holds that ethical terms can be defined; the meaning of ethical sentences can be given in totally non-ethical terms. So to the question, "Can the meaning of ethical sentences be restated in other words that do not use normative concepts like 'good' and 'right'?" the naturalist answers, "Definitely." On the naturalist's view, ultimately, goodness and right are natural properties--they are ultimately properties of things that can be located in the natural world.

We might give a more detailed definition, in terms of propositions and reduction, that, in generalities, expresses the general understanding of the term:

Naturalism is the view that ethical sentences express propositions and that they can be reduced to nonethical sentences.

Let us take a closer look at each part of this definition.

First, there is the notion that ethical sentences express propositions. The view that ethical sentences express propositions can be called cognitivism. So cognitivism is the view that ethical sentences express propositions: see cognitivism and noncognitivism. Propositions are, roughly, what meaningful sentences are supposed to express. Different sentences, in different languages, can (it is often thought) express the same proposition: 'snow is white' and 'schnee ist weiss' both express the proposition that snow is white. A common assumption among philosophers who use this jargon is that propositions, properly speaking, are what are true or false (what bear truth values). So if an ethical sentence does express a proposition, then the sentence expresses something that can be true or false.

To get a better idea of what it means to express a proposition, compare this to something that does not express a proposition. Suppose someone minding a convenience store sees a thief pick up a candy bar and run. The storekeeper manages to exclaim, "Hey!" In this case, "Hey!" does not express a proposition. Among the things that the ejaculation does not express are, "that's a thief there"; "that thief is getting away"; or "that thief really annoys me." The storekeeper is saying anything at all, really, at least nothing that can be true or false. So it is not a proposition that the storekeeper is expressing. Perhaps it is an emotional state that is being expressed. The storekeeper is surprised and angered, and expresses those emotions by saying, "Hey!"

Notice that the first part of the definition of 'naturalism' above says that ethical sentences do express propositions. They are not just emotional outbursts, as though we were saying, "Hey!" or "Yay for Mary!" They are actually expressing propositions that can be true or false. Derivatively, the naturalist would say that ethical sentences themselves are either true or false.

For example, an ethical naturalist might hold that it can be true or false that Mary is a good person; it can be true or false that stealing and lying are always wrong. On the other hand, if one believes the sentence, "Mary is a good person," cannot be either true or false, then one is not a naturalist.

Notice, too, that if we say that ethical sentences merely express emotions (they "do" no more than that: see speech act), as though they they were just exclamations like "Hey!" and "Yay for Mary!", then we cannot also think that ethical sentences are true or false. It would be nonsense to say, "It's true that 'Hey!'" or "It's false that 'Yay for Mary!'" Mere expressions of emotion might be appropriate ("apt" is the jargon bandied here) or inappropriate, but not true or false.

But now what about the second part of the definition of "naturalism"? The second part says that ethical sentences "can be reduced to nonethical sentences." Now you're going to have to remember this notion of reduction from our discussion of the mind-body problem. I told you that philosophy is interconnected and interdependent -- well, it really is! Anyway, so what does it mean to say that ethical sentences can be reduced to nonethical sentences? It just means that you can state the meaning of ethical sentences in other words, in sentences that don't include any ethical terms like "good" and "right." All this talk of good and bad, right and wrong, moral and immoral, and so forth -- that's all just shorthand for some complex propositions about what human beings need, or desire, or what gives them pleasure, or what secures their long-term happiness, and so forth. So this notion that ethical sentences can be reduced to nonethical sentences really amounts to saying that ethical sentences are a kind of shorthand, a kind of very useful abbreviation, for claims about nonethical facts about human needs, desires, and so forth.

Now, when we discuss the theory of value, I'm going to give you some theories of what "good" means. So I'll be giving you a few examples of how you could reduce talk of goodness to talk about other things -- like pleasure, or happiness. So really you could look at the theory of value as a way of thinking naturalism through; the theory of value can be regarded as an attempt to figure out how to reduce goodness to nonethical properties; and for that matter, the theory of conduct, as we'll see, can be regarded as an attempt to figure out how to reduce moral obligations and permissions to nonethical properties as well. So if you are wondering how on earth we could ever reduce ethical sentences to nonethical sentences, just wait, because we'll be looking at some examples of such reductions.