Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
Supreme Court of the United States
Full case name	Luis E. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
Docket no.	07-591
Case history
Prior	guilty; appeal rejected, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 1114, 870 N.E.2d 676 (2007)(unpublished); denying review, 449 Mass. 1113, 874 N.E.2d 407 (2007).
Holding
Sworn affidavits are testimonial in nature, violate the Confrontation Clause under Crawford v. Washington, and do not meet the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The requirements of the Confrontation Clause may not be relaxed because they make the prosecution's task burdensome. "Notice and demand" statutes are Constitutional.
Case opinions
Majority	Scalia, joined by Stevens, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg
Concurrence	Thomas
Dissent	Kennedy, joined by Roberts, Breyer, Alito
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. VI; Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. ___ (2009) was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States, in which it held that sworn affidavits of laboratory drug analysis prepared for the purpose of establishing a prima facie case for criminal drug prosecutions were testimonial and in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). While the court ruled that the then common practice of submitting forensic affidavits was Unconstitutional, it also held that the "notice-and-demand" statutes of three states were Constitutional for two reasons: first, they gave notice to the defendant that such affidavits would be submitted without in-court testimony; and second, they gave the defense sufficient time to raise an objection.

Background

Facts of the criminal trial

In 2001, Boston police received a tip of suspicious activity at a Kmart store. The informant stated that an employee repeatedly received phone calls at work, after which he would exit the store and leave in a blue sedan only to return a few minutes later. Police set up surveillance and witnessed the same suspicious activity. Police detained and searched the employee finding four clear white plastic bags containing a white powdery substance, alleged cocaine. Police detained and searched the passengers of the blue sedan including petitioner, Melendez-Diaz. During transport to police headquarters, police observed their passengers fidgeting and making furtive movements. Upon arrival at the station, police searched the interior of the police cruiser and found 19 smaller clear white plastic bags containing a white powerdery substance, alleged cocaine. In accordance with Massachusetts law, police submitted all alleged contraband for chemical testing. Melendez-Diaz was charged with distribution and drug trafficking of cocaine in an amount between 14 and 28 grams under the Massachusetts Controlled Substances Act, a felony punishable by not less than three years imprisonment.

Procedural history

At trial, the Commonwealth placed into evidence the bags seized from the police cruiser. It also submitted three "certificates of analysis" showing the results of the forensic analysis performed on the seized powdery substance. The certificates reported the weight of the seized bags and stated the substance found was cocaine. The certificates were sworn before a notary public in accordance with Massachusetts law. Melendez-Diaz objected to their admission asserting that the Supreme Court decision in Crawford v. Washington required the forensic analyst to testify in person. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the certificates as prima facie evidence of the positive presence of narcotics.

A jury trial found the defendant, Melendez-Diaz, guilty. He appealed contending inter alia that the admission of the certificates violated his Sixth Amendment right to be confronted by those witnesses who would testify against him. The Appeals court rejected the claim under Massachusetts precedent which held that these certificates did not violate the Confrontation clause. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts also denied review, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Opinions of the Court

Justice Scalia, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Justice Thomas, filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kennedy, filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Breyer and Alito, JJ., joined.

Majority opinion

The Court emphasized that its ruling was a continuation but little more than an application of its holding in Crawford v. Washington.

Affidavits are testimonial evidence

The Court held that the certificates constituted testimonial evidence i.e. they were prepared for the purpose of a later criminal trial. Citing Crawford v. Washington, a witness's testimony is inadmissible unless he or she appears at trial, or if unavailable, the court afforded the defendant the opportunity to cross examine the witness. The court reiterated the non-exclusive class of statements which are testimonial in nature:

Various formulations of this core class of testimonial statements exist: ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially. 541 U. S. 36, 51–52 (emphasis added)

The Court found that the forensic analysts who tested the contraband substance and reported that is was cocaine was a witness for purposes of the Confrontation clause. Because the trial court did not give Melendez-Diaz the opportunity to cross examine the analyst, his right of Confrontation was violated.

Chemical test affidavits are accusatory

The Court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that the analyst's reports were not accusatory. The respondent had argued that the reports were not accusatory because they did not implicate the defendant in a crime alone, but only when taken together with other evidence which linked the defendant to the contraband. The Court rejected this argument noting that the reports proved an essential element of the crime. The Court cited United States v. Kirby 174 U. S. 47 (1899). In Kirby, the Defendant was charged with receiving stolen property. The evidence at issue proved only that the property was stolen, but not the other essential element of the crime, that Kirby had received it. The Court noted that the Kirby decision was part of a long established rule that evidence that proves only one essential element of a crime is nevertheless accusatory for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.

Scientific analysts do not form a class of witnesses immune from confrontation

The Court noted that the Confrontation Clause creates two kinds of witnesses: those whom the prosecution is obligated to call, and those whom the defense has the discretion to call. The Court rejected the argument that the analyst was not a conventional witness because he or she recorded the immediate results of a chemical test rather than recalled a historical event. Even though evidence may be so contemporaneous that it meets the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule, it may nevertheless a violation of the Confrontation Clause. The Court referred to the companion case to Davis v. Washington, where it ruled that statements to police immediately after an incident of domestic violence were inadmissible despite meeting the hearsay exception.

Scientific evidence does not escape confrontation due to reliability

The Court rejected the argument that the neutral and especially reliable nature of the forensic chemical testing would exclude it from the confrontation requirement. This would have been a return to the reasoning of the overruled decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Roberts had found that certain out of court testimony that had "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" would not violate the Confrontation Clause. Additionally, the Court noted that "Forensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation." It cited a study of forensic laboratories where analysts would falsely record results of tests never performed because of the high volume demands of law enforcement. The Court held that an opportunity for confrontation would give the forensic witness the opportunity to recant a previously falsified report. The court cited one particular study where defendants had achieved exoneration, invalid forensic testimony contributed to a false conviction 60% of the time.

Forensic affidavits do not meet the business records exception to the hearsay rule

The Court rejected the Commonwealth's claim that the forensic affidavits met the business records exception to the hearsay rule. A business document will be inadmissible under the exception when "calculated for use essentially in the court, not in the business." The Court analyzed the narrow exception of a clerk certificate authenticating official records. This certificate was limited in that it could only claim the authenticity of the record as official, but speak nothing of its contents. The Court drew a distinction between this exception and the case before it. The forensic analyst was creating a record whereas the clerk was authenticating a record already in existence. Finally, it explained the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the Business Records Exception. Citing Crawford, the court stated that most business records will escape Sixth Amendment scrutiny not because they meet the exception to the hearsay rule, but because they are non-testimonial in nature. A record prepared in the ordinary course of business will necessarily not have been created for the purpose of proving a fact at trial.

There is a Confrontation Clause violation even where the analyst could be called by the defense

The Court drew a distinction between the Compulsory Process Clause and the Confrontation Clause. Even though Melendez-Diaz had the opportunity to call the forensic analyst as a witness at his option, this was no substitute to the protections of the right of confrontation. This would shift the burden of producing adverse witnesses on the defendant rather than on the prosecution. The Court agreed with the scenario proposed by the petitioner: that the prosecution would present affidavits to the judge ex parte and wait for the defense to subpoena whom he chose.

Burdens on prosecution do not warrant a relaxation of the Confrontation Clause

Finally, the Court addressed the argument proposed by the Commonwealth and the amici that a finding for the petitioner would place a substantial burden on the courts. The Court reassured respondents that "the sky [would] not fall." It noted that several states had already passed Constitutional statutes that satisfied the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. Specifically, the Court held that the so called "notice-and-demand statutes require the prosecution to provide notice to the defendant of its intent to use an analyst’s report as evidence at trial, after which the defendant is given a period of time in which he may object to the admission of the evidence absent the analyst’s appearance live at trial" and that these would be Constitutional. These statutes are not a burden shift, but merely require the defense to invoke an objection prior to trial. Notice-and-demand statutes are procedural and merely regulate the timing of objections. The Court also took note of usual practice of defense attorneys to stipulate to the results of drug analyses as a matter of trial strategy (e.g. not wishing to draw attention to the certainty of the results or draw the ire of the judge). It reasoned that the practice would continue and the burdens predicted by the dissent and amici for respondent would not materialize. The court stressed that the requirements of the Confrontation Clause are "binding" and not to be disregard.

See also

• Hearsay
• Hearsay in United States law
• Business records exception
• Forensic toxicology

External links

• ^ 07-591 Full text of the opinion courtesy of Findlaw.com.
• [4] Full text of the opinion
• [5] Melendez-Diaz Resource Page (with links to key materials)
• Merits briefs courtesy of American Bar Association.
• Oral argument courtesy of Oyez.org.