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The Anaconda Plan was drawn up by Union General Winfield Scott to win the American Civil War without invading the South and with minimum loss of life. Scott proposed "It is the design of the Government to raise 25,000 additional regular troops, and 60,000 volunteers, for three years. . . . We rely greatly on the sure operation of a complete blockade of the Atlantic and Gulf ports soon to commence. In connection with such blockade, we propose a powerful movement down the Mississippi to the ocean, with a cordon of posts at proper points . . . the object being to clear out and keep open this great line of communication in connection with the strict blockade of the seaboard, so as to envelop the insurgent States and bring them to terms with less bloodshed than by any other plan." [Elliott p 722] He went on to warn against hot-headed demands for a march on Richmond.

Thus his plan involved two main parts.

Blockade the coast of the South to prevent the export of cotton, tobacco, and other cash crops from the South and to keep them from importing much needed war supplies.
Divide the South by controlling the Mississippi River to cut the South off from the west.

Lincoln implemented Scott's plan but went far beyond it. He used far more troops (nearly two million), and rejected Scott's advice against any invasion and instead tried to capture Richmond. Lincoln called for a blockade of the South on April 19, 1861, six days after the fall of Fort Sumter. The blockade itself, thought to be an impossible task against 3,000 miles of highly irregular coastline, was an unparalleled success within the first six months, and nearly impregnable within the first two years. The blockade accounted for the vast increase in the price of cotton abroad and the extreme scarcity of manufactured goods in the South by the end of the war, contributing to the South's defeat. It was the most successful naval blockade to date, and the first one carried out exclusively by the use of a national navy, without employing privateers.

References

Charles Winslow Elliott; Winfield Scott: The Soldier and the Man Macmillan 1937

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+The '''Anaconda Plan''' was drawn up by Union General [[Winfield Scott]] to win the [[American Civil War]] without invading the South and with minimum loss of life. Scott proposed "It is the design of the Government to raise 25,000 additional regular troops, and 60,000 volunteers, for three years. . . . We rely greatly on the sure operation of a complete blockade of the Atlantic and Gulf ports soon to commence. In connection with such blockade, we propose a powerful movement down the Mississippi to the ocean, with a cordon of posts at proper points . . . the object being to clear out and keep open this great line of communication in connection with the strict blockade of the seaboard, so as to envelop the insurgent States and bring them to terms with less bloodshed than by any other plan." [Elliott p 722] He went on to warn against hot-headed demands for a march on Richmond.
-The '''Anaconda Plan''' was drawn up by General [[Winfield Scott]] to end the [[American Civil War]] in favor of the [[United States of America|North]]. The plan was never officially adopted by the [[Union (American Civil War) | Union]], but elements of it were employed throughout the course of the war. It involved four main parts.
+Thus his plan involved two main parts.
 [[Image:Anaconda Plan.jpg|thumb|right|1861 Cartoon map of Scott's plan]]
-# [[Union blockade|Blockade]] the coast of the [[Southern United States|South]] to prevent the export of [[cotton]], [[tobacco]], and other [[cash crop]]s from the South and to keep them from importing much needed war supplies.
+# [[Union blockade|Blockade]] the coast of the [[Southern United States|South]] to prevent the export of cotton, tobacco, and other cash crops from the South and to keep them from importing much needed war supplies.
 # Divide the South by controlling the [[Mississippi River]] to cut the South off from the west.
+Lincoln implemented Scott's plan but went far beyond it. He used far more troops (nearly two million), and rejected Scott's advice against any invasion and instead tried to capture Richmond.
-# Divide the South  by capturing the [[Tennessee River]] Valley and marching through [[Georgia (U.S. state)|Georgia]] to the coast.
+Lincoln called for a blockade of the South on April 19, 1861, six days after the fall of [[Fort Sumter]]. The blockade itself, thought to be an impossible task against 3,000 miles of highly irregular coastline, was an unparalleled success within the first six months, and nearly impregnable within the first two years. The blockade accounted for the vast increase in the price of cotton abroad and the extreme scarcity of manufactured goods in the South by the end of the war, contributing to the South's defeat. It was the most successful naval blockade to date, and the first one carried out exclusively by the use of a national navy, without employing privateers.
-# Capture [[Richmond, Virginia]], the capital of the [[Confederate States of America]].
+==References==
+* Charles Winslow Elliott; ''Winfield Scott: The Soldier and the Man'' Macmillan 1937
-Although the plan was devised early in the war, it was derided by several newspapers and was reluctantly adopted by the Union's leaders. The plan as originally conceived by Scott also advised passivity, in that it suggested that once the Southern states were effectively cut off from their resources, the North should wait for capitulation. Nonetheless, the particulars of the plan were all carried through, the first three proving indeed to be the most decisive factors of the war.
-# Lincoln called for a blockade of the South on [[April 19]], [[1861]], six days after the fall of [[Fort Sumter]]. The blockade itself, thought to be an impossible task against 3,000 miles of highly irregular coastline, was an unparalleled success within the first six months, and nearly impregnable within the first two years. The blockade accounted for the vast increase in the price of cotton abroad and the extreme scarcity of manufactured goods in the South by the end of the war, contributing to the South's defeat. It was the most successful naval blockade to date, and the first one carried out exclusively by the use of a national navy, without employing privateers.
-# Control of the Mississippi would prove decisive in the Civil War as well; [[President of the Confederate States | Confederate President]] [[Jefferson Davis]] called [[Vicksburg, Mississippi|Vicksburg]] the "vital point" of the Confederacy. Although the Eastern Theater was closer to the major centers of population and therefore often drew more attention, the Mississippi represented a major strategic resource that would, if captured by the North, allow for the movement of men and material into the very heart of the South. [[Ulysses S. Grant]]'s successful [[Vicksburg Campaign]] effectively cemented Union control of the Mississippi River, and began the slow death knell for the Confederacy.
-# The Tennessee River Valley was also very important to the South. [[Nashville, Tennessee]], was served by five [[railroad]]s during the war, and the state of Tennessee was home to the [[Cumberland River|Cumberland]] and Tennessee Rivers, making it an ideal point for marshalling and distributing resources. Indeed, the South's second largest ironworks was in [[Clarksville, Tennessee]], on the [[Kentucky]] border, near a bend in the Cumberland River. As soon as Tennessee voted for [[secession]], the Confederacy began to stockpile weapons and supplies at Nashville, making it the center of distribution and manufacture for Southern war goods of all kinds. They built Forts [[Battle of Fort Henry|Henry]] and [[Battle of Fort Donelson|Donelson]] on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, respectively, to protect this important region. However, their defenses did not hold, and after Grant's taking of the garrison at Fort Donelson on [[February 16]], [[1862]], Southern theater commander [[Albert Sidney Johnston]] knew he could no longer hold Nashville and withdrew. The supply depot would remain in Union hands until the end of the war, and was the site of the decisive [[Battle of Nashville]], where Confederate General [[John Bell Hood]] broke his army against the city's defenses in an ill-advised assault and was obliterated by the Union General [[George Henry Thomas]]. The loss of Tennessee in general and Nashville in particular dealt a crippling blow to the Confederate cause; if it is true that [[Robert E. Lee]] ventured into [[Pennsylvania]] for supplies in the [[Gettysburg Campaign]] (which is one of the justifications he made to Jefferson Davis for the raiding action), then he would have never needed do so had the Tennessee Valley remained in Confederate hands, and thus what many have called the [[Turning Point of the American Civil War|"turning point"]] in the war&mdash;the [[Battle of Gettysburg]]&mdash;would never have happened.
-# Grant occupied Richmond in April 1865, shortly before the surrender of [[Army of Northern Virginia|Lee's Army]], but the city had no particular strategic value, serving only as a blow (albeit a heavy one) to Confederate morale.
-Despite the attention paid to the Eastern Theater of operations by most historians of the past century-and-a-half (a trend that can be traced to the disproportionate coverage from eastern newspapers and the postbellum writings of Confederate General [[Jubal Anderson Early|Jubal Early]]), it was the Western Theater that figured most prominently in the Anaconda Plan and in the actual defeat of the Confederacy. Without the loss of the Mississippi River and the Tennessee Valley, the supposed vast differences in resources between the Union and the Confederate Armies would have been greatly lessened. It was Grant's successes in the West that brought him to the attention of the [[President of the United States | President]] and paved his way for command of the Union forces; if he chose to make his headquarters with the [[Army of the Potomac]], it was only because he rightly perceived that the major work in the West was done, and all that remained was to pin down and finish Lee's army. Indeed, once the West was lost, Lee's defeat became a mere question of time; the "[[war of attrition]]" theory so often repeated in discussions of the Civil War holds true only because of the success of the first three points of the Anaconda Plan. Had Lee not been blockaded, or at least still held the Tennessee Valley, he would have had resources enough to drag the war on interminably, quite possibly long enough to force a settlement with the Union.
 [[Category:American Civil War]]
 [[pt:Plano Anaconda]]