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Social cognition is the encoding, storage, retrieval, and processing, of information about conspecifics (members of the same species). In the area of social psychology, social cognition refers to a specific approach in which these processes are studied according to the methods of cognitive psychology and information processing theory. According to this view, social cognition is a level of analysis that aims to understand social psychological phenomena by investigating the cognitive processes that underlie them.^[1] The major concerns of the approach are the processes involved in the perception, judgment, and memory of social stimuli; the effects of social and affective factors on information processing; and the behavioral and interpersonal consequences of cognitive processes. This level of analysis may be applied to any content area within social psychology, including research on intrapersonal, interpersonal, intragroup, and intergroup processes. However, the term social cognition has also come to be more widely used across other areas of psychology and cognitive neuroscience. In these areas, the term social cognition is most often used to refer to various social abilities disrupted in autism^[2] and other disorders.^[3] In cognitive neuroscience the biological basis of social cognition is investigated.^[4]^[5]^[6] Developmental psychologists study the development of social cognition abilities.^[7]

Historical development

Social cognition came to prominence with the rise of cognitive psychology in the late 1960s and early 1970s and is now the dominant model and approach in mainstream social psychology.^[8] Common to social cognition theories is the idea that information is represented in the brain as "cognitive elements" such as schemas, attributions, or stereotypes. A focus on how these cognitive elements are processed is often employed. Social cognition therefore applies and extends many themes, theories and paradigms from cognitive psychology, for example in reasoning (representativeness heuristic, base rate fallacy and confirmation bias), attention (automaticity and priming) and memory (schemas, primacy and recency). It is very likely that social psychology was always a lot more cognitive than mainstream psychology to begin with, as it traditionally discussed internal mental states such as beliefs and desires when mainstream psychology was dominated by behaviorism.^[9]

A notable theory of social cognition is social schema theory, although this is not the basis of all social cognition studies (for example, see attribution theory).^[9] It has been suggested that other disciplines in social psychology such as social identity theory and social representations may be seeking to explain largely the same phenomena as social cognition, and that these different disciplines might be merged into a "coherent integrated whole".^[10] A parallel paradigm has arisen in the study of action, termed motor cognition,^[11] which is concerned with understanding the representation of action and the associated process.

Social schemas

Social schema theory builds on and uses terminology from schema theory in cognitive psychology, which describes how ideas or "concepts" are represented in the brain and how they are categorized. According to this view, when we see or think of a concept a mental representation or schema is "activated" bringing to mind other information which is linked to the original concept by association. This activation often happens unconsciously. As a result of activating such schemas, judgements are formed which go beyond the information actually available, since many of the associations the schema evokes extend outside the given information. This may influence social cognition and behaviour regardless of whether these judgements are accurate or not. For example, if an individual is introduced as a teacher, then a "teacher schema" may be activated. Subsequently, we might associate this person with wisdom or authority, or past experiences of teachers that we remember and consider important.

When a schema is more accessible this means that it can be more quickly activated and used in a particular situation. Two cognitive processes that increase the accessibility of schemas are salience and priming. Salience is the degree to which a particular social object stands out relative to other social objects in a situation. The higher the salience of an object the more likely that schemas for that object will be made accessible. For example, if there is one female in a group of seven males, female gender schemas may be more accessible and influence the group's thinking and behavior toward the female group member.^[9] Priming refers to any experience immediately prior to a situation that causes a schema to be more accessible. For example, watching a scary movie late at night might increase the accessibility of frightening schemas, increasing the likelihood that a person will perceive shadows and background noises as potential threats.

Social cognition researchers are interested in how new information is integrated into pre-established schemas, especially when that information contrasts with the existing schema.^[12] For example, a student may have a pre-established schema that all teachers are assertive and bossy. After encountering a teacher who is timid and shy, a social cognition researcher might be interested in how the student will integrate this new information with his/her existing teacher schema. Pre-established schemas tend to guide attention to new information, as people selectively attend to information that is consistent with the schema and ignore information that is inconsistent. This is referred to as a confirmation bias. Sometimes inconsistent information is sub-categorized and stored away as a special case, leaving the original schema intact without any alterations. This is referred to as subtyping.

Social cognition researchers are also interested in studying the regulation of activated schemas. It is believed that the situational activation of schemas is automatic, meaning that it is outside individual conscious control. In many situations however, the schematic information that has been activated may be in conflict with the social norms of the situation in which case an individual is motivated to inhibit the influence of the schematic information on their thinking and social behavior. Whether a person will successfully regulate the application of the activated schemas is dependent on individual differences in self-regulatory ability and the presence of situational impairments to executive control. High self-regulatory ability and the lack of situational impairments on executive functioning increase the likelihood that individuals will successfully inhibit the influence of automatically activated schemas on their thinking and social behavior. However, when people stop suppressing the influence of the unwanted thoughts, a rebound effect can occur where the thought becomes hyper-accessible.

Cultural differences

Social psychologists have become increasingly interested in the influence of culture on social cognition.^[13] Although people of all cultures use schemas to understand the world, the content of our schemas has been found to differ for individuals based on their cultural upbringing. For example, one study interviewed a Scottish settler and a Bantu herdsman from Swaziland and compared their schemas about cattle.^[14] Because cattle are essential to the lifestyle of the Bantu people, the Bantu herdsmen's schemas for cattle were far more extensive than the schemas of the Scottish settler. The Bantu herdsmen was able to distinguish his cattle from dozens of others, while the Scottish settler was not.

Studies have found that culture influences social cognition in other ways too. In fact, cultural influences have been found to shape some of the basic ways in which people automatically perceive and think about their environment.^[13] For example, a number of studies have found that people who grow up in East Asian cultures such as China and Japan tend to develop holistic thinking styles, whereas people brought up in Western cultures like Australia and the USA tend to develop analytic thinking styles.^[15]^[16] The typically Eastern holistic thinking style is a type of thinking in which people focus on the overall context and the ways in which objects relate to each other.^[15] For example, if an Easterner was asked to judge how a classmate is feeling then he/she might scan everyone's face in the class, and then use this information to judge how the individual is feeling.^[17] On the other hand, the typically Western analytic thinking style is a type of thinking style in which people focus on individual objects and neglect to consider the surrounding context.^[16] For example, if a Westerner was asked to judge how a classmate is feeling then he/she might focus only on the classmate's face in order to make the judgment.^[17]

Nisbett (2003) suggested that cultural differences in social cognition may stem from the various philosophical traditions of the East (i.e. Confucianism and Buddhism) versus the Greek philosophical traditions (i.e. of Aristotle and Plato) of the West.^[13] However, recent research indicates that differences in social cognition may originate from physical differences in the environments of the two cultures. One study found that scenes from Japanese cities were 'busier' than those in the USA as they contain more objects which compete for attention. In this study, the Eastern holistic thinking style (and focus on the overall context) was attributed to the busier nature of the Japanese physical environment.^[18]

Social cognitive neuroscience

Early interest in the relationship between brain function and social cognition includes the case of Phineas Gage, whose behaviour was reported to have changed after an accident damaged one or both of his frontal lobes. More recent neuropsychological studies have shown that brain injuries disrupt social cognitive processes. For example, damage to the frontal lobes can affect emotional responses to social stimuli,^[19]^[20]^[21] performance on Theory of Mind tasks.^[22]^[23] In the temporal lobe, damage to the fusiform gyrus can lead to the inability to recognize faces.

People with psychological disorders such as autism,^[2] psychosis,^[24] Williams syndrome, antisocial personality disorder,^[3] Fragile X and Turner's syndrome^[25] show differences in social behavior compared to their unaffected peers. Parents with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) show disturbances in at least one aspect of social cognition: namely, joint attention with their young children only after a laboratory-induced relational stressor as compared to healthy parents without PTSD.^[26] However, whether social cognition is underpinned by domain-specific neural mechanisms is still an open issue.^[27] There is now an expanding research field examining how such conditions may bias cognitive processes involved in social interaction, or conversely, how such biases may lead to the symptoms associated with the condition.

The development of social cognitive processes in infants and children has also been researched extensively (see developmental psychology). For example, it has been suggested that some aspects of psychological processes that promote social behavior (such as face recognition) may be innate. Consistent with this, very young babies recognize and selectively respond to social stimuli such as the voice, face and scent of their mother.^[28]

References

^ (International Social Cognition Network: http://www.socialcognition.info)
^ ^a ^b Striano, T.; Reid, V. (eds.). Social Cognition: Development, Neuroscience and Autism. Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 1-4051-6217-1.
^ ^a ^b Blair, J.; Mitchel, D.; Blair, K. (2005). Psychopathy, emotion and the brain. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 25–7. ISBN 0-631-23336-9.
^ Cacioppo, J.T.; Berntson, G.G.; Sheridan, J.F. & McClintock, M.K. (2000). Multilevel integrative analyses of human behavior: social neuroscience and the complementing nature of social and biological approaches. Psychological Bulletin, 126, 829–43.
^ Cacioppo, J.T. (2002). Social neuroscience: understanding the pieces fosters understanding the whole and vice versa. American Psychologist, 57, 819–31.
^ Adolphs, R. (1999). "Social cognition and the human brain". Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 3 (12): 469–79. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(99)01399-6. PMID 10562726.
^ Shaffer, D.R.; Kipp, K. (2009). "Chapter 12: Theories of social and cognitive development". Developmental Psychology: Childhood and Adolescence. Wadsworth Publishing Company. ISBN 0-495-60171-3.
^ Husain, A. (2012). "Chapter 5: Social Perception and Cognition". Social Psychology. Pearson Education India. ISBN 9788131760000.
^ ^a ^b ^c Fiske, S.T.; Taylor, S.E. (1991). Social Cognition. McGraw-Hill, Inc. ISBN 0-07-100910-8.
^ Augustinos, M. (2006). Social Cognition an Integrated Introduction. London: Sage Publications Ltd. ISBN 0-7619-4218-1. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
^ http://www.motorcognition.com
^ Alpay, L.; Verhoef, J.; Teeni, D.; Putter, H.; Toussaint, P.; Zwetsloot-Schonk, J. (2008). "Can contextualisation increase understanding during man-machine communication? A theory driven study". The Open Medical Informatics Journal. 2: 82–91. doi:10.2174/1874431100802010082. PMC 2669642. PMID 19415137.
^ ^a ^b ^c Aronson, E.; Wilson, T; Akert, R.. (2010). "Chapter 3: Social Cognition". Social Psychology. Pearson.
^ name=Bartlett>Bartlett, F. (1932). Remembering. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 249.
^ ^a ^b Nisbett, R.; Peng, K.; Choi, I.; Norenzayan, A. (2001). "Culture and Systems of thought: Holistic vs. analytic cognition". Psychological Review. 108 (2): 291–310. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.108.2.291. PMID 11381831.
^ ^a ^b Masuda, T.; Nisbett, R. (2006). "Culture and change blindness". Cognitive science: A multidisciplinary journal. 30 (2): 381–389. doi:10.1207/s15516709cog0000_63.
^ ^a ^b Masuda, T.; Elsworth, T.; Mesquita, B. (2008). "Placing the face in context: Cultural differences in the perception of facial emotion". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 94 (3): 365–381. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.3.365. PMID 18284287.
^ Miyamoto, Y.; Kitayama, S. (2002). "Cultural variation in correspondence bias: The critical role of attitude diagnosticity of socially constrained behaviour". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 83 (5): 1239–1248. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.83.5.1239. PMID 12416925.
^ Harmon-Jones, E.; Winkielman, P. (2007). Social Neuroscience: Integrating Biological and Psychological Explanations of Social Behavior. Guilford Press. ISBN 978-1-59385-404-1.
^ Damasio, A.R. (1994). Descarte's Error: Emotion, reason and the human brain. New York: Picador. ISBN 0-333-65656-3.
^ Hornak, J.; Rolls, E.T.; Wade, D. (1996). "Face and voice expression identification in patients with emotional and behavioral changes following ventral frontal lobe damage". Neuropsychologia. 34 (4): 247–61. doi:10.1016/0028-3932(95)00106-9. PMID 8657356.
^ Stone, V.E.; Baron-Cohen, S.; Knight, R.T. (1998). "Frontal lobe contributions to theory of mind". Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience. 10 (5): 640–56. doi:10.1162/089892998562942. PMID 9802997.
^ Brunet, E. (2000). "A PET investigation of attribution of intentions to others with a non-verbal task". NeuroImage. 11 (2): 157–66. doi:10.1006/nimg.1999.0525. PMID 10679187. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |coauthor= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
^ Fusar-Poli, P.; Deste, G.; Smieskova, R.; Barlati, S.; Yung, AR.; Howes, O.; Stieglitz, RD.; Vita, A.; McGuire, P.; Borgwardt, Stefan (Jun 2012). "Cognitive functioning in prodromal psychosis: a meta-analysis". Arch Gen Psychiatry. 69 (6): 562–71. doi:10.1001/archgenpsychiatry.2011.1592. PMID 22664547.
^ Mazzocco, M.M.M.; et al. (1998). "Social Functioning Among Girls with Fragile X or Turner Syndrome and Their Sisters". Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders. 28 (6): 509–17. doi:10.1023/A:1026000111467. PMID 9932237. {{cite journal}}: |first2= missing |last2= (help); |first3= missing |last3= (help); |first4= missing |last4= (help); Explicit use of et al. in: |first= (help)
^ Schechter, D.S.; Willheim, E.; Hinojosa, C.; Scholfield-Kleinman, K.; Turner, J.B.; McCaw, J.; Zeanah, C.H.; Myers, M.M. (2010). Subjective and objective measures of parent-child relationship dysfunction, child separation distress, and joint attention. Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological Processes, 73(2), 130–44.
^ Stone, V.E.; Gerrans, P. (2006). "What's domain-specific about theory of mind". Social Neuroscience. 1 (3–4): 309–19. doi:10.1080/17470910601029221. PMID 18633796.
^ Bremner, J.G. (1994). "Chapter 5: Social Development". Infancy. pp. 182–3. ISBN 0-631-14809-4..

@@ Line 17: / Line 17: @@
 ==Cultural differences==
-Social psychologists have become increasingly interested in the influence of culture on social cognition.<ref name= "Aronson">{{cite book |last=Aronson |first=E. |author2=Wilson, T |author3=Akert, R..  |title=Social Psychology |publisher=Pearson |chapter=Chapter 3: Social Cognition |year=2010}}</ref> Although people of all cultures use schemas to understand the world, the content of our schemas has been found to differ for individuals based on their cultural upbringing. For example, one study interviewed a Scottish settler and a Bantu herdsman from Swaziland and compared their schemas about cattle.<ref>name=Bartlett>{{cite book |title= Remembering |last=Bartlett |first=F. |publisher=Cambridge: Cambridge University Press |page=249 |year=1932}}</ref> Because cattle are essential to the lifestyle of the Bantu people, the Bantu herdsmen's schemas for cattle were far more extensive than the schemas of the Scottish settler. The Bantu herdsmen was able to distinguish his cattle from dozens of others, while the Scottish settler was not.
+Social psychologists have become increasingly interested in the influence of culture on social cognition.<ref name= "Aronson">{{cite book |last=Aronson |first=E. |author2=Wilson, T |author3=Akert, R..  |title=Social Psychology |publisher=Pearson |chapter=Chapter 3: Social Cognition |year=2010}}</ref> Although people of all cultures use schemas to understand the world, the content of our schemas has been found to differ for individuals based on their cultural upbringing. For example, one study interviewed a Scottish settler and a Bantu herdsman from Swaziland and compared their schemas about cattle.<ref> name=Bartlett>{{cite book |title= Remembering |last=Bartlett |first=F. |publisher=Cambridge: Cambridge University Press |page=249 |year=1932}}</ref> Because cattle are essential to the lifestyle of the Bantu people, the Bantu herdsmen's schemas for cattle were far more extensive than the schemas of the Scottish settler. The Bantu herdsmen was able to distinguish his cattle from dozens of others, while the Scottish settler was not.
 Studies have found that culture influences social cognition in other ways too. In fact, cultural influences have been found to shape some of the basic ways in which people automatically perceive and think about their environment.<ref name= "Aronson" /> For example, a number of studies have found that people who grow up in East Asian cultures such as [[China]] and [[Japan]] tend to develop holistic thinking styles, whereas people brought up in Western cultures like Australia and the USA tend to develop analytic thinking styles.<ref name= "Nisbett">{{cite journal |last=Nisbett |first=R. |author2=Peng, K. |author3=Choi, I. |author4= Norenzayan, A.  |title=Culture and Systems of thought: Holistic vs. analytic cognition |journal=Psychological Review. |volume=108 |pages=291–310 |year=2001 |doi=10.1037/0033-295X.108.2.291 |pmid=11381831 |issue=2}}</ref><ref name = "Masuda 2006">{{cite journal |last=Masuda |first=T. |author2=Nisbett, R.  |title=Culture and change blindness |journal=Cognitive science: A multidisciplinary journal. |volume=30 |pages=381–389 |year=2006 |doi=10.1207/s15516709cog0000_63 |issue=2}}</ref> The typically Eastern holistic thinking style is a type of thinking in which people focus on the overall context and the ways in which objects relate to each other.<ref name= "Nisbett" /> For example, if an Easterner was asked to judge how a classmate is feeling then he/she might scan everyone's face in the class, and then use this information to judge how the individual is feeling.<ref name = "Masuda 2008">{{cite journal |last=Masuda |first=T. |author2=Elsworth, T. |author3=Mesquita, B.  |title=Placing the face in context: Cultural differences in the perception of facial emotion |journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. |volume=94 |pages=365–381 |year=2008 |doi=10.1037/0022-3514.94.3.365 |pmid=18284287 |issue=3}}</ref> On the other hand, the typically Western analytic thinking style is a type of thinking style in which people focus on individual objects and neglect to consider the surrounding context.<ref name= "Masuda 2006" /> For example, if a Westerner was asked to judge how a classmate is feeling then he/she might focus only on the classmate's face in order to make the judgment.<ref name = "Masuda 2008" />
-Nisbett (2003) suggested that cultural differences in social cognition may stem from the various philosophical traditions of the East (i.e. [[Confucianism]] and [[Buddhism]]) versus the Greek philosophical traditions (i.e. of Aristotle and Plato) of the West.<ref name= "Aronson" /> However, recent research indicates that differences in social cognition may originate from physical differences in the environments of the two cultures. One study found that scenes from Japanese cities were 'busier' than those in the USA as they contain more objects which compete for attention. In this study, the Eastern holistic thinking style (and focus on the overall context) was attributed to the busier nature of the Japanese physical environment.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Miyamoto |first=Y. |author2=Kitayama, S.  |title=Cultural variation in correspondence bias: The critical role of attitude diagnosticity of socially constrained behaviour |journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. |volume=83 |pages=1239–1248 |year=2002 |doi=10.1037/0022-3514.83.5.1239 |pmid=12416925 |issue=5}}</ref>
+Nisbett (2003) suggested that cultural differences in social cognition may stem from the various philosophical traditions of the East (i.e. [[Confucianism]] and [[Buddhism]]) versus the Greek philosophical traditions (i.e. of Aristotle and Plato) of the West.<ref name= "Aronson" /> However, recent research indicates that differences in social cognition may originate from physical differences in the environments of the two cultures. One study found that scenes from Japanese cities were 'busier' than those in the USA as they contain more objects which compete for attention. In this study, the Eastern holistic thinking style (and focus on the overall context) was attributed to the busier nature of the Japanese physical environment.<ref> {{cite journal |last=Miyamoto |first=Y. |author2=Kitayama, S.  |title=Cultural variation in correspondence bias: The critical role of attitude diagnosticity of socially constrained behaviour |journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. |volume=83 |pages=1239–1248 |year=2002 |doi=10.1037/0022-3514.83.5.1239 |pmid=12416925 |issue=5}}</ref>
 ==Social cognitive neuroscience==
 Early interest in the relationship between brain function and social cognition includes the case of [[Phineas Gage]], whose behaviour was reported to have changed after an accident damaged one or both of his frontal lobes. More recent [[neuropsychological]] studies have shown that [[acquired brain injury|brain injuries]] disrupt social cognitive processes. For example, damage to the frontal lobes can affect emotional responses to social stimuli,<ref>{{cite book |last=Harmon-Jones |first=E. |author2=Winkielman, P.  |year=2007 |title=Social Neuroscience: Integrating Biological and Psychological Explanations of Social Behavior |publisher=Guilford Press |isbn=978-1-59385-404-1}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=Descarte's Error: Emotion, reason and the human brain |last=Damasio |first=A.R. |year=1994 |publisher=Picador |location=New York |isbn=0-333-65656-3}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Hornak |first=J. |author2=Rolls, E.T. |author3=Wade, D.  |year=1996 |title=Face and voice expression identification in patients with emotional and behavioral changes following ventral frontal lobe damage |journal=Neuropsychologia |volume=34 |pages=247–61 |doi=10.1016/0028-3932(95)00106-9 |pmid=8657356 |issue=4}}</ref> performance on [[Theory of Mind]] tasks.<ref name=BaronCohen>{{cite journal |last=Stone |first=V.E. |author2=Baron-Cohen, S. |author3= Knight, R.T.  |title=Frontal lobe contributions to theory of mind |journal=Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience |volume=10 |pages=640–56 |year=1998 |doi=10.1162/089892998562942 |pmid=9802997 |issue=5}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Brunet |first=E. |coauthor=Sarfati, Y.; Hardy-Bayle, MC. & Decety, J. |year=2000 |title=A PET investigation of attribution of intentions to others with a non-verbal task |journal=NeuroImage |volume=11 |pages=157–66 |doi=10.1006/nimg.1999.0525 |pmid=10679187 |issue=2}}</ref> In the [[temporal lobe]], damage to the [[fusiform gyrus]] can lead to the [[prosopagnosia|inability to recognize faces]].
 People with [[psychological disorder]]s such as [[autism]],<ref name="Striano"/> [[psychosis]],<ref name="Fusar-Poli-2012">{{Cite journal  | last1 = Fusar-Poli | first1 = P. | last2 = Deste | first2 = G. | last3 = Smieskova | first3 = R. | last4 = Barlati | first4 = S. | last5 = Yung | first5 = AR. | last6 = Howes | first6 = O. | last7 = Stieglitz | first7 = RD. | last8 = Vita | first8 = A. | last9 = McGuire | first9 = P. | title = Cognitive functioning in prodromal psychosis: a meta-analysis | journal = Arch Gen Psychiatry | volume = 69 | issue = 6 | pages = 562–71 |date=Jun 2012 | doi = 10.1001/archgenpsychiatry.2011.1592 | pmid = 22664547  | last10 = Borgwardt  | first10 = Stefan }}</ref> [[Williams syndrome]], [[antisocial personality disorder]],<ref name=BlairMitchellBlair/> [[Fragile X]] and [[Turner's syndrome]]<ref>{{cite journal |last=Mazzocco |first=M.M.M. et al. |journal=Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders |title=Social Functioning Among Girls with Fragile X or Turner Syndrome and Their Sisters |volume=28 |issue=6 |year=1998 |pages=509–17 |doi=10.1023/A:1026000111467 |pmid=9932237 |first2=Thomas |first3=Lisa S. |first4=Allan L.}}</ref> show differences in social behavior compared to their unaffected peers. Parents with [[posttraumatic stress disorder]] (PTSD) show disturbances in at least one aspect of social cognition: namely, [[joint attention]] with their young children only after a laboratory-induced relational stressor as compared to healthy parents without PTSD.<ref>Schechter, D.S.; Willheim, E.; Hinojosa, C.; Scholfield-Kleinman, K.; Turner, J.B.; McCaw, J.; Zeanah, C.H.; Myers, M.M. (2010). Subjective and objective measures of parent-child relationship dysfunction, child separation distress, and joint attention. ''Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological Processes'', 73(2), 130–44.</ref> However, whether social cognition is underpinned by domain-specific neural mechanisms is still an open issue.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Stone |first=V.E. |author2=Gerrans, P.  |year=2006 |title=What's domain-specific about theory of mind |journal=Social Neuroscience |volume=1 |issue=3–4 |pages=309–19 |doi=10.1080/17470910601029221 |pmid=18633796}}</ref> There is now an expanding research field examining how such conditions may bias cognitive processes involved in social interaction, or conversely, how such biases may lead to the symptoms associated with the condition.
 The development of social cognitive processes in infants and children has also been researched extensively (see [[developmental psychology]]). For example, it has been suggested that some aspects of psychological processes that promote social behavior (such as [[face recognition]]) may be [[psychological nativism|innate]]. Consistent with this, very young babies recognize and selectively respond to social stimuli such as the voice, face and scent of their mother.<ref>{{cite book |last=Bremner |first=J.G. |title=Infancy |pages=182–3 |chapter=Chapter 5: Social Development |year=1994 |isbn=0-631-14809-4}}.</ref>
-===Mirror Neurons===
-Recent discoveries in the field of  [[social neuroscience]] have heavily implicated [[mirror neuron]]s and their related systems as a possible neurological basis for social cognition. In chimpanzees (the closet living relative to humans) mirror neuron systems have been shown to be highly active when the ape is observing another individual (ape or human) perform a physical action such as grasping, holding, or hitting.<ref name="Marco">{{Cite journal
-| issn = 1545-7885
-| volume = 3
-| issue = 3
-| pages = –79-e79
-| last = Iacoboni
-| first = Marco
-| coauthors = Istvan Molnar-Szakacs, Vittorio Gallese, Giovanni Buccino, John C Mazziotta, Giacomo Rizzolatti
-| title = Grasping the intentions of others with one's own mirror neuron system
-| journal = Plos Biology
-| accessdate = 2014-09-23
-| date = 2005-03
-| url = http://libpublic3.library.isu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cmedm&AN=15736981&site=eds-live
-}}</ref>  Mirror Neuron regions in the ventral premotor cortex, dorsal premotor cortex, and intraparietal cortex have been found to activate in humans for similar situations of observing an individual perform one of but not limited to the after more mention physical tasks.<ref name="Spunt 80–86">{{Cite journal
-| doi = 10.1177/0956797612450884
-| issn = 0956-7976
-| volume = 24
-| issue = 1
-| pages = 80–86
-| last = Spunt
-| first = Robert P.
-| coauthors = Matthew D. Lieberman
-| title = The Busy Social Brain Evidence for Automaticity and Control in the Neural Systems Supporting Social Cognition and Action Understanding
-| journal = Psychological Science
-| accessdate = 2014-09-10
-| date = 2013-01-01
-| url = http://pss.sagepub.com/content/24/1/80
-| pmid = 23221019
-}}</ref> The activation of the mirror neuron system is automatic and goes beyond recognition of simple physical actions but is thought to be the reason as why an individual is able to guess and understand another individual’s actions.<ref name="Marco"/><ref name="Spunt 80–86"/>
-	fMRI studies in humans have been gathering evidence that mirror neurons are responsible for the “Physical to self-mapping”<ref name="Uddin 153–157">{{Cite journal
-| doi = 10.1016/j.tics.2007.01.001
-| issn = 13646613
-| volume = 11
-| issue = 4
-| pages = 153–157
-| last = Uddin
-| first = Lucina Q.
-| coauthors = Marco Iacoboni, Claudia Lange, Julian Paul Keenan
-| title = The self and social cognition: the role of cortical midline structures and mirror neurons
-| journal = Trends in Cognitive Sciences
-| accessdate = 2014-09-27
-| date = 2007-04
-| url = http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1364661307000307
-}}</ref> In studies where participants had to identify their own face, right hemispheric mirror neurons fired indicating responsibility for the ability of one to represent one’s own physical actions/states. These same areas also fire when the individual views others performing physical actions such as grasping or tearing.<ref name="Uddin 153–157"/><ref>{{Cite journal
-| doi = 10.1016/j.tics.2007.03.002
-| issn = 13646613
-| volume = 11
-| issue = 5
-| pages = 192–194
-| last = Christian Keysers
-| coauthors = Valeria Gazzola
-| title = Integrating simulation and theory of mind: from self to social cognition
-| journal = Trends in Cognitive Sciences
-| accessdate = 2014-09-27
-| date = 2007-05
-| url = http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1364661307000812
-}}</ref>  This activation implies that there is a unique neural connection going on for an individual. Thus the mirror neuron system allows for a bridge between the self to the actions of others. This has been theorized to enable the understanding of intention or the goals of others.<ref name="Sinigaglia 3–29">{{Cite journal
-| doi = 10.1111/j.1468-5922.2009.01821.x
-| issn = 00218774
-| volume = 55
-| issue = 1
-| pages = 3–29
-| last = Sinigaglia
-| first = Corrado
-| coauthors = Laura Sparaci
-| title = Emotions in action through the looking glass
-| journal = Journal of Analytical Psychology
-| accessdate = 2014-09-10
-| date = 2010-02
-| url = http://libpublic3.library.isu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=47696333&site=ehost-live
-}}</ref><ref name="Spaulding 233–257">{{Cite journal
-| doi = 10.1111/mila.12017
-| issn = 02681064
-| volume = 28
-| issue = 2
-| pages = 233–257
-| last = Spaulding
-| first = Shannon
-| title = Mirror Neurons and Social Cognition Mirror Neurons and Social Cognition
-| journal = Mind & Language
-| accessdate = 2014-09-10
-| date = 2013-04
-| url = http://libpublic3.library.isu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ufh&AN=86462571&site=eds-live
-}}</ref>
-A study by Spunt and Liberman (2013) used an fMRI study to observe mirror neurons in the brain. Participants observed a video of an action being performed under a high or low cognitive load. While watching, they had to observe why the action was being performed, what was being performed, or how the action was being performed. The end result provided direct evidence for activation and more importantly automaticity of the mirror neurons in the dorsal premotor cortex, ventral premotor cortex and anterior Intraparietal sulcus.<ref name="Spunt 80–86"/>
-	Although there are large amounts of supporting evidence which indicate mirror neurons activate in situations where one is analyzing ones-self to the actions of others,<ref name="Sinigaglia 3–29"/> there is still debate as to whether these activations should be interpreted as intentional understanding. Shannon Spaulding (2013) argues that the neuroscientists who offer up mirror neurons as a physiological answer to social cognition are misinterpreting their results and not using the correct philosophical definitions of goal and intention. Rather than being interchangeable or one leading to the other, she argues they need to be thought of two separate actions.<ref name="Spaulding 233–257"/>
-The discovery of the link between mirror neurons and social cognition provides further links to a neurological basis found in other social phenomena such as [[social learning theory]] and [[empathy]].<ref name="Marco"/><ref>
-{{Cite journal
-| doi = 10.1038/506416a
-| issn = 0028-0836
-| volume = 506
-| issue = 7489
-| pages = 416–417
-| last = Reardon
-| first = Sara
-| title = Monkey brains wired to share
-| journal = Nature
-| accessdate = 2014-09-10
-| date = 2014-02-25
-| url = http://www.nature.com/news/monkey-brains-wired-to-share-1.14765
-}}</ref>
 ==See also==
@@ Line 180: / Line 74: @@
 [[Category:Social philosophy]]
-[[ar:إدراك اجتماعي]]
 [[cs:Sociální percepce]]
+[[ar:إدراك اجتماعي]]