Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe: Difference between revisions
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{{mergeto|Christopher Michael Langan}} |
{{mergeto|Christopher Michael Langan}} |
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The '''Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe''' or '''CTMU''' (pronounced "cat-mew") is |
The '''Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe''' or '''CTMU''' (pronounced "cat-mew") is the collected work of a blue-collar self-described genius [[Christopher Michael Langan]]. The CTMU rose to media attention in 1999, buoyed by interest in Langan's extremely high IQ.<ref>[http://web.archive.org/web/20000818083819/http://www.abcnews.go.com/onair/2020/transcripts/2020_991209_iq_trans.html McFadden 1999]. ''20/20'' gave Langan an IQ test and reported that "his score was off the charts, too high to be measured. Neuropsychologist Dr. Bob Novelly was astounded", saying, "Chris is the highest individual that I have ever measured in 25 years of doing this." Sager 1999, Wigmore 2000, and Brabham 2001 also make much of Langan's IQ.</ref> Among Langan's claims for the theory are that it constitutes [[absolute truth]], provides the logical framework of a [[Theory of Everything]], and proves the existence of [[God]]. |
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==History== |
==History== |
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For most of the 1990s, knowledge of the CTMU was limited to high-IQ societies. Wider recognition for Langan and his theory began in 1999, when ''[[Esquire (magazine)|Esquire]]'' magazine published a profile of Langan and other members of the high-IQ community.<ref name=Sager>Sager 1999.</ref> Billing Langan as "the smartest man in America", the article's account of the weight-lifting bouncer and his Theory of Everything sparked a flurry of media interest. Articles and interviews highlighting Langan and the CTMU appeared in ''[[Popular Science]]'',<ref name=Quain>[http://megafoundation.org/CTMU/Press/PopularScience/PopSciArt.pdf Quain 2001].</ref> ''[[The Times]]'',<ref name=Wigmore>Wigmore 2000.</ref> ''[[Newsday]]'',<ref name=Brabham>Brabham 2001.</ref> ''[[Muscle & Fitness]]'',<ref>O'Connell 2001.</ref> and elsewhere. Langan was featured on ''[[20/20]]''<ref name=McFadden>[http://web.archive.org/web/20000818083819/http://www.abcnews.go.com/onair/2020/transcripts/2020_991209_iq_trans.html McFadden 1999].</ref> and interviewed on [[Errol Morris]]' ''First Person''.<ref>Morris 2001.</ref> |
For most of the 1990s, knowledge of the CTMU was limited to high-IQ societies. Wider recognition for Langan and his theory began in 1999, when ''[[Esquire (magazine)|Esquire]]'' magazine published a profile of Langan and other members of the high-IQ community.<ref name=Sager>Sager 1999.</ref> Billing Langan as "the smartest man in America", the article's account of the weight-lifting bouncer and his Theory of Everything sparked a flurry of media interest. Articles and interviews highlighting Langan and the CTMU appeared in ''[[Popular Science]]'',<ref name=Quain>[http://megafoundation.org/CTMU/Press/PopularScience/PopSciArt.pdf Quain 2001].</ref> ''[[The Times]]'',<ref name=Wigmore>Wigmore 2000.</ref> ''[[Newsday]]'',<ref name=Brabham>Brabham 2001.</ref> ''[[Muscle & Fitness]]'',<ref>O'Connell 2001.</ref> and elsewhere. Langan was featured on ''[[20/20]]''<ref name=McFadden>[http://web.archive.org/web/20000818083819/http://www.abcnews.go.com/onair/2020/transcripts/2020_991209_iq_trans.html McFadden 1999].</ref> and interviewed on [[Errol Morris]]' ''First Person''.<ref>Morris 2001.</ref> |
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By 2002 the CTMU had drawn the attention of [[ISCID]], the International Society for Complexity, Information, and Design. Langan was made a fellow of the society and in September 2002 published in its online journal a 56-page paper, "The Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe: A New Kind of Reality Theory".<ref>[http://megafoundation.org/CTMU/Articles/Langan_CTMU_092902.pdf Langan 2002].</ref> Langan's paper "Cheating the Millennium: The Mounting Explanatory Debts of Scientific Naturalism", relating the CTMU to existing theories of [[causality]], appeared in the 2004 anthology ''Uncommon Dissent''.<ref>Langan 2004.</ref> |
By 2002 the CTMU had drawn the attention of the [[intelligent design]] organization [[ISCID]], the International Society for Complexity, Information, and Design. Langan was made a fellow of the society and in September 2002 published in its online journal a 56-page paper, "The Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe: A New Kind of Reality Theory".<ref>[http://megafoundation.org/CTMU/Articles/Langan_CTMU_092902.pdf Langan 2002].</ref> Langan's paper "Cheating the Millennium: The Mounting Explanatory Debts of Scientific Naturalism", relating the CTMU to existing theories of [[causality]], appeared in the 2004 anthology ''Uncommon Dissent''.<ref>Langan 2004.</ref> The [[scientific community considers the advocacy of Intelligent Design to be [[pseudoscience]] or [[junk science]]. |
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Langan has maintained an extensive online presence, debating the CTMU in forums across the Internet and posting papers on his [http://ctmu.org/ Web site]. He has also written an unpublished book about the CTMU called ''Design for a Universe''.<ref name=Quain/> |
Langan has maintained an extensive online presence, debating the CTMU in forums across the Internet and posting papers on his [http://ctmu.org/ Web site]. He has also written an unpublished book about the CTMU called ''Design for a Universe''.<ref name=Quain/> |
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==Structure== |
==Structure== |
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| ⚫ | Unlike scientific theories, which rely on observation to establish their correspondence with reality, the CTMU is a [[scholasticism|scholastic]] treatise that is supposed to apply [[apodictic|apodictically]], in all [[possible worlds]]. In fact, claims Langan, "any other valid theory of reality will necessarily equate to the CTMU up to [[isomorphism]]; whatever it adds will come by way of specificity, not generality".<ref>Langan 2002, p. 53, n. 6.</ref> Verification of the CTMU is made "largely rationalistic" by its claimed tautological nature, so that "much of the theory has to be proven like a math theorem rather than confirmed on a lab bench". |
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Prominent among the tools of [[epistemology]] are the [[axiomatic method]] (associated with [[rationalism]], [[Deductive reasoning|deduction]], and [[mathematics]]), and the [[scientific method]] (associated with [[empiricism]], [[Inductive reasoning|induction]], and the [[physical sciences]]). The axiomatic method derives theorems from axioms, but alternative axioms can yield contradictory theorems (as with [[Euclidean geometry|Euclidean]] and [[non-Euclidean geometry]]). The scientific method infers laws from observations, but future observations can break these laws (creating the [[problem of induction]]). Such methodological limitations have led some theorists to conclude that all knowledge is relative: to arbitrary axioms or to restricted observations. |
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The CTMU is an attempt to circumvent these limitations and achieve absolute knowledge. Langan writes: |
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<blockquote>"What I mean by 'absolute' is precisely this: (1) you can't relativize your way out of it by changing the context; (2) finding it in error equates to destroying your own basis for inference. These criteria are built into the theory from the ground up using some very effective, that is to say ironclad, techniques. Logically, there is no way out."</blockquote> |
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The CTMU, Langan says, is based on logical [[tautologies]]. In 2-valued [[logic]], a tautology is a statement that is true under every assignment of "true" and "false" to the variables within it. For example, "A or not-A" (the [[law of the excluded middle]]) is a tautology because it is true regardless of whether A is true or false. Langan argues that all meaningful theories conform to 2-valued logic<ref>Langan 2002, p. 13. Langan argues that "even so-called "nonstandard" logics, e.g. modal, fuzzy, and many-valued logics, must be expressed in terms of fundamental two-valued logic to make sense."</ref>, and that because the axioms and theorems of 2-valued logic are tautological, tautologies "define the truth concept for all of the sciences. From mathematics and physics to biology and psychology, logical tautologies reign supreme and inviolable". |
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Langan further holds that logical tautologies constitute absolute knowledge in the sense of his criteria above.<ref>Langan 2002, p. 13.</ref> That is, where "changing the context" amounts to changing truth assignments to contextual variables, tautologies are true in every context. And where "your own basis for inference" includes 2-valued logic, logically disproving a tautology requires use of the tautology itself, destroying the inference. Accordingly Langan calls tautologies self-evident or "self-proving".<ref>Langan 2002, p. 50.</ref> |
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Tautologies are sometimes dismissed as "empty", "vacuous", and "uninformative" on the grounds that they tell us nothing about the world. Disagreeing, Langan adjoins to logic three [[Metalogic|metalogical]] principles (described below), themselves tautological, intended to relate logic to reality. The resulting theory (the CTMU) Langan calls a "supertautology": the reality-theoretic counterpart of a tautology.<ref>Langan 2002, pp. 15, 31–32.</ref> A supertautology is semantically tautological with respect to its [[Universe (mathematics)|universe]]; that is, "(a) the theory is intrinsically tautological, and (b) its tautological structure is [[Model theory|modeled]] by its universe". |
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| ⚫ | Unlike scientific theories, which rely on observation to establish their correspondence with reality, the CTMU is |
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In the CTMU, reality takes the form of an [[algebraic structure]] Langan calls a "Self-Configuring Self-Processing Language" or SCSPL.<ref>Langan 2002, pp. 42–47.</ref> The CTMU blends elements of various branches of advanced mathematics, including [[category theory]], [[model theory]], [[computation theory]], [[abstract algebra]], and the logic of [[Formal theory|formalized theories]]. Langan's public writings are meant to be relatively accessible, and for that reason, he says, tend to avoid heavy use of symbolic notation in favor of informal characterization. Nonetheless, he claims, the CTMU is [[axiomatizable]] and [[formalizable]], SCSPL is [[well-defined]], and he "can reduce that entire 56 page paper to variables and functional, operational and relational symbols". |
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==Axioms== |
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Langan defines reality as "the perceptual aggregate including (1) all scientific observations that ever were and ever will be, and (2) the entire abstract and/or [[cognitive]] explanatory infrastructure of [[perception]]".<ref name=Langan2002p16>Langan 2002, p. 16.</ref> That is, reality is defined on relevance to perception. Associated with this definition is a tautological [[containment principle]] Langan calls the Reality Principle: "reality contains all and only that which is real".<ref name=Langan2002p16/> That is, reality is self-contained. |
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The three metalogical principles used in the CTMU to relate logic to reality are the Metaphysical Autology Principle (associated with [[closure]]), the Mind Equals Reality Principle (associated with [[comprehensiveness]]), and the Multiplex Unity Principle (associated with [[consistency]]). They are tautological [[axioms]] and, according to Langan, necessarily modeled by reality as a condition of its existence. Langan notes that while they are independent, "the premise of axiomatic independence is itself a rather flimsy concept. These principles are actually rather strongly related in the sense that they can to some extent be inferred from each other in a reality-theoretic context".<ref>Langan 2002, p. 54, n. 30.</ref> |
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The first principle is the Metaphysical Autology Principle or MAP, associated with closure.<ref>Langan 2002, pp. 20–22.</ref> MAP says that reality is closed with respect to all internally relevant operations. In other words, everything essential to reality, including everything needed to describe it, is contained in reality itself. MAP is implied, Langan argues, by the definition of reality: were anything outside of reality relevant to it, it would be included by the definition and therefore inside reality. |
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The second principle is the Mind Equals Reality Principle or M=R, associated with comprehensiveness.<ref>Langan 2002, pp. 15, 22–23. Langan calls comprehensiveness "less thorough but also less undecidable" than the completeness prohibited by [[Gödel's first incompleteness theorem]].</ref> M=R says that reality is comprehensive enough to describe itself. That is, reality conforms to the [[Category of being|categories]] of the minds describing it from within. Whereas MAP gives reality what it needs to describe itself, M=R empowers it to actually do the describing. M=R follows, argues Langan, from the definition of reality. On one hand, mind itself is included in reality by perceptual relevance. On the other hand, mind acts as a filter: that which does not conform to mental categories is irrelevant to perception, and therefore not real. Langan here breaks with [[Kant]], who posited a [[Noumenon|noumenal]] reality of "things-in-themselves", independent of the [[Phenomenon|phenomenal]] reality we perceive. Discarding this "Kantian fallacy", Langan rejects noumena as oxymoronic "inconceivable concepts"<ref>Langan 2002, p. 12.</ref> and holds that phenomenal reality, as the only reality we can know, is the only reality there is. Accordingly, reality relates to our minds as a sort of "distributed [[solipsism]]". |
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The third principle is the Multiplex Unity Principle or MU, associated with consistency.<ref>Langan 2002, pp. 23–24.</ref> MU says that reality is consistent by virtue of the mutually inclusive relationship between itself (unity) and its contents (multiplicity). That is, reality topologically includes its contents, while its contents descriptively include it. Reality is here analogous to the [[set of all sets]]; SCSPL extends [[set theory]] with the above two senses of inclusion so that sets, now "syntactic operators", can consistently contain themselves. The consistency of reality is implied, Langan argues, by the stability of perception: a single irresolvable paradox of the form "A = not-A" would destroy the information content of reality, making it impossible to perceive. |
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==Origins== |
==Origins== |
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Langan arguing that reality has an explanation through [[causality]]. Similar to the [[teleological argument]] he believes that "something" outside of reality has created it, and is relevant to reality.<ref>Langan 2002, p. 21.</ref> Reality, Langan argues, requires as a condition of its existence not merely logical consistency, but also "[[teleological]] consistency". |
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The question of why reality exists is sometimes taken to be unanswerable or meaningless: reality "just exists", it is held, and no further explanation can be given. Alternatively, it is sometimes held that reality exists because it was created by something outside of it. Langan opposes both views, arguing that were reality to lack an explanation, it would be acausal and could not sustain itself, whereas were something outside of reality to have created it, it would be relevant to reality and therefore inside reality by definition.<ref>Langan 2002, p. 21.</ref> |
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The CTMU treats the [[Cosmogony|origin of reality]] in the context of freedom and constraint. Concepts are defined by constraints specifying their structure, and structure requires explanation. Consequently, Langan argues, the only concept not in need of structural explanation is the "terminal concept" with no constraints, and no structure to explain. In the CTMU, this "ontological groundstate" is called "Unbound Telesis" or UBT.<ref>Langan 2004, p. 252.</ref> |
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Because, Langan argues, UBT is a medium of pure potential, everything is possible within it, and this means that what can exist, does exist. However, the requirements for existence are, asserts Langan, more stringent than is normally supposed. Because UBT is unstructured, the only possibilities which can actualize from it are those with sufficient internal structure to create and configure themselves. So in the CTMU, reality, rather than being uncaused or externally caused, is self-caused, and constrained by the structure it needs to create and configure itself, that of SCSPL. |
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The above reasoning, holds Langan, resolves the ''[[ex nihilo]]'' or "something-from-nothing" paradox. The paradox arises when "nothing" is taken to exclude not just "something", but the ''potential'' for "something". Because exclusion of potential is a constraint, "nothing" in this sense requires its own explanation, and cannot serve as an ontological groundstate. But when "nothing" is viewed as unconstrained potential or UBT,<ref>Langan 2002, p. 27.</ref> asserts Langan, reality arises inevitably from it. |
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==Teleology== |
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Reality, Langan argues, requires as a condition of its existence not merely logical consistency, but also "[[teleological]] consistency". To arise from UBT, he says, reality needs a function to distinguish ''what it is'' from ''what it is not''—to "select itself" for existence.<ref name=Langan2002p42>Langan 2002, p. 42.</ref> This requirement, the "Telic Principle", generalizes the well-known [[anthropic principle]]: whereas the anthropic principle addresses the degree to which human existence constrains reality, the Telic Principle addresses the way in which reality tautologically constrains itself.<ref>Langan 2002, pp. 37–38.</ref> |
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Because reality is self-contained, it serves as its own selection function. That is, the function, that which it selects, and the act of selection itself are identical; "existence is everywhere the choice to exist"<ref name=Langan2002p42/> and "reality triples as choice, chooser and chosen". Langan explores the logic of this arrangement: "[a] large part of the CTMU is about what happens when functions, including choice, generative and causal functions, are looped so that input coincides with output coincides with functional syntax". |
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The requirement that reality serve as its own selection function gives it a reflexive form whose goal is to self-actualize. This "MU form" is the starting configuration of SCSPL [[Formal grammar|grammar]].<ref name=Langan2002p42/> With "existence and its amplification" as its sole imperative, reality selects its "future" by maximizing a parameter Langan calls "generalized [[utility]]". The CTMU is therefore a teleological theory in which the purpose of reality is to optimally self-actualize.<ref>Langan 2002, p. 37; Langan 2004, p. 253.</ref> |
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Because reality inherits distributive freedom from UBT, parts of reality can deviate from the teleology of reality as a whole. Unable therefore to maximize utility directly, reality instead maximizes ''potential'' utility, "setting things up" for maximum benefits should teleology be pursued. Langan takes generalized utility as the basis of a system of [[ethics]], defining goodness as that which furthers teleology and extending the [[Ethic of reciprocity|Golden Rule]] to fit the stratified structure of SCSPL. |
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==Evolution== |
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In the CTMU, reality evolves by "telic recursion", a metacausal generalization of ordinary [[recursion]] suited to pre-informational contexts. Telic recursion occurs in two stages, one primary and global, the other secondary and local. The primary stage creates the distributed laws, including the [[laws of physics]], which reality obeys, while the secondary stage creates nondistributed, ''ad hoc'' supplements to those laws as reality transitions from state to state.<ref>Langan 2002, pp. 35–37.</ref> |
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Guided by the Telic Principle, telic recursion seeks to maximize generalized utility through "telic [[feedback]]" between past and future states. This potential for [[reverse causality]] extends back to the very origin of reality, so that in effect, "the system brings itself into existence as a means of atemporal communication between its past and future whereby law and state, syntax and informational content, generate and refine each other across time to maximize total systemic self-utility."<ref>Langan 2002, pp. 6–7.</ref> |
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The CTMU relates [[space]], [[time]], and [[matter]] through a process Langan calls "conspansion"—material contraction in the capacity of spatial expansion.<ref>Langan 2002, pp. 27–30.</ref> Because reality is self-contained, argues Langan, its external size and duration are undefined, and it cannot expand: it has nothing to expand ''into'', and nothing to expand ''during''. Mainstream cosmologists hold that expansion need not occur externally,<ref>[http://www.astro.ucla.edu/~wright/cosmology_faq.html#XIN Frequently Asked Questions in Cosmology: What is the Universe expanding into?].</ref> invoking results from [[differential geometry]] like Gauss' [[Theorema Egregium]] to show that the [[spacetime]] metric can change without reference to an embedding space. Langan asserts that mainstream models nonetheless fall short of full self-containment, arguing that they fail to "conserve spacetime", employ a [[endomorphism|non-endomorphic]] concept of motion, and cannot intrinsically explain the creation of the spacetime manifold itself. |
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In Langan's model, reality stratifies inwardly into a superposition of sequentially related states, each state topologically contained by, but descriptively containing, the one preceding it, and parallelized with respect to its successors. In the resulting "conspansive spacetime", rather than reality expanding relative to its contents, its contents contract relative to it, and time speeds up to preserve the laws of physics—an idea adumbrated in 1933 by [[Arthur Eddington]].<ref>Langan 2002, p. 27. In Eddington's words: "Smaller and smaller. Faster and faster." His theory of the "shrinking atom" appeared in ''The Expanding Universe.''</ref> The point, says Langan, is to retain the valid relationships of conventional spacetime while changing their ''interpretations'' so as to resolve paradoxes of cosmology and physics. |
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Conspansion alternates between two phases: a generative phase in which events produce new possibilities, and a selective phase in which possibilities collapse into new events. The alternation occurs at a fixed conspansion rate ''c'', understood as the rate at which reality creates itself and identified by Langan with the [[speed of light]] in a vacuum. Langan associates conspansive alternation with [[wave-particle duality]], and asserts that the CTMU constitutes a new [[interpretation of quantum mechanics]] called "Sum Over Futures".<ref>Langan 2002, p. 28, diagram caption.</ref> |
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==Mind== |
==Mind== |
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In the CTMU, reality is a [[dual-aspect monism]] consisting of one substance (infocognition) with two aspects (information and cognition); space is a configuration of syntactic operators, and time is the activity of these operators as they process themselves and each other. The CTMU therefore supports a kind of [[panpsychism]]. |
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The CTMU therefore supports a kind of [[panpsychism]]. Although every part of SCSPL has a cognitive aspect, the mental capabilities of a given subsystem depend on its structure. Langan distinguishes three "levels of self-cognition": subordinate, agentive, and global.<ref>Langan 2002, p. 33.</ref> The lowest of these levels, subordinate, encompasses low-complexity objects such as rocks. In the CTMU, rocks are cognitive in the generalized sense—their molecules interact, thereby processing information—but they do not possess [[Free will|independent volition]] or any intrinisic ability to optimize their environment. |
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The next level of self-cognition, which includes humans, is that of agents or "telors": observer-participants in the ongoing creation of reality.<ref>Langan 2002, p. 36.</ref> Telors possess independent volition and constructive, creative intelligence or "sentience". In the CTMU, the distributed [[laws of physics]] do not fully determine reality; they are supplemented by "meta-laws" created by telors as reality evolves. This ability of telors is constrained by factors including locality, interference, and the fact that it must occur within the probabilistic limits of the laws of physics. |
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The third and highest level of self-cognition, the global level, is that of reality itself. This level possesses three formal properties of SCSPL: "syntactic self-distribution" (analogous to [[omnipresence]]), "perfect autotransductive reflexivity" (analogous to [[omniscience]]), and "self-configuration up to freedom" (analogous to [[omnipotence]]). Because these are theological attributes, Langan describes reality as "the mind of God". So, claims Langan, because the CTMU constitutes absolute truth—because it is founded on tautology and supported by logical and mathematical reasoning—it proves the existence of God.<ref>[http://www.ctmu.org/Articles/IntroCTMU.htm Langan 1999].</ref> |
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In short, the CTMU construes physical interaction as information processing, regards information processing as a generalization of human cognition, and assigns cognitive classifications to information processors—from rocks, to humans, to reality itself—based on their structure. |
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==Reception== |
==Reception== |
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Despite its extensive coverage and prominent placement in high-profile media sources |
Despite its extensive coverage and prominent placement in high-profile media sources,<ref name=Sager/><ref name=McFadden/><ref name=Wigmore/><ref name=Brabham/><ref name=Quain/> the CTMU has received no notable, reputable criticism. Unsurprisingly, in view of its bold claims, the theory has not however escaped controversy on the Internet, where anonymous discussion-board participants range from supporters hailing the CTMU as a major breakthrough and praising its author for his brilliance, to critics hurling scorn and invectives at Langan and pronouncing his theory incomprehensible, to neutral bystanders preferring to reserve judgement until the publication of ''Design for a Universe''. |
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==Further reading== |
==Further reading== |
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Revision as of 20:23, 16 July 2006
 | This article may be confusing or unclear to readers. |
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The Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe or CTMU (pronounced "cat-mew") is the collected work of a blue-collar self-described genius Christopher Michael Langan. The CTMU rose to media attention in 1999, buoyed by interest in Langan's extremely high IQ.[1] Among Langan's claims for the theory are that it constitutes absolute truth, provides the logical framework of a Theory of Everything, and proves the existence of God.
History
Of limited means and largely self-taught, Langan created the CTMU in the mid-1980s while working as a nightclub bouncer on Long Island. His first paper on the theory, "The Resolution of Newcomb's Paradox", appeared in the December 1989–January 1990 issue of Noesis, the journal of the Noetic Society, a high-IQ society to which Langan belonged.[2] Over the next decade Langan refined his work, continuing to publish and discuss it in high-IQ journals.
For most of the 1990s, knowledge of the CTMU was limited to high-IQ societies. Wider recognition for Langan and his theory began in 1999, when Esquire magazine published a profile of Langan and other members of the high-IQ community.[3] Billing Langan as "the smartest man in America", the article's account of the weight-lifting bouncer and his Theory of Everything sparked a flurry of media interest. Articles and interviews highlighting Langan and the CTMU appeared in Popular Science,[4] The Times,[5] Newsday,[6] Muscle & Fitness,[7] and elsewhere. Langan was featured on 20/20[8] and interviewed on Errol Morris' First Person.[9]
By 2002 the CTMU had drawn the attention of the intelligent design organization ISCID, the International Society for Complexity, Information, and Design. Langan was made a fellow of the society and in September 2002 published in its online journal a 56-page paper, "The Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe: A New Kind of Reality Theory".[10] Langan's paper "Cheating the Millennium: The Mounting Explanatory Debts of Scientific Naturalism", relating the CTMU to existing theories of causality, appeared in the 2004 anthology Uncommon Dissent.[11] The [[scientific community considers the advocacy of Intelligent Design to be pseudoscience or junk science.
Langan has maintained an extensive online presence, debating the CTMU in forums across the Internet and posting papers on his Web site. He has also written an unpublished book about the CTMU called Design for a Universe.[4]
Structure
Unlike scientific theories, which rely on observation to establish their correspondence with reality, the CTMU is a scholastic treatise that is supposed to apply apodictically, in all possible worlds. In fact, claims Langan, "any other valid theory of reality will necessarily equate to the CTMU up to isomorphism; whatever it adds will come by way of specificity, not generality".[12] Verification of the CTMU is made "largely rationalistic" by its claimed tautological nature, so that "much of the theory has to be proven like a math theorem rather than confirmed on a lab bench".
Origins
Langan arguing that reality has an explanation through causality. Similar to the teleological argument he believes that "something" outside of reality has created it, and is relevant to reality.[13] Reality, Langan argues, requires as a condition of its existence not merely logical consistency, but also "teleological consistency".
Mind
In the CTMU, reality is a dual-aspect monism consisting of one substance (infocognition) with two aspects (information and cognition); space is a configuration of syntactic operators, and time is the activity of these operators as they process themselves and each other. The CTMU therefore supports a kind of panpsychism.
Reception
Despite its extensive coverage and prominent placement in high-profile media sources,[3][8][5][6][4] the CTMU has received no notable, reputable criticism. Unsurprisingly, in view of its bold claims, the theory has not however escaped controversy on the Internet, where anonymous discussion-board participants range from supporters hailing the CTMU as a major breakthrough and praising its author for his brilliance, to critics hurling scorn and invectives at Langan and pronouncing his theory incomprehensible, to neutral bystanders preferring to reserve judgement until the publication of Design for a Universe.
Further reading
The most comprehensive paper on the CTMU is the 56-page "A New Kind of Reality Theory". Less formidable, but still technical, is the "Introduction to the CTMU". For laypeople seeking a gentler introduction, there are questions and answers.
References
- Brabham, Dennis. (August 21, 2001). "The Smart Guy". Newsday.
- Langan, Christopher M. (December 1989–January 1990). "The Resolution of Newcomb's Paradox." Noesis No. 44.
- Langan, Christopher M. (1999). "Introduction to the CTMU". Ubiquity Vol. 1, No. 1.
- Langan, Christopher M. (2002). "The Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe: A New Kind of Reality Theory". Progress in Complexity, Information, and Design 1.2–1.3.
- Langan, Christopher M. (2004). "Cheating the Millennium: The Mounting Explanatory Debts of Scientific Naturalism". In Uncommon Dissent: Intellectuals Who Find Darwinism Unconvincing, edited by William Dembski. ISI Books.
- McFadden, Cynthia. (December 9, 1999). "The Smart Guy". 20/20.
- Morris, Errol. (August 14, 2001). "The Smartest Man in the World". First Person.
- O'Connell, Jeff. (May 2001). "Mister Universe". Muscle & Fitness.
- Quain, John R. (October 14, 2001). "Wise Guy". Popular Science.
- Sager, Mike. (November 1999). "The Smartest Man in America". Esquire.
- Wigmore, Barry. (February 7, 2000). "Einstein's brain, King Kong's body". The Times.
External links
- Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe official site
- Christopher Langan biography at ISCID
Notes
- ^ McFadden 1999. 20/20 gave Langan an IQ test and reported that "his score was off the charts, too high to be measured. Neuropsychologist Dr. Bob Novelly was astounded", saying, "Chris is the highest individual that I have ever measured in 25 years of doing this." Sager 1999, Wigmore 2000, and Brabham 2001 also make much of Langan's IQ.
- ^ Langan 1989–1990.
- ^ a b Sager 1999.
- ^ a b c Quain 2001.
- ^ a b Wigmore 2000.
- ^ a b Brabham 2001.
- ^ O'Connell 2001.
- ^ a b McFadden 1999.
- ^ Morris 2001.
- ^ Langan 2002.
- ^ Langan 2004.
- ^ Langan 2002, p. 53, n. 6.
- ^ Langan 2002, p. 21.