Nuclear concessions to Iran

The United States and other Western powers have made concessions to the Islamic Republic of Iran in the nuclear talks in Lausanne, in exchange for concessions from Iran. These concessions concerned the breakout time to produce a nuclear weapon, the Fordow Enrichment Plant, ballistic missiles, and possible military dimensions of Iran's past nuclear work.

Ending Iran's nuclear program

In the October 12, 2012 Presidential debate, Barack Obama stated that "the deal we'll accept is they end their nuclear program. It's very straightforward." On December 10, 2013, John Kerry told the House Foreign Affairs committee that the purpose of the sanctions was to "hopefully help Iran dismantle its nuclear program". He added that "that was the whole point of the regime."

The final agreement does not end Iran's nuclear program. It does place certain constraints on Iran's program, most of which will sunset after 10 or 15 years.

Breakout time

In an April 7, 2015 interview with NPR, Obama said that in year 13, 14, or 15 of the prospective agreement, Iran would have advanced centrifuges and their breakout time [to produce a nuclear weapon] would "have shrunk almost down to zero."

The White House asserted in July, 2015 that if Iran implements the final agreement, Iran's breakout time will grow to a year or more for the first ten years, and at the end of that time, the US will have a better understanding of Iran's program. President Obama added that after 10 years, the US would have a better understanding of Iran's program, and if the breakout time were to decrease, the option of a future President to take action would remain. However, Alan J. Kupeman, who is coordinator of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project at the University of Texas at Austin, disputed President Obama's assessment, arguing that under the deal, Iran's breakout time will be 3 months.

Fordow enrichment plant

The Fordow Enrichment Plant is an enrichment facility built in an underground bunker under a mountain near Qom. The existence of the plant was publicly disclosed from declassified intelligence by American, British, and French officials on September 25, 2009. President Barack Obama said the plant was "a direct challenge to the basic foundation of the nonproliferation regime." On December 2013, Obama again demanded that Iran close the Fordow plant, stating that "they don’t need to have an underground, fortified facility like Fordow in order to have a peaceful nuclear program." However, by April 2015, the draft agreement with Iran proposed that the plant be "converted." Centrifuges would still run at Fordow, but instead of uranium, they would be enriching medical isotopes. MIT centrifuge expert Scott Kemp wrote that, if not done carefully, the centrifuges could easily be repurposed to enrich uranium if Iran were attempting to produce a nuclear weapon.

In the final agreement, centrifuges will spin at Fordow, but uranium and other fissile materials are not to be there for 15 years.

Ballistic missiles

A Ballistic Missile is a rocket that can be used to deliver a warhead to a target. Iran has spent over $1 billion on its ballistic missiles since the year 2000 and is the only country to develop a ballistic missile with a 2000 km range without first having a nuclear weapon. Iran's ballistic missiles have poor accuracy; the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) stated that "Longer missiles armed with even large conventional explosive warheads [and] anything but fully reliable precision guidance lack the accuracy and lethality to be effective weapons." Between 2006 and 2010, five U.N. security council resolutions targeted Iran's ballistic missile program. However, the April, 2015 framework aggreement with Iran contains no restrictions on its ballistic missile program. The Iranian version and the joint statement do not mention the program at all, while the U.S. version only says that a future U.N. resolution will verify their status.

Under the final agreement, the embargo on Iranian purchases of ballistic missiles will end after 8 years. In order to counter this threat, the U.S. is trying to help Arab states develop ballistic missile defenses.

Possible military dimensions

Since 2002, The IAEA has been concerned about the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. Concerns have included the development of a "high-enriched uranium implosion device" (in other words, a Uranium Nuclear weapon), of a Exploding-bridgewire detonator and of a missile reentry vehicle. In the November, 2013 Joint Plan of Action, Iran promised to "facilitate resolution of past areas of concern". In April, 2015, John Kerry said that Iran has to disclose prior military nuclear activities in order to attain a final deal. Similarly, the European Union said that a nuclear deal would require Iran to "cooperate fully" with the IAEA regarding past possible military dimensions. However, on May 20, 2015 Ali Khamenei said he would not allow foreigners to interview Iranian scientists, which was intended to shed light on possible military work. And on June 15, 2015, Kerry said the US is "not fixated" on possible military dimensions because "we know what they did."

Terrorism, human rights, and missile sanctions

On April 2, 2015, President Obama said that in the event of a nuclear agreement with Iran, the existing sanctions against Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and its ballistic missile program would remain in place. However, a June 9 story from the Associated Press stated that Administration officials were looking at the possibility of rolling back non-nuclear sanctions as part of a nuclear agreement.

Warning from former advisers

The ongoing concessions led a group of former Presidential advisers, including five former Obama advisers, to write an open letter to Obama warning that the pending deal "may fall short" of the Obama Administration's own standard of what would constitute a "good deal" with Iran. The letter was signed by David Petraeus, James Cartwright, Joe Lieberman, and others. The authors of the letter listed five conditions they said were essential to a deal. The conditions included the ability to inspect any site in Iran on demand, without Iranian delay, and also the ability to interview Iranian nuclear scientists. The letter warned that the prospective deal "may fall short" of these goals.