Jump to content

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers civil works controversies (New Orleans): Difference between revisions

Add links
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Browse history interactively
← Previous editNext edit →
Content deleted Content added
VisualWikitext
AnomieBOT (talk | contribs)
Bots
6,472,849 edits
Rescuing orphaned refs ("IPET" from rev 688104087)
Reordered for flow.
Line 27: Line 27:
In November of 2007, Levees.Org posted a spoof<ref>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XauhgHNgPw0</ref> on [[YouTube]] satirizing what it believed was an overly cozy relationship between the Army Corp of Engineers and the members of the ASCE's ERP. The video depicted money changing hands in an overstuffed brief case and ERP members covered with [[bling]]. The group contended that the ERP validating the IPET process was an apparent conflict of interest because the Corps selected the ASCE, directly paid the ASCE over $2 million and awarded the panel members [[Department of the Army Outstanding Civilian Service Award|Outstanding Civilian Service Medals]] (OCSM) before their work was complete.
In November of 2007, Levees.Org posted a spoof<ref>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XauhgHNgPw0</ref> on [[YouTube]] satirizing what it believed was an overly cozy relationship between the Army Corp of Engineers and the members of the ASCE's ERP. The video depicted money changing hands in an overstuffed brief case and ERP members covered with [[bling]]. The group contended that the ERP validating the IPET process was an apparent conflict of interest because the Corps selected the ASCE, directly paid the ASCE over $2 million and awarded the panel members [[Department of the Army Outstanding Civilian Service Award|Outstanding Civilian Service Medals]] (OCSM) before their work was complete.


In December 8, 2007, the ASCE confirmed that it had launched two ethics investigations. One of them was an internal probe led by Rich Hovey to look into Dr. Ray Seed’s claims in his 42-page ethics complaint accusing it of colluding with the Army Corps to cover up its engineering mistakes discovered after the 2005 hurricane struck.<ref>http://levees.org/2/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/WFMarcusonIII_a_-1.pdf</ref> The second was external, would be led by retired Congressman Sherwood Boehlert R-NY and would look at the ethics of the ASCE receiving funds directly from those organizations selecting the ASCE for its peer reviews.
In December 8, 2007, the ASCE confirmed that it had launched two ethics investigations. One of them was an internal probe led by Rich Hovey to look into Dr. Ray Seed’s claims in his 42-page ethics complaint accusing it of colluding with the Army Corps to cover up its engineering mistakes discovered after the 2005 hurricane struck.<ref>http://levees.org/2/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/WFMarcusonIII_a_-1.pdf</ref>


⚫
The second was external and would look at the ethics of the ASCE receiving funds directly from those organizations selecting the ASCE for its peer reviews. The task force was chaired by the Honorable Sherwood L. Boehlert, former Chairman of the House Science Committee. The other participants are as follows: Joseph Bordogna, PhD, Former Deputy Director of the [[National Science Foundation]]; Jack W. Hoffbuhr, P.E., DEE, Former Executive Director of the [[American Water Works Association]]; Jack Snell, PhD, Former Director of the [[National Institute of Standards and Technology]]’s Building and Fire Research Laboratory; William A. Wulf, PhD, Former President of the [[National Academy of Engineering]].<ref name=Boehlert />
⚫
On September 12, 2008, Congressman Boehlert released his investigative report on Dr. Ray Seed’s allegations contained in his ethics complaint. The report, issued nearly nine months after their investigation began, criticized the ASCE for apparent conflicts of interest. The Boehlert Report<ref>http://levees.org/2/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/BoehlertReport.pdf</ref> made several major recommendations, the most important being that funding for peer reviews over $1 million should come from a separate source, like the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The report also recommended that the ASCE Headquarters should facilitate but not control the assessment teams, and that dissemination of information to the public and press not be under the extremely tight controls that Dr. Seed and his team experienced. The report concluded that ASCE should draw up an ethics policy to eliminate questions of possible conflicts of interest.

⚫
On September 12, 2008, Congressman Boehlert released his investigative report on Dr. Ray Seed’s allegations contained in his ethics complaint. The report, issued nearly nine months after their investigation began, criticized the ASCE for apparent conflicts of interest. The Boehlert Report<ref>http://levees.org/2/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/BoehlertReport.pdf</ref> made several major recommendations, the most important being that funding for peer reviews over $1 million should come from a separate source, like the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The report also recommended that the ASCE Headquarters should facilitate but not control the assessment teams, and that dissemination of information to the public and press not be under the extremely tight controls that Dr. Seed and his team experienced. The report concluded that ASCE should draw up an ethics policy to eliminate questions of possible conflicts of interest. The task force also acknowledged that the {{quote|"[P]otential conflicts of interest in ASCE's engineering review process are not unique to ASCE and can be addressed through procedures utilized by many government agencies charged with providing unbiased assessments to the public".<ref name=Boehlert />}}


On April 6, 2009, the internal probe with the ASCE issued a report that ordered a retraction of the ASCE's June 1, 2007 press release.<ref>http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2009/04/american_society_of_civil_engi.html</ref> The panel determined that the press release "inadvertently conveyed a misleading impression regarding the role of engineering failures in the devastation of New Orleans." The release also incorrectly said that surge levels along Mississippi's coastline were higher than water levels caused by a tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004, and incorrectly repeated estimates of deaths and property damage that might have occurred in New Orleans if levees and floodwalls hadn't been breached.
On April 6, 2009, the internal probe with the ASCE issued a report that ordered a retraction of the ASCE's June 1, 2007 press release.<ref>http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2009/04/american_society_of_civil_engi.html</ref> The panel determined that the press release "inadvertently conveyed a misleading impression regarding the role of engineering failures in the devastation of New Orleans." The release also incorrectly said that surge levels along Mississippi's coastline were higher than water levels caused by a tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004, and incorrectly repeated estimates of deaths and property damage that might have occurred in New Orleans if levees and floodwalls hadn't been breached.
Line 46: Line 48:
=== Design problems and mechanisms of failure ===
=== Design problems and mechanisms of failure ===
On 5 April 2006, months after independent investigators had demonstrated that the levee failures were not due to natural forces beyond intended design strength, Lt. Gen. Carl Strock testified before the [[U.S. Senate]] Subcommittee on Energy and Water that, "We have now concluded we had problems with the design of the structure." He also testified that the Corps of Engineers did not know of this mechanism of failure prior to 29 August 2005. The claim of ignorance is refuted by the [[National Science Foundation]] investigators hired by the Army Corps of Engineers, who point to a 1986 study (E-99 study) by the corps itself that such separations were possible in the I-wall design.[28] This issue is addressed again in a study released in August 2015 by J. David Rogers et al who concluded that a misinterpretation of the 1986 study occurred apparently because the Corps had draped a tarpaulin over the gap that formed between the bases of the deflecting sheet piles and the soil in which they were embedded, so they did not see the gap. The tarpaulin was there for safety and to stop water that would seep through the interlocks. Failure to include the gap in interpretation of the test results introduced unconservatism in the final designs based on these tests. It allowed the use of shorter sheet piles, and reduced overall flood protection reliability.<ref>http://www.iwaponline.com/wp/01704/0707/017040707.pdf</ref>
On 5 April 2006, months after independent investigators had demonstrated that the levee failures were not due to natural forces beyond intended design strength, Lt. Gen. Carl Strock testified before the [[U.S. Senate]] Subcommittee on Energy and Water that, "We have now concluded we had problems with the design of the structure." He also testified that the Corps of Engineers did not know of this mechanism of failure prior to 29 August 2005. The claim of ignorance is refuted by the [[National Science Foundation]] investigators hired by the Army Corps of Engineers, who point to a 1986 study (E-99 study) by the corps itself that such separations were possible in the I-wall design.[28] This issue is addressed again in a study released in August 2015 by J. David Rogers et al who concluded that a misinterpretation of the 1986 study occurred apparently because the Corps had draped a tarpaulin over the gap that formed between the bases of the deflecting sheet piles and the soil in which they were embedded, so they did not see the gap. The tarpaulin was there for safety and to stop water that would seep through the interlocks. Failure to include the gap in interpretation of the test results introduced unconservatism in the final designs based on these tests. It allowed the use of shorter sheet piles, and reduced overall flood protection reliability.<ref>http://www.iwaponline.com/wp/01704/0707/017040707.pdf</ref>

==== Boehlert Task Force report ====

The Boehlert Task Force was an independent panel of experts convened to conduct a peer review of ASCE investigations. Boehlert's task force was assembled at the request of ASCE in response to Dr. Seed's ethics complaint and also a video produced by Levees.org spoofing the apparent conflict of interest.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nola.com/national/t-p/index.ssf?/base//news-0/122128325453780.xml&coll=1 |title=New Orleans, Louisiana Local News |publisher=Nola.com |accessdate=26 May 2011}}</ref> The Boehlert Task Force examined ASCE’s existing review process, at the request of David Mongan, the President of ASCE. The process by which ASCE peer reviews were conducted was found to be in need of improved clarity, efficiency and transparency.<ref name=Boehlert>http://content.asce.org/files/pdf/BoehlertReport.pdf</ref>

⚫
The task force was chaired by the Honorable Sherwood L. Boehlert, former Chairman of the House Science Committee. The other participants are as follows: Joseph Bordogna, PhD, Former Deputy Director of the [[National Science Foundation]]; Jack W. Hoffbuhr, P.E., DEE, Former Executive Director of the [[American Water Works Association]]; Jack Snell, PhD, Former Director of the [[National Institute of Standards and Technology]]’s Building and Fire Research Laboratory; William A. Wulf, PhD, Former President of the [[National Academy of Engineering]].<ref name=Boehlert />

The task force issued a report of their findings.

=====Negative comments =====
The report carried criticism on how the ASCE conducts its peer reviews as well as recommendations to improve its processes. One notable comment was the inadequate "consideration of real or perceived conflict of interest". All the criticisms of ASCE's peer reviews noted by the Boehlert Task Force are present in the ASCE's peer review of the Corps of Engineers' IPET report.

The report cited a “lack of formal, well articulated, procedures for conducting engineering reviews,” and recommended that the ASCE develop a Manual of Engineering Review Procedures covering each phase of the peer review process, with the manual to be made available to the public. It suggested that committee membership should include non-members of the ASCE.<ref name=Boehlert />
The report commented on funding: “The way in which engineering reviews are funded is a source of perceived and potentially real conflicts of interests and ASCE should take measures to address these conflicts.”<ref name=Boehlert />
The report stated that the “committee selection process needs formal procedures to assess potential or perceived conflicts of interests.”<ref name=Boehlert />

===== Positive comments =====
The task force also acknowledged that the {{quote|"[P]otential conflicts of interest in ASCE's engineering review process are not unique to ASCE and can be addressed through procedures utilized by many government agencies charged with providing unbiased assessments to the public".<ref name=Boehlert />}} Despite the criticism, however, Mr. Boehlert's task force also praised ASCE by writing, {{quote|"ASCE has long been respected for its investigatory skill and expertise, and its work on assessments is held in high regard by those in the engineering profession. ... After a thoughtful and exhaustive examination, we remain firm in our belief that ASCE not only plays a vital role in conducting post-disaster engineering assessments, but that the Society is the single best organization to carry out this type of work for our nation ... The Task Force believes ASCE remains the best option for conducting post disaster engineering assessments."<ref name=Boehlert />}}


== Public relations controversies ==
== Public relations controversies ==

Revision as of 23:12, 29 October 2015

In nineteen (19) different Flood Control Acts since 1917, the United States Congress has authorized the United States Army Corps of Engineers to design and build flood protection projects and one risk reduction system in the Greater New Orleans area and throughout the nation.

The pre-Katrina Orleans Levee District (OLD), governed by the Orleans Levee Board, owned considerable assets, mainly real estate, a peculiarity that stems from its history. In the early 20th century, the OLD reclaimed a portion of Lake Pontchartrain (a 24-mile-wide lake north of New Orleans; 1 mile ¼ 1.60934 kilometers), developed the land, and sold it to raise money to build and improve levees.[1] In the Flood Control Act of 1965 – legislation enacted in response to losses exceeding US$1 billion1 (including multiple levee failures) during Hurricane Betsy – Congress directed the Corps, from then forward, to be responsible for design and construction of the hurricane flood protection system enveloping New Orleans. The Corps was ordered to work in consultation with the OLD, which became the local sponsor for the ‘Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project.’ The project, when designed, was expected to take about 13 years to complete and cost about $85 million. Although federally authorized, it was a joint federal, state, and local effort. As the GAO reported in 1982,[2]

"...The Corps of Engineers has not resolved environmental, technical, and financial issues associated with the Lake Pontchartrain Hurricane Protection Project. Although the Corps considers this project a high priority, its progress has not kept pace with earlier completed plans. Also, estimated project costs have grown from about $85 million to $924 million. GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Army require the Chief of Engineers to take specific steps to resolve the issues associated with this major project...."

The state and local sponsors agreed with GAO and believed the Corps has not pursued this project with the expediency necessary to protect the New Orleans area. In 1982, the local sponsor observed, "...only another disaster resulting from a hurricane and heightened public interest would probably expedite project completion.”[3]

In August 2005, forty years later, when Hurricane Katrina passed to the east of New Orleans, the Corps's flood protection failed catastrophically with levee breaches in over 50 places. The levee failures caused massive flooding in New Orleans with associated property loss and drownings. This was the first total failure of a USACE system. On 29 August 2005, the hurricane protection authorized was between 60 and 90% complete; and the projected date of completion was estimated to be 2015.[4]

Controversies following Hurricane Katrina (2005)

Federal Investigation of levee failure

Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force (IPET)

In October 2005, the Chief of Engineers at the Army Corps, Lt. General Carl Strock commissioned the IPET (Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force) to evaluative the performance of the hurricane protection systems in New Orleans and the surrounding areas. It was to "provide credible and objective scientific and engineering answers to fundamental questions about the performance of the hurricane protection and flood damage reduction system in the New Orleans metropolitan area." This meant that the organization responsible for the flood protection's performance would convene and manage an investigation of its own work. Neither Louisiana's governor nor the Louisiana Congressional delegation what appeared to be a conflict of interest. However, Steve Ellis (Taxpayers for Common Sense), Scott Faber (Environmental Defense) and Ivor van Heerden (Louisiana State University Hurricane Center) protested. They preferred to see some sort of independent, federally authorized commission look into the levee breaches, in addition to the Corps.

After the IPET draft final report was released, the grassroots group, Levees.org, headquartered in New Orleans and lead by Sandy Rosenthal questioned the credibility of this levee investigation as well. They noted that the study was convened and closely managed by the Corps of Engineers, the agency responsible for the levee design and construction that that an independent commission should be created[5] The group contacted U.S. Senator Mary Landrieu's office and submitted documentation with statistics revealing that of the top three IPET leaders, two work for USACE and one did for 15 years (1986–2002). Of the 23 task team leaders, six work for the Corps and seven work for the Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC). In 10 out of the 15 volumes of the IPET draft final report, the majority of the team members were Corps of Engineers personnel.[6]

According to the IPET draft final report,[7] IPET membership consisted of individuals from the Universities of Maryland, Florida, Notre Dame, and Virginia Polytechnic Institute, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the South Florida Water Management District, Harris County Flood Control District (Houston, TX), the United States Department of Agriculture, and the United States Bureau of Reclamation as well as those from USACE.

American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) involvement

On June 1, 2007, the American Society of Civil Engineers issued its External Peer Review (ERP) report,[8] the peer review of the Corps-sponsored IPET and also an accompanying press release.[9] However, the press release was criticized because it contained information that was not present in the report, included information that conflicted with the report, and minimized the Army Corps' involvement in the catastrophe. The press release stated, “Even without breaching, Hurricane Katrina’s rainfall and surge overtopping would have caused extensive and severe flooding—and the worst loss of life and property loss ever experienced in New Orleans.” Meanwhile, the ERP report stated that had levees and pump stations not failed, “far less property loss would have occurred and nearly two-thirds of deaths could have been avoided.” This determination was on page 39 of an 80 page report. The New Orleans Times Picayune editorial board decried ASCE’s press release.

In October 2007, Dr. Ray Seed, University of California-Berkeley civil engineering professor and ASCE member submitted an ethics complaint to the ASCE alleging that the Corps of Engineers, with the help of the ASCE, sought to minimize the Corps' mistakes in the flooding, intimidate anyone who tried to intervene, and delay the final results until the public's attention had turned elsewhere.[10] The Corps acknowledged receiving a copy of the letter but has refused to comment until after the ASCE's Committee on Professional Conduct (CPC), led by Rich Hovey, comments on the complaint.[11] It took over a year for the ASCE to announce the results of the CPC.[12] When the results of the self-study were finally announced, the ASCE panel did not file any charges of ethical misconduct. They blamed their errors in their June press release on its creation by "staff level and not by review panel members."[13]

In November of 2007, Levees.Org posted a spoof[14] on YouTube satirizing what it believed was an overly cozy relationship between the Army Corp of Engineers and the members of the ASCE's ERP. The video depicted money changing hands in an overstuffed brief case and ERP members covered with bling. The group contended that the ERP validating the IPET process was an apparent conflict of interest because the Corps selected the ASCE, directly paid the ASCE over $2 million and awarded the panel members Outstanding Civilian Service Medals (OCSM) before their work was complete.

In December 8, 2007, the ASCE confirmed that it had launched two ethics investigations. One of them was an internal probe led by Rich Hovey to look into Dr. Ray Seed’s claims in his 42-page ethics complaint accusing it of colluding with the Army Corps to cover up its engineering mistakes discovered after the 2005 hurricane struck.[15]

The second was external and would look at the ethics of the ASCE receiving funds directly from those organizations selecting the ASCE for its peer reviews. The task force was chaired by the Honorable Sherwood L. Boehlert, former Chairman of the House Science Committee. The other participants are as follows: Joseph Bordogna, PhD, Former Deputy Director of the National Science Foundation; Jack W. Hoffbuhr, P.E., DEE, Former Executive Director of the American Water Works Association; Jack Snell, PhD, Former Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Building and Fire Research Laboratory; William A. Wulf, PhD, Former President of the National Academy of Engineering.[16]

On September 12, 2008, Congressman Boehlert released his investigative report on Dr. Ray Seed’s allegations contained in his ethics complaint. The report, issued nearly nine months after their investigation began, criticized the ASCE for apparent conflicts of interest. The Boehlert Report[17] made several major recommendations, the most important being that funding for peer reviews over $1 million should come from a separate source, like the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The report also recommended that the ASCE Headquarters should facilitate but not control the assessment teams, and that dissemination of information to the public and press not be under the extremely tight controls that Dr. Seed and his team experienced. The report concluded that ASCE should draw up an ethics policy to eliminate questions of possible conflicts of interest. The task force also acknowledged that the

"[P]otential conflicts of interest in ASCE's engineering review process are not unique to ASCE and can be addressed through procedures utilized by many government agencies charged with providing unbiased assessments to the public".[16]

On April 6, 2009, the internal probe with the ASCE issued a report that ordered a retraction of the ASCE's June 1, 2007 press release.[18] The panel determined that the press release "inadvertently conveyed a misleading impression regarding the role of engineering failures in the devastation of New Orleans." The release also incorrectly said that surge levels along Mississippi's coastline were higher than water levels caused by a tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004, and incorrectly repeated estimates of deaths and property damage that might have occurred in New Orleans if levees and floodwalls hadn't been breached.

Timeline of IPET actions

As of November 2009, the National Academy of Science had not released the results of their review of the IPET report.

Team Louisiana investigation report

Scientists from LSU and from the private sector conducted a forensic investigation of the levee failures. Commissioned by the Louisiana State Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD), it was led by Dr. Ivor van Heerden, Deputy Director of the LSU Hurricane Center, and released in 2007. They found that the hurricane protection system was not properly conceived to accomplish the 1965 Congressional mandate to protect against the “most severe combination of meteorological conditions reasonably expected,” and they highlighted many other shortcomings in the hurricane protection system creation practices. It recommended independent review of levee projects, among other suggestions.[19]

Senate committee hearings

Lt. Gen. Carl Strock told a Senate committee that the corps neglected to consider the possibility that floodwalls atop the 17th Street Canal levee would lurch away from their footings under significant water pressure and eat away at the earthen barriers below. "We did not account for that occurring," Strock said after the Senate Appropriations subcommittee hearing. "It could be called a design failure."[20]

Design problems and mechanisms of failure

On 5 April 2006, months after independent investigators had demonstrated that the levee failures were not due to natural forces beyond intended design strength, Lt. Gen. Carl Strock testified before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Water that, "We have now concluded we had problems with the design of the structure." He also testified that the Corps of Engineers did not know of this mechanism of failure prior to 29 August 2005. The claim of ignorance is refuted by the National Science Foundation investigators hired by the Army Corps of Engineers, who point to a 1986 study (E-99 study) by the corps itself that such separations were possible in the I-wall design.[28] This issue is addressed again in a study released in August 2015 by J. David Rogers et al who concluded that a misinterpretation of the 1986 study occurred apparently because the Corps had draped a tarpaulin over the gap that formed between the bases of the deflecting sheet piles and the soil in which they were embedded, so they did not see the gap. The tarpaulin was there for safety and to stop water that would seep through the interlocks. Failure to include the gap in interpretation of the test results introduced unconservatism in the final designs based on these tests. It allowed the use of shorter sheet piles, and reduced overall flood protection reliability.[21]

Public relations controversies

In 2007, the New Orleans District hired a PR firm, Outreach Process Partners (OPP), allegedly to develop educational materials and set up public meetings that the Corps is required by law to hold in order to get valuable feedback from residents about the Corps' projects.[22] For this work, OPP receives over $1,000,000 in federal dollars per year.[23] The total cost of the PR contract is $5,250,000.[24]

In May 2009, an internet blogger discovered that OPP had a bar graph on its website that boasted how it helped reduce negative news coverage that plagued the Corps following Hurricane Katrina.[25] New Orleans residents felt that the Corps' should not be spending taxpayer dollars trying to repair the Corps' public reputation.

Internet Scandal

In December 2008, the New Orleans CBS affiliate television station publicized an incident in which employees of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers used taxpayer-funded computers to post derogatory blog comments deriding citizen activists' efforts. In response to the news story, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers described the event as an isolated incident.[26] Three days after the incident was publicized, the Commander of the New Orleans District of the Corps of Engineers, Colonel Alvin Lee, issued a formal apology. “Please accept my apology for the unprofessional comments someone in my District posted to your web site,” said the letter. “I have reinforced with my entire staff that this was an inappropriate and unacceptable use of our computers and time.”[27] However, many residents are calling for those responsible to be fired from their posts.[28]

On 23 June 2009, US Senator Mary Landrieu issued this statement to WWL TV Eyewitness News in New Orleans[29] with regard to the scandal:

“I am very concerned by the reports that a number of Corps employees have engaged in a disingenuous campaign to undercut their critics in Louisiana,” Landrieu said. “My staff and I will continue to review these allegations and will urge Pentagon officials to thoroughly review this matter.”

On 29 September 2009, the Department of Defense Inspector General's Office has closed its investigation. "We believe that (corps New Orleans District office) officials took appropriate actions once informed of the allegations at issue," Assistant Inspector General John Crane said in a letter to U.S. Sen. Mary Landrieu, D-La. "Accordingly, further review by this agency is not warranted." Those actions included strongly worded messages to corps employees telling them comments that demeaned corps critics were not allowed. In addition, access to the site of the Levees.org group was blocked from corps computers, preventing employees from commenting there. Lastly, the employee of a contractor—who was a former corps employee himself and was identified as using a government computer to post disparaging remarks on NOLA.com—was barred from working on corps projects.[30]

Past levee controversies

Debate over type of flood protection

Different types of hurricane protection were proposed to protect the southern Louisiana region.

Following a lawsuit by the environmental group ‘Save Our Wetlands,’ the judge on the case ordered the Corps of Engineers to "redo its cursory environmental analysis. The agency eventually abandoned the gates, deciding to build taller levees instead."[31]

After Katrina, the controversy was revisited, with some blaming the lack of floodgates – and the environmentalists – for the storm's destruction. But Corps' officials told the Government Accountability Office that "if they had gone ahead with the floodgate plan, Katrina's devastation would have been even worse, because the barriers would not have been large enough to keep the storm surge out of the lake – and the levees around the city would have been even lower."[31]

A Texas Army National Guard UH-60 Blackhawk deposits a 6,000+ pound bag of sand and gravel to close the breach in the 17th Street Canal, New Orleans, 4 September 2005.

In March 2007, the City of New Orleans filed a $77 billion claim against the USACE for damages sustained from faulty levee construction and resultant flooding during Hurricane Katrina. Of this amount, only $1 billion was designated as direct "infrastructure damages"; the rest was attributed to consequential damages such as industry losses and the city's tarnished image.[32] Hundreds of thousands of individual claims were received in the Corps' New Orleans District office. In addition to the City of New Orleans, other claimants include Entergy New Orleans, the city's now-bankrupt electric utility, and New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board.[33]

In February 2007 U.S. District Court Judge Stan Duval ruled that the Flood Control Act of 1928 did not apply to cases involving navigational projects.[34] He ruled that the Corps may be sued over alleged defects in its Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet navigation channel. Immunity for cases involving flood levees was apparently not addressed at that time.

On 30 January 2008, Judge Duval ruled that even though the US Army Corps of Engineers was negligent and derelict in their duty to provide flood protection for the citizens of New Orleans, he was compelled to dismiss a class action lawsuit filed against the Corps for levee breaches after Hurricane Katrina. He cited the Flood Control Act of 1928 which, among other actions, provided protection to the federal government from lawsuits when flood control projects like levees break.[35]

While the United States government is immune for legal liability for the defalcations alleged herein, it is not free, nor should it be, from posterity's judgment concerning its failure to accomplish what was its task. This story—50 years in the making—is heart-wrenching. Millions of dollars were squandered in building a levee system with respect to these outfall canals which was known to be inadequate by the corps's own calculations.[36]

Duval's decision left the New Orleans Sewerage & Water Board and Orleans Levee District as defendants in the lawsuit.[37] The dismissal of the lawsuit also denied about 489,000 claims by businesses, government entities, and residents, seeking trillions of dollars in damages against the Corps, which were pinned to the suit and a similar one filed over flooding from a navigation channel in St. Bernard Parish. It was unclear how many claims could still move forward. The plaintiffs vowed to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

On 19 November 2009, the Court found the Army Corps responsible for the flooding by not properly maintaining the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet Canal (MRGO). Judge Duval said that the "Corps had an opportunity to take a myriad of actions to alleviate this deterioration or rehabilitate this deterioration and failed to do so." Duval ruled in favor of five of the six plaintiffs, awarding those from Lower Ninth Ward and St. Bernard Parish between $100,000 and $317,000 in damages. Duval, however, ruled against a couple from New Orleans East.[38] In his decision, Duval wrote that the Corps was aware that deteriorating conditions of the canal would affect the levees in St. Bernard Parish and the Lower Ninth Ward neighborhoods. Duval awarded a total of $719,000 to the five plaintiffs but the decision leaves the U.S. government open to additional lawsuits from those affected.[39] A spokesman for the Corps indicated the matter would be appealed, up to and including the U.S. Supreme Court.[40]

See also

References

  1. ^ http://www.iwaponline.com/wp/01704/0707/017040707.pdf
  2. ^ http://archive.gao.gov/d42t14/119206.pdf
  3. ^ http://archive.gao.gov/d42t14/119206.pdf
  4. ^ http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d051050t.pdf
  5. ^ Burdeau, Cain (6 February 2007). "Group Wants 9–11-Style Panel on Levees –". The Washington Post. Retrieved 26 May 2011.
  6. ^ http://levees.org/2/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/IPET-leadership-.doc
  7. ^ "Microsoft Word - Final Draft, Vol I_2Jun08_mh.doc" (PDF). Retrieved 26 May 2011.
  8. ^ http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/katrina/reports/ERPreport.pdf
  9. ^ http://levees.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/ASCE_Press_Release_June.pdf
  10. ^ "Microsoft Word - W F Marcuson III_a_.doc" (PDF). Retrieved 26 May 2011.
  11. ^ Colley Charpentier. "Critic: Corps tried to thwart inquiry New Orleans Times-Picayune – NOLA.com". Blog.nola.com. Retrieved 26 May 2011.
  12. ^ "Levee group slams ASCE investigation". NOLA.com. 6 August 2008. Retrieved 26 May 2011.
  13. ^ Mark Schleifstein, The Times-Picayune. "American Society of Civil Engineers finds no ethical violations in its own Katrina levee review". NOLA.com. Retrieved 26 May 2011.
  14. ^ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XauhgHNgPw0
  15. ^ http://levees.org/2/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/WFMarcusonIII_a_-1.pdf
  16. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference Boehlert was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  17. ^ http://levees.org/2/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/BoehlertReport.pdf
  18. ^ http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2009/04/american_society_of_civil_engi.html
  19. ^ http://www.publichealth.hurricane.lsu.edu/Adobe%20files%20for%20webpage/Team%20LA%20indiv/Team%20Louisiana%20-%20cov,%20toc,%20exec%20summ,%20intro.pdf
  20. ^ "Senate committee hearings". 30 September 2007. Archived from the original on 30 September 2007. Retrieved 26 May 2011.
  21. ^ http://www.iwaponline.com/wp/01704/0707/017040707.pdf
  22. ^ Nienaber, Georgianne (7 May 2009). "Army Corps of Engineers in New Orleans: Buying Advice or Spin?". Huffington Post.
  23. ^ OMB Watch (28 May 2009). "Federal Contracts for Federal Fiscal Year : 2007, Place of Performance State : Louisiana, Place of Performance Cong. District : Louisiana 2 (William J. Jefferson), Major Contracting Agency : Dept. of Defense, Level of Detail : Summary". Fedspending.org. Retrieved 26 May 2011.
  24. ^ "Microsoft Word - AWDNTFY_NOD1.doc" (PDF). Retrieved 26 May 2011.
  25. ^ "Outrage Over Army Corps' $4.7M PR Contract". CBS News.
  26. ^ [1][dead link]
  27. ^ [2][dead link]
  28. ^ Jarvis DeBerry. "Snipers lurking at the corps , NOLA.com". Blog.nola.com. Retrieved 26 May 2011.
  29. ^ BREAKING NEWS: US Senator will urge the Pentagon to review alleged Corps campaign against critics | Levees.Org
  30. ^ Department of Defense Inspector General closes investigation into allegations of derogatory postings to NOLA.com by Army Corps of Engineers employees | NOLA.com
  31. ^ a b View all comments that have been posted about this article. "The Slow Drowning of New Orleans – Washington Post". The Washington Post. Retrieved 26 May 2011.
  32. ^ Katrina Claim – CNN[dead link]
  33. ^ Heath, Brad (9 April 2007). "Katrina Claims Stagger Corps –". USA Today. Retrieved 26 May 2011.
  34. ^ Ann M. Simmons, Los Angeles Times (3 March 2007). "Duval says FCA 1928 does not apply to navigational projects". San Francisco Chronicle. Retrieved 26 May 2011.
  35. ^ Judge issues stinging rebuke but dismisses class action lawsuit[dead link]
  36. ^ Nossiter, Adam (1 February 2008). "In Court Ruling on Floods, More Pain for New Orleans – New York Times". The New York Times. New Orleans (La). Retrieved 26 May 2011.
  37. ^ Mark Schleifstein, The Times-Picayune. "Corps off hook for N.O. canal lapses – New Orleans News –". Nola.com. Retrieved 26 May 2011.
  38. ^ Court: Army Corps of Engineers liable for Katrina flooding. CNN. 19 November 2009.
  39. ^ Corps of Engineers blamed for Hurricane Katrina levee breaches. Los Angeles Times. 19 November 2009
  40. ^ Fausset, Richard; Vartabedian, Ralph (20 November 2009). "Effect of judge's Katrina ruling could be huge. ',Los Angeles Times',. 19 November 2009". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 26 May 2011.
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=U.S._Army_Corps_of_Engineers_civil_works_controversies_(New_Orleans)&oldid=688146451"