Fall Grün (Czechoslovakia): Difference between revisions
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The military campaign was to emphasise speed of action and an element of surprise. The aim of the army, in coordination with the air force, was to stage a surprise attack, penetrating and outflanking the border defences adjacent to Germany. The attack was to be carried out by 4 army formations massed along the western borders of Czechoslovakia. The main trust of the campaign would come from the west in the direction of [[Plzeň]] and [[Prague]]. Simultaneously, a pincer movement from the north towards [[Olomouc]] and the south towards [[Brno]] would prevent the withdrawal of the Czechoslovak army eastwards into [[Slovakia]]. Even the [[Danube]] flotilla would be brought into action in support of the army. With future armed conflict in mind, the directive also required, wherever possible, for Czechoslovakia’s industrial capacity to be preserved.<ref name="DGFP" /> |
The military campaign was to emphasise speed of action and an element of surprise. The aim of the army, in coordination with the air force, was to stage a surprise attack, penetrating and outflanking the border defences adjacent to Germany. The attack was to be carried out by 4 army formations massed along the western borders of Czechoslovakia. The main trust of the campaign would come from the west in the direction of [[Plzeň]] and [[Prague]]. Simultaneously, a pincer movement from the north towards [[Olomouc]] and the south towards [[Brno]] would prevent the withdrawal of the Czechoslovak army eastwards into [[Slovakia]]. Even the [[Danube]] flotilla would be brought into action in support of the army. With future armed conflict in mind, the directive also required, wherever possible, for Czechoslovakia’s industrial capacity to be preserved.<ref name="DGFP" /> |
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==Political pressure== |
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A significant role in the preparatory stages of the campaign was played by the radicalised section of the ethnic German minority population in Czechoslovakia organised in the [[Sudeten German Party]] (SdP). The leader of the party, [[Konrad Henlein]], received instruction from Hitler in Berlin, in March 1938, to create an atmosphere of tension in dealings with the Czechoslovak authorities by making unacceptable demands for major political reforms, but without the intention of reaching a settlement before Germany was ready for military action.<ref>Smelser, Ronald M., ''The Sudeten Problem, 1933–1938: Volkstumspolitik and the Formulation of Nazi Foreign Policy'', Folkestone, 1975, p. 222.</ref> As the sense of crisis heightened during the course of the year, Czechoslovakia’s western allies, Britain in particular, applied strong pressure on the president of Czechoslovakia, [[Edvard Benes]], and his government to reach an accommodation with the SdP by conceding to their demands.<ref>Vyšný, Paul, ''The Runciman Mission to Czechoslovakia, 1938: Prelude to Munich'', Basingstoke, 2003, pp. 243-60.</ref> |
A significant role in the preparatory stages of the campaign was played by the radicalised section of the ethnic German minority population in Czechoslovakia organised in the [[Sudeten German Party]] (SdP). The leader of the party, [[Konrad Henlein]], received instruction from Hitler in Berlin, in March 1938, to create an atmosphere of tension in dealings with the Czechoslovak authorities by making unacceptable demands for major political reforms, but without the intention of reaching a settlement before Germany was ready for military action.<ref>Smelser, Ronald M., ''The Sudeten Problem, 1933–1938: Volkstumspolitik and the Formulation of Nazi Foreign Policy'', Folkestone, 1975, p. 222.</ref> As the sense of crisis heightened during the course of the year, Czechoslovakia’s western allies, Britain in particular, applied strong pressure on the president of Czechoslovakia, [[Edvard Benes]], and his government to reach an accommodation with the SdP by conceding to their demands.<ref>Vyšný, Paul, ''The Runciman Mission to Czechoslovakia, 1938: Prelude to Munich'', Basingstoke, 2003, pp. 243-60.</ref> |
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Revision as of 22:43, 28 March 2023
 | This article needs additional citations for verification. (February 2016) |
| Fall Grün | |
|---|---|
| Part of German occupation of Czechoslovakia | |
| Planned | 1937 |
| Objective | Capture and defeat Czechoslovakia |
| Date | Cancelled and never carried out (planned for 28 September 1938) |
Fall Grün (German for 'Case Green') was a pre-World War II plan for the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany. Although some preliminary steps were taken to destabilise Czechoslovakia, the plan was never fully realised since Nazi Germany achieved its objective by diplomatic means at the Munich Conference in September 1938, followed by the unopposed military occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the creation of a nominally independent Slovakia, in March 1939.
Background
The plan was first drafted in June 1937, then revised as the military situation and requirements changed - such as after the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany in March 1938. Following the May Crisis war scare of that year, the plan acquired a target date scheduling the attack for not later than 1 October 1938. The directive, signed by Adolf Hitler on 30 May 1938, indicated it was his "unalterable decision" to destroy Czechoslovakia in the near future.[1]
Czechoslovakia's principal ally, France, in conjunction with Britain, pursued a policy of "Appeasement" towards Nazi Germany, culminating in the Munich Agreement, signed on 30 September 1938. The agreement, between the leaders of Britain, France, Germany and Italy, transferred the mainly German-inhabited regions of the country (known as the "Sudetenland") to Germany.[2] The territory concerned contained Czechoslovakia’s strategically significant border fortifications,[3] and, as a result of the loss, the plan for a military attack was no longer relevant. The destruction of Czechoslovakia was completed in March 1939, when Slovakia became a nominally independent state under the influence of Nazi Germany. The remaining western parts of Czechoslovakia were occupied by Germany and became the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.[4]
The name Fall Grün was later assigned to the plans for an invasion of Ireland.
Plan of attack
In addition to specific military assignments, the directive for Fall Grün also focussed on political preparations. The Czechoslovak authorities were to be intimidated by belligerent threats from Nazi Germany and the ethnic German minority population within the country organised to support the military operations. An incident would be staged to provide a pretext for opening hostilities. Attention was also to be given to encouraging Poland and Hungary to pursue their territorial claims against Czechoslovakia. [5]
The military campaign was to emphasise speed of action and an element of surprise. The aim of the army, in coordination with the air force, was to stage a surprise attack, penetrating and outflanking the border defences adjacent to Germany. The attack was to be carried out by 4 army formations massed along the western borders of Czechoslovakia. The main trust of the campaign would come from the west in the direction of Plzeň and Prague. Simultaneously, a pincer movement from the north towards Olomouc and the south towards Brno would prevent the withdrawal of the Czechoslovak army eastwards into Slovakia. Even the Danube flotilla would be brought into action in support of the army. With future armed conflict in mind, the directive also required, wherever possible, for Czechoslovakia’s industrial capacity to be preserved.[5]
Political pressure
A significant role in the preparatory stages of the campaign was played by the radicalised section of the ethnic German minority population in Czechoslovakia organised in the Sudeten German Party (SdP). The leader of the party, Konrad Henlein, received instruction from Hitler in Berlin, in March 1938, to create an atmosphere of tension in dealings with the Czechoslovak authorities by making unacceptable demands for major political reforms, but without the intention of reaching a settlement before Germany was ready for military action.[6] As the sense of crisis heightened during the course of the year, Czechoslovakia’s western allies, Britain in particular, applied strong pressure on the president of Czechoslovakia, Edvard Benes, and his government to reach an accommodation with the SdP by conceding to their demands.[7]
Undeclared German-Czechoslovak war
On 17 September 1938, Adolf Hitler ordered the establishment of Sudetendeutsches Freikorps, a paramilitary organisation that took over the structure of Freiwillinger Schutzdienst/Ordnersgruppe, an organisation of ethnic Germans in Czechoslovakia that had been dissolved by the Czechoslovak authorities the previous day because of its implication in large number of terrorist activities. The organisation was sheltered, trained and equipped by German authorities and conducted cross-border terrorist operations into Czechoslovakian territory. Relying on the Convention for the Definition of Aggression, Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš[8] and the Czechoslovak government-in-exile[9] later regarded 17 September 1938 to be the beginning of the undeclared German-Czechoslovak war. That understanding has been assumed also by the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic in 1997.[10]
See also
References
- ^ Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, vol. 2, London, 1950, no. 221, pp. 357-362.
- ^ "Munich Pact, September 30, 1938", The Avalon Project, Yale Law School.
- ^ Interactive Map of Czechoslovak Fortifications
- ^ Mamatey, V. S. and Luža, R. (eds.), A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948, Princeton, 1973, pp. 268-70.
- ^ a b Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, vol. 2, London, 1950, no. 221, pp. 357-362, no.388, p.618-620 and no. 448, pp. 727-730.
- ^ Smelser, Ronald M., The Sudeten Problem, 1933–1938: Volkstumspolitik and the Formulation of Nazi Foreign Policy, Folkestone, 1975, p. 222.
- ^ Vyšný, Paul, The Runciman Mission to Czechoslovakia, 1938: Prelude to Munich, Basingstoke, 2003, pp. 243-60.
- ^ President Beneš's declaration made on 16 December 1941
- ^ Note of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile dated 22 February 1944
- ^ Ruling No. II. ÚS 307/97 (Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic 1997) ("Stran interpretace "kdy země vede válku", obsažené v čl. I Úmluvy o naturalizaci mezi Československem a Spojenými státy, publikované pod č. 169/1929 Sb. za účelem zjištění, zda je splněna podmínka státního občanství dle restitučních předpisů, Ústavní soud vychází z již v roce 1933 vypracované definice agrese Společnosti národů, která byla převzata do londýnské Úmluvy o agresi (CONVENITION DE DEFINITION DE L'AGRESSION), uzavřené dne 4. 7. 1933 Československem, dle které není třeba válku vyhlašovat (čl. II bod 2) a dle které je třeba za útočníka považovat ten stát, který první poskytne podporu ozbrojeným tlupám, jež se utvoří na jeho území a jež vpadnou na území druhého státu (čl. II bod 5). V souladu s nótou londýnské vlády ze dne 22. 2. 1944, navazující na prohlášení prezidenta republiky ze dne 16. 12. 1941 dle § 64 odst. 1 bod 3 tehdejší Ústavy, a v souladu s citovaným čl. II bod 5 má Ústavní soud za to, že dnem, kdy nastal stav války, a to s Německem, je den 17. 9. 1938, neboť tento den na pokyn Hitlera došlo k utvoření "Sudetoněmeckého svobodného sboru" (Freikorps) z uprchnuvších vůdců Henleinovy strany a několik málo hodin poté už tito vpadli na československé území ozbrojeni německými zbraněmi.").
External links
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