Ignosticism: Difference between revisions
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'''Ignosticism''' is a word coined by [[Rabbi]] [[Sherwin Wine]] to indicate |
'''Ignosticism''' is a word coined by [[Rabbi]] [[Sherwin Wine]] to indicate a views about the word "God" (with capital G, not "god"), "G-d", "Yahweh", "Allah", etc. |
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The |
The view is that the word "God" must be shown to represent something imaginable before any question of the existence of anything named "God" can be meaningfully discussed. Furthermore, if nothing can be imagined for the word "God" to represent, the ignostic takes the [[theological noncognitivism|theological noncognitivist]] position that "Does God exist?" is not a genuine question, but a cognitively meaningless pseudo-question. |
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The second view is synonymous with ''[[theological noncognitivism]]'', and skips the step of first asking "What is meant by God?" before proclaiming the concept meaningless. |
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Some philosophers have seen ignosticism as a variation of [[agnosticism]] or [[atheism]], while others have considered it to be distinct. In any case, it is a form of [[nontheism]]. |
Some philosophers have seen ignosticism as a variation of [[agnosticism]] or [[atheism]], while others have considered it to be distinct. In any case, it is a form of [[nontheism]]. |
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==Relationship to other views about God== |
==Relationship to other views about the word "God"== |
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Ignosticism and [[theological noncognitivism]] are generally synonymous,<ref>Conifer, ''Theological Noncognitivism'': "Theological noncognitivism is usually taken to be the view that the sentence 'God exists' is cognitively meaningless."</ref> and ignostics are [[nontheist]]s in that they do not believe in God, but the relationship of ignosticism to other nontheistic views is less clear. While Kurtz finds the view to be compatible with both [[weak atheism]] and agnosticism,<ref>Kurtz, ''New Skepticism'', 220: "Both [atheism and agnosticism] are consistent with igtheism, which finds the belief in a metaphysical, transcendent being basically incoherent and unintelligible."</ref> other philosophers consider ignosticism to be distinct. |
Ignosticism and [[theological noncognitivism]] are generally synonymous,<ref>Conifer, ''Theological Noncognitivism'': "Theological noncognitivism is usually taken to be the view that the sentence 'God exists' is cognitively meaningless."</ref> and ignostics are [[nontheist]]s in that they do not say "I do not believe in God", but the relationship of ignosticism to other nontheistic views is less clear. While Kurtz finds the view to be compatible with both [[weak atheism]] and agnosticism,<ref>Kurtz, ''New Skepticism'', 220: "Both [atheism and agnosticism] are consistent with igtheism, which finds the belief in a metaphysical, transcendent being basically incoherent and unintelligible."</ref> other philosophers consider ignosticism to be distinct. |
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In a chapter of his 1936 book ''[[Language, Truth, and Logic]]'', A. J. Ayer argued that one could not speak of God's existence, or even the probability of God's existence, since the concept itself was unverifiable and thus nonsensical.<ref>Ayer, ''Language'', 115: "There can be no way of proving that the existence of a god … is even probable. … For if the existence of such a god were probable, then the proposition that he existed would be an empirical hypothesis. And in that case it would be possible to deduce from it, and other empirical hypotheses, certain experimental propositions which were not deducible from those other hypotheses alone. But in fact this is not possible."</ref> Ayer wrote that this ruled out atheism and agnosticism as well as theism because all three positions assume that the sentence "God exists" is meaningful.<ref>Ayer, ''Language'', 115–16</ref> Given the meaninglessness of theistic claims, Ayer opined that there was "no logical ground for antagonism between religion and natural science,"<ref>Ayer, ''Language'', 117</ref> as theism alone does not entail any propositions which the scientific method can falsify. |
In a chapter of his 1936 book ''[[Language, Truth, and Logic]]'', A. J. Ayer argued that one could not speak of God's existence, or even the probability of God's existence, since the concept itself was unverifiable and thus nonsensical.<ref>Ayer, ''Language'', 115: "There can be no way of proving that the existence of a god … is even probable. … For if the existence of such a god were probable, then the proposition that he existed would be an empirical hypothesis. And in that case it would be possible to deduce from it, and other empirical hypotheses, certain experimental propositions which were not deducible from those other hypotheses alone. But in fact this is not possible."</ref> Ayer wrote that this ruled out atheism and agnosticism as well as theism because all three positions assume that the sentence "God exists" is meaningful.<ref>Ayer, ''Language'', 115–16</ref> Given the meaninglessness of theistic claims, Ayer opined that there was "no logical ground for antagonism between religion and natural science,"<ref>Ayer, ''Language'', 117</ref> as theism alone does not entail any propositions which the scientific method can falsify. |
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==Dependence on a particular concept of God== |
==Dependence on a particular concept of God== |
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Drange emphasizes that any stance on |
Drange emphasizes that any stance on "Does God exist?" is made with respect to a particular concept of what one claims to consider "God" to represent: |
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{{quote|Since the word "God" has many different meanings, it is possible for the sentence "God exists" to express many different propositions. What we need to do is to focus on each proposition separately. … For each different sense of the term "God," there will be theists, atheists, and agnostics ''relative to that concept of God.''<ref name="Drange" />}} |
{{quote|Since the word "God" has many different meanings, it is possible for the sentence "God exists" to express many different propositions. What we need to do is to focus on each proposition separately. … For each different sense of the term "God," there will be theists, atheists, and agnostics ''relative to that concept of God.''<ref name="Drange" />}} |
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As "God" means very different things to different people, when the word is spoken, an ignostic may seek to determine if something like a child's definition of a god is meant or if a [[theology|theologian's]] is intended instead. |
As "God" means very different things to different people, when the word is spoken, an ignostic may seek to determine if something like a child's definition of a god is meant or if a [[theology|theologian's]] is intended instead. |
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However, ignostics often reject Drange's claim that "God" means very different things to different people, and instead deny that it has any coherent meaning at all to any adult theist or non-theist. Also, most ignostics do not consider a child's definition of "God" to be a legitimate definition in standard English. |
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| ⚫ | A theistic child's concept generally has a simple and coherent meaning, based on an [[anthropomorphic]] conception of God: a big powerful man in the sky responsible for certain matters.<ref>Hanisch, ''Drawings''</ref> This anthropomorphic divine conception has been rejected by [[Spinoza]], as well as by [[Ludwig Feuerbach|Feuerbach]] in ''[[The Essence of Christianity]]'' (1841). |
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| ⚫ | A theistic child's concept generally has a simple and coherent meaning, based on an [[anthropomorphic]] conception of God: a big powerful man in the sky responsible for certain matters.<ref>Hanisch, ''Drawings''</ref> This anthropomorphic divine conception has been rejected by [[Spinoza]], as well as by [[Ludwig Feuerbach|Feuerbach]] in ''[[The Essence of Christianity]]'' (1841). But this definition is usually if not always rejected by adult theists. |
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A theologian's concept is more complex and abstract, often involving such concepts as ''first cause'', ''sustainer'', and ''unmoved mover'' and claiming such |
A theologian's concept is more complex and abstract, often involving such concepts as ''first cause'', ''sustainer'', and ''unmoved mover'' and claiming such adjectives for "God" as ''infinite'', ''omnipotent'', ''omniscient'', ''omnipresent'', and ''omnibenevolent''. To the ignostic these terms, taken singly or in combination, cannot be said to be false; rather, they are muddled, self-contradictory, linguistically empty, or perhaps poetic. Hence, one cannot meaningfully expound on the existence or nonexistence of anything named "God". |
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The consistent ignostic, therefore, awaits a coherent definition of God (or of any other [[Metaphysics|metaphysical]] |
The consistent ignostic, therefore, awaits a coherent definition of the word "God" (or of any other [[Metaphysics|metaphysical]] utterance purported to be discussable) before claiming to be able to consider the words "God's existence" as cognitively meaningful so as to be able to engage in arguments called "God exists" or "God does not exist". |
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==See also== |
==See also== |
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Revision as of 18:45, 5 September 2007
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Ignosticism is a word coined by Rabbi Sherwin Wine to indicate a views about the word "God" (with capital G, not "god"), "G-d", "Yahweh", "Allah", etc.
The view is that the word "God" must be shown to represent something imaginable before any question of the existence of anything named "God" can be meaningfully discussed. Furthermore, if nothing can be imagined for the word "God" to represent, the ignostic takes the theological noncognitivist position that "Does God exist?" is not a genuine question, but a cognitively meaningless pseudo-question.
Some philosophers have seen ignosticism as a variation of agnosticism or atheism, while others have considered it to be distinct. In any case, it is a form of nontheism.
Relationship to other views about the word "God"
Ignosticism and theological noncognitivism are generally synonymous,[1] and ignostics are nontheists in that they do not say "I do not believe in God", but the relationship of ignosticism to other nontheistic views is less clear. While Kurtz finds the view to be compatible with both weak atheism and agnosticism,[2] other philosophers consider ignosticism to be distinct.
In a chapter of his 1936 book Language, Truth, and Logic, A. J. Ayer argued that one could not speak of God's existence, or even the probability of God's existence, since the concept itself was unverifiable and thus nonsensical.[3] Ayer wrote that this ruled out atheism and agnosticism as well as theism because all three positions assume that the sentence "God exists" is meaningful.[4] Given the meaninglessness of theistic claims, Ayer opined that there was "no logical ground for antagonism between religion and natural science,"[5] as theism alone does not entail any propositions which the scientific method can falsify.
Like Ayer, Theodore Drange sees atheism and agnosticism as positions which accept "God exists" as a meaningful proposition; atheists judge it to be "false or probably false" and agnostics consider it to be inconclusive until further evidence is met.[6] If Drange's definitions are accepted, ignostics are neither atheists nor agnostics. An atheist would say "I don't believe God exists", an agnostic would say "I don't know whether or not God exists", and an ignostic would say "I don't know what you mean when you say 'God exists'".
Ignosticism is not to be confused with apatheism, a position of apathy toward the existence of God. An apatheist may see the statement "God exists" as meaningless, yet they may also see it as meaningful, and perhaps even true.[7]
Dependence on a particular concept of God
Drange emphasizes that any stance on "Does God exist?" is made with respect to a particular concept of what one claims to consider "God" to represent:
Since the word "God" has many different meanings, it is possible for the sentence "God exists" to express many different propositions. What we need to do is to focus on each proposition separately. … For each different sense of the term "God," there will be theists, atheists, and agnostics relative to that concept of God.[6]
As "God" means very different things to different people, when the word is spoken, an ignostic may seek to determine if something like a child's definition of a god is meant or if a theologian's is intended instead.
However, ignostics often reject Drange's claim that "God" means very different things to different people, and instead deny that it has any coherent meaning at all to any adult theist or non-theist. Also, most ignostics do not consider a child's definition of "God" to be a legitimate definition in standard English.
A theistic child's concept generally has a simple and coherent meaning, based on an anthropomorphic conception of God: a big powerful man in the sky responsible for certain matters.[8] This anthropomorphic divine conception has been rejected by Spinoza, as well as by Feuerbach in The Essence of Christianity (1841). But this definition is usually if not always rejected by adult theists.
A theologian's concept is more complex and abstract, often involving such concepts as first cause, sustainer, and unmoved mover and claiming such adjectives for "God" as infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and omnibenevolent. To the ignostic these terms, taken singly or in combination, cannot be said to be false; rather, they are muddled, self-contradictory, linguistically empty, or perhaps poetic. Hence, one cannot meaningfully expound on the existence or nonexistence of anything named "God".
The consistent ignostic, therefore, awaits a coherent definition of the word "God" (or of any other metaphysical utterance purported to be discussable) before claiming to be able to consider the words "God's existence" as cognitively meaningful so as to be able to engage in arguments called "God exists" or "God does not exist".
See also
Notes
- ^ Conifer, Theological Noncognitivism: "Theological noncognitivism is usually taken to be the view that the sentence 'God exists' is cognitively meaningless."
- ^ Kurtz, New Skepticism, 220: "Both [atheism and agnosticism] are consistent with igtheism, which finds the belief in a metaphysical, transcendent being basically incoherent and unintelligible."
- ^ Ayer, Language, 115: "There can be no way of proving that the existence of a god … is even probable. … For if the existence of such a god were probable, then the proposition that he existed would be an empirical hypothesis. And in that case it would be possible to deduce from it, and other empirical hypotheses, certain experimental propositions which were not deducible from those other hypotheses alone. But in fact this is not possible."
- ^ Ayer, Language, 115–16
- ^ Ayer, Language, 117
- ^ a b Drange, Atheism
- ^ Rauch, Let It Be: "… many apatheists are believers. … Even regular churchgoers can, and often do, rank quite high on the apatheism scale."
- ^ Hanisch, Drawings
References
- Armstrong, Karen (1993). A History of God. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. ISBN 0-679-42600-0.
- Ayer, A. J. (1952) [1936]. "Critique of Ethics and Theology". Language, Truth and Logic. New York: Dover Publications. ISBN 0486200108. LCCN 52-0 – 000.
- Conifer, Steven J. (2002), "Theological Noncognitivism Examined", The Interlocutor, 4, retrieved 2007-05-24
{{citation}}: Unknown parameter|month=ignored (help) - Cousens, Myrna Bonnie, ed., "God", Guide to Humanistic Judaism, Society for Humanistic Judaism
- Drange, Theodore (1998). "Atheism, Agnosticism, Noncognitivism". Internet Infidels. Retrieved 2007-03-26.
- Hanisch, Helmut (2002-10-21). "Children's and Young People's Drawings of God". Retrieved 2007-04-26.
{{cite web}}: Check date values in:|date=(help) - Kurtz, Paul (1992). The New Skepticism: Inquiry and Reliable Knowledge. Buffalo: Prometheus Books. ISBN 0-87975-766-3.
- Rauch, Jonathan (2003), "Let It Be", The Atlantic, vol. 291, no. 4, retrieved 2007-05-24
- Spiegel, Irving (1965-06-20). "Jewish 'Ignostic' Stirs Convention; Dropping of 'God' in Service Deplored and Condoned". New York Times. p. 62.
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