:::Take it up with, oh, Willmott, I think (without it in front of me, I can't say for sure), not with me. And don't forget Nagumo'd've gotten ''verbal'' orders, too. [[User:Trekphiler|Trekphiler]] ([[User talk:Trekphiler|talk]]) 14:20, 14 April 2008 (UTC)
:::Take it up with, oh, Willmott, I think (without it in front of me, I can't say for sure), not with me. And don't forget Nagumo'd've gotten ''verbal'' orders, too. [[User:Trekphiler|Trekphiler]] ([[User talk:Trekphiler|talk]]) 14:20, 14 April 2008 (UTC)
::::H. P. Willmott did not post. You did. You did not provide a citation. So, " ... why don't you look at Yamamoto's own orders." yourself - including your now infantile dodge of those "verbal". Is this another of your "I think ..." stellar contributions being plainly demonstrated?
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From The Week Before Pearl Harbor by A. A. Hoehling (W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, NY, 1963), in the Epilogue is to be found on Page 200:
“... That panic gripped the second deck of the Navy Department immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor is beyond reasonable dispute. One officer, then in intelligence, now in a high post in the Navy, told this writer that he went to his office safe one morning to find that a number of ‘magic’ dispatches were mysteriously missing. He never retrieved them.
ONI, in fact, had done such a thorough housecleaning of its top-secret and secret as well as not-so-secret files, that, according to another officer on duty at the time, not even a departmental organization chart of November and December, 1941, could ever be found. ...”
And, on Page 204:
“ ... There are a few specialists, circa 1941, who insist that their memories as well must bear the ‘secret’ tag. A leading cryptanalyst, in retirement, hinting at a kind of passive brain-washing, with his pension as a lever, maintains he has been ordered not to discuss those long-ago codes and ciphers. However, the National Security Council, which he indirectly accused, has denied not only the allegations but any interest in the World War II period. ...”
Perhaps of note in passing, within Hoehling’s text (released some 22 years after the Pearl Harbor attack) are interviews with several principals, e.g.,Stark, Kimmel, Bicknell, McCollum, Rochefort, ..., etc.
JN25 in any of its variants is not mentioned, while Safford is quoted only using “Operations Code” at the top of Page 76.
From the Knox Report, released on December 15, 1941, one of the early reportings on the damage done at Pearl Harbor.
"... Neither Short nor Kimmel, at the time of the attack, had any knowledge of the plain intimations of some surprise move, made clear in Washington, through the interception of Japanese instructions to Nomura, in which a surprise move of some kind was clearly indicated by the insistence upon the precise time of Nomura's reply to Hull, at one o'clock on Sunday.
A general war warning had been sent out from the Navy Department on November 27th, to Admiral Kimmel. General Short told me that a message of warning sent from the War Department on Saturday night at midnight, before the attack, failed to reach him until four or five hours after the attack had been made. ..."
A. "Neither Short nor Kimmel, ... had any knowledge of the plain intimations of some surprise move, made clear in Washington, ..." [Who knew what and when?]
B. "A general war warning had been sent out from the Navy Department on November 27th, ..." [Not a full alert, but a 'general war warning' - the so called "Do/Don't" message.]
C. "... message of warning sent from the War Department on Saturday night at midnight, before the attack, ..." This message has never been found, and is assumed destroyed. [It is also often confused with the storied Marshall message delivered by RCA messenger after the attack.]
What if this midnight message had been sent as Knox believes it had been when he arrived at Pearl Harbor and asked about it. Imagine if this "... Saturday night at midnight, before the attack, ..." - that is, midnight, December 6, 1941, Washington local time - had been sent and received by Kimmel. The two IJN O-type seaplanes doing their pre-attack fly-over - see and report what?
— Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.132.176.50 (talk • contribs) 06:31, 13 December 2007 (UTC)[reply]
This is so incredibly ignorant, I should just ignore it.
"A general war warning had been sent out from the Navy Department on November 27th" Did you bother to read it? It warns of possible attacks in the Philippines, Russia, Borneo, & Thailand; it makes no mention whatever of Pearl Harbor, contrary to what's usually implied by conspiracy loons.
"plain intimations of some surprise move," Ditto. Not against Pearl.
"Imagine" Yes, do. Kimmel sorties the fleet to meet Nagumo, rdv w Halsey en route. Nagumo delivers a crushing blow to the Battle Line. 8 BBs & 1 (perhaps both?) US CVs sunk; Halsey, Kimmel, Spruance, Burke?, Fletcher KIA. Losses top 20000. Nagumo approaches Hawaii & savages the shore installations. Rochefort, Davenport, Jacobs, English KIA. Hawaii is incapable of serving as a repair & replenishment station for a year. US subs congregate in Australia & San Francisco. Japan wins at the Coral Sea, fight to a draw around Fiji. The Soviets enter the war in August 1945, just as the Marines assault Saipan. The Soviets (with reason) insist on joint occupation of Japan & control of all of Korea. MacArthur takes sides in the Chinese Civil War. The Soviets object. LeMay suggests boming them back to the Stone Age with atomic bombs. Truman agrees. The world goes up in flames. Trekphiler (talk) 10:35, 11 March 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Or - the China-Japanese war continues; China without aid from US and USSR. Germany and USSR (without Lend-Lease aid) bleed each other to death, Britain is on "Cash-and-Carry" basis ... British Empire falls. Britain, French, and Dutch lose colonies. No communist inspired Korean War, Viet Nam War. No Cold War. ... United States is not policeman of the world. A geo-political world with a re-ordered set of "spheres of influence" with dollar/mark/yen economies ... [No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the US Entry into WWII Bruce M. Russett] —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.47 (talk) 11:56, 6 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
"China without aid from US and USSR" What fantasy world are you living in? The ChiComs had been getting aid since the '30s.
"No communist inspired Korean War"? On what basis? CCP losing the Civil War when Chiang rolls a six & pillages Beijing? Or does the U.S. just hammer Japan & ignore China? The China she'd been helping for a decade & been trying to open as a market (of about 500 million people) for longer than that, BTW. Fat chance. Can't have it both ways. (Oh, wait, this is your fantasy. I guess you can.)
"Germany and USSR (without Lend-Lease aid) bleed each other to death"? Only in the fantasies of the ill-informed. The Soviets would have won regardless; the question was, how long would it take? With Germany gone, & no really strong power in WEur, there'd be nothing to keep the Red Army off the Biscay coast. (Especially if "British Empire falls", which "Britain is on "Cash-and-Carry" basis" ensures, which would bring more than a little ruin to the U.S. banking system, which is one reason the U.S. joined WW1...never mind WW2.)
"Britain is on "Cash-and-Carry" basis". Well, no, as noted. Also, Hitler was acknowledged as more dangerous than Tojo. And SU's growing power would worry US as much as Hitler, if (when) Hitler attacked SU & brought his own destruction, so propping up Britain made sense in any case. (Why no greater effort was made to resuscitate France is unclear.)
Lose colonies? As I recall, they did anyway; the difference was, how willingly? The U.S. had the power postwar to ensure it was peaceful, & failed to use it in Vietnam, while misjudging the need for SU aid against Japan, whence occupied Korea. "policeman of the world"? No, bad judgement by FDR & his senior advisors.
Another of those Trek "I'm guessing ..." remarks - reminiscent of W. H. Auden's O Where Are you Going and its last stanza, which half-thimble no doubt knows to be: "As he left them there, as he left them there." [But perhaps not, as half-thimble admits to an aversion to "researching" ... and struggles with his own and very public errors of fact.] —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.47 (talk) 19:44, 6 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Through a glass, darkly
I deleted:
"Of note, for added clarity here, the perspective of U.S. naval intelligence at the time as taken from the Proceedings of the Hewitt Inquiry[1] shows, " ... The significance of the term, 'tactical circuit' is that the vessel itself, that is AKAGI, was using its own radio to call up and work directly the other vessels rather than work them through shore stations via the broadcast method which was the common practice in Japanese communications. The working of the AKAGI with the Marus, indicated that she was making arrangements for fuel or some administrative function, since a carrier would rarely address a maru.""
because, frankly, I'm not sure what it was trying to do; the point was already made in the 'graph above it clearly enough. I also deleted this:
"To also note, for the 30 Nov41 COMSUM14's statement about Akagi hear on tactical circuits (i.e., radio transmissions) calling marus, that all requests for the source materials used to develop this summary have been denied for many years; with many of these requests even pre-dating the FOIA process. Which maru(s) did Akagi "work" - call signs? How was Akagi identified? Time of the intercept(s)? Signal characterisitcs (quantity and strength) of the intercept(s)? Frequency (or frequencies) used by Akagi? Any acknowledgements intercept(s)? RDF bearings taken? ... ? All of these questions remain open. <!--Again, facts are facts.-->"
as unencyclopedic. They may be valid points for more research; try answering some of them. I'm guessing the Hewitt Report asked {& answered!) these questions; try citing it. Or sources that do answer them. Trekphiler (talk) 03:08, 4 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]
"I'm guessing ..." - a clear winner, prima facia, as being "encyclopedic" Oh, in case you missed/ignored it - the source material remains classified. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 11:11, 4 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Why don't you try contributing something besides insulting remarks & unanswered questions? I guess being an anonymous jerk is more your style. Trekphiler (talk) 05:33, 5 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Vacuous prattle from I got that wrong! and I'm guessing the Hewitt Report asked (& answered!) ... - another of the stellar contributions from the untutored? Track down that Hewitt Report guess yet? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.164.2.123 (talk) 13:34, 27 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Would those "better things" include your reading, however so brief, of the Hewitt Report? Can we expect you to illuminate/contribute items from the 30Nov41 COMSUM14 report? Or would that be more of your guessing? Do tell. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.56 (talk) 20:26, 27 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]
<--Y'know, rather than complaining, why don't you source it, for those of us who don't live next door to the Library of Congress? No, wait, you'd rather attack people who disagree with your purblind ignorant views. My mistake. Trekphiler (talk) 13:16, 9 March 2008 (UTC)[reply]
You may want to "Google" it for yourself - there are several "sources." But as you seem to avoid "looking stuff up" - enjoy your solo journey.
Regards the Library of Congress - a wonderful resource, but you might want to start elsewhere. The National Archives in College Park, MD is suggested. See John Taylor - very helpful to many.
While there, rub the "terp" and go to the student operated "Creamery" on Route 1, try the vanilla ice cream with maple syrup; and within walking distance is the first military air field in the US - the Wright brothers flew from there. Watching "short field" practice is always fun.
"As given by IJN Admiral Toimioka,[2] the oilers supporting the Kido Butai were Kyokuto Maru, Kenyo Maru, Kokuyo Maru, Shinkoku Maru, Toho Maru, Nihon Maru, Toei Maru, and Shiriya; Shiriya is described[3] as a "... naval unit designed as an auxiliary to the Pearl Harbor task force ... The skipper of Shiriya was Captain Minour Togo, son of the great Admiral Heihachiro Togo. ..." And, also Parker's "The Unsolved Messages of Pearl Harbor", Cryptologia, 1991, Volume 15, Number 4, pgs. 295-313 has, " ... One of the most significant of the intercepted messages was sent 1 December 1941. It offered a tantalizing clue as to the whereabouts of the objectives. One of the tankers assigned to the Strike Force was Shiriya ...""
and
"However, Shiriya Maru, an IJN tanker and not a member of Japan's merchant fleet, appears in Parts XIII, pages 407, 420, 462-464, and Part XXX, page 2743, 2787, and 2792 in the Hearing before the Joint Committee. As well, message SRN-116476 refers to two "marus". "
I can already hear the complaints about deleting sourced material, so for the zealots, let me make it crystal clear: if you can demonstrate the significance of this material, rather than just use it to hint special knowledge (which is all it's doing now; calling Shiriya a "naval unit", but conveniently ignoring "an auxiliary", i.e., not a fleet unit {I won't even ask about the relevance of the relationship to "the great Admiral"}), put it back in. That is, show how these lists put the Kido Butaien route to Pearl. As I read it, the "calling marus" is routine housekeeping, carried on by the radiomen left behind, as part of the deception program; unless you can show different, leave it out. Trekphiler (talk) 13:25, 9 March 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Just some research ...
Starting with SRN-115398 - a frequently pointed out singularly in the tale of the SHIRIYA. This message, of 1 Dec 1941, from SHIRIYA to ComDesDiv7, is given as “This ship is processing direct to position 30.00N, 154.20E. Expect to arrive that point at 1800 on 3 Dec. Thereafter will proceed eastward alone 30 degrees North latitude at speed 7 of knots.”
Psst, ... Thimble, her ain't a'headin' south.
And, further ...
Some other SHIRIYA messages (by date and not SRNs) in addition to SRN-115398 above add more detail and include:
18 Nov
From: Sec1stAirFlt
To: CdrDesDiv7
Info: CO SHIRIYA
STRIKING FORCE Secret Operations Order No. 6 was not sent to the SHIRIYA. Please arrange to supply her with a copy of same.
Thimble ... "STRIKING FORCE Secret Operations Order ..."
20 Nov
From: SHIRIYA
Action: COS CarDiv1, Combined Fleet
1. I will complete loading aviation gasoline and other miscellaneous equipment 21 Nov.
2. The main generator and other minor repairs will be completed 23 Nov.
3. Expect to get underway on 24 Nov and join up during morning of 27 Nov.
4. STRIKING FORCE Secret Operations Order No. 6 has not been received.
Thimble ... COS CarDiv1 ... Chief of Staff, Carrier Division 1 ...
21 Nov
From: CO SHIRIYA
To: CrdDesDiv7
We are undergoing overhaul at Yokosuka. Expect to depart 24 Nov and arrive at Sea on 27 Nov. Advise rendezvous point your unit. Regarding refueling at Sea …
Thimble ... DesDiv 7 (Destroyer Division 7) was the escort assigned to CarDiv1 (Carrier Division 1) – namely CVs AKAGI and KAGA]
Finally, it is HIJMS SHIRIYA ... and, yes, her is a "fully-fledged" member of the IJN.
So, on absolutely no standing, Thimble deletes sourced material again ... becoming forever known as half-Thimble for making a mess and not cleaning it up - again!
Are you always such a halfwit? Or is it just with me? Where did I say Shiriya wasn't IJN? Or a fleet tanker? You've offered no evidence putting Akagi, Kaga, or DesDiv 7 en route. "30.00N, 154.20E", without looking at a chart of the Pacific, is about where I'd expect an exercise rdv. And if she was assigned DesDiv 7, I'd expect just this sort of routine housekeeping traffic. Or is that actually being faked by conspirators? Or can't the Japanese read charts? (Oh, wait, you think they can't. I forgot.) Show me something that puts her en routeto Pearl. (Hmm, Lurline was reading her deactivated radio transmitter from 1000nm away. Is that right?) Show me something that proves she was en route. (Sorry, Grogan's unsub word doesn't get it. Neither does yours.) Show me something that proves one of her "consorts" was en route. (Ditto.) Show me anything except evidence Shiriya was a fleet tanker, which is all you've proven so far, & which I knew already. (You have a real talent for proving the known. How about some of the unknown, for a change?)
Your argument "it's secret, therefore it's a conspiracy" is unpersuasive. (I think that's an "appeal to silence", or something; somebody doesn't deny your ridiculous charges, they must be true.) There are any number of reasons to keep things secret; conspiracy does not always pertain, contrary to your paranoid fantasies. Or, explain how what FDR was doing in the Atlantic encouraged Japan to attack. (That I gotta read.) Maybe you forgot (I'm being charitable, my guess is you have no clue), the world is round, & the USN has only so many ships to cover it all, so what happens in the Atlantic has a direct, material bearing on what happens in the Pacific; if FDR is sending ships to aid Britain in the Atlantic (he was, y'know), where were they coming from? The Bolivian Navy?
And finally, since somebody put it up on the page, at long last (if unsourced, AFAIK), what kind of moron would FDR have to be to sacrifice his main fleet assets just to bring the U.S. into war? Even to risk them, with no chance to inflict harm on the enemy? Where is it carved in stone there had to be a massacre at Pearl to get Congress off the dime? It's carved in the paranoid fantasies of the conspiracy loons; that's hardly persuasive (or any) evidence. Answer those.
BTW, when you're finished your ad hominem rant, recall, I'm not the sole arbiter of what stays off the page or goes in; if anybody but you thought I was really wrong, it'd be back in long before now. Captain Dunsel01:30, 11 March 2008 (UTC)[reply]
And, from the Knox Report we have, and no "guessing" ...
"Of course the best means of defense against air attack consists of fighter planes. Lack of an adequate number of this type of aircraft available to the Army for the defense of the Island is due to the diversion of this type before the outbreak of the war, to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians."
So, along with Kimmel losing about one-third of his fleet to King operating in the pond, lest we forget ... all that other "giving" ... from the "Bolivaian Navy" no less.
{You do know who authored Lend-Lease?]
Congress ... um, Stark says to Congress US was agressor in the pond. Does Congress or President ask for declaration of war? And, gee, an election is coming ...
Desire for "first overt act of war" from Japanese ... or, sorry gobs, but do take the first punch; it will not that bad, these "Japs" cannot be that strong.
Oh, the details from that COMSUM14 from 30Nov41 ... "you guessed" it ... still classified, ... really, they are - fair dinkum fact.
And, as you said earlier, to paraphrase ... Rochefort lost friends.
Rochefort stated that there was no dummy message traffic during all of 1941 - none.
"The main effect (if not the intended purpose) of this particular story (US Navy document CSP 1494A, April 14, 1942, pages 14-15, Did the Japanese Paint Us a 'Picture.') was to make the service believe that the old lie was actually true - that Rochefort, Huckins and Williams had been sucked in by the Japanese radio deception. ...
"Rochefort and the other officers at Pearl Harbor took offense at the contemptible way in which their reputations had been smeared. ... There were no dummy messages on Japanese naval circuits at any time during 1941. ... No responsible person in the C. I. Organization ever believed that the messages in this system were 'dummies.' ... "
"Lack of an adequate number of this type of aircraft available to the Army for the defense of the Island is due to the diversion of this type before the outbreak of the war, to the British," Wasn't that the idea? Aid the British? So your own argument falters on little things like facts.
"Kimmel losing about one-third of his fleet to King operating in the pond," Again, wasn't that the idea? And, look at the reverse. After Japan attacked, these ships would be sent back, which did nothing to aid the British. (Ooops, I forgot, FDR is an evil genius, he engineered a conspiracy to help Britain. My bad.)
Um, and yet via the Robert Commission, Hawaii Departments are deemed "unprepared"? In 1941 how many PBY-5s went across the pond; how many to Hawaii? Were those "sent" back? Did CV RANGER come back? Did USS Texas come back?
"Does Congress or President ask for declaration of war?" Ditto. After Rueben James & Greer, there was reason enough, & that would have helped Britain. Pay attention. War with Japan assuredly would not, per above (which you yourself pointed out, I see).
"'first overt act of war'" You forget, Japan was fighting the Chinese, & FDR wanted to impose a blockade without the League of Nations branding the U.S. an aggressor. ...
But it was not called a war in the US was it? The "China Incident" as called was needed to side-step the US Neutrality laws - arms to belligerents a non-no. So why does US provide arms and financial aid to China? Regards League of Nations, Haile Salassie showed the US (the US having Observer Status only - recall FDR's commitment to Hearst) its choice not to join cost them nothing, i.e., "branding" was not an issue.
...An overt act by Japan would allow it. Like the man said, you've got to "see the whole board". (In your case, see part of the board. See a square on the board. See part of a square on the board.)
So, take the punch. "Accidents" in the Atlantic did not cause a declaration or war, the cockleshell fleet of three did not, the Dutch rang the ABD agreement (of which Congress knew nothing in 1941) bell 4Dec41, ... time is running out.
"Rochefort stated that there was no dummy message traffic during all of 1941 - none." In JN-25, no; the only reason the Japanese would send dummy traffic in JN-25 is if they thought it was compromised. Ask if there was any maskirovka for the traffic analysts.
Glory - No dummy traffic in JN-25. But, to ask, just how does a traffic analyst assigned to RDF work determine if the message is a dummy?
As an exercise, try using the ATIA procedure to gain the release of "The Examination Unit" files for Gordon Head RDF for the period 26Nov41-7Dec41. And do let the readers know of your success or failure in the exercise.
Noted, but there are still people around who think this crap is credible. Let some of them, even one, see the flaws, I'm satisfied.
"'Accidents' in the Atlantic"? Fat chance. FDR was hoping Hitler or Congress would get so het up, there'd be a declaration; bet on it.
"how does a traffic analyst assigned to RDF work determine if the message is a dummy?" Not the issue. The originator is in the callsign; true or fake, for DF, the originator & location are what's important, not the content. And it's masking the location of the Kido Butai that's the issue; if the originator says Akagi & the location is Hittokapu Wan, the job's done.
"not called a war", "arms to belligerents a non-no." Exactly. If Japan made an overt act, the U.S. could apply a blockade, rather than just try & sneak weaps through. (Don't think the League didn't suspect aid to China. It was coming from Germany & Russia in a rush, more than the U.S. ever supplied before the war.)
"So, take the punch." Which benefits Britain how, again? Escorts, ships, aircraft, VLR Liberators [!] all going to SWPA, rather than RN & RAFCC... Boy, that conspiracy is right up there with...hmmm...defeating al Qaida by invading Iraq.
"how many PBY-5s went across the pond; how many to Hawaii? Were those "sent" back? Did CV RANGER come back? Did USS Texas come back?" Not the issue. How many went to Hawaii instead of Britain? Whole squadrons of B-24s, which CC was desperate for, went to SWPA for LR recon & bombing; just one in Gander could have cut losses to U-boats dramatically in 1941, which would have had very beneficial effects on BOLERO & might have meant NEPTUNE goes off, oh, a year sooner, with substantially fewer casualties & much faster inland & frontier-bound movement, whence no Sov occupation of Poland & EGer, for starters. Ranger wasn't capable of fleet operations (she was too small), so no loss; she'd have served as a training ship or an AVG anyhow (which should have spared Wasp from ferrying Spits to Malta, BTW). Trekphiler (talk) 03:25 & 03:44, 12 March 2008 (UTC)[reply]
What - nothing on Gordon Head? The Marconi gear there was impressive for its day. Recall the difference in the "Y" procedures and the "W" procedures - and then how to marry them? Got caught missing your intent about dummy messages did you - loose reasoning, again. Did you miss school the day the League of Nations was covered? Remember why Japan withdrew from the League of Nations? Another of those "I got that wrong" instances? Oh, you were guessing - again ... that explains a great deal.
"Which benefits Britain how?" ... missed another memo have you? As a hint: conduct a detailed review the Magic summaries for Nov41 - just a suggested starting pointer for you. You might, just might, track a path to answer how and why FDR - the night before his 8Dec41 speech - tells some Congressional leaders that Germany will declare war on the US in days. Warning as this will require focus and energy and certainly tools of discovery your "twenty-fives" does not evidence. Enjoy a few "Blues" along the way.
Oh, and prior to getting that Gordon Head material released, and please do report progress, suggest you brush on the BRUSA and UKUSA Agreements. The CANUSA and CAZAB Agreement might also apply. Remember SRH-149 remains redaced, obviously using your rationale.
But as half-thimble is now but a dram (or a sou), a real page-turner for you. It is clear your "solid" claims need some ... dare I say ... revision. So, do scan Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor: Avoiding was in East Asia, 1936-41 by Antony Best (N.B., no "h" in Antony), LSE/Routledge, London and New York, 1995. [ISBN 0-415-11171-4]. For example, Chapter Six ... Burma Road something or other. ... a give'me for you.
Have at it dram. Enjoy the "happenings" in the pond - you might even discover the history of the British FH3/FH4/FH5 sets and those "birdcage" antennae. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 63.3.18.1 (talk) 11:10, 12 March 2008 (UTC)[reply]
This section is smudging the facts a bit. Yamamoto who planned the attack disagreed with battleships being superior to battleships and from what I've read in some books, he planned the attack for when it happened based on the hope that the Aircraft carriers would be in dock, he missed them by 2-3 days. Also note that the IJN strike force consisted of large amounts of carriers. This section leads people to believe that all members of both Navies considered carriers inferior, infact there was a divide in the navies, older Admirals who had been with battleships most of their lives and younger officers who trained with carriers. Similar to how some of my older relatives refuse to learn metric and continue to use it, and complain when something is not in Imperial (we're Canadian, not a shot at Americans). Commissioned officers works on a merit system, but also a seniority and political system, quite a few leading IJN officers for instance would have been in the Battle of Tsushima (Yamamoto Isoroku included), and would of considered ships like the Yamato new and top of the line. Younger officers who may of had their first commands or first served on carriers would hold very different opinions. Who knows what opinion Roosevelt had. Also, saying that "aircraft carriers were classified as fleet scouting elements, and hence relatively expendable" doesn't make sense, thats 2+2=4. Aircraft carriers as scouts could remain safely behind battleships and still scout far ahead of all other ships, no expendable ship displaced 19800 tonnes empty and has a complement of 2200+ people. Thats more than 10x a Tribal class destroyer. Twice the personnel complement of the Arizona, with a similar displacement. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 (talk) 05:55, 2 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
If the battleships were so universally considered superior, why the Kido Butai? 6 aircraft carriers and escorts. 6 scouts and escorts hardly sound like "the single most powerful naval fleet", not my words, by the words of Wikipedia on the Kido Butai. In addition, while trying to say how unsafe they were out in the ocean surrounded by the IJN, Midway was shelled at the same time as Pearl Harbor, the next day Malaya was invaded by the 25th Army under Yamashita and the Americans were kicked out of Shanghai. Then on the 9th goes Bangkok. Peking is overrun on the 11th. On the 13th the Philippines are invaded by the 14th. On the 16th Borneo is invaded. And on the 23rd, Wake Island is captured. Seems like the safest place during all of this was 200 miles west of Hawai. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 (talk) 06:28, 2 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Some IJN perspective:
"In the last analysis, the success or failure of our entire strategy in the Pacific will be determined by whether of not we succeed in destroying the U.S. Fleet, more particularly, its carrier task forces." [ADM Yamamoto, IJN, 1942], and
"I think our principal teacher in respect to the necessity of emphasizing aircraft carriers was the American Navy. We had no teachers to speak of besides the United States in respect to the aircraft themselves and to the method of their employment. ... We were doing our utmost all the time to catch up with the United States." [FADM Nagano, IJN, 1945].
"Yamamoto who planned the attack disagreed with battleships being superior to battleships". So the legend goes. That's not what happened at Pearl, nor Midway, where he held his heavies back, well beyond the range of carrier air, per doctrine.
"Aircraft carriers as scouts could remain safely behind battleships and still scout far ahead of all other ships". True. Doctrine didn't see it that way. Carriers would scout in the van; cf Midway.
"no expendable ship displaced 19800 tonnes empty and has a complement of 2200+ people. Thats more than 10x a Tribal class destroyer. Twice the personnel complement of the Arizona, with a similar displacement." Irrelevant. Battleships were expected to engage battleships in a heads up gunfight, after scouts (CVs, SSs) attrited the enemy; losses were expected, & accepted.
Do you have a source that says Aircraft Carriers, not just ships serving as scouts, were expendable, or that the Kido Butai was west instead of north of them? Wikipedian rules, the burden of proof lies in the hands of whoever wants to add, I don't need proof to delete. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 (talk) 03:35, 6 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
I agree with Trek here. Hindsight is enticing, and if oftne responsible for distorting perceptions. It is certainly true that some forward thinking folks were aware of the potential of aircraft carriers (in all large navies), just as it's true that some still held with battleships as the main threat and most effective offense. And it may be that the split was largely along age lines (though Yamamoto's views would be an obvious exception. But it is nevertheless true that most (in all navies) did not see carriers as the major threat they would become (though mostly in the Pacific) until the Taranto raid (and even then it was mostly thought to be some sort of special case) and the sinking of Repulse and Prince of Wales off SE Asia. Even so, IJN failure to adequately train and replace pilots (in comparison to US effort) made their carriers less effective after Midway and Coral Sea.
By and large then, mental ossification was a significant factor in the panning of all Navies, and even to some extent after Taranto, Pearl, and the SE Asia sinkings. It changed, certainly in the US Navy, after the loss of all those ships at Pearl. The carriers, and the subs, were really all that was left for quite a while. The IJN had the luxury of thinking otherwise for some time. ww (talk) 03:48, 6 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Even if you do get the sources, don't just revert, actually try to improve the article, just because its a "page for conspiracy loons" doesn't mean you can't try to make it better. The Kido Butai was to the north, not the west, if you look at the map you can clearly see the Enterprise was no where near either attack force, so don't add back comments that suggest it was.
Agreement is not as important as sources that state an aircraft carrier was expendable to either military force at the time. Sorry if the image above is annoying, I don't use them much.
"doesn't mean you can't try to make it better." True, which is why the perspective is important. Saying CVs were more important doesn't do that. At the time, they weren't recognized as such. Yamamoto's oft-touted as the IJN icon of CV air, yet his screwed up dispositions at Midway were textbook Mahan. If you can explain that contradiction, I would love to hear it. (Don't even mention Nagumo; he was a]a BB sailor & b]not the sharpest knife in the drawer.) I notice also no BBs went with Nagumo to Pearl, in keeping with CF doctrine which was, had been, & would be, expecting a "decisive battle" (with BBs, by definition) near Japan as late as June 1944, despite (by then) extensive experience to the contrary. (I'll leave aside the influence of submarines, which was greater than most historiographers acknowledge or recognize; it's an old, old tune for me...)
From Trek (aka half-thimble) we have " ... I notice also no BBs went with Nagumo to Pearl, ..."
When can we expect another of those famous "I was wrong about that - again." comments, as there were two BBs in the Striking Force - (BB Hiei and BB Kirishima). [Poor chap, seems he does not know what he does not know; but, regardless, we can expect this fact not to deter him from his deletions of properly cited materials] —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.47 (talk) 11:36, 6 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
As for where Enterprise & Lexington were, we can argue how close to the K.B. either was, but surely nearer Japan than Pearl, which was the point; if the objective was to sacrifice fleet units, why weren't they held? Trekphiler (talk) 04:47, 6 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Sun Tzu said something about the basis of war is deception. I didn't think the goal was to sacrifice fleet resources but to sacrifice resources in a way to not destroy your strategic ability to win and to appear as if you were an underdog or some such. I can't explain the behavior of Yamamoto. I haven't added into the article anything about carriers being better, I don't even think I added anything, what I did do was delete information that was incorrect (sending Big E and Lex away was dangerous for them, Pearl Harbor was no safe port, and there were few safe ports to be in after Pearl Harbor) and that would lead people to believe that a ship with 2000 people on it and a cost very comparable to a battleship would be sacrificed as readily as a destroyer or other small normal scout element. If they did do that, I want to see sources to that effect for it to remain in the article. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 (talk) 06:00, 6 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Don't you revert that again, you have no sources aside from your own opinion to add that stuff in. That would be the third time and I'm a little rusty on the rules but I recall something about doing something 3 times is bad when you have nothing but your opinion backing you up. If your right get sources, if you can't find any, right it on your own website, it doesn't belong in wiki. And you can see on the map the Big E and Lex, which are at the bottom stay well away from the KB which come from the north, the closest they got was on the 6th, afterwards the KB moves far north again, west. According to a map in a book next to me they might of been close to the 3rd Submarine Squad. Probably not a threat there though, submarines rarely attacked large ships with any success and they already had a mission which they weren't going to jeopardize for a small group. And they went towards Japan in the same way that LA is towards Japan while NY isn't, the carriers always had other American properties, namely Wake and Midway, between them and Japanese properties. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 (talk) 06:18, 6 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Actually at the time of the attack it looks like Big E was pretty close to Niihau (I think, thats kinda hard to read), only a couple of islands west of Pearl Harbor. Lex is over at Midway, it then moves south on the 8th while the Kido moves north. Thats still very misleading though, most people know more about minimaps in Strategy games than Radar or whatever. I doubt single ships or small groups of ships would really be in much danger unless they were specifically being hunted by a large group with plenty of surveillance equipment (namely airfields and sea planes and submarines placed in the right spots on the sea lanes), such actions would not be feasible when trying to attack enemy possessions. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 (talk) 06:48, 6 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
<--
"you have no sources aside from your own opinion to add that stuff in." Oh, really? Let me see... Wilmott, Empires in the Balance & Barrier & the Javelin (USNIPress, 1982 & 1983); Peattie & Evans, Kaigun (USNIPress, 1997); Holmes, Undersea Victory (1966); Miller, War Plan Orange (USNIPress, 1991)(see the page, which agrees (& which I didn't write, BTW); Humble, Japanese High Seas Fleet (Ballantine, 1973) (not the strongest source, I admit, but it's handy...); Mahan, Influence of Sea Power on History (Little Brown, n.d.); Blair, Silent Victory (Lipincott, 1975) (I think); Morison's 14 volume history of USN ops in WW2; & doubtless others I haven't bothered to make a note of.
"I didn't think the goal was to sacrifice fleet resources but to sacrifice resources in a way to not destroy your strategic ability to win and to appear as if you were an underdog or some such." If that were so, the carriers would have been in harbor & the heavies at sea; risking, let alone sacrificing, BBs was totally contrary to doctrine of all major navies dating to the 1900s. It would have been stupid in '40s thinking, which is exactly why IJN refused to risk their own heavies well into 1944, expecting, anticipating "decisive battle" between BBs, contrary to the evidence. And IJN was (or so the myth goes) more progressive in use of carriers than anybody prewar.
As to "nearness", I'm happy to concede that one. It's a trivial point. In any case, if the idea is to sacrifice without excessive cost to future combat, it's the CVs, not the BBs, that would have been in harbor. They weren't. QED. Trekphiler (talk) 07:18, 6 April 2008 (UTC) (post scriptum: had the BBs been at sea, the losses would have been an order of magnitude worse... Is that evidence of conspiracy, too?)[reply]
"From Trek (aka half-thimble) we have " another insult from the peanut gallery with nothing constructive to offer. Do you spend your days looking for ways to catch me in mistakes? Or do you genuinely believe I spend hours researching every reply I make here just to avoid petty insults from the likes of you? (I'd say what I really think, but that'd be even less civil than you, & arguing with a halfwit accomplishes nothing.) You hide behind an anon account & haven't even the common manners not to break up other people's posts... Isn't that trolling? Trekphiler (talk) 14:56, 6 April 2008 (UTC) (Be glad I'm not an admin, boyo.)[reply]
" ... believe I spend hours researching every reply I make here ..." Prima facia from your many erroneous postings, even what is considered fundamental and common knowledge about Pearl Harbour (viz., the two BBs in Kido Butai), escapes you - that is, not knowing what you do not know. [Does the adage Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. - False in one thing, false in all things - apply here?] —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 15:16, 6 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Actually I am asshole, I'm not satisfied with your comments above, but I am satisfied with what you did to the article, instead of reverting everything you got rid of the garbage and you actually got sources (which I'll have to trust state somewhere that especially large and costly ships serving in the scout role are expendable). As being uncivil, up to this point I have not had a bad thought in my head while writing this, your the one with words like "conspiracy loons" in your mouth, why right on a page you think to be for the insane? And I'm not hiding, I used to have an account a long time ago and then everything in my real life fell apart and I abandoned the account and for the past little while I've been going on here and fixing little things wrong that I see, people saying things without sources backing them up, people using sources that don't make sense (for instance someone on the Order of the Dragon was using a Zulu shaman as a source for the use of the dragon in their symbols). And thats got to be the stupidest fucking quote I've ever read, nothing is so black and white that a person who is full of the wrong information can't occasionally have the right information. Theres a guy who got banned not so long ago and every edit he had done in the last while got reverted, perfectly harmless CORRECT information, references to a Chinese wiki, and then someone got banned for adding that back in, on the grounds of the idea of your quote, I weep for the world when idiots who read something cool sounding think they've become wise. What so contructive have you done, even after looking at a map (and since you seem knowledgable I'd assume you've looked at many more involving this, just as I have) you repeatdly refused to delete the Kido Butai. I see you've had some arguements about grammar, thats useful, of course it would be somewhat hypocritical of me to see a little of your work and assume it represents all of it. I got someone with more understanding of the subject to follow the fucking rules and use sources, like pulling teeth that was. I added my 2 cents here far away from the eyes of the normal reader. If you were an admin this whole project would be on its way to hell. As proof, its on its way to hell and there are plenty of admins just like you, ready to break every rule when they want and to ban people over following them, citing imagined lack of civility. (By the way, nice Schofield).
Take it offline or hang it up, guys. This particular article is what we're discussing; fragging each other isn't helping Our Gentle Reader. Binksternet (talk) 05:12, 7 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Y'know, instead of busting my balls over whether the carriers were expendable, why don't you look at Yamamoto's own orders. He told Nagumo losing half the task force's carriers was an acceptable loss rate. Also notice, IJN to the end of the war tried to conserve BBs for the "decisive battle" of Mahanian doctrine. CVs did not play a role there, & never had. Fleet doctrine was for CVs to act as scouts. That's how they were designed & operated. As scouts, they were expected to be expendable. Navies expect to lose ships in wars. That's what construction & training programs are for: to replace losses, expected losses. Callous? It's a fact. And if you think that attitude is callous, take a look at how Ralph Christie treated his subs out of Oz during the war: "playing checkers with submarines" (quoted in Blair's Silent Victory, feel free to look it up). And if I were an admin, this page would have been deleted long ago.
As for your problems elsewhere, I sympathize. I've been sniped at by anon nitwits here enough, it's hard to tell who's who, & I begin to class all the same. If that doesn't apply, my apologies. Honestly. Trekphiler (talk) 17:07, 12 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Monograph No. 97
Japanese Monograph No. 97
PEARL HARBOR OPERATIONS:
General Outline of Orders and Plans
Prepared by:
Military History Section
Headquarters, Army Forces Far East
Distributed by:
Office of the Chief of Military History
Department of the Army
[Page ii blank]
[Page iii]
FOREWORD
This monograph is a collection of pertinent Navy Orders and Directives, Combined Fleet Orders, and Carrier Striking Task Force Orders concerning the Pearl Harbor operation. Since all copies of these orders were destroyed prior to the end of the war, they have been reconstructed from personal notes and memory.
In editing, explanatory footnotes were added when deemed necessary.
19 February 1953
[Page iv blank]
[Page v]
Preface
Through Instructions No. 126 to the Japanese Government, 12 October 1945, subject: Institution for War Records Investigation, steps were initiated to exploit military historical records and official reports of the Japanese War Ministry and Japanese General Staff, and the transfer of their former functions to the Demobilization Bureau, research and compilation continued and developed into a series of historical monographs.
The paucity of original orders, plans and unit journals, which are normally essential in the preparation of this type of record, most of which were lost or destroyed during field operations or bombing raids rendered the task of compilation most difficult; particularly distressing has been the complete lack of official strength reports, normal in AG or G3 records. However, while many of the important orders, plans and estimates have been reconstructed form memory and therefore are not textually identical with the originals, they are believed to be generally accurate and reliable.
Under the supervision of the Demobilization Bureau, the basic material contained in this monograph was compiled and written in Japanese by former officers, on duty in command and staff units within major units curing the period of operations. Translation was effected through the facilities of Military Intelligence Group, G2, Headquarters, Far East Command.
[Page vi]
This Japanese Operational Monograph was rewritten in English by the Japanese Research Division, Military History Section, Headquarters, Army Forces Far East and is based on the translation of the Japanese original. Editorial corrections are limited to those necessary for coherence and accuracy.
[Page vii]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Navy Order No. 1 ......................................... 1
Navy Directive No. 1 ..................................... 1
Combined Fleet Operations Order No. 2 .................... 4
Navy Order No. 5 ......................................... 5
Navy Directive No. 5 ..................................... 6
Carrier Striking Task Force Operations Order No. 1 ....... 7
Carrier Striking Task Force Operations Order No. 3 ....... 13
Combined Fleet, Operations Order No. 5 ................... 21
Navy Order No. 9 ......................................... 22
Navy Directive No. 9 ..................................... 23
Navy Order No. 12 ........................................ 24
Verbal Directive of the Chief of the Naval General Staff . 25
Combined Fleet Telegraphic Operations Order No. 021730 ... 25
CHARTS
Chart No. 1. Disposition of Forces ....................... 9
Chart No. 2. Organization of the Air Attack Units ........ 15
APPENDIX
Appendix I. Imperial Navy's Course of Action in Operations
Against United States, Great Britain and the
Netherlands ................................... 27
MAP
Planned Track of Carrier Striking Task Force for Pearl
5 November 1941
Order to: Yamamoto, C in C, Combined Fleet
1. In view of the great possibility of being compelled to go to war against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands in the cause of self-existence and self-defense, Japan has decided to complete various operational preparations within the first ten days of December.
2. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet will make the necessary operational preparations.
3. The details of the operation shall be directed by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.
By Imperial Order
Chief of the Naval General Staff
Nagano, Osami
Navy Directive No. 1
5 November 1941
Directive to: Yamamoto, C in C, Combined Fleet
1. The Combined Fleet will advance necessary forces at a suitable time to their preparatory points to stand by for the start of operations in the event of unavoidable hostilities against America,
[Page 2]
Great Britain and the Netherlands, in the first ten days of December. [1]
2. During the above-mentioned advance, strict watch will be kept against unexpected attacks.
3. The operational policy against America, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, in case of hostilities, is scheduled as cited in the separate volume. [2]
Chief of the Naval General Staff
Nagano, Osami
Note:
Combined Fleet Operations Order No. 1 issued on 5 November 1941 and titled "Preparations for War and Commencement of Hostilities" was an 89-page volume covering all phases of war preparations. In general this order stated the following:
a. The Empire is expecting war to break out with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. When the decision is made to complete all operational preparations, orders will be issued es-
[1]. Preparatory Points
Carrier Striking Task Force Hitokappu Bay
Philippine Invasion Force Bako (Formosa)
Malay Invasion Force Camranh Bay
Main Body, Southern Force Samah (Hainan Island)
Submarine Force Kwajalein
[2]. All copies of "The Separate Volume" were destroyed prior to the end
of the war. Attached as appendix I is a reconstructed version prepared
from personal notes and memory by Capt. T. Ohmae, former Chief, Plans
Section, Naval General Staff.
[Page 3]
tablishing the approximate date (Y Day) for commencement of hostilities and announcing "First Preparations for War."
When these orders are issued, the forces will act as follows:
(1) All fleets and forces, without special orders, will organize and complete battle preparations for operations in accordance with "the Allocation of Forces for First Period Operations of First Phase Operations." When directed by respective commanding officers, they will proceed at a proper time to the pre-operation rendezvous points and wait in readiness.
(2) All forces will be on strict look-out for unexpected attacks by the U.S., British, and Netherlands forces.
(3) The commanding officers of various forces may carry out such secret reconnaissance as is necessary for the operations.
[Page 4]
Combined Fleet Operations Order No. 2
7 November 1941
Order to: Combined Fleet
First Preparations for War
Y Day 8 December. [3]
C in C, Combined Fleet
Yamamoto, Isoroku
[3]. This order was issued by C in C, Combined Fleet, after he had
received verbal notification from Chief, Naval General Staff, that 8
December had been tentatively selected as "Y" Day.
[Page 5]
Navy Order No. 5
21 November 1941
Order to: Yamamoto, C in C, Combined Fleet
1. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet will dispatch at an appropriate time the necessary forces for the execution of operations to positions of readiness. [4]
2. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet is empowered to use force in self-defense in case his fleet is challenged by American, British or Dutch forces during the process of carrying out military preparations.
3. The details concerned will be directed by the Chief of the Naval General Staff. [5]
By Imperial Order
Chief of the Naval General Staff
Nagano Osami
[4]. So-called positions of readiness were designated operational sea
areas. They were as follows:
Southern Force (2nd, 3rd and South China Sea
Southern Expeditionary Fleets) (Elements in Western
Caroline Area)
South Seas Force (4th Fleet) Inner South Seas Area
Northern Force (5th Fleet) Kurile Area
Submarine Force (6th Fleet) Hawaiian Sea Area
Carrier Striking Task Force Hawaiian Sea Area
(1st Air Fleet)
Commerce Destruction Force Indian Ocean
Land Based Air Force (11th Air Fleet) Formosa, French Indo-
China and Palau
[5]. On the same day C in C, Combined Fleet, issued the necessary orders
for dispatch of forces to the designated operational sea areas. Time of
departure was left to the discretion of respective force commanders.
[Page 6]
Navy Directive No. 5
21 November 1941
Directive to: Yamamoto, C in C, Combined Fleet
1. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet will immediately assemble and call back the operational units if the Japanese-American negotiation is successful.
2. The exercise of military authority cited in the Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 5 will be effected in the event the American, British, or Dutch naval forces invade our territorial waters and carry out reconnaissance, or approach our territorial waters and their move is recognized to be threatening, or an aggressive act is taken to endanger us even beyond our territorial waters.
Chief of the Naval General Staff
Nagano, Osami
[Page 7]
Carrier Striking Task Force Operations Order No. 1 [6]
23 November 1941
To: Carrier Striking Task Force
1. The Carrier Striking Task Force will proceed to the Hawaiian Area with utmost secrecy and, at the outbreak of the war, will launch a resolute surprise attack on and deal a fatal blow to the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area. The initial air attack is scheduled at 0330 hours, X Day. Upon completion of the air attacks, the Task Force will immediately withdraw and return to Japan and, after taking on new supplies, take its position for Second Period Operations. In the event that, during this operation, an enemy fleet attempts to intercept our force or a powerful enemy force is encountered and there is danger of attack, the Task Force will launch a counterattack.
2. The disposition of Force will be as shown on Chart 1.
3. The Operation of Each Force.
a. General
While exercising strict antiaircraft and antisubmarine measures and making every effort to conceal its position and movements, the entire force (except the Midway Bombardment Unit) in accordance with special orders will depart as a group from Hitokappu Bay at a speed of 12-14 knots. The force refueling en route whenever possible will arrive at the standby point (42 N, 165 W). In the event bad weather prevents refueling en route to the standby point, the screening unit will be
[6]. General outline.
[Page 8]
MAP: Planned Track of Carrier Striking Force For Pearl Harbor Attack.
ordered to return to the home base. Subsequent to the issuance of the order designating X Day (the day of the outbreak of hostilities), the force will proceed to the approaching point (32 N, 157 W).
[Page 11]
Around 0700 hours, X-1 Day the Task Force will turn southward at high speed (approximately 24 knots) from the vicinity of the approaching point. It will arrive at the take-off point (200 nautical miles north of the enemy fleet anchorage) at 0100 hours X Day (0530 Honolulu time) and commit the entire air strength to attack the enemy fleet and important airfields on Oahu.
Upon completion of the air attacks, the Task Force will assemble the aircraft, skirt 800 nautical miles north of Midway, return about X + 15 Day to the western part of the Inland Sea via the assembly point (30 N, 165 E) and prepare for Second Period Operations. In the event of a fuel shortage the Task Force will proceed to Truk via the assembly point.
The force may skirt near Midway in the event that consideration of an enemy counter-attack is unnecessary due to successful air attacks or if such action is necessitated by fuel shortage.
In this event, the 5th Carrier Division with the support of the Kirishima from the 3rd Battleship Division will leave the Task Force on the night of X Day or the early morning of X + 1 Day and carry out air attacks on Midway in the early morning of X + 2 Day.
If a powerful enemy force intercepts our return route, the Task Force will break through the Hawaiian Islands area southward and proceed to the Marshall Islands.
b. Patrol unit
The patrol unit will accompany the main force. In the event the screening unit is returned to the home base, the patrol unit
[Page 12]
will screen the advance of the main force and the launching and the landing of aircraft. After the air attacks, the patrol unit will station itself between the flank of the main force and the enemy. In the event of an enemy fleet sortie, the patrol unit will shadow the enemy and in a favorable situation attack him.
c. The Midway Bombardment Unit
The Midway Bombardment Unit will depart from Tokyo Bay around X-6 Day and, after refueling, secretly approach Midway. It will arrive on the night of X Day and shell the air base. The unit will then withdraw and, after refueling, return to the western part of the Inland Sea. The oiler Shiriya will accompany the bombardment unit on this mission and will be responsible for the refueling operation.
d. Supply Force
The supply force will accompany the main force to the approaching point, carrying out refuelings, separate from the main force, skirt 800 nautical miles north of Midway, return to the assembly point by 0800 hours, X +6 Day, and stand by.
4. The Task Force may suspend operations en route to the Hawaiian area and return to Hitokappu Bay, Hokkaido or Mutsu Bay, depending upon the situation.
Commander
Carrier Striking Task Force
Nagumo, Chuichi
[Page 13]
Carrier Striking Task Force Operations Order No. 3 [7]
23 November 1941
To: Carrier Striking Task Force
The Hawaiian operations air attack plan has been decided as follows:
1. The Operation of the Air Attack Forces
The force will be 700 nautical miles due north of point Z (set at the western extremity of the Island of Lanai) at 0600 hours X-1 Day and advance on a course of 180 degrees from 0700 hours X-1 Day at an increased speed of 24 knots.
Air attacks will be carried out by launching the first attack units 230 nautical miles due north of Z point at 0130 hours X Day, and the second attack unit at 200 nautical miles due north of Z point at 0245 hours.
After the launching of the second attack units is completed, the task force will withdraw northward at a speed of about 24 knots. The first attack units are scheduled to return between 0530 and 0600 hours and the second attack units are scheduled to return between 0645 and 0715 hours.
Immediately after the return of the first and second attack units, preparations for the next attack will be completed. At this time, carrier attack planes capable of carrying torpedoes will be armed with such as long as the supply lasts.
[7]. General outline.
[Page 14]
If the destruction of enemy land-based air strength progresses favorably, repeated attacks will be made immediately and thus decisive results will be achieved.
In the event that a powerful enemy surface fleet appears, it will be attacked.
2. Organization of the Air Attack Units
(see Chart 2)
3. Targets
a. The First Attack Units
The targets for the first group will be limited to about four battleships and four aircraft carriers; the order of targets will be battleships and then aircraft carriers.
The second group will attack the enemy land-based air strength according to the following assignment:
The 15 Attack Unit: Hangars and aircraft on Ford Island
The 16 Attack Unit: Hangars and aircraft on Wheeler Field
The targets of Fighter Combat Units will be enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground.
b. The Second Attack Units
The first group will attack the enemy air bases according to the following assignment:
The 5 Attack Unit: Aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island and Barbers Point.
The 6 Attack Unit: Hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field.
The targets for the second group will be limited to four
[Page 15]
Chart 2
Organization of the Air Attack Units
1st Attack Units CO Commander Fuchida
1st Group CO do
1st Attack Unit CO do
15 Kates each fitted with a 800-kg Armor Piercing Bomb for
level (high altitude) bombing.
2nd Attack Unit CO Lt Cmdr Hashiguchi
15 Kates-Same bombs as 1st Attack Unit.
3rd Attack Unit CO Lt Abe
10 Kates-Same bombs as 1st Attack Unit.
4th Attack Unit CO Lt Cmdr Kusmi
10 Kates-Same bombs as 1st Attack Unit.
1st Torpedo Attack Unit CO Lt Cmdr Murata
12 Kates each fitted with an Aerial Torpedo, Mark 91.
2nd Torpedo Attack Unit CO Lt Kitajima
12 Kates-Same torpedoes as 1st Torpedo Attack Unit.
3rd Torpedo Attack Unit CO Lt Nagai
8 Kates-Same torpedoes as 1st Torpedo Attack Unit.
4th Torpedo Attack Unit CO Lt Matsumura
8 Kates-Same torpedoes as 1st Torpedo Attack Unit.
2nd Group CO Lt Cmdr Takahashi
15th Attack Unit CO do
27 Vals each fitted with a 250-kg Anti-ground (general purpose)
bomb for dive bombing.
16th Attack Unit CO Lt Sakamoto
27 Vals-Same bomb as 15th Attack Unit.
3rd Group CO Lt Cmdr Itaya
1st Fighter Combat Unit CO do
9 Zekes for air control and strafing
2nd Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Shiga
9 Zekes-Same Mission
3rd Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Suganami
9 Zekes-Same Mission
4th Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Okajima
6 Zekes-Same Mission
5th Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Sato
6 Zekes-Same Mission
6th Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Kaneko
6 Zekes-Same Mission
2nd Attack Units
1st Group CO Lt Cmdr Shimazaki
6th Attack Unit CO do
27 Kates each fitted with a 250-kg Anti-ground (general purpose
bomb and six 60-kg Ordinary bombs for level (high altitude)
bombing.
5th Attack Unit CO Lt Ichihara
27 Kates-Same bombs as 6th Attack Unit
[Page 16]
Chart 2 (Cont'd)
2nd Group CO Lt Cmdr Egusa
13th Attack Unit CO do
18 Vals each fitted with a 250-kg Ordinary bomb for dive bombing.
14th Attack Unit CO Lt Kobayashi
18 Vals-Same bombs as 13th Attack Unit
11th Attack Unit CO Lt Chihaya
18 Vals-Same bombs as 13th Attack Unit
12th Attack Unit CO Lt Makino
18 Vals-Same bombs as 13th Attack Unit
3rd Group CO Lt Shindo
1st Fighter Combat Unit CO do
9 Zekes for air control and strafing
2nd Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Nikaido
9 Zekes-Same Mission
3rd Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Iida
9 Zekes-Same Mission
4th Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Kumano
9 Zekes-Same Mission
[Page 17]
or five enemy aircraft carriers. If the number of targets is insufficient, they will select targets in the order of cruisers and battleships.
The Fighter Combat Units will attack the enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground.
4. Attack Procedure
a. The First Attack Units
(1) With the element of surprise as the principle, attacks will be carried out by the torpedo unit and bomber unit of the First Group, and then the Second Group.
(2) During the initial phase of the attack, the Fighter Combat Units will, in one formation, storm the enemy skies about the same time as the First Group, and contact and destroy chiefly the enemy interceptor planes.
In the event that no enemy aircraft are encountered in the air, the units will immediately shift to the strafing of parked aircraft as follows:
1st and 2nd Fighter Combat Units: Ford Island and Hickam Field.
3rd and 4th Fighter Combat Units: Wheeler Field and Barbers Point.
5th and 6th Fighter Combat Units: Kaneohe
(3) In the event that the advantage of surprise attack cannot be expected due to strict enemy security, the
[Page 18]
approach and attack will be made in the order of the Fighter Combat Units, Dive Bombing Units, Horizontal Bombing Units and the Torpedo Attacking Units.
b. The Second Attack Units
All units will storm the enemy skies almost simultaneously and launch the attacks.
Although the general outline of the operations of the Fighter Combat Units corresponds to that of the First Attack Units, the strafing will be carried out according to the following in case there are no enemy aircraft in the air.
1st and 2nd Fighter Combat Units: Ford Island and Hickam Field
3rd and 4th Fighter Combat Units: Wheeler Field and Kaneohe
c. The general outline of attack in the event that enemy aircraft carriers and the main body of the U.S. Fleet are in anchorages outside Pearl Harbor are:
(1) The organization and targets are the same as mentioned above. The First Attack Units of the First Group, however, will increase the number of torpedo bombers as much as possible.
(2) Escorted by the Fighter Combat Units, the Air Attack Units will proceed in a group and attack the designated targets in the order of the enemy fleet anchorages and the Island of Oahu. If attacks on
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the enemy fleet anchorages progress favorably, however, the Fighter Combat Units and the 2nd Group of the First Air Attack Unit will immediately proceed to the Island of Oahu. Upon completion of the attacks, the anchorage attack unit will return directly to the carriers.
d. Rendezvous for Return to Carriers
(1) The rendezvous point will be 20 nautical miles at 340 degrees from the western extremity (Kaena Point) of the Island of Oahu. The rendezvous altitude will be 1,000 meters. (If this vicinity is covered with clouds, it will be below the cloud ceiling.)
(2) The Attack Units will wait at the rendezvous point for about 30 minutes and return to their carriers, after being joined by the Fighter Combat Units.
(3) While returning to carriers, the Fighter Combat Unit will become the rear guards for the whole unit and intercept any enemy pursuit.
5. Reconnaissance
a. Pre-operation Reconnaissance
Pre-operation reconnaissance will not be carried out unless otherwise ordered.
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b. Immediate Pre-attack Reconnaissance
Two reconnaissance seaplanes of the 8th Cruiser Division will take off at 0030 hours, X Day, secretly reconnoiter Pearl Harbor and Lahaina Anchorage and report the presence of the enemy fleet (chiefly carriers and the main body of the fleet).
c. Scouting Patrol
The reconnaissance seaplanes of the 8th Cruiser Division will take off at 0300 hours and will carry out an extensive search of the waters between the enemy and the friendly forces and the waters adjacent to the two channels situated to the east and west of the Island of Oahu. They will observe and report the presence and activities of the enemy sortie force and enemy aircraft on counter-attack missions.
d. Before returning to its carrier, after the attack, an element of fighters designated by the Fighter Combat Unit Commander will fly as low and as fast as circumstances permit and observe and determine the extent of damage inflicted upon the enemy aircraft and ships.
Air Security Disposition No. 1 Method B will be followed from one hour before sunrise until 45 minutes after sunset on the day of the air attack. [8]
Commander
Carrier Striking Task Force
Nagumo, Chuichi
[8] This Security Disposition called for combat air cover over the
carriers.
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Combined Fleet, Operations Order No. 5 (General Outline)
25 November 1941
Order to: Carrier Striking Task Force
The Carrier Striking Task Force will immediately complete taking on supplies and depart with utmost secrecy from Hitokappu Bay on 26 November and advance to the standby point (42 N, 170 W) by the evening of 3 December.
Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet
Yamamoto, Isoroku
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Navy Order No. 9
1 December 1941
Order to: Yamamoto, C in C, Combined Fleet
1. Japan has decided to open hostilities against the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands early in December.
2. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet will smash the enemy fleets and air forces in the Orient and at the same time will intercept and annihilate enemy fleets should they come to attack us.
3. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined fleet will occupy immediately the key bases of the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands in East Asia in close cooperation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army and will capture and secure the key areas of the southern regions.
4. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined fleet will cooperate with the operations of the China Area Fleet, if necessary.
5. The time of the start of operations based on the aforementioned items will be made known later.
6. The Chief of the Naval General Staff will issue instructions concerning particulars.
By Imperial Order
Chief of the Naval General Staff
Nagano, Osami
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Navy Directive No. 9
1 December 1941
Directive to: Yamamoto, C in C, Combined Fleet
Operations of the Combined Fleet against American, England and Holland will be conducted in accordance with the Separate Volume, Imperial Navy's Course of Action in Operations against United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands.
Chief of the Naval General Staff
Nagano, Osami
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Navy Order No. 12
2 December 1941
Order to: Yamamoto, C in C, Combined Fleet
1. As of 8 December the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet will start military operations in accordance with Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 9.
2. Military operations will be launched against the Netherlands at an opportune time after attacking the United States and Great Britain.
By Imperial Order
Chief of the Naval General Staff
Nagano, Osami
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Verbal Directive of the Chief of the Naval General Staff
2 December 1941
Verbal Directive to: Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet (in Tokyo at the time)
Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostilities, it is understood that all elements of the Combined Fleet are to be assembled and returned to their bases in accordance with separate orders.
Chief of the Naval General Staff
Nagano, Osami
Combined Fleet Telegraphic Operations Order No. 021730
(Date and time of dispatch)
Imperial Navy's Course of Action in Operations Against
United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands
(Attached to Navy Directives No. 1 and No. 9)
I. Outline of Operations
Continue control over China Coast and Yangtze River.
Quickly destroy enemy fleet and air power in East Asia.
Occupy and hold strategic points in Southern Area.
Destroy enemy fleet.
Consolidate strength to hold out for a long time and destroy enemy's will to fight.
II. Combined Fleet Course of Action
(a) The First Phase of Operations
1. With the forces of the Second Fleet, Third Fleet, First Expeditionary Fleet and Eleventh Air Fleet as a nucleus destroy enemy fleets and air forces in the Philippines, British Malay, and Netherlands Indies. In cooperation with the Army, take the initiative in attacks on air forces and fleets in the Philippines and Malaya. Push forward our bases by landing advance troops. Then with main body of invasion forces occupy the Philippines and Malaya.
In early stages of operations, first occupy British Borneo and then as quickly as possible occupy Dutch Borneo, Celebes and Southern Sumatra. The above to be followed by occupation of Molucca Islands and Timor. Established air bases in all of
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the above-mentioned places. Utilize the air bases for subjugation of Java and then occupy Java. After capture of Singapore, occupy northern Sumatra and then at an opportune time commence operations in Burma. Cut supply routes to China.
2. Forces of the Fourth Fleet.
Patrol, maintain surface communications, and defend the South Sea Islands. Capture Wake. At opportune time attack and destroy enemy advance bases in the South Pacific Area. In cooperation with Army capture Guam and then at an opportune time Bismarck Area.
3. Forces of the Fifth Fleet.
Patrol the area east of the home islands. Make preparations against surprise attacks by enemy. Make reconnaissance of Aleutians and defend Bonin Islands. Maintain surface communications. Be on guard against Soviet Russia.
4. Forces of the Sixth Fleet. (Submarines)
Make reconnaissance of American Fleet in Hawaii and West Coast areas and, by surprise attacks on shipping, destroy lines of communications.
5. Forces of First Air Fleet. (Carriers)
Hawaiian attack. Thereafter support Fourth Fleet operations and assist in capture of Southern areas.
6. Main Body of Combined Fleet.
Support operations in general. Operate according to the situation.
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7. Part of Combined Fleet. (24th Commercial Destruction Unit)
Destroy enemy lines of communication in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
(b) Second Phase of Operations.
1. Forces of Sixth Fleet. (Submarines)
Make reconnaissance and surprise attacks on main forces of enemy fleet. Destroy enemy surface communications in cooperation with a part of Combined Fleet. At opportune time make surprise attacks on enemy advanced bases.
2. Forces of First and Eleventh Air Fleets. (Carriers and Land-Based Air Forces)
Search for and attack enemy forces. Destroy enemy advanced bases.
3. Forces of Third Fleet, First Expeditionary Fleet and Other Forces as Necessary.
Defend occupied key areas in Southern area. Operate patrols, maintain surface communications, search for and destroy enemy shipping in Southern Area, attack and destroy enemy advanced bases on our perimeter.
4. Forces of Fourth Fleet.
Defend and patrol points in South Seas Islands and Bismarcks. Maintain surface communications. Search for and attack enemy shipping. Make surprise attacks and destroy enemy bases on our perimeter.
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5. Forces of Fifth Fleet
Defend Bonin Islands and patrol area to north of those islands and east of home islands. Maintain surface communications. Search for and attack enemy fleet should it appear in the area. Attack and destroy enemy bases in the Aleutians.
6. Part of Combined Fleet. (24th Commercial Destruction Unit)
Destroy enemy surface communications in Pacific and Indian Oceans.
7. Main Body of Combined Fleet.
Support all operations. Operate as required.
8. In case of attack by strong American Force.
A part of the Sixth Fleet will maintain contact with the enemy. Reduce enemy strength by air and submarine attacks. At suitable opportunity assemble major portion of Combined Fleet and destroy enemy.
9. In case of attack by strong British Force.
By movement the Third Fleet, Fourth Fleet, First Expeditionary Fleet, Air Force, and Submarine Squadrons will maintain contact with enemy force and destroy it by concerted attacks. The main body of Combined Fleet, depending upon the strength, movement and location of American Fleet, will also be used in destruction of the British Fleet.
10. The important places to be defended among the points which were to be occupied were as follows:
Continue operations against China. Cooperate with the Army in destruction of United States and British forces in China. Second China Fleet cooperate with Army in capture of Hong Kong and destruction of enemy forces there. Maintain surface communications along China coast. Prevent enemy from using China coast. Cooperate with Combined Fleet and Army in operations. (Escort of surface transport and defense of assembly points.)
IV. Operations of Naval District and Auxiliary Naval Station Forces
Defend assigned areas. Maintain surface communications in assigned areas. Cooperate with Combined Fleet and China Area Fleet in operations affecting assigned areas.
" ... why don't you look at Yamamoto's own orders. He told Nagumo losing half the task force's carriers was an acceptable loss rate."
Take it up with, oh, Willmott, I think (without it in front of me, I can't say for sure), not with me. And don't forget Nagumo'd've gotten verbal orders, too. Trekphiler (talk) 14:20, 14 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
H. P. Willmott did not post. You did. You did not provide a citation. So, " ... why don't you look at Yamamoto's own orders." yourself - including your now infantile dodge of those "verbal". Is this another of your "I think ..." stellar contributions being plainly demonstrated?
