Houston riot of 1917

The Houston Riot of 1917 was a mutiny by one hundred and fifty black soldiers of the Third Battalion of the (black) Twenty-fourth United States Infantry. It lasted one afternoon, and resulted in the deaths of four soldiers and fifteen civilians. The rioters were tried at three courts-martial. Fourteen were executed, and forty-one were given life sentences.

Preliminary situation

In the spring of 1917, shortly after the United States declared war on Germany, the War Department, taking advantage of the temperate climate and newly opened Houston Ship Channel, ordered two military installations built in Harris County —- Camp Logan and Ellington Field. To guard the construction site for Camp Logan, on July 27, 1917, the army ordered the Third Battalion of the black Twenty-fourth United States Infantry to travel by train with seven white officers from the regimental encampment at Columbus, New Mexico, to Houston. From the outset, the black contingent faced racial discrimination when they received passes to go into the city. Those individuals responsible for keeping order, especially the police, streetcar conductors, and public officials, viewed the presence of black soldiers as a threat to racial harmony. Many Houstonians thought that if the black soldiers were shown the same respect as white soldiers, black residents of the city might come to expect similar treatment.

Black soldiers were willing to abide by the legal restrictions imposed by segregated practices, but they resented the manner in which the laws were enforced. Some police officers regularly harassed African Americans, both soldiers and civilians. Rather than confront the growing tension caused by Houstonian authorities' racism, Army commanders sought ways to keep the enlisted men at the camp, though the black soldiers disliked this exchange of their freedom for racial peace.

Precipitating causes

Around noon, on August 23, 1917, two Houston policemen detained a black American soldier for interfering with their detention and questioning of a black American woman. Early in the afternoon, Corporal Charles Baltimore went to the station to inquire about the soldier's arrest, and was confronted by policemen, one of whom hit Baltimore over the head. Baltimore attempted to flee, but the police fired at Baltimore three times, chased him into an unoccupied house, and took him to police headquarters. Though he was later released, a rumor quickly reached Camp Logan that Baltimore had been shot and killed.

News of these events reached the Third Battalion around the same time as a rumor that an armed mob of white citizens was heading in their direction.

The riot

The Battalion organized under Sgt. Vida Henry of I Company and moved out, hoping to quell any local insurgency. Thus began what would become known as the Houston Riot of 1917. Sergeant Henry led about one hundred and fifty black soldiers in a two-hour march on the City of Houston. The soldiers were met by local policemen and a great crowd of Houston residents who had armed themselves. When the group killed Captain J.W. Mattes, of the Illinois National Guard (after mistaking him for a local policeman), the Battalion fell into disarray and Sgt. Henry shot himself, distraught over having killed another serviceman. In their two-hour march on the city, the Battalion killed fifteen armed whites, including four policemen, and seriously wounded twelve others, one of whom, a policeman, subsequently died. Four black soldiers also died. Two were accidentally shot by their own men, one in camp and the other on San Felipe Street.

See also: History of the Houston Police Department

Immediate aftermath

Martial law was declared in Houston and the 24th Infantry was removed from Fort Sam Houston to Columbus, New Mexico, and, eventually, the Philippines. On the way, seven soldiers agreed to testify in exchange for clemency.

Almost two hundred witnesses testified across twenty-two days and left a record of over two thousand pages. Professor Haynes suggests that General John Wilson Ruckman was “especially anxious for the courts-martial to begin” (p. 251). Ruckman had preferred that the proceedings take place in El Paso, but eventually agreed to allow them to remain in San Antonio. Haynes writes that the decision was made to accommodate many of the witnesses who lived in Houston and “the countless spectators” who were interested in following the proceedings (p. 254). Ruckman also “urged” the War Department to select a “prestigious court” (p. 255). Eventually, three brigadier generals were chosen, along with seven colonels and three lieutenant colonels. Eight of the members were West Point graduates. The court also featured an admirable geographic balance between northerners, southerners and westerners.

The Departmental Judge Advocate General, Colonel George Dunn, reviewed the record of the first court martial that followed the Houston Riot (also known as “the Nesbit Case.”) and approved the sentences. He then forwarded materials to Ruckman on December 3. On December 9, thirteen of the prisoners were told that they would be hanged, but were not informed of the time or place (p.3). Evidently, the court recommended clemency for one Private Hudson, but General Ruckman declined to extend such.

The first hanging

The condemned soldiers (one sergeant, four corporals, and eight privates) were transferred to a barracks on December 10. Later, that evening, motor trucks carried new lumber for scaffolds to some bathhouses built for the soldiers at Camp Travis near a swimming pool in the Salado Creek. The designated place of execution was a few hundred yards away. Army engineers completed their grim work by the light of bonfires. The thirteen troops were awakened and brought to the place of execution at five in the morning. They were hanged, simultaneously, one minute before sunrise, at seven seventeen. The scaffolds were then disassembled and every piece was carried back to Fort Sam Houston. The New York Times, impressed by the clean-up operations, observed the place of execution and place of burial were “indistinguishable.” Only army officers and County Sheriff John Tobin had witnessed the affair.

Haynes notes General Ruckman “announced the verdicts and executions” at nine o’clock in the morning to a small group of “surprised and highly annoyed” newspapermen. Most of them had been fooled by a rumor that the hangings would take place at Camp Stanley, thirty miles north of San Antonio (p. 7). Professor Haynes writes that the rumor was “obviously planted by military authorities” and concludes that, while it was “ostensibly designed for security purposes,” it was also “calculated” to “infuriate” black Americans and “to please” white citizens (pp. 7, 273).

Ruckman told reporters that he had personally approved the death sentences and announced that forty-one men were given life sentences and four others received sentences of two and a half years or less. He also informed newspapermen that it was he who has selected the time and place for the hangings (p. 7). Weiner’s 1989 law review articles point out that what Ruckman had done in the first court martial was “entirely legal” and “in complete conformity” with the 1916 Articles of War. Indeed this conclusion was generally reported in the nation’s newspapers.

Second court martial

Six days later, a second court martial (also known as “the Washington Case”) began. This time, fifteen men of the Lower A Division were tried and five of them were sentenced to hang. On January 2, 1918, Ruckman approved of the verdicts and sentences in a public statement. A new rule - General Orders No. 167, dated December 29, 1917 - prohibited the execution of any death sentence until after review by the Judge Advocate General’s Office. Just over two weeks after Ruckman approved of the verdicts in the second court martial, the War Department also issued General Orders No. 7 requiring that – as a matter of policy - all death sentences be suspended until the President of the United States could officially review all records. It is almost certain that Major General Ruckman was aware that this order was in the making and/or coming down the line. The Washington Post now reported that representatives from the New York branch of the NAACP had presented a petition to President Wilson to extend clemency to the five soldiers recently sentenced to hang. This time, the Commander of the Southern Department waited until both the Secretary of War and President Woodrow Wilson could review the case.

Meanwhile, Ruckman approved the holding of a third court martial (also known as “the Tillman Case”) to try another forty men. Haynes suggests the announcement of the third trial encouraged President Woodrow Wilson to wait to review records until all of the verdicts were in for the Houston Riot cases. On March 26, twenty-three soldiers were found guilty. Eleven were sentenced to hang and the other twelve were sentenced to life in prison. On May 2, Ruckman approved the sentences.

Wilson's clemency and commentary

On August 31, President Wilson granted clemency to ten soldiers by commuting their death sentences to life in prison. But Wilson also issued a rare public statement in order that the basis of his action might be “a matter of record.”

The President’s statement began by recounting the events that led to the deaths of “innocent bystanders” who were “peaceable disposed civilians of the City of Houston.” He noted the investigations that followed were “very searching and thorough.” In each of the three proceedings, the court was “properly constituted” and composed of “officers of experience and sobriety of judgment.” Wilson also noted “extraordinary precautions” were taken to “insure the fairness of the trials” and, in each instance, the rights of the defendants were “surrounded at every point” by the “safeguards” of “a humane administration of the law.” As a result, there were “no legal errors” which had “prejudiced the rights of the accused.”

Wilson then stated that he affirmed the death sentences of six soldiers because there was “plain evidence” that they “deliberately” engaged in “shocking brutality.” On the other hand, the President commuted the remaining sentences because he believed the “lesson” of the lawless riot had already been “adequately pointed.” He also desired that the “splendid loyalty” of African American troops be recognized and expressed his hope that clemency would inspire others of that race “to further zeal and service to the country.”

Most importantly, from General Ruckman’s standpoint, Wilson wrote that the actions taken by the former Commander of the Southern Department were “legal and justified by the record.” Indeed, the President agreed that “a stern redress” of the rioters’ “wrongs” was the “surest protection of society against their further recurrence.”

Thus, on September 29, 1918, five more troops were hanged at daybreak. One week later, a sixth was marched to the gallows.

References

• Wiener, Colonel Frederick Bernays. 1989. “The Seamy Side of the World War I Court Martial Controversy.” 123 Military Law Review 109 (Winter).
• Wiener, Colonel Frederick Bernays. 1989. “American Military Law in Light of the First Mutiny Act’s Tri-centennial.” 126 Military Law Review 1 (Fall).

External links

• Handbook of Texas Online Brief Overview
• John Wilson Ruckman Bio
• "Buffalo Bayou An Echo of Houston's Wilderness Beginnings: The Tragic Violence Along Buffalo Bayou in 1917" Detailed recounting at Hal-PC (Houston Area League of PC Users) By Louis F. Aulbach
• History of Houston Police Department
• Lyrics to song 'The Houston Riot of 1917,' by JOE DOLCE, from THE LEADBELLY BALLAD NOVEL, 2008.)