Frye standard: Difference between revisions
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== Court Statement == |
== Court Statement == |
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"Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in admitting experimental testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." |
"Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in admitting experimental testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." |
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== Definition == |
== Definition == |
Revision as of 17:51, 16 September 2008
The Frye standard is a legal precedent in the United States regarding the admissibility of scientific examinations or experiments in legal proceedings. This standard comes from the case Frye vs. United States (293 F. 1013 (DC Cir 1923)) District of Columbia Circuit Court in 1923, regarding the admissibility of polygraph evidence into court. In most but not all jurisdictions, the Frye standard has been superseded by the Daubert standard.
Court Statement
"Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in admitting experimental testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."
Definition
To meet the Frye standard, scientific evidence presented to the court must be interpreted by the court as "generally accepted" by a meaningful segment of the associated scientific community. This applies to procedures, principles or techniques that may be presented in the proceedings of a court case.
In practical application of this standard, those who were proponents of a particular scientific issue had to provide a number of experts to speak to the validity of the science behind the issue in question.
Novel techniques, placed under the scrutiny of this standard forced courts to examine papers, books and judice precedence on the subject at hand to make determinations as to the reliability and "general acceptance."
Commentary
While Daubert has superseded Frye, we and the standard of Daubert is not substantially different. While the focus of the inquiry has changed, the result rarely does. Accordingly, the Daubert standard is occasionally referred to as "Frye in drag."[1]
Difficulty in the application of this standard has produced questions about whether or not the standard is flexible enough to adapt to truly new and novel scientific issues, where "general" or "widespread" acceptance may not yet be garnered.
As an alternative to this standard, the courts have generally adopted Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as the primary for expert testimony and scientific evidence.
See also
- Daubert standard, a later precedent for the admissibility on expert testimony.
References
- ^ See Paul Rice, Evidence: Common Law and Federal Rules of Evidence
External links
- Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Under Daubert (compares the Daubert and Frye standards, and their usage in different parts of the U.S.)