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The "hedge borrower" is one who borrows with the intent of making debt payments from cash flows from other investments; the "speculative borrower" who borrows based on the belief that the appreciation of the value of the assets (e.g. real estate) will be sufficient to refinance or pay-off their debt but who does not have sufficient resources to repay the original loan, otherwise; and the "Ponzi borrower" (named for [[Charles Ponzi]], see also [[Ponzi scheme]]) who relies on continually rolling over the principal into new investments.
The "hedge borrower" is one who borrows with the intent of making debt payments from cash flows from other investments; the "speculative borrower" who borrows based on the belief that the appreciation of the value of the assets (e.g. real estate) will be sufficient to refinance or pay-off their debt but who does not have sufficient resources to repay the original loan, otherwise; and the "Ponzi borrower" (named for [[Charles Ponzi]], see also [[Ponzi scheme]]) who relies on continually rolling over the principal into new investments.

In his own words
"Three distinct income-debt relations for economic units, which are labeled as hedge, speculative, and Ponzi finance, can be identified. Hedge financing units are those which can fulfill all of their contractual payment obligations by their cash flows: the greater the weight of equity financing in the liability structure, the greater the likelihood that the unit is a hedge financing unit. Speculative finance units are units that can meet their payment commitments on 'income account' on their liabilities, even as they cannot repay the principal out of income cash flows. Such units need to 'roll over' their liabilities — issue new debt to meet commitments on maturing debt. For Ponzi units, the cash flows from operations are not sufficient to fill either the repayment of principal or the interest on outstanding debts by their cash flows from operations. Such units can sell assets or borrow. Borrowing to pay interest or selling assets to pay interest (and even dividends) on common stocks lowers the equity of a unit, even as it increases liabilities and the prior commitment of future incomes.

It can be shown that if hedge financing dominates, then the economy may well be an equilibrium-seeking and containing system. In contrast, the greater the weight of speculative and Ponzi finance, the greater the likelihood that the economy is a deviation-amplifying system. The first theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that the economy has financing regimes under which it is stable, and financing regimes in which it is unstable. The second theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that over periods of prolonged prosperity, the economy transits from financial relations that make for a stable system to financial relations that make for an unstable system.

In particular, over a protracted period of good times, capitalist economies tend to move to a financial structure in which there is a large weight to units engaged in speculative and Ponzi finance. Furthermore, if an economy is in an inflationary state, and the authorities attempt to exorcise inflation by monetary constraint, then speculative units will become Ponzi units and the net worth of previously Ponzi units will quickly evaporate. Consequently, units with cash flow shortfalls will be forced to try to make positions by selling out positions. This is likely to lead to a collapse of asset values."


Minsky was also identified as one of very few authors who (with [[Donald Markwell]]) discussed Keynes's belief that his economics was likely to be more conducive to peace than the old economic system had been.<ref>Hyman P Minsky, ''John Maynard Keynes'', Columbia University Press, 1975. [[Donald Markwell]], ''John Maynard Keynes and International Relations: Economic Paths to War and Peace'', Oxford University Press, 2006. [http://hypocrisy.com/2008/11/23/tanya-white-reminds-us-of-economist-keynes-paths-to-peace/]</ref>
Minsky was also identified as one of very few authors who (with [[Donald Markwell]]) discussed Keynes's belief that his economics was likely to be more conducive to peace than the old economic system had been.<ref>Hyman P Minsky, ''John Maynard Keynes'', Columbia University Press, 1975. [[Donald Markwell]], ''John Maynard Keynes and International Relations: Economic Paths to War and Peace'', Oxford University Press, 2006. [http://hypocrisy.com/2008/11/23/tanya-white-reminds-us-of-economist-keynes-paths-to-peace/]</ref>

Revision as of 03:00, 19 February 2009

Hyman Minsky
NationalityAmerican
Academic career
FieldMacroeconomics
School or
tradition
Post-Keynesian economics
InfluencesJoseph Schumpeter
Wassily Leontief
ContributionsMinsky moment

Hyman Minsky (September 23, 1919, Chicago, Illinois – October 24, 1996), was an American economist and professor of economics at Washington University in St. Louis. His research attempted to provide an understanding and explanation of the characteristics of financial crises. Minsky was sometimes described as a Keynesian because he supported some government intervention in financial markets and opposed some of the popular deregulation policies in the 1980s, and argued against the accumulation of debt. His research, nevertheless, endeared him to Wall Street. [1]

Education

Minsky received a bachelor of science degree from the University of Chicago. He went on to earn a master's degree in public administration and a doctorate from Harvard University, where he studied under Joseph Schumpeter and Wassily Leontief.

Financial theory

Dr. Minsky proposed theories linking financial market fragility, in the normal life cycle of an economy, with speculative investment bubbles endogenous to financial markets. Minsky claimed that in prosperous times, when corporate cash flow rises beyond what is needed to pay off debt, a speculative euphoria develops, and soon thereafter debts exceed what borrowers can pay off from their incoming revenues, which in turn produces a financial crisis. As a result of such speculative borrowing bubbles, banks and lenders tighten credit availability, even to companies that can afford loans, and the economy subsequently contracts.

This slow movement of the financial system from stability to crisis is something for which Minsky is best known, and the phrase "Minsky moment" refers to this aspect of Minsky's academic work.

"He offered very good insights in the '60s and '70s when linkages between the financial markets and the economy were not as well understood as they are now," said Henry Kaufman, a Wall Street money manager and economist. "He showed us that financial markets could move frequently to excess. And he underscored the importance of the Federal Reserve as a lender of last resort."

Minsky's model of the credit system, which he dubbed the "Financial Instability Hypothesis" (FIH), incorporated many ideas already circulated by John Stuart Mill, Alfred Marshall, Knut Wicksell and Irving Fisher[2]. "A fundamental characteristic of our economy," Minsky wrote in 1974, "is that the financial system swings between robustness and fragility and these swings are an integral part of the process that generates business cycles."

Disagreeing with many mainstream economists of the day, he argued that these swings, and the booms and busts that can accompany them, are inevitable in a free market economy, unless government steps in to control them, through regulation, central bank action and other tools; such mechanisms, in fact, came into existence in response to the Great Depression. He opposed the deregulation that characterized the 1980s.

It was at the University of California at Berkeley that seminars attended by Bank of America executives helped him to develop his theories about lending and economic activity, views he laid out in two books John Maynard Keynes (1975), a classic study of the economist and his contributions, and Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (1986), and more than a hundred professional articles.

Minsky's theories and the subprime mortgage crisis

Hyman Minsky's theories about debt accumulation received revived attention in the media during the Subprime mortgage crisis of the late 2000s.[3]

Minsky argued that a key mechanism that pushes an economy towards a crisis is the accumulation of debt. He identified 3 types of borrowers that contribute to the accumulation of insolvent debt: Hedge Borrowers; Speculative Borrowers; and Ponzi Borrowers.

The "hedge borrower" is one who borrows with the intent of making debt payments from cash flows from other investments; the "speculative borrower" who borrows based on the belief that the appreciation of the value of the assets (e.g. real estate) will be sufficient to refinance or pay-off their debt but who does not have sufficient resources to repay the original loan, otherwise; and the "Ponzi borrower" (named for Charles Ponzi, see also Ponzi scheme) who relies on continually rolling over the principal into new investments.

In his own words "Three distinct income-debt relations for economic units, which are labeled as hedge, speculative, and Ponzi finance, can be identified. Hedge financing units are those which can fulfill all of their contractual payment obligations by their cash flows: the greater the weight of equity financing in the liability structure, the greater the likelihood that the unit is a hedge financing unit. Speculative finance units are units that can meet their payment commitments on 'income account' on their liabilities, even as they cannot repay the principal out of income cash flows. Such units need to 'roll over' their liabilities — issue new debt to meet commitments on maturing debt. For Ponzi units, the cash flows from operations are not sufficient to fill either the repayment of principal or the interest on outstanding debts by their cash flows from operations. Such units can sell assets or borrow. Borrowing to pay interest or selling assets to pay interest (and even dividends) on common stocks lowers the equity of a unit, even as it increases liabilities and the prior commitment of future incomes.

It can be shown that if hedge financing dominates, then the economy may well be an equilibrium-seeking and containing system. In contrast, the greater the weight of speculative and Ponzi finance, the greater the likelihood that the economy is a deviation-amplifying system. The first theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that the economy has financing regimes under which it is stable, and financing regimes in which it is unstable. The second theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that over periods of prolonged prosperity, the economy transits from financial relations that make for a stable system to financial relations that make for an unstable system.

In particular, over a protracted period of good times, capitalist economies tend to move to a financial structure in which there is a large weight to units engaged in speculative and Ponzi finance. Furthermore, if an economy is in an inflationary state, and the authorities attempt to exorcise inflation by monetary constraint, then speculative units will become Ponzi units and the net worth of previously Ponzi units will quickly evaporate. Consequently, units with cash flow shortfalls will be forced to try to make positions by selling out positions. This is likely to lead to a collapse of asset values."

Minsky was also identified as one of very few authors who (with Donald Markwell) discussed Keynes's belief that his economics was likely to be more conducive to peace than the old economic system had been.[4]

See also

References

  1. ^ LOUIS UCHITELLE (October 26, 1996). "H. P. Minsky, 77, Economist Who Decoded Lending Trends". New York Times. Retrieved 2008-07-13.
  2. ^ pg. 14, Manias, Panics, and Crashes, 4th Ed. by Charles P. Kindleberger
  3. ^ The Credit Crisis: Denial, delusion and the "defunct" American economist who foresaw the dénouement
  4. ^ Hyman P Minsky, John Maynard Keynes, Columbia University Press, 1975. Donald Markwell, John Maynard Keynes and International Relations: Economic Paths to War and Peace, Oxford University Press, 2006. [1]