Battle of Somosierra

Battle of Somosierra
Part of the Peninsular War
La bataille de Somo-Sierra by Baron Lejeune (1775 - 1848). Oil on canvas, 1810.
Date November 30, 1808 Location Somosierra Pass, north of Madrid, Spain Result French victory
Belligerents
France, Duchy of Warsaw	Spain
Commanders and leaders
Napoleon I of France	Benito de San Juan
Strength
45,000	20,000 infantry 16 guns
Casualties and losses
Unknown[1]	250 dead or wounded

The Battle of Somosierra was a battle of the Peninsular War that took place on November 30, 1808 at the Somosierra pass in the Sierra de Guadarrama north of Madrid. It was a victory for the French under Napoleon and led directly to the fall of Madrid on December 4. The most famous episode of the battle was a spectacular Polish cavalry charge led by Jan Kozietulski.

Situation before the battle

By late November 1808, the French juggernaut had overwhelmed and destroyed both wings of the Spanish popular army. To complete his reconquest of Spain, Napoleon advanced on Madrid with 45,000 men of his Grande Armée.

General San Juan mustered an ad hoc army of militia, reservists, and various regular regiments reeling from earlier defeats; in all about 20,000 men, to defend Madrid. In order to screen the many approaches to the city, San Juan was obliged to deconcentrate his already greatly outnumbered forces. Under his orders, 9,000 men were dispatched west to guard the Guadarrama pass while 3,500 occupied an advanced post at Sepulvida, leaving only 9,000 men and 16 guns on the heights of Somosierra.

Somosierra pass

The nature of the terrain and the tenacity of the Spaniards initially worked in their favour. On the evening of November 29 the brigade at Sepulvida repulsed a French attack, inflicted heavy casualties, and escaped from overwhelming French numbers in the gathering darkness.

The next morning, Napoleon advanced his infantry directly toward the pass while small detachments crept up the flanks. Exchanging musket volleys with the defenders, the French made slow but measurable progress toward the enemy guns.

The Polish charge

Because the Spanish forces could not easily be outflanked by infantry movement, and Napoleon was impatient to proceed, he ordered his Polish Light Horse escort to charge the Spaniards and their fortified artillery batteries.^[2] This decision, arguably callous and imprudent, has been the subject of much historical controversy.^[3]

Don Benito de San Juan had 16 cannons at his disposition, arranged in four batteries.^[4]

Who commanded the charge

File:Szarza w wawozie Somosierry.jpg

Cavalry charge in Somosierra gorge on a 1907 painting by Wojciech Kossak. Oil on canvas. 96 x 141 cm

13th bulletin mentioned that chevau-légers were commanded by Gen. Louis Pierre, Count Montbrun. However, both Polish charge participants mentioned above and Lt.Col. Pierre Dautancourt, one of the commanders of the unit, stressed in their relations that this was not the case. Datancourt mentioned in his relation that Montbrun in conversations with him himself was laughing from that idea. Yet French historian Adolphe Thiers gave him the honours of leading the charge, which caused the protest by Polish living participants of the battle. Also Maj. Philippe de Ségur in his memories wrote that he was commanding the charge, but his relations were often described as unreliable and again both Datancourt and Poles denied his role.

First charge was led by Kozietulski, but he lost his horse after taking the first battery. Only then squadron was joined by Lt. Andrzej Niegolewski, who was on reconnaissance with his soldiers. The charge was continued under command of Dziewanowski, and when he fell from the horse after taking the third battery, by Wincenty Krasiński. The charge to last battery was led by Niegolewski, who then survived almost by miracle when Spanish attacked the cannons and recaptured then (he received nine wounds from bayonnettes and wound on the head; he himself stated he was shot at in the head (!), but in documents it is mentioned it is wound from a sabre).

The second charge was led by Tomasz Łubieński, who then also tried to give himself the whole glory, trying to minimise the role of the third squadron (while Niegolewski tried to show that he took the canons and Łubieński had it so easy so Spanish were shooting at him with candies).

Charge effects

French officers tried to minimise the effect of the Polish charge, saying that all the success should be given to French infantry of Gen Francois Ruffin. Yet still 13th bulletin of Great army mentioned lead role of Polish chevau-légers. It must be also stressed, that even first charge was able to took all four batteries, even if the success was temporary and the last was quickly recaptured, which allowed French infantry to press their attack, and that the second charge took the last battery again which caused en-masse retreat of Spanish Andalusian irregular militia and in the effect retreat of the whole army. It must be noted that Spanish artillery men were unusually brave and that they preferred to die than abandon their position - but no Polish relation mentioned any fight with Spanish militia. Militiamen just left their position seeing how seemingly easily Poles took the artillery positions. In the fog and smoke they could not see how few Poles were on the top.

Aftermath

File:Antoine-Jean Gros 006.jpg

Surrender of Madrid by Antoine-Jean Gros. Oil on canvas, 1810. Madrid fell in the aftermath of the defeat at Somosierra.

San Juan raced his army back to Madrid. Although the victory at Somosierra was more accurately the result of a combined infantry and cavalry attack, with the infantry bearing the heavier fighting, later accounts, Napoleon's included, placed all the emphasis on the gallant Polish charge.

French patrols reached the outskirts of Madrid on December 1. General San Juan made a half-hearted and futile attempt to defend the capital, and on December 24, a devastating French artillery barrage brought the Spanish defence to grief. San Juan surrendered his remaining 2,500 regulars; the 20,000 civilians under his banner dispersed; and the French entered Madrid for the second time that year.

Notes

1. ^ Unit registers showed the deaths (not counting the officers) as 12 Poles from 3rd squadron (plus 2 others who died from wounds), and 2 from 1st squadron and 4 from 2nd squadron (plus one who died later from wounds). With officers, total losses were 18 dead and 11 wounded, from which 5 later died from wounds. Those were large losses, but all Polish squadrons were operational within few days after the battle. Datancourt mentioned in his relation 57 dead and wounded. The Poles were probably much helped by the fog, which made it harder for Spanish to target them.
2. ^ Unit registers showed that the squadron numbered 216 and not 125 or 140, as is sometimes said. To that number must be added members of other squadrons, in total about 450. The first charge against first battery numbered about 80, these being joined by Niegolewski's soldiers returning from reconnaissance. It is not clear however, whether the number include only the front-line troops (sabres) or all the soldiers of the units.
3. ^ Napoleon did not issue any written orders. Kozietulski, who commanded 3rd squadron that day, mentioned the order as "lekka jazda kłusem" ("light cavalry in trot") and, passing by the Emperor's position, heard "Polonais, prenez-moi ces canons"—"Poles, take those cannons for me." Many western authors assumed that Napoleon simply went out of his mind, ordering Poles to charge against one large battery of 16 cannons over few kilometres of extremely difficult terrain. However, it seems that Napoleon ordered taking only the closest battery, to open way for his infantry. Kozietulski, who, upon capturing the first battery, reported to the Emperor that he had completed his orders, seemed to understand the order in this sense. Taking the first battery was difficult, but within the cavalry's capabilities. Once the chevau-légers found themselves under fire from the second battery, however, their options were to retreat or to press the attack. Rotmistrz Jan Dziewanowski, who took the command after Kozietulski lost his horse, decided to continue the attack. Only few chevau-légers reached the last battery, and Spanish were able to recapture it. It was then that Napoleon saw his chance and immedietely committed the other squadrons.
4. ^ Some accounts, based mostly on relations of French officers, assume that the Spaniards placed all their guns at the peak of Somosierra pass. However, with a range of 600-700 metres, the cannons, deployed in this fashion, could not have struck much of the French army—and relations report that Napoleon himself was at times put under artillery fire. Also, the chevau-légers that took part in the charge, as well as the Spanish prisoners captured before the battle, mentioned that Benito de San Juan had cannons in four batteries, not one. The first battery defended the entrance to Somosierra pass, the next two covered the pass, and the fourth, only, stood on the heights. It was usually assumed that all batteries had four cannons, but the pass was too narrow for that to be possible; French artillery, when ordered to fire, could not use more than two cannons at the time. Most probably, the first three batteries had two cannons each and the fourth had ten cannons.