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Tucker & Ellis have conducted numerous studies into the impact of previous experiences upon object affordances. They suggest that previous experience modifies the way in which people make judgements about actions unrelated to the action that is usually afforded to the object <ref>{{cite journal |title= On the relations between seen objects and components of potential actions |year= 1998 |last1= Tucker |first1= M. |last2= Ellis |first2= R. |journal= Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human perception and performance |volume= 24.3 |issue= 1 |pages= 830}}</ref>. An example of this is deciding if an image of an object is inverted or upright, rather than how you would pick up or use the object. Studies conducted by Vingerhoets in 2008 attempting to explore the neuroscience of skilled tool usage found that the initial motor response to these tools is initiated by the presence of the tool itself, and not the experience that has been had previously with similar tools <ref>{{cite journal |doi= 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2007.12.058 |title= Knowing about tools: Neural correlates of tool familiarity and experience |year= 2008 |last1= Vingerhoets |first1= G. |journal= NeuroImage |volume= 40 |issue= 3 |pages= 1380-1391}}</ref>. However, when presented with unfamiliar tools participants had increased inferior temporal and medial and lateral occipital activation, which suggests that these regions have a role in visual feature processing for action affordances, particularly in tool identification. |
Tucker & Ellis have conducted numerous studies into the impact of previous experiences upon object affordances. They suggest that previous experience modifies the way in which people make judgements about actions unrelated to the action that is usually afforded to the object <ref>{{cite journal |title= On the relations between seen objects and components of potential actions |year= 1998 |last1= Tucker |first1= M. |last2= Ellis |first2= R. |journal= Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human perception and performance |volume= 24.3 |issue= 1 |pages= 830}}</ref>. An example of this is deciding if an image of an object is inverted or upright, rather than how you would pick up or use the object. Studies conducted by Vingerhoets in 2008 attempting to explore the neuroscience of skilled tool usage found that the initial motor response to these tools is initiated by the presence of the tool itself, and not the experience that has been had previously with similar tools <ref>{{cite journal |doi= 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2007.12.058 |title= Knowing about tools: Neural correlates of tool familiarity and experience |year= 2008 |last1= Vingerhoets |first1= G. |journal= NeuroImage |volume= 40 |issue= 3 |pages= 1380-1391}}</ref>. However, when presented with unfamiliar tools participants had increased inferior temporal and medial and lateral occipital activation, which suggests that these regions have a role in visual feature processing for action affordances, particularly in tool identification. |
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Past experience with an object changes the way in which that object is perceived by the brain. Past experience that equates to expertise has a particularly large impact <ref>{{cite journal |doi= 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2012.09.028 |title= Physical experience leads to enhanced object perception in parietal cortex: Insights from knot tying |year= 2012 |last1= Cross |first1= E. S. |last2= Cohen first2= N. R. |last3= Hamilton |first3= A. F. C. |last4= Ramsey |first4= R. |last5= Wolford |first5= G. |last6= Grafton |first6= S. T. |journal= Neuropsychologia |volume= 50 |issue= 14 |pages= 3207-3217}}</ref>. Research has shown that experts in a particular field are better at tasks that relate to that particular field – this applies to action affordances also. Expert climbers are better at recalling novel difficult climbing routes than non-experts; embodied simulation relies on motor competence <ref>{{cite journal |doi= 10.1016/j.bandc.2010.03.002 |title= When affordances climb into your mind: Advantages of motor simulation in a memory task performed by novice and expert rock climbers |year= 2010 |last1= Pezzulo |first1= G. |last2= Barca first2= L. |last3= Bocconi |first3= A. L. |last4= Borghi |first4= A. M. |journal= Brain and Cognition |volume= 73 |issue= 1 |pages= 68-73}}</ref>. |
Past experience with an object changes the way in which that object is perceived by the brain. Past experience that equates to expertise has a particularly large impact <ref>{{cite journal |doi= 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2012.09.028 |title= Physical experience leads to enhanced object perception in parietal cortex: Insights from knot tying |year= 2012 |last1= Cross |first1= E. S. |last2= Cohen |first2= N. R. |last3= Hamilton |first3= A. F. C. |last4= Ramsey |first4= R. |last5= Wolford |first5= G. |last6= Grafton |first6= S. T. |journal= Neuropsychologia |volume= 50 |issue= 14 |pages= 3207-3217}}</ref>. Research has shown that experts in a particular field are better at tasks that relate to that particular field – this applies to action affordances also. Expert climbers are better at recalling novel difficult climbing routes than non-experts; embodied simulation relies on motor competence <ref>{{cite journal |doi= 10.1016/j.bandc.2010.03.002 |title= When affordances climb into your mind: Advantages of motor simulation in a memory task performed by novice and expert rock climbers |year= 2010 |last1= Pezzulo |first1= G. |last2= Barca |first2= L. |last3= Bocconi |first3= A. L. |last4= Borghi |first4= A. M. |journal= Brain and Cognition |volume= 73 |issue= 1 |pages= 68-73}}</ref>. The same studies showed that extensive physical experience with an object (such as climbing holds for experienced [[climbers]]) has a distinct impact on how the object in question is perceived. |
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== Action affordances within development == |
== Action affordances within development == |
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The wife of James J. Gibson, Eleanor J. Gibson, wrote a theory of perceptual learning based on her husband’s ideas around affordances |
The wife of James J. Gibson, Eleanor J. Gibson, wrote a theory of perceptual learning based on her husband’s ideas around affordances. Her theory focused on the prevalence of the context and environment in learning <ref>{{cite journal |title= Development of knowledge of visual-tactual affordances of substance. |year= 1984 |last1= Gibson |first1= E. J. |last2= Walker |first2= A. S. |journal= Child Development |pages= 453-460}}</ref>. Within this theory she stated that “children learn to detect information that specifies objects, events, and layouts in the world that they can use for their daily activities”, thus suggesting that the existence of affordances within humans is a mechanism necessary for survival. Expanding on this, Eleanor J. Gibson also suggested that human children are the equivalent of hunter-gatherers, but they hunt information in the place of food. |
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Revision as of 21:06, 5 December 2013
Action affordances are actions assigned to objects that enable interaction with said object. Actions are interpreted by directly matching the actions observed to the observer’s own motor system and visualising a simulation; this is called a motor-simulation mechanism. This is what allows people to do things such as learning a new dance routine, or a new football skill. Some action simulations can be performed automatically, such as processes like “mirroring”. Action affordances were first defined by psychologist James J. Gibson in the 1977 article “The Theory of Affordances”[1] . He defined them as “action possibilities” available with components of the environment. Viewed objects enhance components of the actions afforded. An example of an action affordance is associating typing to a keyboard, which will not afford the action of typing to an infant, but will to an adult. Previous research has suggested that there may be several factors which have an influence upon perception of objects, and speed at which actions are afforded to them.
Actions and affordances
When people make judgments about objects that are unrelated to the objects’ associated action (i.e., deciding whether a mug is upright or inverted, but not how you would pick up the mug), the action one would use to interact with that object is automatically primed. [2] Handy et al found that the motor regions of the parietal cortices selectively activate when an object that has a grasping action afforded to it is perceived [3]. Grasping in relation to action affordances is an area that has been extensively researched in the field. Handy et al also showed that participants observing visual stimuli of climbing holds had a systematic response in several of their visuomotor-related areas of cortex. It was also found that doorknobs also generated a response that was limited to the lateral occipital cortex. This led to the conclusion that object-specific motor experience is negatively correlated to object-specific responses in motor and visual-related cortices.
Visual Attention and Affordances
It has been suggested that visual attention may also generate the basis of the motor response to graspable objects. Research by Anderson, Yamagishi, and Karavia in 2002 [4] sought to find if the initial motor response was generated by action affordances or by visual attention. They found that consciously directed visual attention is responsible for automatic motor signal generation surrounding the spatial definition of perceived objects. Anderson, Yamagishi, and Karavia also incidentally found that previous experience seemed to have an effect upon the speed of motor response to an object.
Previous experiences and affordances
Tucker & Ellis have conducted numerous studies into the impact of previous experiences upon object affordances. They suggest that previous experience modifies the way in which people make judgements about actions unrelated to the action that is usually afforded to the object [5]. An example of this is deciding if an image of an object is inverted or upright, rather than how you would pick up or use the object. Studies conducted by Vingerhoets in 2008 attempting to explore the neuroscience of skilled tool usage found that the initial motor response to these tools is initiated by the presence of the tool itself, and not the experience that has been had previously with similar tools [6]. However, when presented with unfamiliar tools participants had increased inferior temporal and medial and lateral occipital activation, which suggests that these regions have a role in visual feature processing for action affordances, particularly in tool identification.
Past experience with an object changes the way in which that object is perceived by the brain. Past experience that equates to expertise has a particularly large impact [7]. Research has shown that experts in a particular field are better at tasks that relate to that particular field – this applies to action affordances also. Expert climbers are better at recalling novel difficult climbing routes than non-experts; embodied simulation relies on motor competence [8]. The same studies showed that extensive physical experience with an object (such as climbing holds for experienced climbers) has a distinct impact on how the object in question is perceived.
Action affordances within development
The wife of James J. Gibson, Eleanor J. Gibson, wrote a theory of perceptual learning based on her husband’s ideas around affordances. Her theory focused on the prevalence of the context and environment in learning [9]. Within this theory she stated that “children learn to detect information that specifies objects, events, and layouts in the world that they can use for their daily activities”, thus suggesting that the existence of affordances within humans is a mechanism necessary for survival. Expanding on this, Eleanor J. Gibson also suggested that human children are the equivalent of hunter-gatherers, but they hunt information in the place of food.
References
- ^ James J. Gibson (1977), The Theory of Affordances. In Perceiving, Acting, and Knowing, edited by Robert Shaw and John Bransford, ISBN 0-470-99014-7.
- ^ Tucker, M.; Ellis, R. (2004). "Action priming by briefly presented objects". Acta Psychologica. 116 (2): 185–203. doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2004.01.004.
- ^ Handy, T. C.; Tipper, C. M.; Borg, J. S.; Grafton, S. T.; Gazzaniga, M. S. (2006). "Motor experience with graspable objects reduces their implicit analysis in visual- and motor-related cortex". Brain Research. 1097 (1): 156–166. doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2006.04.059.
- ^ Anderson, S. J.; Yamagishi, N.; Karavia, V. (2002). "Attentional processes link perception and action". Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences. 269 (1497): 1225–1232. doi:10.1098/rspb.2002.1998.
- ^ Tucker, M.; Ellis, R. (1998). "On the relations between seen objects and components of potential actions". Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human perception and performance. 24.3 (1): 830.
- ^ Vingerhoets, G. (2008). "Knowing about tools: Neural correlates of tool familiarity and experience". NeuroImage. 40 (3): 1380–1391. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2007.12.058.
- ^ Cross, E. S.; Cohen, N. R.; Hamilton, A. F. C.; Ramsey, R.; Wolford, G.; Grafton, S. T. (2012). "Physical experience leads to enhanced object perception in parietal cortex: Insights from knot tying". Neuropsychologia. 50 (14): 3207–3217. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2012.09.028.
- ^ Pezzulo, G.; Barca, L.; Bocconi, A. L.; Borghi, A. M. (2010). "When affordances climb into your mind: Advantages of motor simulation in a memory task performed by novice and expert rock climbers". Brain and Cognition. 73 (1): 68–73. doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2010.03.002.
- ^ Gibson, E. J.; Walker, A. S. (1984). "Development of knowledge of visual-tactual affordances of substance". Child Development: 453–460.