Talk:Two-person rule: Difference between revisions
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:: Firs reason is UK political policy on "no first use". Secondly Trident is an immensely expensive way of doing this and has no way of being used tactically: ''any'' ICBM launch is so indistinguishable from a major strategic strike that it is the start of all-out war and will invite a response. Thirdly, there's only one Trident boat on station: you can only use it once. It can't be used for a deterrent threat against Moscow if it has just been launched against a tank attack. Launching also gives its position away and the SSBN is likely to be sunk shortly afterwards. |
:: Firs reason is UK political policy on "no first use". Secondly Trident is an immensely expensive way of doing this and has no way of being used tactically: ''any'' ICBM launch is so indistinguishable from a major strategic strike that it is the start of all-out war and will invite a response. Thirdly, there's only one Trident boat on station: you can only use it once. It can't be used for a deterrent threat against Moscow if it has just been launched against a tank attack. Launching also gives its position away and the SSBN is likely to be sunk shortly afterwards. |
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:: There was a time in the 1980s when GLCM was seen by the hawks as the option to fight a nuclear tank war in Europe, overturning 20 years of MAD. Thankfully we've stepped back from that now. [[User:Andy Dingley|Andy Dingley]] ([[User talk:Andy Dingley|talk]]) 11:52, 22 April 2016 (UTC) |
:: There was a time in the 1980s when GLCM was seen by the hawks as the option to fight a nuclear tank war in Europe, overturning 20 years of MAD. Thankfully we've stepped back from that now. [[User:Andy Dingley|Andy Dingley]] ([[User talk:Andy Dingley|talk]]) 11:52, 22 April 2016 (UTC) |
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:::Well honestly we could discuss weapon use until the cows come home, it is that involved. This is not the Cold War, so-called "tactical" use of nuclear weapons has been ruled out for decades. Offensive "strategic use" has been ruled out due to "no first use" policy. In terms of maintaining MAD, this is fine, but without an "offensive" capability, MAD is meaningless, ergo, even trident can, in theory, be used offensively. Questions of cost of a "tactical" strike quickly escalate (pun intended) into much further reaching questions, like "What is "tactical", what is "strategic"". However, I was more interested in the rumoured govermental policy of "Can the Prime Minister order a nuclear strike? Or can he only *authorise* the military use of them under whatever circumstances?" [[Special:Contributions/178.15.151.163|178.15.151.163]] ([[User talk:178.15.151.163|talk]]) 13:46, 22 April 2016 (UTC) |
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17:33, 1 June 2007
The description for "no lone zone" or The "Two-Man Rule" is not fully correct. More accuractly, a no-lone zone is an area that must be staffed by 2 or more qualified individuals. Each individual must be within visual contact with each other and in visual contact with the critical component resulting in a no-lone-zone area. A no lone zone may contain a code component, weapon system hardware under test, a nuclear weapon or active nuclear weapon controls. (Fast Eddie) 67.82.49.199 (talk) 17:33, 1 June 2007 (UTC)
Other countries
This article seems largely to concentrate on the United States - the Nuclear Weapon and Communications sections only give a US view and although some of the other sections could apply anywhere, overall I feel there is to strong a bias towards the US view (particularly when it comes to examples). Although I know this term certainly has usage in the UK I don't feel comfortable expanding this article so have tagged it instead. Dpmuk (talk) 13:30, 4 May 2010 (UTC)
- There is a similar system in place in the UK, but I can't recall the precise name of it, as it's been decades since I spoke with counterparts from the UK on the two man rule.Wzrd1 (talk) 19:25, 19 September 2012 (UTC)
- The article is certainly USA-centric, although I have no problem with that so long as it covers the subject adequately. The difficulty with this one is twofold. Firstly, someone inserted a redirect from Dual key that effectively eliminated any discussion of precisely what the term means. Secondly, in NATO usage Dual key has a different meaning to the generally accepted meaning (and especially in the US) of the term Two-Man-Rule .
- The article is certainly USA-centric, although I have no problem with that so long as it covers the subject adequately. The difficulty with this one is twofold. Firstly, someone inserted a redirect from Dual key that effectively eliminated any discussion of precisely what the term means. Secondly, in NATO usage Dual key has a different meaning to the generally accepted meaning (and especially in the US) of the term Two-Man-Rule .
- Two-Man-Rule is usually reserved for a process where security can be maintained by its application. However, dual key in the British, European, and NATO allies context has a different and political meaning, that derives from the McMahon Atomic Energy Act of 1946. This US domestic law prevents a US administration from transferring any nuclear weapon from its control to any other nation. "Dual key" arrangements allow nuclear weapons for the delivery systems of allies (not only NATO members but also in the Far East) to be used by those allied nations. In practice, it means that nuclear bombs can be pre-positioned at forward bases in the UK, West Germany and elsewhere, and in the custody of the USMC, the USAF, or the US Army until such time as a Presidential Release allows them to be released to allies. Also in practice, release of some tactical battlefield nuclear weapons was delegated to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe SACEUR - always an American 4-star general. It also permitted the US to release as much information about the physical characteristics of specific weapons, as is needed by allies to adapt and equip their aircraft and other delivery vehicles. In the UK this was known as Project E for USAF weapons in USAF custody, and Project N for US Navy weapons deployed by RAF and Dutch maritime aircraft and kept in USMC custody at bases in the UK. Numerically largest were those weapons assigned to the British Army in Germany kept in the custody of the US Army.
- Two-Man-Rule is usually reserved for a process where security can be maintained by its application. However, dual key in the British, European, and NATO allies context has a different and political meaning, that derives from the McMahon Atomic Energy Act of 1946. This US domestic law prevents a US administration from transferring any nuclear weapon from its control to any other nation. "Dual key" arrangements allow nuclear weapons for the delivery systems of allies (not only NATO members but also in the Far East) to be used by those allied nations. In practice, it means that nuclear bombs can be pre-positioned at forward bases in the UK, West Germany and elsewhere, and in the custody of the USMC, the USAF, or the US Army until such time as a Presidential Release allows them to be released to allies. Also in practice, release of some tactical battlefield nuclear weapons was delegated to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe SACEUR - always an American 4-star general. It also permitted the US to release as much information about the physical characteristics of specific weapons, as is needed by allies to adapt and equip their aircraft and other delivery vehicles. In the UK this was known as Project E for USAF weapons in USAF custody, and Project N for US Navy weapons deployed by RAF and Dutch maritime aircraft and kept in USMC custody at bases in the UK. Numerically largest were those weapons assigned to the British Army in Germany kept in the custody of the US Army.
- Although for some weapons there may not be an actual or physical key, the term derives from an early implementation of the system where Thor missiles were deployed in the UK. These were operated by the RAF. An RAF officer held one of two launch-enabling keys, and a USAF officer in attendance held the second key. Hence the term dual key. Similar arrangements were in place for the Jupiter missiles deployed in Italy and Turkey, until the Turkish missiles were withdrawn after the Cuban Missile Crisis. There were variations in the arrangements on occasion, especially for interceptors on quick reaction alert where weapons of necessity needed to be pre-loaded onto the aircraft, sometimes single-seaters. That posed difficulties for the two-man rule. One arrangement used in the UK was to keep the aircraft inside a gated fenced area close to the runway and guarded by armed military police. Anecdotal stories abound from veterans, of instructions to shoot the pilot, shoot out the aircraft tyres, or simply throw their rifle into the engine air intakes.
- Although for some weapons there may not be an actual or physical key, the term derives from an early implementation of the system where Thor missiles were deployed in the UK. These were operated by the RAF. An RAF officer held one of two launch-enabling keys, and a USAF officer in attendance held the second key. Hence the term dual key. Similar arrangements were in place for the Jupiter missiles deployed in Italy and Turkey, until the Turkish missiles were withdrawn after the Cuban Missile Crisis. There were variations in the arrangements on occasion, especially for interceptors on quick reaction alert where weapons of necessity needed to be pre-loaded onto the aircraft, sometimes single-seaters. That posed difficulties for the two-man rule. One arrangement used in the UK was to keep the aircraft inside a gated fenced area close to the runway and guarded by armed military police. Anecdotal stories abound from veterans, of instructions to shoot the pilot, shoot out the aircraft tyres, or simply throw their rifle into the engine air intakes.
- The article certainly needs some editing to make it better in this area. Good luck in that. George.Hutchinson (talk) 15:38, 8 January 2013 (UTC)
Coercion or refusal to launch?
What about 1.) the case where one of the two individuals coerces the other to cooperate, what is known about measures in place to prevent this? and 2.) the opposite case, where one of the two individuals refuses an order to launch? Is anything known about possible override systems? Currently both of these cases are only mentioned with regard to the movie "Wargames". I don't know whether it belongs in this article, but if not, this should still be discussed somewhere in Wikipedia and linked from here. Unfortunately I don't know anything about this so I can't write it myself. -- 84.63.225.161 (talk) 13:46, 1 January 2011 (UTC)
All United States banknotes require two signatures to be valid (Treasurer and Secretary). 76.117.247.55 (talk) 06:56, 28 July 2011 (UTC)
Men Only?
I guess the kinds of decisions mentioned lead to frequently only male persons being involved, but in case the term "two-person rule" is used at all, we should probably mention this as an alternative wording. 195.72.107.83 (talk) 14:06, 15 February 2012 (UTC)
Two-man?
Apart what was said in the previous comment, I dare to suggest that the article been entitled "two-men" rule. No? --Casablanca1950 (talk) 09:04, 19 April 2012 (UTC)
Not if the actual phrase is two man rule, which I believe it is. Though two-men would be grammatically correct, it might not be accurate. Fjf1085 (talk) 02:29, 27 December 2012 (UTC)
single pilot aircraft
How about fighters able to carry nukes but only have one pilot?Phd8511 (talk) 15:01, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
- Fighters don't typically carry nuclear weapons, at least not since modern guided missiles became commonplace. Even then, the weapons could not activate without the Permissive Action Link being activated by two at the top of the leadership of the National Command Authority, such as the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense. Similar is in place for most other nuclear armed nations.Wzrd1 (talk) 19:23, 19 September 2012 (UTC)
- The US Nuclear gravity bombs in Europe are capable of being launched by single seat F-16s.Phd8511 (talk) 22:27, 20 June 2013 (UTC)
Superman III
In Superman 3 there's a scene where the computer hacker is completely drunk and has to access a computer requiring two keys - but the slots are too far apart to be inserted by one man simultaneously. So he ties string around the hand of a comatose man with his key against one slot, while he pulls on the string while inserting his key simultaneously. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 109.145.178.238 (talk) 22:28, 14 October 2013 (UTC)
The President
Hacking Nuclear Command and Control, page 10, is given as the reference for the claim that the president can only authorise a nuclear launch if the secretary of defense concurs. However, the author of the source cites "Pike (2006)" as his own source for that information. Pike (2006) turns out to be this short web article, which does not actually say this. It only goes so far as to say that the National Command Authority consists of the president and the secretary (or their alternates), but it does not say whether they both have to agree or if the president can override the secretary. We need a better source for the two-man rule in this context. Richard75 (talk) 13:58, 4 August 2014 (UTC)
- It's been 15 months and no-one's come up with a source for this. Just because it's a device often used in fiction doesn't mean it's real. So I'm taking it out now until someone can cite a reliable source that actually says the president genuinely can't launch without someone else's permission. Richard75 (talk) 22:16, 15 November 2015 (UTC)
Is this how it is in the UK?
I have heard that the UK Prime Minister can only *authorise* the use of nuclear weapons, and after that, the decision to actually deploy them rests on military shoulders. IE: the Prime Minister cannot order the use of nuclear weapons, only grant permission - and if when authorised, the military powers-that-be decide that they are not necessary, they are not obliged to use them. I assume that this also means the same for targetting - that the Prime Minister would not necessarilly have a say in where the nukes go, he cannot say "Nuke Moscow" for example, but in an escalating conflict, he can say "If you need to use nukes, you have authorisation" and then the military would decide what (and if) to attack.
Can anyone corroborate/refute this?178.15.151.163 (talk) 09:55, 20 April 2016 (UTC)
- Sounds like nonsense. Richard75 (talk) 22:34, 20 April 2016 (UTC)
- The UK process for nuclear release is well described, in all except one detail. The UK no longer has an offensive nuclear capability. Trident just isn't set up for that. Even the nuclear depth charges have gone now, let alone the tactical strike of Jaguars, Harriers and WE.177. All that's left is a Trident boat on distant patrol, waiting for news of armageddon by Radio 4 failing to broadcast it. The Prime Minister of the day passes a sealed letter to each V boat beforehand. On a loss of command scenario, the Captain reads the letter. It might (we have no idea) request a reprisal attack, request no reprisal, or leave it in the hands of the Captain.
- On the boats, there is a two-man key switching system too, along with a variety of safeguards around access to the keys and the firing trigger. Andy Dingley (talk) 00:19, 21 April 2016 (UTC)
- A reprisal attack sounds like an offensive capability to me. Richard75 (talk) 11:58, 21 April 2016 (UTC)
- I can't see why trident could not be used in an offensive manner? Not that it would be likely, but it is no less capable of hitting target than a WE177, moreso probably. Anyhoo that wasn't really the question. If the prime minister giving authorisation but not being able to order an actual strike is "nonsense" then trident submarines getting their orders from radio 4 is completely preposterous! Yes I'm aware of the radio 4 thing, but I'm pretty sure its a myth.178.15.151.163 (talk) 11:20, 22 April 2016 (UTC)
- Firs reason is UK political policy on "no first use". Secondly Trident is an immensely expensive way of doing this and has no way of being used tactically: any ICBM launch is so indistinguishable from a major strategic strike that it is the start of all-out war and will invite a response. Thirdly, there's only one Trident boat on station: you can only use it once. It can't be used for a deterrent threat against Moscow if it has just been launched against a tank attack. Launching also gives its position away and the SSBN is likely to be sunk shortly afterwards.
- There was a time in the 1980s when GLCM was seen by the hawks as the option to fight a nuclear tank war in Europe, overturning 20 years of MAD. Thankfully we've stepped back from that now. Andy Dingley (talk) 11:52, 22 April 2016 (UTC)
- Well honestly we could discuss weapon use until the cows come home, it is that involved. This is not the Cold War, so-called "tactical" use of nuclear weapons has been ruled out for decades. Offensive "strategic use" has been ruled out due to "no first use" policy. In terms of maintaining MAD, this is fine, but without an "offensive" capability, MAD is meaningless, ergo, even trident can, in theory, be used offensively. Questions of cost of a "tactical" strike quickly escalate (pun intended) into much further reaching questions, like "What is "tactical", what is "strategic"". However, I was more interested in the rumoured govermental policy of "Can the Prime Minister order a nuclear strike? Or can he only *authorise* the military use of them under whatever circumstances?" 178.15.151.163 (talk) 13:46, 22 April 2016 (UTC)