Battle of Cowpens

Battle of Cowpens
Part of American Revolutionary War
Painted by William Ranney in 1845, this depiction of the Battle of Cowpens show an unnamed black soldier (left) firing his pistol and saving the life of Colonel William Washington (on white horse in center).
Date January 17, 1781 Location Cowpens, South Carolina Result Decisive American victory
Belligerents
United States	Great Britain
Commanders and leaders
Daniel Morgan	Banastre Tarleton
Strength
1,000	1,100
Casualties and losses
12 killed 61 wounded	110 killed 229 wounded 525 captured

The Battle of Cowpens was fought on January 17, 1781, during the American Revolutionary War and was an overwhelming victory by American revolutionary forces under Brigadier General Daniel Morgan.

Prelude

The Battle of Cowpens was one of the many engagements between the Americans and the British during the Southern campaign during the American Revolution. The commanders specifically involved were American Brigadier General Daniel Morgan, commander of some 700 militia, including some Over Mountain Men and cavalry, and 300 Continentals, and Englishman Colonel Banastre Tarleton, who headed a legion of 1,100 dragoons, 17th Lancers, regulars, Tory loyalists, and Highlanders.

General Cornwallis instructed Tarleton and his legion, who had been successful at battles such as Camden and Waxhaw in the past, to destroy Morgan's command. Tarleton's previous victories had been won by bold attacks, often despite being outnumbered. American commander Nathanael Greene had taken the daring step of dividing his army, detaching Morgan away from the main Patriot force. Morgan called Americans to gather at the cow pens (a grazing area), which were a familiar landmark. Tarleton attacked with his customary boldness but without regard for the fact Morgan had had much more time to prepare. He was consequently caught in a double envelopment. Only Tarleton and about 260 British troops escaped, but the Americans suffered only 73 casualties (12 dead and 61 wounded).

Battle

Tactical deployment

Daniel Morgan knew that he should use the unique landscape of Cowpens and the time available before Tarleton's arrival to his advantage. Furthermore, he knew his men and his opponent, knew how they would react in certain situations, and used this knowledge to his advantage. To begin with, the location of his forces were contrary to any existing military doctrine: he placed his army between the Broad and Pacolet River, thus making escape impossible if the army were routed. His reason for cutting off escape was obvious; to ensure that the untrained militiamen would not, as they had been accustomed to do, turn in flight at the first hint of battle and abandon the regulars. Selecting a hill as the center of his position, he placed his Continental infantry on it, deliberately leaving his flanks exposed to his opponent. Morgan reasoned that Tarleton would attack him head on, and he made his tactical preparations accordingly. He set up three lines of soldiers: one of skirmishers (sharpshooters), one of militia, and a main one. The 150 select skirmishers were from North Carolina (Major McDowell) and Georgia (Major Cunningham). Behind these men were 300 militiamen under the command of Andrew Pickens.

Reenactors at Cowpens Battlefield

Realizing that poorly trained milita were unreliable in battle, especially when they were under attack from cavalry, Morgan decided to ask the militia to fire two shots and then retreat, so he could have them reform under cover of the reserve (cavalry commanded by William Washington and James McCall) behind the third, more experienced line of militia and continentals. The movement of the militia in the second line would unmask the third line to the British. The third line, composed of the remainder of the forces (about 550 men) was composed of Continentals from Delaware and Maryland, and militiamen from Georgia and Virginia. Colonel John Eager Howard commanded the Continentals and Colonels Tate and Triplett the militia. The goal of this strategy was to weaken and disorganize Tarleton's forces (which would be attacking the third line uphill) before attacking and defeating them. Howard’s men would not be unnerved by the militia’s expected move, and unlike the militia they would be able to stand and hold, especially since the first and second lines, Morgan felt, would have inflicted both physical and psychological attrition on the advancing British before the third line came into action.

Additionally, by placing his men downhill from the advancing British lines, Morgan exploited the British tendency to fire too high in battle. The downhill position of his forces allowed the British forces to be silhouetted against the morning sunlight, providing easy targets for Patriot troops. With a ravine on their right flank and a creek on their left flank, Morgan's forces were protected against British flanking maneuvers at the beginning of the battle. Morgan insisted, "the whole idea is to lead Benny [Tarleton] into a trap so we can beat his cavalry and infantry as they come up those slopes. When they've been cut down to size by our fire, we'll attack them." In developing his tactics at Cowpens, as historian John Buchanan wrote, Morgan may have been "the only general in the American Revolution, on either side, to produce a significant original tactical thought.”

Battle of Cowpens 17 January 1781.

Events

At 5:00 a.m. on January 17 1781, Tarleton roused his troops and continued his march to the cowpens. His Tory scouts had told him of the countryside Morgan was fighting on, and he was certain of victory because Morgan's soldiers, mostly militiamen, seemed to be caught between mostly experienced British troops and a flooding river. As soon as he reached the spot, he formed a battle line, which consisted of dragoons on his flanks, with his two grasshopper cannon in between the British Regulars and American Loyalists. More cavalry and the 71st Highlanders composed his reserve. Sure of an easy victory, he sent his unrested men into battle. Tarleton’s plan was simple and direct. Most of his infantry (including that of the Legion) would be assembled in linear formation and move directly upon Morgan. The right and left flanks of this line would be protected by dragoon units. In reserve he would hold his 250-man battalion of Scottish Highlanders (71st Regiment of Foot), commanded by Major Arthur MacArthur, a professional soldier of long experience who had served in the Dutch Scotch Brigade. Finally, Tarleton kept the 250-man cavalry contingent of his Legion ready to be unleashed when the Americans broke and ran.

Morgan's strategy worked perfectly. After killing fifteen dragoons, the skirmishers retreated. The British pulled back temporarily but attacked again, this time reaching the militiamen, who (as ordered) poured two volleys into the British who—with 40% of their casualties being officers—were astonished and confused. They reformed and continued to advance. Pickens' militia broke and apparently fled to the rear and were eventually reorganized. Tarleton responded by ordering one of his officers, Ogilvie, to charge with some dragoons into the "defeated" Americans. His men moved forward in regular formation and were momentarily checked by the militia musket fire but continued to advance, sensing victory. The British drove in successive lines, anticipating victory only to encounter another, stronger line after exerting themselves and suffering casualties. The depth of the American lines gradually soaked up the shock of the British advance. Taking the withdrawal of the first two lines as a full blown retreat, and sensing victory, the British advanced headlong into the awaiting final line of disciplined regulars which firmly held on the hill.

Despite this, Tarleton sensed he could still win with only one line of Americans left and sent his infantry in for a frontal attack. The Highlanders were ordered to flank the Americans. Under the direction of Howard, the Americans retreated. Flushed with victory and now disorganized, the British ran after them. Abruptly, Howard pulled an about-face, fired an extremely devastating volley into his enemy, and then charged. Triplett's riflemen attacked, however, severely damaging the British, and the cavalry of Washington and McCall charged. Completely routed, the dragoons fled to their own rear. Having dismantled Ogilvie's forces, Washington then also charged into the British. When the British advance was finally halted by the Continentals, the American cavalry struck them on the right flank and rear, while the militia, having re-formed, charged out from behind the hill to hit the British left.

The shock of the sudden charge, coupled with the reappearance of the American militiamen on the flanks where Tarleton's exhausted men expected to see their own cavalry, proved too much for the British. Caught in a clever double envelopment, the British surrendered after suffering heavy losses. With Tarleton's right flank and center line collapsed, there remained only the 71st Highlanders still fighting part of Howard's line. Tarleton, realizing the desperate seriousness of what was occurring, rode back to his one remaining unit, the Legion cavalry. Desperate to save something, Tarleton assembled a group of cavalry and tried to save the two cannon he had brought with him, but they had been taken, and so Tarleton decided to save himself. Tarleton with a few remaining horsemen rode back into the fight, but after clashing with Washington’s men, he too retreated from the field. He was temporarily stopped by Colonel Washington, whose horse Tarleton shot out from under him and thus made his escape.

Reenactors playing Patriot troops march into battle at Cowpens

Aftermath

Coming in the wake of the American debacle at Camden, Cowpens, in its part in the Revolution, was a surprising victory and a turning point that changed the psychology of the entire war —"spiriting up the people", not just those of the backcountry Carolinas, but those in all the Southern colonies. As it was, the Americans were encouraged to fight further, and the Loyalists and British were demoralized. Furthermore, its strategic result—the destruction of an important part of the British army in the South—was incalculable toward ending the war. Along with the British defeat at Battle of King's Mountain, Cowpens was a decisive blow to Cornwallis, who would have defeated much of the remaining American resistance had Tarleton won Cowpens. As a result, the battle set in motion a series of events leading to the British pyrrhic victory at Guilford Court House and the eventual Patriot victory at Yorktown. In the opinion of John Marshall, "Seldom has a battle, in which greater numbers were not engaged, been so important in its consequences as that of Cowpens." It gave General Nathanael Greene his chance to conduct a campaign of "dazzling shiftiness" that led Cornwallis by "an unbroken chain of consequences to the catastrophe at Yorktown which finally separated America from the British crown."

The battle site is preserved at Cowpens National Battlefield.

References

• http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Moncure/moncure.asp
  
• http://www.nps.gov/cowp/dmorgan.htm
  
• http://www.nps.gov/cowp/batlcowp.htm
  
• Wood, W.J. Battles of the Revolutionary War. Algonquin Books of Chapter Hill, 1990.
• Babbits, Lawrence E. A Devil of a Whipping University of North Carolina Press, 1998.

External links

• British version of the battle