Disagreement (epistemology): Difference between revisions
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{{AFC comment|1=I note that a few additional edits have been made since the original decline; I have left additional comments on this draft's talk page, though I don't think my comments alone (save the first bullet point) are sufficient |
{{AFC comment|1=I note that a few additional edits have been made since the original decline; I have left additional comments on this draft's talk page, though I don't think my comments alone (save the first bullet point) are sufficient to justify an outright AfC rejection at this point of time. [[User:Chenzw|<span style="color:purple">Chenzw</span>]] <span style="font-size:x-small">[[User_talk:Chenzw|<span style="color:purple">Talk</span>]]</span> 17:00, 26 August 2020 (UTC)}} |
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Revision as of 17:00, 26 August 2020
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Comment: I note that a few additional edits have been made since the original decline; I have left additional comments on this draft's talk page, though I don't think my comments alone (save the first bullet point) are sufficient to justify an outright AfC rejection at this point of time. Chenzw Talk 17:00, 26 August 2020 (UTC)
The issue of Disagreements in epistemology discusses the question how a person should respond when he learns that somebody else disagrees with him. Should he revise his belief or should he stick to his own original belief. There is much discussion and controversy over this question in Epistemology.[1]
Types of Disagreements
Epistemologists relate to two types of disagreements. The first one is disagreement about facts. For instance, a disagreement about the question whether earth is spherical or flat. The other type of disagreement is about an action. For instance, should we travel to Italy or Greece. The discussion in the Epistemic literature is mainly about disagreements of the first type.[2]
The philosophical discussion is about “peer disagreement”. This is the case where the two disputants have roughly the same capabilities in terms of information and intelligence.[3]
Responses to Disagreements
The schools about the right way to respond to a disagreement are the Conciliatory School and the Steadfast school. Different philosophers provide different reasons for each of these schools.
The Conciliatory School
This school contends that a person must consider his peer opinion as equally valid as his own opinion. Consequently, he must revise his own belief taking into account his peer belief. One possibility is to meet in the middle. When this is not possible, he may withdraw his own belief.[2][4]
The Steadfast School
This school contends that a person must adhere to his own original belief notwithstanding his knowledge of a disagreement. One reason is that the disputant may be mistaken. Another reason is that a person must, above all else, trust himself.[4] Another reason is related to the dispute about the Uniqueness Thesis. If the Uniqueness Thesis is not true, i.e., two contradictory beliefs may be justified, the fact that someone believes differently does not imply that anyone of the disputants is not justified in his belief.[5]
References
- ^ For a collection of articles about this issue see: Feldman, Richard; Warhead, Ted A, eds. (2010). disagreement. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-922608-5.
- ^ a b Frances, Frances; Matheson, Jonathann. "Disagreement". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 ed.).
- ^ Kelly, Thomas (2005). Hawthorne, John; Gendler, Tamar (eds.). The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. Oxford University Press. pp. 167–196.
- ^ a b Matheson, Jonathan (2018-05-14). "The Epistemology of Disagreement". 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology.
- ^ Weintraub, Ruth (2013). "Can Steadfast Peer Disagreement Be Rational?". Philosophical Quarterly. 63 (253). Wiley-Blackwell: 740–759. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.12065.