Jump to content

Southern Airways Flight 242

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Spacestevie (talk | contribs) at 10:59, 16 November 2007 (→‎See also). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Southern Airways Flight 242
Occurrence
DateApril 4, 1977
SummaryMultiple engine failure
SiteNew Hope, Paulding County, Georgia, United States
Aircraft typeDC-9-31
OperatorSouthern Airways
RegistrationN1335U
Passengers83
Crew4
Fatalities70 (including 8 on the ground)
Injuries22
Survivors21

Southern Airways Flight 242 was a DC-9-31 jet, registered N1335U, that executed a forced landing on a highway in New Hope, Paulding County, Georgia, United States after suffering hail damage and losing both engines in a severe thunderstorm on April 4, 1977.

At the time of the accident, the aircraft was flying from Huntsville, Alabama to Atlanta, Georgia. Sixty-two people on the aircraft (including the flight crew) and eight people on the ground died; 19 passengers survived, as well as the two flight attendants.

Accident sequence

The flight crew was advised of the presence of embedded thunderstorms and possible tornadoes along their general route prior to their departure from Huntsville, but was not subsequently updated of the fact that the cells formed up into a squall line. The flight crew had flown through that same area from Atlanta earlier in the day, and encountered only mild turbulence and light rain during those flights.

The weather system had apparently intensified in the meanwhile. The peak convective activity was later shown on ground radar to be near Rome, GA, to which the flight was cleared to proceed by Air Traffic Control. The crew attempted to pick out a path through the cells depicted on their onboard weather radar display, but were apparently misled by the radar's attenuation effect and proceeded toward what they perceived as a low intensity area, which in fact was the peak convective activity point, attenuated by rain.

As the flight descended from its cruise altitude of 17,000 feet to 14,000 feet near Rome VOR, it apparently entered a thunderstorm cell and encountered a massive amount of water and hail. The hail was intense enough to break the aircraft's windshield, and due to ingestion of the water and hail combination, both engines were damaged and underwent flameout. The crew attempted unsuccessfully to achieve a restart of the engines, gliding down unpowered while trying to find an emergency landing field within gliding range. Air Traffic Control suggested Dobbins Air Force Base, about 20 miles east, as a possible landing site, but it turned out to be beyond reach. Another option, Cartersville Airport, a General Aviation field about 15 miles north with a much shorter runway was considered, but it too was now out of reach. As the aircraft ran out of altitude and options, gliding with a broken windshield and no engine power, the crew made visual contact with the ground and spotted a straight section of a rural highway below. They executed an unpowered forced landing on that road, but during the rollout the aircraft collided with a gas station/grocery store and other structures. The flight crew and 60 passengers were killed during the forced landing due to impact forces and fire, but 19 of the passengers survived, as well as both flight attendants. Eight people on the ground were also killed.

NTSB investigation and final report

The NTSB investigated the accident and concluded the following Probable Cause in its majority report, issued on January 26, 1978:[1]

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the total and unique loss of thrust from both engines while the aircraft was penetrating an area of severe thunderstorms. The loss of thrust was caused by the ingestion of massive amounts of water and hail which in combination with thrust lever movement induced severe stalling in and major damage to the engine compressors.

The NTSB also included the following Contributing Factors:

Major contributing factors included the failure of the company's dispatching system to provide the flightcrew with up-to-date severe weather information pertaining to the aircraft's intended route of flight, the captain's reliance on airborne weather radar for penetration of thunderstorm areas, and limitations in the Federal Aviation Administration's air traffic control system which precluded the timely dissemination of realtime hazardous weather information to the flightcrew.

Francis H. McAdams, one of the four NTSB members, dissented with the other members and filed the following Probable Cause in the same report:

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the captain's decision to penetrate rather than avoid an area of severe weather, the failure to obtain all the available weather information despite having knowledge of the severity of the storm system, and the reliance upon airborne weather radar for penetration rather than avoidance of the storm system. The penetration resulted in a total loss of thrust from both engines due to the ingestion of massive amounts of water and hail which in combination with advanced throttle settings induced severe stalling in, and major damage to, the engine compressors, which prevented the crew from restarting the engines. Furthermore, if the company's dispatching system had provided the flightcrew with timely severe weather information pertaining to the aircraft's intended route of flight, it is possible that the severe weather would not have been penetrated.

McAdams also added the following Contributing Factor:

Contributing to the cause were the inadequacies of the Federal Aviation Administration's air traffic control system which precluded the dissemination of real-time hazardous weather information to the flightcrew.

Flight attendants commendation

The NTSB noted in its report that despite the fact that the flight crew did not communicate with the cabin crew during the emergency sequence, the flight attendants nevertheless on their own initiative briefed and prepared the passengers for an emergency landing as the plane glided down. Just prior to touchdown, with no prior notice or cue from the flight crew that the plane was about to crash land, the flight attendants "saw trees" in the windows, and immediately yelled to the passengers a final "grab your ankles!" command. The flight attendants also helped evacuate the passengers from the burning plane after the crash landing. The NTSB concluded:

The flight attendants acted commendably for initiating a comprehensive emergency briefing of the passengers for their protection in preparation for a crash landing. This contributed to the number of survivors.[1]

Accident location

The NTSB identified the accident site in its report as "Highway 92 Spur, bisecting New Hope, GA".[1] They also include the geographical coordinates of 33°57′45″N 84°47′13″W / 33.96250°N 84.78694°W / 33.96250; -84.78694. In addition, the NTSB report includes a depiction of the accident site, hand drawn as a circled 'X' on an aviation Sectional chart. Due to subsequent development, the highway designations have changed as of 2006. The road section used for the forced landing, formerly called Highway 92 Spur, is now called Dallas-Acworth Highway (Highway 381).[2] The small community of New Hope, GA, Paulding County, where a memorial/reunion was held by survivors and family members 20 years after the accident in 1997,[3] still appears on maps as of 2006.[4]

See also

References