Battle of the Paracel Islands
| Battle of Hoang Sa (Vietnamese) Battle of Xisha (Chinese:中越西沙海战) Battle of Paracel Islands | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 People's Liberation Army Navy |
 Republic of Vietnam Navy | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Unknown | Colonel Hà Văn Ngạc | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
|
4 Corvettes 2 Hainan Class Submarine Chasers marine battalions unknown number of militia |
3 Frigates 1 Corvette commando platoon demolition team militia platoon | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
|
4 Corvettes damaged. 18 killed |
1 Corvette sunk 1 Frigate heavily damaged 2 Frigates lightly damaged 53 killed 16 injured 48 captured | ||||||
Battle of Paracel (Battle of Hoàng Sa in Vietnam, and Battle of Xisha in China) was a sea battle between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) at Paracel Islands on January 19, 1974.
Historical background
The dispute over Paracel Islands traces back to the colonial era, as the Paracel Islands history has shown. The islands were originally under control of ancient Vietnam. Its Vietnamese name is Hoàng Sa. When France dominated Vietnam in 19th century, it gained control of the whole islands. France then built a meteorologic station on Paracel Islands as a part of institute of meteorologic of Đà Nẵng (a province of Vietnam).
When French troops left Vietnam in 1954, the French government handed over the control of Paracel Islands to the government of Republic of Vietnam (also referenced as South Vietnam) following the Geneva accord signed in 1954. After that, China secretly sent troops and militia to control some parts of Paracel Islands. In 1956, the People's Republic of China claimed control of Woody Island in Paracel Islands and sent troops and militia to the islands. The Chinese troops and militia were then defeated and captured by South Vietnamese marines in the same year and then returned to China by the government of Republic of Vietnam.
In 1958, the People's Republic of China announced its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, Macclesfield Island, and Pescadores Islands.[1]
On September 22 1958, Nhân Dân newspaper in North Vietnam printed an official letter from the Prime Minister of North Vietnam, Phạm Văn Đồng to Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China in which North Vietnam (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) recognized the claim of China's sovereignty over Paracel Islands.[2].
However, this recognition was not legally valid as, according to Geneva accord signed in 1954 by both Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Republic of Vietnam, Vietnam was divided into two independent nations: Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the North and Republic of Vietnam in the South. Paracel Islands, following the accord, was under the control of Republic of Vietnam, not under the control of Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
In 1961, South Vietnam made Paracel Islands a part of Quảng Nam Province.
By 1973, South Vietnamese military presence on the islands was reduced to a platoon of local soldiers as Vietnamese marines had been withdrawn from the islands for her defence against North Vietnamese troops in Vietnam War.
In 1974, the People's Republic of China again publicly declared her claim of sovereignty over Paracel Islands. The claim was immediately rejected by the government of Republic of Vietnam.
In an effort to strengthen its presence on the islands, South Vietnam decided to build a larger air base on Paracel Islands that could support C-7 Caribou airplanes. The territorial dispute quickly escalated into an armed conflict between South Vietnam and China.
Order of battle
Four warships of Republic of Vietnam participated in the battle. They are the frigate Trần Bình Trọng (HQ-5),[3] frigate Lý Thường Kiệt (HQ-16),[4] frigate Trần Khánh Dư (HQ-4),[5] and corvette Nhật Tảo (HQ-10).[6] HQ-10 had only one running engine when the battle began. In addition to the warships were a platoon of South Vietnamese naval commandos, an under-water demolition team and a platoon of soldiers stationed on Paracel Islands.
People's Republic of China had four warships for most parts of the battle (PLAN corvettes # 271, #274, # 389 and # 396). This force was then reinforced by two more Hainan-Class submarine chaser gunboats (# 282 and # 281) by the end of the battle. In addition to these warships were two marine battalions and an unknown number of militia on the chinese controlled portion of the islands.
The battle
On 16 January, 1974, while surveying Paracel Islands for the construction of a new air base, South Vietnamese warship Lý Thường Kiệt (HQ-16) detected Chinese militia and soldiers setting up stelae presenting Chinese sovereignty over Paracel Islands. The militia and soldiers were covered and supported by Chinese warships (# 389, # 396) and minesweepers (# 402, # 407).
Prelude of the battle
Frigate HQ-16 used light signals to demand Chinese ships to leave Vietnamese territorial waters immediately. The patrolling naval corvettes of People's Republic of China did not leave and also used light signals to demand that the Vietnamese ships leave Chinese territorial waters immediately.
On 17 January, 1974, South Vietnamese Navy frigate Trần Khánh Dư (HQ-4) arrived in Paracel as reinforcement for frigate HQ-16. At the same time, two naval corvettes (# 274 and # 271) of People's Liberation Army Navy also arrived to the area as reinforcement for Chinese forces.
On 18 January, 1974, frigate Trần Bình Trọng (HQ-5) and corvette Nhật Tảo (HQ-10) joined the South Vietnamese fleet at Paracel Islands. HQ-10 had only one running engine at the time. On board of HQ-5 was Colonel Hà Văn Ngạc, commander of the Vietnamese fleet.
Actual battle
On early morning of 19 January, 1974, Vietnamese troops landed on Quang Hòa island from HQ-5 and were immediately under fire from Chinese troops. Three Vietnamese soldiers were killed and two others were injured. As Vietnamese troops were outnumbered by Chinese troops and Chinese armed fishermen, HQ-5 withdrew the Vietnamese soldiers from the island (it was revealed later that all Chinese fishermen were in fact Chinese naval militia, the reserve members of PLAN). From that time, four warships HQ-4, HQ-5, HQ-10 and HQ-16 of Republic of Vietnam and four warships #271, #274, #389 and #396 of People's Republic of China were ready for combat. Guns on Vietnamese warships and guns on Chinese warships were pointing directly to each other.
At 10:24 AM on 19 January, 1974, all four warships of Republic of Vietnam started firing at four Chinese warships at the same time. The warships of People's Republic of China immediately fired back. The battle began and lasted for about 40 minutes.
According to South Vietnam, while the battle was going on, South Vietnamese fleet detected two Chinese reinforcing warships rushing to the area from Hainan island (China later acknowledged that these were warships #281 and #282 sent from Hainan to participate in the battle). In addition, South Vietnamese fleet also received warnings from the United States that radars of United States Navy had detected additional Chinese guided missile frigates and MIG jet fighters on their way from Hainan to Paracel Islands. South Vietnam requested for assistance from United States Navy. The request was rejected.
As South Vietnam had no reinforcing forces for the battle at the time and China did, Colonel Hà Văn Ngạc ordered the Vietnamese fleet to withdraw despite outclassing the Chinese Fleet in tonnage. All Vietnamese warships but HQ-10 retreated. Warship HQ-10 could not retreat because her only working engine was disabled after the battle began. Vietnamese soldiers on HQ-10 then had to abandon the warship on life-saving boats (the captain of HQ-10, Major Ngụy Văn Thà, did not leave the ship and he was killed). Chinese warships then focus their fire-power on HQ-10 and sank the Vietnamese warship.[7]
According to China, she did not have any missile frigates at Hainan island. China said the closest Chinese missile frigates were at the northern end of Taiwan Strait, unsure of passing due to the fear that Republic of China, an ally of South Vietnam, would shell them if they attempted to cross the strait. The only Chinese reinforcement nearby was two Hainan-Class submarine chasers and, due to the backwardness of Chinese communications, they were not notified near end of the battle and only participated later in pursuit of the retreating South Vietnamese force.
On 20 January, 1974 (one day after the sea battle), People's Republic of China sent a force of marines, jet fighters, and warships to Paracel Islands. This force crushed and captured the South Vietnamese Navy Marine garrison on the islands. The Chinese force was sent from Hainan.
The whole Paracel Islands have been under control of People's Republic of China since then.
Results of the battle
The casualties of Republic of Vietnam were agreed on by both sides. The casualties of People's Republic of China were not.
Vietnamese casualties
The South Vietnamese claim of her own casualties were agreed to by Chinese. According to the claim, warship HQ-10 was sunk, HQ-16 was heavily damaged, HQ-5 and HQ-4 were both lightly damaged. Fifty-three (53) Vietnamese soldiers including Captain Ngụy Văn Thà of HQ-10 were killed, 16 others were injured. On January 20, 1974, ship Kopionella of Netherlands saved 23 men of HQ-10 who at the time were floating around the region. On 29 January, 1974, Vietnamese fishermen found a group of 15 Vietnamese soldiers near Mũi Yến (Qui Nhơn), who had participated in the combat on Quang Hòa islands, and escaped on life-saving boats.[8]
On January 20, 1974, the day after the retreat of South Vietnamese fleet, a powerful Chinese force including Chinese jet fighters, warships and marines gained total control of Paracel Islands. China captured 48 war prisoners, including 1 American advisor[9] that were on Paracel Islands at the time. China later released them all in Hong Kong through Red Cross.
Chinese casualties
According to South Vietnam, warship # 271 of China sank, warship # 274 of China had to run aground and then exploded, warships # 389 and # 396 were both heavily damaged.
According to China, although all Chinese warships were hit numerous times, most Vietnamese shells passed harmlessly from one side of the hull to the other due to the armor-piercing rounds used. China said warships # 271 and # 389 were mostly suffered superfacial damages on hulls, both were back to Hainan Island and were rapidly repaired. The only damage that could be considered serious for these two warships were that the pipes of their engines were hit and greatly reduced their speed, and the replacement of these damaged pipes were more costly in patching up holes on the hull. Warship # 274 was damaged more because some of the shells struck were actually block by the equipment installed inside, and thus the shells caused more damage. As a result, # 274 had to stop at the Yongxing Island first for emergency repair, and then sailed to Hainan on its own power next day. Warship # 396 was damaged the most, with a shell struck its main propulsion and exploded, causing a fire, and with the help of minesweepers #402 and #407, it managed to run aground and put out the fire, and had to be towed back to its base. The repair of warship #396 was the most costly among all, because the main propulsion diesels had to be replaced. Of the 18 Chinese sailors killed, 5 of them were in the main propulsion machinery room because the fire caused the toxic gas which poisoned the sailors. Due to the backwardness of the Chinese communications, reinforcing warships (#281 and #282) joined the battle too late, and they did not suffer any damages in the pursuit of the enemy. According to Chinese government, the overestimation of Chinese losses by South Vietnam might partially due to a combination of factors: Chinese warships had successfully laid smoke screen during the battle, and thus obscured the Vietnamese vision, and since the radars and other surveillance equipment onboard the Vietnamese ships were damaged, it was hard to accurately assess the actual Chinese losses. Furthermore, due to the damages, Chinese warships could no longer pursuit their enemy in their maximum speed, which was not high to begin with, and thus the pursuit task was assigned to the newly arrived warships (#281 and #282), which would easily provide the false impression that most Chinese warships in the battle were sunk.
However, the Chinese government usually doesn't provide exact information on Chinese losses in combat. According to military experts, Chinese claims of her warships laying smoke screens while fighting were not consistent with military practices. It is believed that smoke coming from Chinese warships were actually caused by damages to the warships.
Other outcomes
As a result of the battle, Republic of Vietnam no longer has control of Paracel Islands, the control of which it had been handed by France in 1954. After the battle, the People's Republic of China controls the whole islands.
Unlike its reaction in 1958, the government of Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) did not support China's actions to gain control over Paracel Islands in 1974. Democratic Republic of Vietnam issued a public statement that she supported a peaceful solution for Paracel Islands. However, she stopped short of supporting Republic of Vietnam defending the islands.
After the reunification of Vietnam in 1976, the government of united Vietnam (Socialist Republic of Vietnam) immediately claimed her sovereignty over Paracel Islands. According to the government of Socialist Republic of Vietnam, former Democratic Republic of Vietnam made statements for Chinese benefits over Paracel Islands in 1958 just because it had been forced to do so for receiving military aid from China.
An unexpected outcome is that the important sea line of Taiwan Strait was opened due to the battle after being closed for about 25 years. Chiang Kai-shek, the President of Republic of China at the time, ordered his forces not to shell and intercept the Communist Chinese missile frigates sent to reinforce the Chinese force in Paracel Islands.[citation needed]
The control of People's Republic of China over Paracel Islands has been causing strong and endless oppositions from Vietnamese government as well as all Vietnamese communities around the world. Vietnamese with different political viewpoints (communists and non-communists alike) all express their belief that Paracel Islands is a part of Vietnam and must be returned to Vietnam.
Notes
- ^ Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: Exploring Potential Triggers of Conflict A Pacific Forum CSIS Special Report, của Ralph A. Cossa, Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998, trang B-2
- ^ Nhân Dân No. 1653, 22 September 1958 [10]
- ^ Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes Data (DyMID), version 2.0 tabulations
- ^ Hải Chiến Hoàng Sa, Bão biển Đệ Nhị Hải Sư, Australia, 1989, page 101
- ^ DyMID
- ^ This warship is formerly USCGC Chincoteague (WHEC-375), and was transferred to South Vietnam and renamed RVNS Tran Binh Trong (HQ-5). It was later transferred to the Philippines and renamed RPS Andres Bonifacto (PF-7) in 1975 when South Vietnam fell.
- ^ This warship is formerly USCGC Bering Strait (WHEC-382), and was transferred to South Vietnam and renamed RVNS Ly Thuong Kiet (HQ-16). It was later transferred to the Philippines and renamed RPS Diego Silang (PF-9) in 1975 when South Vietnam fell.
- ^ This warship is formerly USS Forster (DER-334), loaned to South Vietnam on 25 September 1971 and renamed Tran Khanh Du (HQ-4). Captured by North Vietnamese after the fall of Saigon and was renamed Dai Ky (HQ-03).
- ^ This warship is formerly USS Serene (AM 300/MSF-300), and was transferred to South Vietnam 24 January 1964. It was re-designated as RVNS Nhut Tao (HQ-10)
- ^ Counterpart, A South Vietnamese Naval Officer's War Kiem Do and Julie Kane, Naval Institute, Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1998, chương 10.
- ^ Thế Giới Lên Án Trung Cộng Xâm Lăng Hoàng Sa Của VNCH. Tài liệu Tổng cục Chiến tranh Chính trị, Bộ Tổng tham mưu QLVNCH, Sài Gòn, 1974, trang 11.
- ^ 西沙海战――痛击南越海军, Xinhua, 20 January 2003, online
- 西沙海战详解[图], online.