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From The Week Before Pearl Harbor by A. A. Hoehling (W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, NY, 1963), in the Epilogue is to be found on Page 200:
“... That panic gripped the second deck of the Navy Department immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor is beyond reasonable dispute. One officer, then in intelligence, now in a high post in the Navy, told this writer that he went to his office safe one morning to find that a number of ‘magic’ dispatches were mysteriously missing. He never retrieved them.
ONI, in fact, had done such a thorough housecleaning of its top-secret and secret as well as not-so-secret files, that, according to another officer on duty at the time, not even a departmental organization chart of November and December, 1941, could ever be found. ...”
And, on Page 204:
“ ... There are a few specialists, circa 1941, who insist that their memories as well must bear the ‘secret’ tag. A leading cryptanalyst, in retirement, hinting at a kind of passive brain-washing, with his pension as a lever, maintains he has been ordered not to discuss those long-ago codes and ciphers. However, the National Security Council, which he indirectly accused, has denied not only the allegations but any interest in the World War II period. ...”
Perhaps of note in passing, within Hoehling’s text (released some 22 years after the Pearl Harbor attack) are interviews with several principals, e.g.,Stark, Kimmel, Bicknell, McCollum, Rochefort, ..., etc.
JN25 in any of its variants is not mentioned, while Safford is quoted only using “Operations Code” at the top of Page 76.
From the Knox Report, released on December 15, 1941, one of the early reportings on the damage done at Pearl Harbor.
"... Neither Short nor Kimmel, at the time of the attack, had any knowledge of the plain intimations of some surprise move, made clear in Washington, through the interception of Japanese instructions to Nomura, in which a surprise move of some kind was clearly indicated by the insistence upon the precise time of Nomura's reply to Hull, at one o'clock on Sunday.
A general war warning had been sent out from the Navy Department on November 27th, to Admiral Kimmel. General Short told me that a message of warning sent from the War Department on Saturday night at midnight, before the attack, failed to reach him until four or five hours after the attack had been made. ..."
A. "Neither Short nor Kimmel, ... had any knowledge of the plain intimations of some surprise move, made clear in Washington, ..." [Who knew what and when?]
B. "A general war warning had been sent out from the Navy Department on November 27th, ..." [Not a full alert, but a 'general war warning' - the so called "Do/Don't" message.]
C. "... message of warning sent from the War Department on Saturday night at midnight, before the attack, ..." This message has never been found, and is assumed destroyed. [It is also often confused with the storied Marshall message delivered by RCA messenger after the attack.]
What if this midnight message had been sent as Knox believes it had been when he arrived at Pearl Harbor and asked about it. Imagine if this "... Saturday night at midnight, before the attack, ..." - that is, midnight, December 6, 1941, Washington local time - had been sent and received by Kimmel. The two IJN O-type seaplanes doing their pre-attack fly-over - see and report what?
— Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.132.176.50 (talk • contribs) 06:31, 13 December 2007 (UTC)[reply]
This is so incredibly ignorant, I should just ignore it.
"A general war warning had been sent out from the Navy Department on November 27th" Did you bother to read it? It warns of possible attacks in the Philippines, Russia, Borneo, & Thailand; it makes no mention whatever of Pearl Harbor, contrary to what's usually implied by conspiracy loons.
"plain intimations of some surprise move," Ditto. Not against Pearl.
"Imagine" Yes, do. Kimmel sorties the fleet to meet Nagumo, rdv w Halsey en route. Nagumo delivers a crushing blow to the Battle Line. 8 BBs & 1 (perhaps both?) US CVs sunk; Halsey, Kimmel, Spruance, Burke?, Fletcher KIA. Losses top 20000. Nagumo approaches Hawaii & savages the shore installations. Rochefort, Davenport, Jacobs, English KIA. Hawaii is incapable of serving as a repair & replenishment station for a year. US subs congregate in Australia & San Francisco. Japan wins at the Coral Sea, fight to a draw around Fiji. The Soviets enter the war in August 1945, just as the Marines assault Saipan. The Soviets (with reason) insist on joint occupation of Japan & control of all of Korea. MacArthur takes sides in the Chinese Civil War. The Soviets object. LeMay suggests boming them back to the Stone Age with atomic bombs. Truman agrees. The world goes up in flames. Trekphiler (talk) 10:35, 11 March 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Or - the China-Japanese war continues; China without aid from US and USSR. Germany and USSR (without Lend-Lease aid) bleed each other to death, Britain is on "Cash-and-Carry" basis ... British Empire falls. Britain, French, and Dutch lose colonies. No communist inspired Korean War, Viet Nam War. No Cold War. ... United States is not policeman of the world. A geo-political world with a re-ordered set of "spheres of influence" with dollar/mark/yen economies ... [No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the US Entry into WWII Bruce M. Russett] —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.47 (talk) 11:56, 6 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Through a glass, darkly
I deleted:
"Of note, for added clarity here, the perspective of U.S. naval intelligence at the time as taken from the Proceedings of the Hewitt Inquiry[1] shows, " ... The significance of the term, 'tactical circuit' is that the vessel itself, that is AKAGI, was using its own radio to call up and work directly the other vessels rather than work them through shore stations via the broadcast method which was the common practice in Japanese communications. The working of the AKAGI with the Marus, indicated that she was making arrangements for fuel or some administrative function, since a carrier would rarely address a maru.""
because, frankly, I'm not sure what it was trying to do; the point was already made in the 'graph above it clearly enough. I also deleted this:
"To also note, for the 30 Nov41 COMSUM14's statement about Akagi hear on tactical circuits (i.e., radio transmissions) calling marus, that all requests for the source materials used to develop this summary have been denied for many years; with many of these requests even pre-dating the FOIA process. Which maru(s) did Akagi "work" - call signs? How was Akagi identified? Time of the intercept(s)? Signal characterisitcs (quantity and strength) of the intercept(s)? Frequency (or frequencies) used by Akagi? Any acknowledgements intercept(s)? RDF bearings taken? ... ? All of these questions remain open. <!--Again, facts are facts.-->"
as unencyclopedic. They may be valid points for more research; try answering some of them. I'm guessing the Hewitt Report asked {& answered!) these questions; try citing it. Or sources that do answer them. Trekphiler (talk) 03:08, 4 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]
"I'm guessing ..." - a clear winner, prima facia, as being "encyclopedic" Oh, in case you missed/ignored it - the source material remains classified. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.38 (talk) 11:11, 4 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Why don't you try contributing something besides insulting remarks & unanswered questions? I guess being an anonymous jerk is more your style. Trekphiler (talk) 05:33, 5 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Vacuous prattle from I got that wrong! and I'm guessing the Hewitt Report asked (& answered!) ... - another of the stellar contributions from the untutored? Track down that Hewitt Report guess yet? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.164.2.123 (talk) 13:34, 27 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Would those "better things" include your reading, however so brief, of the Hewitt Report? Can we expect you to illuminate/contribute items from the 30Nov41 COMSUM14 report? Or would that be more of your guessing? Do tell. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.56 (talk) 20:26, 27 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]
<--Y'know, rather than complaining, why don't you source it, for those of us who don't live next door to the Library of Congress? No, wait, you'd rather attack people who disagree with your purblind ignorant views. My mistake. Trekphiler (talk) 13:16, 9 March 2008 (UTC)[reply]
You may want to "Google" it for yourself - there are several "sources." But as you seem to avoid "looking stuff up" - enjoy your solo journey.
Regards the Library of Congress - a wonderful resource, but you might want to start elsewhere. The National Archives in College Park, MD is suggested. See John Taylor - very helpful to many.
While there, rub the "terp" and go to the student operated "Creamery" on Route 1, try the vanilla ice cream with maple syrup; and within walking distance is the first military air field in the US - the Wright brothers flew from there. Watching "short field" practice is always fun.
"As given by IJN Admiral Toimioka,[2] the oilers supporting the Kido Butai were Kyokuto Maru, Kenyo Maru, Kokuyo Maru, Shinkoku Maru, Toho Maru, Nihon Maru, Toei Maru, and Shiriya; Shiriya is described[3] as a "... naval unit designed as an auxiliary to the Pearl Harbor task force ... The skipper of Shiriya was Captain Minour Togo, son of the great Admiral Heihachiro Togo. ..." And, also Parker's "The Unsolved Messages of Pearl Harbor", Cryptologia, 1991, Volume 15, Number 4, pgs. 295-313 has, " ... One of the most significant of the intercepted messages was sent 1 December 1941. It offered a tantalizing clue as to the whereabouts of the objectives. One of the tankers assigned to the Strike Force was Shiriya ...""
and
"However, Shiriya Maru, an IJN tanker and not a member of Japan's merchant fleet, appears in Parts XIII, pages 407, 420, 462-464, and Part XXX, page 2743, 2787, and 2792 in the Hearing before the Joint Committee. As well, message SRN-116476 refers to two "marus". "
I can already hear the complaints about deleting sourced material, so for the zealots, let me make it crystal clear: if you can demonstrate the significance of this material, rather than just use it to hint special knowledge (which is all it's doing now; calling Shiriya a "naval unit", but conveniently ignoring "an auxiliary", i.e., not a fleet unit {I won't even ask about the relevance of the relationship to "the great Admiral"}), put it back in. That is, show how these lists put the Kido Butaien route to Pearl. As I read it, the "calling marus" is routine housekeeping, carried on by the radiomen left behind, as part of the deception program; unless you can show different, leave it out. Trekphiler (talk) 13:25, 9 March 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Just some research ...
Starting with SRN-115398 - a frequently pointed out singularly in the tale of the SHIRIYA. This message, of 1 Dec 1941, from SHIRIYA to ComDesDiv7, is given as “This ship is processing direct to position 30.00N, 154.20E. Expect to arrive that point at 1800 on 3 Dec. Thereafter will proceed eastward alone 30 degrees North latitude at speed 7 of knots.”
Psst, ... Thimble, her ain't a'headin' south.
And, further ...
Some other SHIRIYA messages (by date and not SRNs) in addition to SRN-115398 above add more detail and include:
18 Nov
From: Sec1stAirFlt
To: CdrDesDiv7
Info: CO SHIRIYA
STRIKING FORCE Secret Operations Order No. 6 was not sent to the SHIRIYA. Please arrange to supply her with a copy of same.
Thimble ... "STRIKING FORCE Secret Operations Order ..."
20 Nov
From: SHIRIYA
Action: COS CarDiv1, Combined Fleet
1. I will complete loading aviation gasoline and other miscellaneous equipment 21 Nov.
2. The main generator and other minor repairs will be completed 23 Nov.
3. Expect to get underway on 24 Nov and join up during morning of 27 Nov.
4. STRIKING FORCE Secret Operations Order No. 6 has not been received.
Thimble ... COS CarDiv1 ... Chief of Staff, Carrier Division 1 ...
21 Nov
From: CO SHIRIYA
To: CrdDesDiv7
We are undergoing overhaul at Yokosuka. Expect to depart 24 Nov and arrive at Sea on 27 Nov. Advise rendezvous point your unit. Regarding refueling at Sea …
Thimble ... DesDiv 7 (Destroyer Division 7) was the escort assigned to CarDiv1 (Carrier Division 1) – namely CVs AKAGI and KAGA]
Finally, it is HIJMS SHIRIYA ... and, yes, her is a "fully-fledged" member of the IJN.
So, on absolutely no standing, Thimble deletes sourced material again ... becoming forever known as half-Thimble for making a mess and not cleaning it up - again!
Are you always such a halfwit? Or is it just with me? Where did I say Shiriya wasn't IJN? Or a fleet tanker? You've offered no evidence putting Akagi, Kaga, or DesDiv 7 en route. "30.00N, 154.20E", without looking at a chart of the Pacific, is about where I'd expect an exercise rdv. And if she was assigned DesDiv 7, I'd expect just this sort of routine housekeeping traffic. Or is that actually being faked by conspirators? Or can't the Japanese read charts? (Oh, wait, you think they can't. I forgot.) Show me something that puts her en routeto Pearl. (Hmm, Lurline was reading her deactivated radio transmitter from 1000nm away. Is that right?) Show me something that proves she was en route. (Sorry, Grogan's unsub word doesn't get it. Neither does yours.) Show me something that proves one of her "consorts" was en route. (Ditto.) Show me anything except evidence Shiriya was a fleet tanker, which is all you've proven so far, & which I knew already. (You have a real talent for proving the known. How about some of the unknown, for a change?)
Your argument "it's secret, therefore it's a conspiracy" is unpersuasive. (I think that's an "appeal to silence", or something; somebody doesn't deny your ridiculous charges, they must be true.) There are any number of reasons to keep things secret; conspiracy does not always pertain, contrary to your paranoid fantasies. Or, explain how what FDR was doing in the Atlantic encouraged Japan to attack. (That I gotta read.) Maybe you forgot (I'm being charitable, my guess is you have no clue), the world is round, & the USN has only so many ships to cover it all, so what happens in the Atlantic has a direct, material bearing on what happens in the Pacific; if FDR is sending ships to aid Britain in the Atlantic (he was, y'know), where were they coming from? The Bolivian Navy?
And finally, since somebody put it up on the page, at long last (if unsourced, AFAIK), what kind of moron would FDR have to be to sacrifice his main fleet assets just to bring the U.S. into war? Even to risk them, with no chance to inflict harm on the enemy? Where is it carved in stone there had to be a massacre at Pearl to get Congress off the dime? It's carved in the paranoid fantasies of the conspiracy loons; that's hardly persuasive (or any) evidence. Answer those.
BTW, when you're finished your ad hominem rant, recall, I'm not the sole arbiter of what stays off the page or goes in; if anybody but you thought I was really wrong, it'd be back in long before now. Captain Dunsel01:30, 11 March 2008 (UTC)[reply]
And, from the Knox Report we have, and no "guessing" ...
"Of course the best means of defense against air attack consists of fighter planes. Lack of an adequate number of this type of aircraft available to the Army for the defense of the Island is due to the diversion of this type before the outbreak of the war, to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians."
So, along with Kimmel losing about one-third of his fleet to King operating in the pond, lest we forget ... all that other "giving" ... from the "Bolivaian Navy" no less.
{You do know who authored Lend-Lease?]
Congress ... um, Stark says to Congress US was agressor in the pond. Does Congress or President ask for declaration of war? And, gee, an election is coming ...
Desire for "first overt act of war" from Japanese ... or, sorry gobs, but do take the first punch; it will not that bad, these "Japs" cannot be that strong.
Oh, the details from that COMSUM14 from 30Nov41 ... "you guessed" it ... still classified, ... really, they are - fair dinkum fact.
And, as you said earlier, to paraphrase ... Rochefort lost friends.
Rochefort stated that there was no dummy message traffic during all of 1941 - none.
"The main effect (if not the intended purpose) of this particular story (US Navy document CSP 1494A, April 14, 1942, pages 14-15, Did the Japanese Paint Us a 'Picture.') was to make the service believe that the old lie was actually true - that Rochefort, Huckins and Williams had been sucked in by the Japanese radio deception. ...
"Rochefort and the other officers at Pearl Harbor took offense at the contemptible way in which their reputations had been smeared. ... There were no dummy messages on Japanese naval circuits at any time during 1941. ... No responsible person in the C. I. Organization ever believed that the messages in this system were 'dummies.' ... "
"Lack of an adequate number of this type of aircraft available to the Army for the defense of the Island is due to the diversion of this type before the outbreak of the war, to the British," Wasn't that the idea? Aid the British? So your own argument falters on little things like facts.
"Kimmel losing about one-third of his fleet to King operating in the pond," Again, wasn't that the idea? And, look at the reverse. After Japan attacked, these ships would be sent back, which did nothing to aid the British. (Ooops, I forgot, FDR is an evil genius, he engineered a conspiracy to help Britain. My bad.)
Um, and yet via the Robert Commission, Hawaii Departments are deemed "unprepared"? In 1941 how many PBY-5s went across the pond; how many to Hawaii? Were those "sent" back? Did CV RANGER come back? Did USS Texas come back?
"Does Congress or President ask for declaration of war?" Ditto. After Rueben James & Greer, there was reason enough, & that would have helped Britain. Pay attention. War with Japan assuredly would not, per above (which you yourself pointed out, I see).
"'first overt act of war'" You forget, Japan was fighting the Chinese, & FDR wanted to impose a blockade without the League of Nations branding the U.S. an aggressor. ...
But it was not called a war in the US was it? The "China Incident" as called was needed to side-step the US Neutrality laws - arms to belligerents a non-no. So why does US provide arms and financial aid to China? Regards League of Nations, Haile Salassie showed the US (the US having Observer Status only - recall FDR's commitment to Hearst) its choice not to join cost them nothing, i.e., "branding" was not an issue.
...An overt act by Japan would allow it. Like the man said, you've got to "see the whole board". (In your case, see part of the board. See a square on the board. See part of a square on the board.)
So, take the punch. "Accidents" in the Atlantic did not cause a declaration or war, the cockleshell fleet of three did not, the Dutch rang the ABD agreement (of which Congress knew nothing in 1941) bell 4Dec41, ... time is running out.
"Rochefort stated that there was no dummy message traffic during all of 1941 - none." In JN-25, no; the only reason the Japanese would send dummy traffic in JN-25 is if they thought it was compromised. Ask if there was any maskirovka for the traffic analysts.
Glory - No dummy traffic in JN-25. But, to ask, just how does a traffic analyst assigned to RDF work determine if the message is a dummy?
As an exercise, try using the ATIA procedure to gain the release of "The Examination Unit" files for Gordon Head RDF for the period 26Nov41-7Dec41. And do let the readers know of your success or failure in the exercise.
Noted, but there are still people around who think this crap is credible. Let some of them, even one, see the flaws, I'm satisfied.
"'Accidents' in the Atlantic"? Fat chance. FDR was hoping Hitler or Congress would get so het up, there'd be a declaration; bet on it.
"how does a traffic analyst assigned to RDF work determine if the message is a dummy?" Not the issue. The originator is in the callsign; true or fake, for DF, the originator & location are what's important, not the content. And it's masking the location of the Kido Butai that's the issue; if the originator says Akagi & the location is Hittokapu Wan, the job's done.
"not called a war", "arms to belligerents a non-no." Exactly. If Japan made an overt act, the U.S. could apply a blockade, rather than just try & sneak weaps through. (Don't think the League didn't suspect aid to China. It was coming from Germany & Russia in a rush, more than the U.S. ever supplied before the war.)
"So, take the punch." Which benefits Britain how, again? Escorts, ships, aircraft, VLR Liberators [!] all going to SWPA, rather than RN & RAFCC... Boy, that conspiracy is right up there with...hmmm...defeating al Qaida by invading Iraq.
"how many PBY-5s went across the pond; how many to Hawaii? Were those "sent" back? Did CV RANGER come back? Did USS Texas come back?" Not the issue. How many went to Hawaii instead of Britain? Whole squadrons of B-24s, which CC was desperate for, went to SWPA for LR recon & bombing; just one in Gander could have cut losses to U-boats dramatically in 1941, which would have had very beneficial effects on BOLERO & might have meant NEPTUNE goes off, oh, a year sooner, with substantially fewer casualties & much faster inland & frontier-bound movement, whence no Sov occupation of Poland & EGer, for starters. Ranger wasn't capable of fleet operations (she was too small), so no loss; she'd have served as a training ship or an AVG anyhow (which should have spared Wasp from ferrying Spits to Malta, BTW). Trekphiler (talk) 03:25 & 03:44, 12 March 2008 (UTC)[reply]
What - nothing on Gordon Head? The Marconi gear there was impressive for its day. Recall the difference in the "Y" procedures and the "W" procedures - and then how to marry them? Got caught missing your intent about dummy messages did you - loose reasoning, again. Did you miss school the day the League of Nations was covered? Remember why Japan withdrew from the League of Nations? Another of those "I got that wrong" instances? Oh, you were guessing - again ... that explains a great deal.
"Which benefits Britain how?" ... missed another memo have you? As a hint: conduct a detailed review the Magic summaries for Nov41 - just a suggested starting pointer for you. You might, just might, track a path to answer how and why FDR - the night before his 8Dec41 speech - tells some Congressional leaders that Germany will declare war on the US in days. Warning as this will require focus and energy and certainly tools of discovery your "twenty-fives" does not evidence. Enjoy a few "Blues" along the way.
Oh, and prior to getting that Gordon Head material released, and please do report progress, suggest you brush on the BRUSA and UKUSA Agreements. The CANUSA and CAZAB Agreement might also apply. Remember SRH-149 remains redaced, obviously using your rationale.
But as half-thimble is now but a dram (or a sou), a real page-turner for you. It is clear your "solid" claims need some ... dare I say ... revision. So, do scan Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor: Avoiding was in East Asia, 1936-41 by Antony Best (N.B., no "h" in Antony), LSE/Routledge, London and New York, 1995. [ISBN 0-415-11171-4]. For example, Chapter Six ... Burma Road something or other. ... a give'me for you.
Have at it dram. Enjoy the "happenings" in the pond - you might even discover the history of the British FH3/FH4/FH5 sets and those "birdcage" antennae. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 63.3.18.1 (talk) 11:10, 12 March 2008 (UTC)[reply]
This section is smudging the facts a bit. Yamamoto who planned the attack disagreed with battleships being superior to battleships and from what I've read in some books, he planned the attack for when it happened based on the hope that the Aircraft carriers would be in dock, he missed them by 2-3 days. Also note that the IJN strike force consisted of large amounts of carriers. This section leads people to believe that all members of both Navies considered carriers inferior, infact there was a divide in the navies, older Admirals who had been with battleships most of their lives and younger officers who trained with carriers. Similar to how some of my older relatives refuse to learn metric and continue to use it, and complain when something is not in Imperial (we're Canadian, not a shot at Americans). Commissioned officers works on a merit system, but also a seniority and political system, quite a few leading IJN officers for instance would have been in the Battle of Tsushima (Yamamoto Isoroku included), and would of considered ships like the Yamato new and top of the line. Younger officers who may of had their first commands or first served on carriers would hold very different opinions. Who knows what opinion Roosevelt had. Also, saying that "aircraft carriers were classified as fleet scouting elements, and hence relatively expendable" doesn't make sense, thats 2+2=4. Aircraft carriers as scouts could remain safely behind battleships and still scout far ahead of all other ships, no expendable ship displaced 19800 tonnes empty and has a complement of 2200+ people. Thats more than 10x a Tribal class destroyer. Twice the personnel complement of the Arizona, with a similar displacement. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 (talk) 05:55, 2 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
If the battleships were so universally considered superior, why the Kido Butai? 6 aircraft carriers and escorts. 6 scouts and escorts hardly sound like "the single most powerful naval fleet", not my words, by the words of Wikipedia on the Kido Butai. In addition, while trying to say how unsafe they were out in the ocean surrounded by the IJN, Midway was shelled at the same time as Pearl Harbor, the next day Malaya was invaded by the 25th Army under Yamashita and the Americans were kicked out of Shanghai. Then on the 9th goes Bangkok. Peking is overrun on the 11th. On the 13th the Philippines are invaded by the 14th. On the 16th Borneo is invaded. And on the 23rd, Wake Island is captured. Seems like the safest place during all of this was 200 miles west of Hawai. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 (talk) 06:28, 2 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Some IJN perspective:
"In the last analysis, the success or failure of our entire strategy in the Pacific will be determined by whether of not we succeed in destroying the U.S. Fleet, more particularly, its carrier task forces." [ADM Yamamoto, IJN, 1942], and
"I think our principal teacher in respect to the necessity of emphasizing aircraft carriers was the American Navy. We had no teachers to speak of besides the United States in respect to the aircraft themselves and to the method of their employment. ... We were doing our utmost all the time to catch up with the United States." [FADM Nagano, IJN, 1945].
"Yamamoto who planned the attack disagreed with battleships being superior to battleships". So the legend goes. That's not what happened at Pearl, nor Midway, where he held his heavies back, well beyond the range of carrier air, per doctrine.
"Aircraft carriers as scouts could remain safely behind battleships and still scout far ahead of all other ships". True. Doctrine didn't see it that way. Carriers would scout in the van; cf Midway.
"no expendable ship displaced 19800 tonnes empty and has a complement of 2200+ people. Thats more than 10x a Tribal class destroyer. Twice the personnel complement of the Arizona, with a similar displacement." Irrelevant. Battleships were expected to engage battleships in a heads up gunfight, after scouts (CVs, SSs) attrited the enemy; losses were expected, & accepted.
Do you have a source that says Aircraft Carriers, not just ships serving as scouts, were expendable, or that the Kido Butai was west instead of north of them? Wikipedian rules, the burden of proof lies in the hands of whoever wants to add, I don't need proof to delete. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 (talk) 03:35, 6 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
I agree with Trek here. Hindsight is enticing, and if oftne responsible for distorting perceptions. It is certainly true that some forward thinking folks were aware of the potential of aircraft carriers (in all large navies), just as it's true that some still held with battleships as the main threat and most effective offense. And it may be that the split was largely along age lines (though Yamamoto's views would be an obvious exception. But it is nevertheless true that most (in all navies) did not see carriers as the major threat they would become (though mostly in the Pacific) until the Taranto raid (and even then it was mostly thought to be some sort of special case) and the sinking of Repulse and Prince of Wales off SE Asia. Even so, IJN failure to adequately train and replace pilots (in comparison to US effort) made their carriers less effective after Midway and Coral Sea.
By and large then, mental ossification was a significant factor in the panning of all Navies, and even to some extent after Taranto, Pearl, and the SE Asia sinkings. It changed, certainly in the US Navy, after the loss of all those ships at Pearl. The carriers, and the subs, were really all that was left for quite a while. The IJN had the luxury of thinking otherwise for some time. ww (talk) 03:48, 6 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Even if you do get the sources, don't just revert, actually try to improve the article, just because its a "page for conspiracy loons" doesn't mean you can't try to make it better. The Kido Butai was to the north, not the west, if you look at the map you can clearly see the Enterprise was no where near either attack force, so don't add back comments that suggest it was.
Agreement is not as important as sources that state an aircraft carrier was expendable to either military force at the time. Sorry if the image above is annoying, I don't use them much.
"doesn't mean you can't try to make it better." True, which is why the perspective is important. Saying CVs were more important doesn't do that. At the time, they weren't recognized as such. Yamamoto's oft-touted as the IJN icon of CV air, yet his screwed up dispositions at Midway were textbook Mahan. If you can explain that contradiction, I would love to hear it. (Don't even mention Nagumo; he was a]a BB sailor & b]not the sharpest knife in the drawer.) I notice also no BBs went with Nagumo to Pearl, in keeping with CF doctrine which was, had been, & would be, expecting a "decisive battle" (with BBs, by definition) near Japan as late as June 1944, despite (by then) extensive experience to the contrary. (I'll leave aside the influence of submarines, which was greater than most historiographers acknowledge or recognize; it's an old, old tune for me...)
From Trek (aka half-thimble) we have " ... I notice also no BBs went with Nagumo to Pearl, ..."
When can we expect another of those famous "I was wrong about that - again." comments, as there were two BBs in the Striking Force - (BB Hiei and BB Kirishima). [Poor chap, seems he does not know what he does not know; but, regardless, we can expect this fact not to deter him from his deletions of properly cited materials] —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.23.47 (talk) 11:36, 6 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
As for where Enterprise & Lexington were, we can argue how close to the K.B. either was, but surely nearer Japan than Pearl, which was the point; if the objective was to sacrifice fleet units, why weren't they held? Trekphiler (talk) 04:47, 6 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Sun Tzu said something about the basis of war is deception. I didn't think the goal was to sacrifice fleet resources but to sacrifice resources in a way to not destroy your strategic ability to win and to appear as if you were an underdog or some such. I can't explain the behavior of Yamamoto. I haven't added into the article anything about carriers being better, I don't even think I added anything, what I did do was delete information that was incorrect (sending Big E and Lex away was dangerous for them, Pearl Harbor was no safe port, and there were few safe ports to be in after Pearl Harbor) and that would lead people to believe that a ship with 2000 people on it and a cost very comparable to a battleship would be sacrificed as readily as a destroyer or other small normal scout element. If they did do that, I want to see sources to that effect for it to remain in the article. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 (talk) 06:00, 6 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Don't you revert that again, you have no sources aside from your own opinion to add that stuff in. That would be the third time and I'm a little rusty on the rules but I recall something about doing something 3 times is bad when you have nothing but your opinion backing you up. If your right get sources, if you can't find any, right it on your own website, it doesn't belong in wiki. And you can see on the map the Big E and Lex, which are at the bottom stay well away from the KB which come from the north, the closest they got was on the 6th, afterwards the KB moves far north again, west. According to a map in a book next to me they might of been close to the 3rd Submarine Squad. Probably not a threat there though, submarines rarely attacked large ships with any success and they already had a mission which they weren't going to jeopardize for a small group. And they went towards Japan in the same way that LA is towards Japan while NY isn't, the carriers always had other American properties, namely Wake and Midway, between them and Japanese properties. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 (talk) 06:18, 6 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Actually at the time of the attack it looks like Big E was pretty close to Niihau (I think, thats kinda hard to read), only a couple of islands west of Pearl Harbor. Lex is over at Midway, it then moves south on the 8th while the Kido moves north. Thats still very misleading though, most people know more about minimaps in Strategy games than Radar or whatever. I doubt single ships or small groups of ships would really be in much danger unless they were specifically being hunted by a large group with plenty of surveillance equipment (namely airfields and sea planes and submarines placed in the right spots on the sea lanes), such actions would not be feasible when trying to attack enemy possessions. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.137.207.191 (talk) 06:48, 6 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]
<--
"you have no sources aside from your own opinion to add that stuff in." Oh, really? Let me see... Wilmott, Empires in the Balance & Barrier & the Javelin (USNIPress, 1982 & 1983); Peattie & Evans, Kaigun (USNIPress, 1997); Holmes, Undersea Victory (1966); Miller, War Plan Orange (USNIPress, 1991)(see the page, which agrees (& which I didn't write, BTW); Humble, Japanese High Seas Fleet (Ballantine, 1973) (not the strongest source, I admit, but it's handy...); Mahan, Influence of Sea Power on History (Little Brown, n.d.); Blair, Silent Victory (Lipincott, 1975) (I think); Morison's 14 volume history of USN ops in WW2; & doubtless others I haven't bothered to make a note of.
"I didn't think the goal was to sacrifice fleet resources but to sacrifice resources in a way to not destroy your strategic ability to win and to appear as if you were an underdog or some such." If that were so, the carriers would have been in harbor & the heavies at sea; risking, let alone sacrificing, BBs was totally contrary to doctrine of all major navies dating to the 1900s. It would have been stupid in '40s thinking, which is exactly why IJN refused to risk their own heavies well into 1944, expecting, anticipating "decisive battle" between BBs, contrary to the evidence. And IJN was (or so the myth goes) more progressive in use of carriers than anybody prewar.
As to "nearness", I'm happy to concede that one. It's a trivial point. In any case, if the idea is to sacrifice without excessive cost to future combat, it's the CVs, not the BBs, that would have been in harbor. They weren't. QED. Trekphiler (talk) 07:18, 6 April 2008 (UTC) (post scriptum: had the BBs been at sea, the losses would have been an order of magnitude worse... Is that evidence of conspiracy, too?)[reply]
"From Trek (aka half-thimble) we have " another insult from the peanut gallery with nothing constructive to offer. Do you spend your days looking for ways to catch me in mistakes? Or do you genuinely believe I spend hours researching every reply I make here just to avoid petty insults from the likes of you? (I'd say what I really think, but that'd be even less civil than you, & arguing with a halfwit accomplishes nothing.) You hide behind an anon account & haven't even the common manners not to break up other people's posts... Isn't that trolling? Trekphiler (talk) 14:56, 6 April 2008 (UTC) (Be glad I'm not an admin, boyo.)[reply]
" ... believe I spend hours researching every reply I make here ..." Prima facia from your many erroneous postings, even what is considered fundamental and common knowledge about Pearl Harbour (viz., the two BBs in Kido Butai), escapes you - that is, not knowing what you do not know. [Does the adage Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. - False in one thing, false in all things - apply here?]
