Jump to content

Morotai Mutiny

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by David Underdown (talk | contribs) at 17:05, 28 April 2008 (→Aftermath: wl). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Air Commodore Cobby (left) and Group Captain Caldwell (right) pictured at Morotai in January 1945

The "Morotai Mutiny" was an incident involving several senior flyers of the Australian First Tactical Air Force (1TAF) in April 1945. Eight pilots, who included Australia's top-scoring ace, Group Captain Clive Caldwell, tendered their resignations in protest at what they saw as the relegation of Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) fighter squadrons to strategically unimportant ground attack missions. Investigations resulted in vindication for the "mutineers", while three high-ranking officers at Headquarters 1TAF, including the Air Officer Commanding, were relieved of their posts.

Background

1TAF, commanded by Air Commodore Harry Cobby, was the main frontline unit of the RAAF in 1944–45. It came within the operational control of Lieutenant General George C. Kenney, United States Army Air Forces (USAAF), who was the Allied Air Forces commander in the South West Pacific Area under General Douglas MacArthur. Initially made up of one Beaufighter and two P-40 Kittyhawk wings, 1TAF was augmented in 1945 by No. 80 Wing, commanded by Caldwell. This force comprised three Spitfire squadrons, whose pilots included a number of veterans of the North African campaign and the defence of Northern Australia against Japanese air raids.[1][2]

Group Captain Arthur (pictured in 1941) commissioned a "balance sheet" of 1TAF losses vs. results

By early 1945, Japanese air power in the South West Pacific had been virtually destroyed. U.S. Army forces were focused on completing the recapture of the Philippines, as a stepping stone to an invasion of Japan. 1TAF was used increasingly for garrisoning duties and harassing Japanese bases on islands bypassed by MacArthur's forces.[3] The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Vice Marshal George Jones, would later contend that the RAAF, in the words of Air Force historian Alan Stephens, "was 'side-stepped' out of the final victory over Japan by MacArthur, who wanted all the glory for himself".[4] This feeling was shared by the aviators of the United States Marine Corps, who formed the Air North Solomons command; they also believed that MacArthur's headquarters was favouring the USAAF in the assignment of combat duties.[5]

The overall situation led to dissatisfaction and poor morale amongst 1TAF personnel based on Morotai, particularly the Spitfire pilots who had little opportunity for air-to-air combat and whose aircraft were ill-suited to ground attack missions.[6] Group Captain Wilfred Arthur, former Officer Commanding No. 81 Wing and now in charge of No. 78 Wing, became concerned that his units' expenditure in terms of men, machines and ordnance was not justified by the damage inflicted on enemy targets, or by the relative importance of those targets. He asked his Intelligence staff to produce a "balance sheet" to quantify losses versus results. Arthur presented the balance sheet to Air Commodore Cobby, who reviewed it and disseminated it to his headquarters staff, but took no further action.[7][8][9]

Prelude to resignation

Frustrated by the lack of response from Cobby and his staff, Arthur discussed his concerns with a number of other senior pilots in 1TAF, beginning with Wing Commander Kenneth Ranger, Senior Staff Officer (Plans). Ranger had been Senior Air Staff Officer with No. 9 Operational Group RAAF and had made a number of allegations against its commander, Air Commodore Joe Hewitt, who was eventually dismissed from his post. Arthur sought Ranger out as someone else with "moral guts", who would take "a stand against the type of operations we were engaged in". Arthur next enlisted Caldwell's support, though the latter was at the time facing charges by Cobby over liquor trafficking and there was a possibility that his involvement in any protest over operations would be misconstrued. However Arthur believed that Caldwell "would go as far as he possibly could to back up his opinions [which] were worth a lot more than the opinions of most other people in the area."[2]

The common factor was based on the fact that we did know each other very well; we had mutual confidence and mutual experience, which we believe has demonstrated sufficiently, to us at any rate, that the RAAF is not doing its job as it should.

Group Captain Clive Caldwell[2]

Through Caldwell more officers came on board, including two other celebrated aces, Wing Commander Bobby Gibbes and Squadron Leader John Waddy, as well as Squadron Leader Bert Grace, Squadron Leader Douglas Vanderfield and later Squadron Leader Stuart Harpham.[10] Following a series of meetings in March and April 1945, Caldwell proposed that the eight resign en masse, and the others agreed.[9] Arthur later contended that "I meant to make as big a fuss as I possibly could with the object of getting the position corrected ... All the same, we realised that, to lay ourselves open to any charge of mutiny, we might lessen the force of what we were doing, which was the reason we put the things in as resignations and not as any attempt to unseat people higher up."[2]

Arthur even attempted to secure Cobby's support in some form of action. 1TAF's commander had been the Australian Flying Corps' leading ace in World War I, as Caldwell was the RAAF's in World War II.[3] Arthur reasoned that although Cobby was partly to blame for the morale issue, "we felt that his value to our move, because of his name with the Public, together with Group Captain Caldwell, would give us a very considerable amount of public support ... he was the prima donna of one war, and ... arm-in-arm with the prima donna of the next war, we would put up a reasonable front and attract a lot of attention in the headlines of the newspapers." However Cobby refused to join, and later claimed to be unaware of the depth of feeling among the pilots.[2]

The "mutiny"

I will leave these applications on the table and if you pick them up, all records and all notes of any of this affair will be expunged from Air Force records and files and nothing will be heard about it.

Air Vice Marshal William Bostock, quoted by Squadron Leader John Waddy[2]

On 20 April 1945, the eight pilots presented Cobby with identically-worded letters under the heading "APPLICATION FOR RESIGNATION OF COMMISSION", which read "I hereby respectfully make application that I be permitted to resign my Commission as an officer in the Royal Australian Air Force, forthwith." Cobby appeared taken aback and would not accept the resignations. He spoke to all the pilots individually, except Caldwell, because he was already under charge.[11] When the men refused to withdraw the letters, Cobby contacted his immediate superior, Air Vice Marshal William Bostock, head of RAAF Command, the air force's main operational formation. Bostock arrived on Morotai the next day and interviewed the pilots, asking them to tear up the letters, without success.[6] Their only concession was to resubmit the resignations with the word "forthwith" replaced by "at the end of current operations".[9]

Air Vice Marshal Jones (left) and Lieutenant General Kenney (right) in July 1945

Bostock signalled Jones, advising that he found morale in 1TAF to be at a "dangerously low level" and recommending that Jones fire Cobby and replace him with Air Commodore Frederick Scherger.[6][12] Jones considered the pilots' action "absurd" due to the technicality that an officer could not legally resign during wartime, but he travelled to Morotai to investigate the matter personally. He also interviewed the pilots, later indicating that he believed they were acting honestly but out of a misguided concept of duty.[6]

Kenney also became embroiled in the affair, having been informed by Bostock, and insisted on speaking directly to the pilots himself over Jones' protest that this was a RAAF disciplinary matter. Kenney tried to persuade the officers to drop the attempt to resign but again they refused. He agreed with Bostock that Cobby should be replaced by Scherger, and declared that if the pilots were court-martialled then he would appear in their defence. Jones resolved to dismiss not only Cobby but his staff officers, Group Captains Gibson and Simms, and Scherger took over as Air Officer Commanding 1TAF the following month.[3][13]

Aftermath

In the event, no court-martial took place for any actions directly related to the "mutiny", and all the pilots except Caldwell continued on operations until the end of the war. A RAAF investigation found that Jones' removal of Cobby, Gibson and Simms was justified.[3] The Australian Government set up an inquiry into events on Morotai headed by Justice John Vincent Barry. Commencing on 16 May 1945, the inquiry focused on both the resignations and reports of illegal trafficking in alcohol between RAAF and U.S. service personnel on the island.[3][14] Barry's terms of reference encompassed only 1TAF, however the inquiry would also hear evidence of shortcomings in the Air Force's higher command that may have contributed to structural and morale problems on Morotai, particularly the bitter and long-running feud between Jones and Bostock over the division of operational and administrative control of the RAAF in the Pacific.[2]

We did manage to change the command up there completely. One or two of them I felt sad about. Harry Cobby who was a wonderful man, he was posted. But some of the others I wasn't distressed about. But we did change the command, and that's what we set out to do.

Wing Commander Bobby Gibbes[2]

The complete report of the inquiry was released in October, preceded by a summary of findings issued on 14 September 1945.[7][14] Judge Barry vindicated Arthur's "balance sheet" and the stand taken by the pilots, finding that their motives in tendering their resignations were sincere.[6][9] No further action was taken against them over the "mutiny" itself, but Caldwell and Gibbes were subsequently court martialled for their involvement in the alcohol racket and reduced to the rank of Flight Lieutenant.[3][15] The incident did not change the RAAF's role in the dying days of the war in the Pacific and has been blamed for contributing to difficulties in 1TAF preparing for the upcoming Battle of Tarakan.[13] However it did improve the situation on Morotai as Air Commodore Scherger set about restoring morale.[6] The "mutineers" considered that they had achieved most of what they set out to do by effecting a change of command in 1TAF and bringing about a governmental inquiry.[2]

News of the resignations, the alcohol racket, and Caldwell's court martial were widely reported in Australia. Following publication of Barry's findings, The Daily Telegraph in Sydney opined that "the RAAF should have a complete new deal. It is a badly run show and the fault is high up."[14] The same paper later called Caldwell’s court martial a "witch hunt".[16] Despite this publicity, the action did not become popularly known as the "Morotai Mutiny" until years later. The phrase dated back to the earliest days of the incident, Group Captain Arthur having written it at the top of an aide memoire. He later said that "the alliteration must have appealed to me". Shortly after writing it he crossed out "Morotai" and added a question mark following "Mutiny". The term did not catch on with the public at the time but Arthur's original words have been credited as the source of the name by which the incident eventually became known.[2]

Notes

  1. ^ Odgers, Air War Against Japan, pp. 297–99.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Alexander, "Cleaning the augean stables".
  3. ^ a b c d e f Stephens, The Royal Australian Air Force, pp. 123–24.
  4. ^ Stephens, The Royal Australian Air Force, p. 109.
  5. ^ Garand & Strobridge, History of U.S. Marine Corps, p. 389.
  6. ^ a b c d e f Helson, "Ten Years at the Top", pp. 207–15.
  7. ^ a b Alexander, Clive Caldwell, pp. 185–203.
  8. ^ Odgers, Air War Against Japan, pp. 386–90.
  9. ^ a b c d Odgers, Air War Against Japan, pp. 443–50.
  10. ^ Odgers, The Royal Australian Air Force, p. 125. Caldwell's official tally for the war was 28½ kills, Waddy's 15½, Gibbes' 10¼, and Arthur's 10.
  11. ^ Alexander, "Cleaning the augean stables". Bostock and Jones also left Caldwell out of their subsequent interviews with the pilots on Morotai.
  12. ^ Odgers, The Royal Australian Air Force, pp. 122–23.
  13. ^ a b Odgers, Air War Against Japan, pp. 456–59.
  14. ^ a b c Watson, Killer Caldwell, pp. 228–39.
  15. ^ Carman, Gerry (14 April 2007). "Air ace was born to fly: Bobby Gibbes 1916–2007". The Sydney Morning Herald: p. 34. {{cite journal}}: |pages= has extra text (help); Check date values in: |date= (help)
  16. ^ Alexander, Clive Caldwell, pp. 211–15.

References

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Morotai_Mutiny&oldid=208787993"