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Powder Alarm

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Powder Alarm
Part of the American Revolutionary War

The Old Powder House in Somerville, Massachusetts, as it stood in 1935, atop the hill at Nathan Tufts Park overlooking Powder House Square
DateSeptember 1, 1774
Location
Boston area
Result British soldiers seize military supplies

The Powder Alarm was a massive popular reaction to a raid by British soldiers under the command of General Thomas Gage, royal governor of Massachusetts, soon before the American Revolutionary War. On September 1, 1774, British soldiers confiscated gunpowder and other military supplies in a surprise raid near Boston. In response to the raid, amid rumors that blood had been shed, alarm spread through the countryside, and American Patriots sprang into action, fearing that war was at hand.

Although it proved to be a false alarm, the Powder Alarm caused all concerned to proceed more carefully in the days ahead, and essentially provided a "dress rehearsal" for the Battle of Lexington and Concord seven months later. Furthermore, actions on both sides to control weaponry, gunpowder, and other military supplies became more contentious, as the British sought to bring military stores more directly under their control, and the Patriot colonists sought to acquire them for their own use.

Background

In 1772, many of the thirteen British colonies, in response to the Gaspee Affair and other unpopular British actions, elected to form Committees of Correspondence. These allowed communities to formally communicate with each other, raise awareness of incidents occurring elsewhere, and coordinate actions;[1] as such, they became instrumental in enforcing the colonial response to enforcement of the Tea Act, the Intolerable Acts, and other unpopular legislation. The colonists of Massachusetts had not yet taken concerted action to militarily organize themselves against actions of the British regulars, although statements were made about supporting Boston (whose port was closed under the Boston Port Act) "at the risque of our lives and fortunes".[2]

General Gage, who had become the military governor of Massachusetts in May 1774, was in charge of enforcing the highly unpopular Intolerable Acts, which Parliament had passed in response to the Boston Tea Party. Seeking to prevent the outbreak of war and to keep the peace between the American Patriot (Whig) majority and the Loyalist (Tory) minority, he believed that the best way to accomplish this was by secretly removing military stores from storehouses and arsenals in New England.[3][4]

There were several places throughout the colonies were the British army had stockpiled supplies. Some of these places were fortifications that were manned by small garrisons; others were merely locked magazines. Most of the powder in these was under the control of the provincial government, though some was the property of individual towns. Access to the storehouse in what was then part of Charlestown, now Somerville, was controlled by William Brattle, the leader of the provincial militia and an appointee of the governor. Brattle, who had not obviously sided with either Loyalists or Patriots, notified Governor Gage in a letter dated August 27 that the provincial ("King's") powder was now the only supply remaining in that storehouse, the towns having removed all of theirs.[5] Gage decided that this powder had to be brought to Boston for safekeeping.[3]

The Powder House ("Magazine") is near the northern edge of this detail from a 1775 map of the Siege of Boston.

Expedition

On August 31, Gage sent Middlesex County sheriff David Phips to Brattle with orders to remove the provincial powder, so Brattle gave the key to the powderhouse to him. He also gave orders to ready a force of troops for action the next day, something that did not go unnoticed by the local population.[6] At some point on the 31st, General Gage, whether by his intent, accident, or theft by a messenger, lost possession of William Brattle's letter; the widely held story was that it was dropped. News of its content would spread rapidly, and it was widely held to be a warning to Gage to remove the provincial powder.[7]

Early in the morning of September 1, a force of roughly 260 British regulars from the 4th Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel George Maddison, were rowed in secrecy up the Mystic River from Boston to a landing point near Winter Hill in modern-day Somerville. From there, they marched about a mile to the Powder House, a gunpowder magazine that still stands at the present-day Powder House Square, Somerville, where the largest supply of gunpowder in Massachusetts was kept. Colonel David Phips, the county sheriff and a Loyalist sympathizer, gave the King's Troops the keys to the building, and after sunrise they removed all the gunpowder. Most of the regulars then returned to Boston the way they had come, but a small contingent marched to Cambridge, removed two field pieces, and took them to Boston by foot over the Great Bridge and up Boston Neck.[8] The powder and the field pieces were taken to the British fort on Castle Island.[9]

Response to the raid

In the course of the day, rumors began to fly through the countryside. The regulars were marching; Provincial powder had been seized; war was at hand; people had been killed; Boston was being bombarded by His Majesty's warships. The alarm spread as far as Connecticut. From all over the region, people took up arms and began streaming toward Boston. One traveler in Shrewsbury, Massachusetts reported that in the space of 15 minutes, 50 men had gathered, equipped themselves, sent out messengers to surrounding towns, and left for Boston.[10] On the 2nd, several thousand men bent on violence gathered in Cambridge, where they forced several notable Loyalists, including William Brattle, to flee to Boston and the protection of the military. Colonel Phips was forced, in writing, to dissociate himself from any and all government actions.[11] Eventually the air was cleared, and militia units (some of which were still heading toward Boston) returned home.[12]

British reaction

Gage, surprised by the reaction, delayed and eventually cancelled a second planned expedition to the storehouse in Worcester.[13] He concentrated his troops in Boston, and called for reinforcements from London, writing "if you think ten thousand men sufficient, send twenty; if one million is thought enough, give two; you save both blood and treasure in the end."[14] Gage's request was somewhat ridiculous, as there were only 12,000 troops in Britain at the time. He eventually received an additional 400 Marines in response to his requests.[14] He later began planning and executing seizures again.[15]

Colonial reaction

After the Powder Alarm, militia forces throughout New England were more cautious with their supplies and more intent on gaining information about Gage's plans and troop movements. Paul Revere played a significant role in distributing this information due to his geographical position in Boston, his social position as a middle-class craftsman in contact with all social classes, and his political position as a well-known Patriot propagandist and organizer.[16]

A 2007 photograph of the Old Powder House in Nathan Tufts Park, Somerville, Massachusetts

The colonists organize

On September 21, 1774, Patriot leaders met in Worcester and urged town meetings to organize a third of the militias into special companies of minutemen in constant readiness to march.[17] They also instituted the system of express riders and alarms that would prove to be critical at Lexington and Concord.[16] In October, the former legislature of Massachusetts met in defiance of the Massachusetts Government Act and declared itself to be the First Provincial Congress. It created a Committee of Safety modeled after a body with the same name during the English Civil War and it recommended that a quarter of the militia be designated as minutemen.[14] Military stores were to be stockpiled away from the coast (more than a convenient day's march), to make attempts to seize them more difficult. The largest stockpiles were located at Concord and Worcester.[18]

Portsmouth Alarm

Early in December, British military command voted to prohibit the export of arms and powder to North America, and to secure all remaining stores. On December 12, intelligence received by Paul Revere indicated that a seizure of stores at Fort William and Mary in Portsmouth, New Hampshire was imminent. He rode from Boston to Portsmouth on the 13th to notify the local Patriots, and on the 14th the fort was raided, and its supplies removed by the Patriots. Revere's intelligence had been incorrect; while a British operation had been contemplated, it had not been ordered. The British did eventually send ships carrying troops to Portsmouth, but they arrived long after the event. The first arrived on the 17th, and was directed into shallows at high tide by a local Patriot pilot, much to the ship captain's anger.[15]

Stores of gunpowder—typically referred to by Loyalists as "the king's powder" and by Patriots as "the militia's powder"—were also carried off from forts in Newport, Rhode Island, Providence, Rhode Island, and New London, Connecticut and distributed to the militias in towns away from the coast.[19] Cannon and other supplies were smuggled out of Boston and Charlestown.[20]

Salem confrontation

On February 27, 1775, HMS Lively brought a force of about 240 British regulars from the 64th Regiment under Colonel Alexander Leslie to confiscate weapons in Salem, Massachusetts. They were stopped by a small crowd that raised a drawbridge in their path and taunted them while others moved the cannon to safety and sent for help from nearby towns. Eventually, the drawbridge was lowered and the regulars were permitted to search the forge where the cannon had once been. They returned to their ship while being mocked by a growing force of irregulars marching along in lock-step next to them. There were minor scuffles, but no shots were fired.[21]

Analysis

These bloodless conflicts over military supplies seemed to be leading almost inevitably to open warfare to both the participants and contemporary historians.[22] General Gage was certainly aware of the military implications; he took steps to further fortify the Boston peninsula.[23] John Adams summed up the reaction in Philadelphia, where the First Continental Congress was meeting:

When the horrid news was brought here of the bombardment of Boston, which made us completely miserable for two days, we saw proofs of both the sympathy and the resolution of the continent. War! war! war! was the cry, and it was pronounced in a tone which would have done honor to the oratory of a Briton or a Roman. If it had proved true, you would have heard the thunder of an American Congress.[23]

There are notable comparisons and differences between these events and those leading to the battles of Lexington and Concord. The British had a similar goal in each case: the secret seizure of military supplies. The march on the powder house was done in secret, and executed successfully by the British; the march on Concord was done with timely intelligence of its execution being transmitted to the militias. The action in Portsmouth was based on faulty intelligence, and ended with Patriot success, as they surprised the garrison there; the intelligence on the night of April 18, 1775 was, to all intents, sufficiently accurate to warrant Patriot action. The timeliness of intelligence enabled the Patriots to assemble their militias; its accuracy may have contributed to the standoff that led to the "shot heard 'round the world".[24]

Fate of William Brattle

Brattle, who had lived in Cambridge all his life, would never see it again. On September 2, Boston newspapers published a letter in which he protested that he had not warned Gage to remove the powder; Gage had requested from him an accounting of the storehouse's contents, and he had complied. The content of his letter would be published on the 5th. Brattle would remain on Castle Island through the siege of Boston, and leave when the British evacuated the city in March 1776. Brattle died in Halifax, Nova Scotia in October 1776 at the age of 70.[25]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Tagney, pp. 65-67
  2. ^ Tagney, pp. 68-75 (emphasis in original)
  3. ^ a b Frothingham, p. 13
  4. ^ Fischer, p. 43
  5. ^ Richmond, p. 5
  6. ^ Richmond, p. 6
  7. ^ Richmond, pp. 52-56
  8. ^ Fischer, pp. 44-45
  9. ^ Richmond, p. 7
  10. ^ Fischer, p. 46
  11. ^ Fischer pp. 47-48
  12. ^ French, pp. 122-125
  13. ^ French, pp. 126-141
  14. ^ a b c Fischer, p. 51
  15. ^ a b Fischer, pp. 52-57
  16. ^ a b French, p. 170
  17. ^ Provincial Congress Journals, pp. 642-644
  18. ^ French, p. 160
  19. ^ Bancroft, pp. 183-184
  20. ^ Tagney, p. 130
  21. ^ Tagney, pp. 140-142
  22. ^ See e.g. Volo, pp. 71-72, Fischer p 44-52, or Bancroft, pp. 114-121. Virtually every sufficiently detailed history from the late 19th century forward presents these events in a suggestive causal way.
  23. ^ a b French, pp. 125-126
  24. ^ See Battles of Lexington and Concord for details on the timeline of April 18-19, 1775.
  25. ^ Richmond, pp. 57-58

References

  • Bancroft, George (1860). History of the United States from the Discovery of the American Continent, Volume 7. Little, Brown, and Co.
  • Fischer, David Hackett (1994). Paul Revere's Ride. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-508847-6. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |city= ignored (|location= suggested) (help)
  • French, Allen (1911). The Siege of Boston. McMillan.
  • Frothingham, Jr, Richard (1851). History of the Siege of Boston and of the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill. Little and Brown.
  • Massachusetts Provincial Congress (1774). The Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts in 1774 and 1775. Dutton and Wentworth, Printers to the state.
  • Raphael, Ray (2002). The First American Revolution: Before Lexington and Concord. The New Press. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |city= ignored (|location= suggested) (help)
  • Richmond, Robert P (1971). Powder Alarm 1774. Auerbach.
  • Tagney, Ronald N (1976). A County in Revolution. The Cricket Press.
  • Volo, Dorothy Denneen (2003). Daily Life During the American Revolution. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 9780313318443. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)