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1964 Brinks Hotel bombing

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1964 Brinks Hotel bombing
The aftermath of the bombing
LocationSaigon, South Vietnam
DateDecember 24, 1964
Attack type
Bombing
Deaths2
Injured58
PerpetratorsVietcong

The Brinks Hotel bombing on the evening of December 24, 1964, was a bomb attack on the Brinks Hotel in Saigon by the Vietcong during the Vietnam War. Aimed at a building that housed United States Army officers, the explosion killed two Americans and injured 58 others.

The Vietcong commanders had planned the venture with two aims in mind. Firstly, by attacking an American institution in the core of the heavily guarded capital, it demonstrated an ability to strike in Vietnam should the United States decide to launch air raids against North Vietnam. The second was to demonstrate to South Vietnamese that the Americans were vulnerable and could not be relied upon for protection.[1][2]

The bombing prompted debate within the administration of Lyndon Baines Johnson, with most of his advisors favouring retaliatory bombing of North Vietnam and the introduction of American combat troops, while Johnson preferred to rely on the Army of the Republic of Vietnam to strengthen itself and repel the Vietcong. Johnson prevailed and no retaliatory action was taken.

Background and planning

Following World War I, the communist-dominated Vietminh had fought the French colonial forces in an attempt to gain independence for Vietnam. In 1954, after the French defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam was partitioned at the 17th parallel, pending national reunification elections in 1956.[3][4] However, these were cancelled, resulting in the communist North Vietnam and anti-communist South Vietnam existing as separate states. In the late-1950s, southern communist guerrillas known as the Vietcong, with support from the north, began an insurgency with the aim of forcing the reunification of Vietnam under communist rule.[5] With the Cold War in full-flight, the United States, the main backer of South Vietnam,[6] sent military advisers into the country to help train and guide the Army of the Republic of Vietnam in their fight against the Vietcong. By 1964, there were over 16,000 American military personnel in the country. The communists viewed the Americans as colonizers and South Vietnam as their puppets, and targetted both.

The bombing was planned and performed by two Vietcong agents who escaped uninjured. One of them, Nguyen Thanh Xuan recollected the incident to historian Stanley Karnow after the war had ended. Xuan and his comrade had received orders from an intermediary in late November. They reconnoitered the targeted building, mixing with the crowds in the busy street outside the hotel and noting that South Vietnamese officers mingled freely with Americans. They obtained Army of the Republic of Vietnam uniforms from Saigon’s black market, and Xuan dressed himself as a military chauffeur, while his partner disguised himself as a ARVN officer and then mingled with the officers, copying their mannerisms, speaking style and even their smoking style. They then procured two cars and the explosives needed for the operation.[1][2]

The Vietcong commanders had planned the venture with two aims in mind. Firstly, by attacking an American institution in the core of the heavily guarded capital, it demonstrated an ability to strike in Vietnam should the United States decide to launch air raids against North Vietnam. The second was to demonstrate to South Vietnamese that the Americans were vulnerable and could not be relied upon for protection.[1][2] Xuan also said that "all the crimes committed by the Americans were directed from this nerve center".[7] He added the number of American officers present at the hotel had swelled on Christmas Eve as they were coordinating their celebrations from that location, and that the attack would cause further casualties.[7] The building housed United States Army officers, including lieutenant colonels and majors,[8] and attracted off-duty personnel with its well-regarded food and drink, rooftop seating areas and movie screenings.[9]

Execution

The two Vietcong agents stashed the explosives in the trunk of one of the cars, setting a timing device so that the bomb would trigger at 17:45, the happy hour in the officers’ bar of the hotel in central Saigon. The pair drove their vehicles into the hotel, with one posing as a ARVN major and the other as his chauffeur. Knowing from intelligence that a certain US colonel had left for home, the “major” told the hotel clerk that he had an appointment with the colonel, claiming that he would be coming from Da Lat. Despite the clerk’s reply that the colonel had left, the “major” insisted that he had not, and parked his car in the lot beneath the hotel, and told his “chauffeur” to go and fetch the American with the other vehicle. The “major” then left the hotel gate, asking the guard to tell the American colonel to wait, claiming that he had not eaten all the day and would go to a nearby café for sustenance. While the “major” was there, the explosion occurred, killing two and injuring 58.[1][2] At the time, American entertainers such as Bob Hope were in Saigon to perform for American personnel, but they were staying in a hotel across the street and were unharmed.[10]

Reaction

Maxwell Taylor, the US Ambassador to South Vietnam, called for air strikes against North Vietnam in retaliation for the bombing.

The attack surprised American officials and policymakers on Vietnam, who were confident that the South Vietnamese government were in control in Saigon and that the Vietcong were only capable of attacking in their rural strongholds.[11] Maxwell Taylor, the US ambassador to South Vietnam and former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General William Westmoreland, the US army head in Vietnam, and other senior US officers in Saigon and Washington DC urged President Lyndon Baines Johnson to authorise reprisal bombings against North Vietnam. Maxwell stated in a message "Hanoi will get the word that, despite our present tribulations, there is still bite in the tiger they call paper, and the U.S. stock in this part of the world will take sharp rise. Some of our local squabbles will probably disappear in enthusiasm which our action would generate."[2] However, at the time, the South Vietnamese government had been unstable, with numerous military juntas ruling for a brief period before being deposed by another.[12] Johnson declined, stating that an escalation during the Christmas period would be inappropriate as it would damage public morale.[1] He also noted that because of the political instability, neither the international community nor the American public were unlikely to believe that the Vietcong were behind the attack, rather than it being due to local infighting.[12] It was only a few days after the bombing that Johnson administration officials came to the conclusion that the Vietcong were the perpetrators of the attack.[12] The State Department cabled Taylor in Saigon saying that "In view of the overall confusion in Saigon", U.S. and international opinion towards an American air strike would be that Johnson was "trying to shoot its way out of an internal [South Vietnamese] political crisis".[12] Johnson was recorded in administration archives as saying to Taylor that "Every time I get a military recommendation it seems to me that it calls for large-scale bombing. I have never felt that this war will be won from the air".[12] At the time, Johnson was reluctant to accede to his officials' calls for large-scale bombing of North Vietnam, which would eventually became policy.[12]

However, the attack turned US political opinion towards a feeling of insecurity against communist attacks. Johnson hoped that the continuing presence of American military advisers would be sufficient to strengthen the Army of the Republic of Vietnam so it could stabilise the south, but many of his advisers felt that American ground troops with combat status were necessary.[11] This increased the tension between the president and his advisors.[13] David Tucker of the United States Army War College said that the bombing was "insignificant for the conventional military balance but important for the political struggle that was the primary focus of the enemy [Vietcong]".[14] The building was later repaired and American officers continued to stay there until the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975.[15]

Notes

  1. ^ a b c d e Karnow, p. 423.
  2. ^ a b c d e Langguth, A. J. (2000). Our Vietnam. Simon and Schuster. pp. 326–327. ISBN 0-684-81202-9.
  3. ^ Jacobs, pp. 40–56.
  4. ^ Karnow, pp. 210–214.
  5. ^ Jacobs, pp. 90–100.
  6. ^ Jacobs, pp. 102–104.
  7. ^ a b "LBJ Goes to War (1964–65)". Public Broadcasting Service. 1983. Retrieved 2009-03-04.
  8. ^ Bayless, Robert M. (2006). Vietnam: Victory Was Never an Option. Trafford Publishing. p. 152. ISBN 1412060575.
  9. ^ Miller, John Grider (2000). The Co-vans: U.S. Marine Advisors in Vietnam. Naval Institute Press. p. 74. ISBN 1557505497.
  10. ^ Quirk, Lawrence J. (1998). Bob Hope: The Road Well-traveled. Applause Books. p. 252. ISBN 1557833532.
  11. ^ a b Olson, James Stuart (1999). Historical Dictionary of the 1960s. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 73. ISBN 031329271X.
  12. ^ a b c d e f Steinberg, Blema S. (1996). Shame and Humiliation: Presidential Decision Making on Vietnam. McGill-Queen's Press. p. 91. ISBN ISBN 0773513922. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help)
  13. ^ Porter, Gareth (2006). Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam. University of California Press. p. 345. ISBN 0520250044.
  14. ^ Tucker, David (2006). Confronting the Unconventional: Innovation and Transformation in Military Affairs. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. p. 47. ISBN 1584872543.
  15. ^ Elliott, Duong Van Mai (2000). The Sacred Willow: Four Generations in the Life of a Vietnamese Family. Oxford University Press. p. 310. ISBN 0195137876.

References

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