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Welles Declaration

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Welles declaration, July 23, 1940

The Welles declaration was issued on July 23, 1940 by United States Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, acting as Secretary of State. The declaration condemned what the U.S. saw as the USSR’s forcible incorporation of the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and initiated its refusal to recognize the legitimacy of Soviet control of the three states.[1]: 3  It was an application of the Stimson Doctrine to the Baltic issue.[1]: 39  The declaration was consistent with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s attitude towards territorial expansion, and reflected the views held by the highest levels of the Roosevelt administration.[1]: 40 

The Welles Declaration established a five-decade non-recognition of the Baltic States' annexation.[2] The document had major significance for overall U.S. policy toward Europe in the critical year of 1940.[1]: 33–34  While the U.S. did not engage the Soviet Union militarily in the region, the declaration enabled the Baltic states to maintain independent diplomatic missions, and an amendment to Executive Order 8389 protected Baltic financial assets. The Welles declaration was supported by subsequent U.S. presidents and Congressional resolutions. The Baltic states re-established their independence in 1990.

Background

File:Million signatures.jpg
More than a million signatures collected by Lithuanian Americans demanding de jure recognition of Lithuania from the U.S.
Sumner Welles, was acting Secretary of State in July 1940

The entire region was controlled by the Russian Empire during the 19th century. The Estonian Age of Awakening, the Latvian National Awakening, and the Lithuanian National Revival expressed the peoples' wishes to create independent states. After World War I the three states declared their independence – Lithuania re-established its independence on February 16, 1918, Estonia on February 24, 1918 and Latvia on November 18, 1918. The Baltic countries often were seen as a unified group, despite dissimilarities in their languages and histories – Latvia emerged from the old Province of Livonia, Estonia was often perceived as Finland Minor, while only Lithuania could trace its history as a specific political and geopolitical entity for over 1,000 years.[3]: 15  All three states were admitted into the League of Nations in 1921.[3]: 15 

The U.S. had granted full de jure recognition to all three Baltic states by July 1922. The recognitions were granted during the shift from the Democratic administration of Woodrow Wilson to the Republican administration of Warren Harding.[2] While the U.S. did not sponsor any meaningful political or economic initiatives in the region during the interwar period, there were normal diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the Baltic states.[1]: 33  The U.S. had suffered over 100,000 deaths during World War I[4] and pursued an isolationist policy, determined to avoid involvement in any further European conflicts.[1]: 33  Interwar U.S. administrations did not consider the states strategically important.[1]: 33 

The situation changed after the outbreak of World War II. The secret protocol contained in the 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact relegated Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to the Soviet sphere of influence. During the course of 1939 and 1940, the Soviet Union issued a series of ultimatums to the Baltic governments that eventually led to the full annexation of the states.[1]: 33  (At about the same time, the Soviet Union was exerting similar pressure on Finland.) About 30,000 Soviet troops entered the Baltic states during June 1940, followed by deportations.[5] Elections to "People's Assemblies" were held in all three states in mid-July; the Soviet-sponsored slates received between 92.2% and 99.2% of the vote.[6]: 26–27  The U.S. responded with a July 15 amendment to Executive Order 8389 that froze the assets of the Baltic states, thereby grouping them with German-occupied countries, and by issuing the condemnatory Welles declaration.[2]

Formulation

Loy W. Henderson, one of the authors of the declaration

The Welles declaration was written by Loy W. Henderson in consultation with Welles and Roosevelt. Welles had participated in the creation of the Atlantic Charter, which stated that territorial adjustments should be made in accordance with the wishes of the peoples concerned.[7]: 283  He increasingly served as acting Secretary of State during Cordell Hull's illnesses.[8]: 12  Henderson, then the State Department's Director of the Office of European Affairs, had opened an American Red Cross office in Kaunas, Lithuania after World War I and served in the Eastern European Division of the State Department for 18 years.[9]

In a conversation on the morning of July 23, Welles asked Henderson to prepare a press release "expressing sympathy for the people of the Baltic States and condemnation of the Soviet action."[9][1]: 39–40  After reviewing the statement's initial draft, Welles emphatically expressed his opinion that it was not strong enough. In the presence of Henderson, Welles called Roosevelt and read the draft to him. Roosevelt and Welles agreed that it needed strengthening. Welles then reformulated several sentences and added others which apparently had been suggested by the President. According to Henderson, "President Roosevelt was indignant at the manner in which the Soviet Union annexed the Baltic States and personally approved the condemnatory statement issued by Under Secretary Welles on the subject."[9] The declaration was made public later on the same day.[9]

Text of declaration

During these past few days the devious process whereunder the political independence and territorial integrity of the three small Baltic Republics – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – were to be deliberately annihilated by one of their more powerful neighbors, have been rapidly drawing to their conclusion.

From the day when the peoples of these Republics first gained their independent and democratic form of government the people of the United States have watched their admirable progress in self-government with deep and sympathetic interest.

The policy of this Government is universally known. The people of the United States are opposed to predatory activities no matter whether they are carried on by the use of force or by the threat of force. They are likewise opposed to any form of intervention on the part of one State, however powerful, in the domestic concerns of any other sovereign state, however weak.

These principles constitute the very foundations upon which the existing relationship between the 21 sovereign republics of the New World rests.

The United States will continue to stand by these principles, be of the conviction of the American people that unless the doctrine in which these principles are inherent once again governs the relations between nations, the rule of reason, of justice and of law – in other words, the basis of modern civilization itself – cannot be preserved [1]: 39 

Impact

Welles also announced that the U.S. government would continue to recognize the foreign ministers of the Baltic countries as the envoys of sovereign governments.[10] At the same time, the Department of State instructed that U.S. representatives be withdrawn from the Baltic states for "consultations".[10] In 1940 The New York Times described the Welles declaration as "one of the most exceptional diplomatic documents issued by the Department of State in many years."[10]

The Welles declaration linked U.S. policy towards the Baltic states with the Stimson Doctrine, which did not recognize Japanese, German and Italian occupations during the 1930s.[11]: 346  By refusing to regard the Baltic states as legal possessions of the USSR, Washington abandoned Wilsonian policies on the issue. Wilson had supported a strong Russian presence as a counterweight to German power.[5] The status of the Baltic states subsequently became an important element in Washington’s attempt to influence and restrict Moscow’s activities in matters of foreign policy.[1]: 3 

Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, a judge of international law, described the basis of the non-recognition doctrine as being founded on the principles of ex injuria jus non oritur:

This construction of non-recognition is based on the view that acts contrary to international law are invalid and cannot become a source of legal rights for the wrongdoer. That view applies to international law one of 'the general principles of law recognized by civilized nation.' The principle ex injuria jus non oritur is one of the fundamental maxims of jurisprudence. An illegality cannot, as a rule, become a source of legal right to the wrongdoer.[12]

Like the Stimson Doctrine, Welles' declaration was largely symbolic in nature, although it offered some material benefits in conjunction with amendment Executive Order 8389. It enabled the diplomatic representatives of the Baltic states in various other countries to fund their operations, and protected the ownership of ships flying Baltic flags.[1]: 42 

Welles later served as the administration's spokesman on this issue. He would go on to discuss the declaration further, asserting that the USSR had maneuvered to give "an odor of legality to acts of aggression for purposes of the record".[1]: 39 [10] The declaration was a source of contention during the subsequent alliance between the U.S., Great Britain, and the USSR, but Welles persistently defended it.[13]: 118  In a memorandum describing his conversations with British Ambassador Lord Halifax in 1942, Welles stated that he would have preferred to characterize the plebiscites supporting the annexations as "faked".[14]: 47 

During the 1943 Tehran Conference, President Roosevelt "jokingly" assured Stalin that when Soviet forces reoccupied Baltic countries, "he did not intend to go to war with the Soviet Union on this point." But, he explained, "the question of referendum and the right of self-determination" would constitute a matter of great importance for the U.S.[15]: 436  The U.S. position that the Baltic states had been forcibly annexed would, however, remain its official stance for the following 51 years. Subsequent U.S. presidents and Congressional resolutions reaffirmed the substance of the Welles declaration.[11]: 346 

President Dwight D. Eisenhower reaffirmed the right of the Baltic states to independence in an address to the United States Congress on January 6, 1957. After confirming the Helsinki Final Act in July 1975, the United States House of Representatives passed a resolution that the Final Act would not affect the continuity of U.S. recognition of the sovereignty of Baltic states. On July 26, 1983, on the 61st anniversary of de jure recognition of the three Baltic countries by the U.S. in 1922, President Ronald Reagan re-declared the United States' recognition of the independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The declaration was read in the United Nations as well.[11]: 346  Throughout the 51 years that followed the events of 1940, all U.S. official maps and publications that mentioned the Baltic states included a statement of U.S. non-recognition of Soviet occupation.[11]: 346 

The Baltic states re-established their independence in 1990. (further see: Estonian Independence, On the Restoration of Independence of the Republic of Latvia and Act of the Re-Establishment of the State of Lithuania).

See also

References

  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Hiden, John (2008). The Baltic question during the Cold War. Routledge. p. 209. ISBN 0415371007. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  2. ^ a b c Made, Vahur. "Foreign policy statements of Estonian diplomatic missions during the Cold War: establishing the Estonian pro-US discourse". Estonian School of Diplomacy. Retrieved 2009-05-02.
  3. ^ a b Ashbourne, Alexandra (1999). Lithuania: the rebirth of a nation, 1991-1994. Lexington Books. p. 219. ISBN 0739100270.
  4. ^ "American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics" (PDF). CSR Report for Congress. 2008. Retrieved 2009-05-02.
  5. ^ a b "A Short History of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and the Republic of Lithuania". Lituanus. Retrieved 2009-05-14.
  6. ^ Romuald J. Misiunas, Rein Taagepera (1993). The Baltic States, years of dependence, 1940-1990. University of California Press. p. 400. ISBN 0520082281.
  7. ^ Dallek, Robert (1995). Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy. Oxford University Press. p. 671. ISBN 0195097327.
  8. ^ Justus D. Doenecke, Mark A. Stoler (2005). Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt's foreign policies, 1933-1945. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 238. ISBN 084769416X.
  9. ^ a b c d "Oral History Interview with Loy W. Henderson". The Harry S. Truman Library and Museum. 1973. Retrieved 2009-05-02.
  10. ^ a b c d Hulen, Bertram (1940-07-24). "US. Lashes Soviet for Baltic Seizure". The New York Times. pp. 1–2. {{cite news}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help)
  11. ^ a b c d Miljan, Toivo (2004). Historical dictionary of Estonia. Scarecrow Press. p. 558. ISBN 0810849046.
  12. ^ Krivickas, Domas (1989). "The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939:Legal and Political consequences". Lituanus. Retrieved 2009-05-04.
  13. ^ Dunn, Dennis J. (1998). Caught between Roosevelt & Stalin. University Press of Kentucky. p. 349. ISBN 0813120233.
  14. ^ Edward Moore Bennett (1990). Franklin D. Roosevelt and the search for victory. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 207. ISBN 0842023658.
  15. ^ Dallek, Robert (1995). Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945. Oxford University Press. p. 671. ISBN 0-19-502457-5.