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Azores Liberation Front

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Flag of the Azores Liberation Front

The Azores Liberation Front, more commonly known as the FLA (Portuguese: Frente de Libertação dos Açores) was a right-wing terrorist paramilitary organization with the goal of forceful independence of the Azores, appearing right after the Carnation Revolution and whose actions included violent attacks in 1975.

History

Originally, it was founded by José de Almeida in London, on April 8, 1975, a former representative of the Acção Nacional Popular (English: Popular National Action Party) in the National Assembly, who modeled his actions on the Frente de Libertação do Arquipélago da Madeira (FLMA). As Almeida would state:

"The Azorean independentistas are not 'Che Guevaras'. It is not ideology that motivates us, we never fell to that temptation. What mobilizes us is the Azores and remains the Azores"[1]

In the beginning, the movement was primarily responsible for intimidation tactics, markedly hostile to groups or organizations counter to their own political sensibilities.[2] Although it was supported by the local merchants and entrepreneurs on the island of São Miguel, fearful of the possible nationalization of businesses, the group was sociologically popular with the agrarian-classes on the island, having its origin in the seigneur system of inheritances that had existed in the archipelago during its settlement. There was some fear that the lean towards socialism on the continent would result in the loss of land rights and personal possessions in a presumed collectivization. As the Communists accumulated more power, fear of Portugal becoming a pro-Soviet puppet state started to grow and was nourished by the right-wing. Besides, the PREC (with its nationalization policies) became very unpopular among Azorean farmers and industrialists, mostly from São Miguel island who organized themselves to resist the "red danger".

From an economic perspective, the FLA based their success on a future re-negotiation of the air base lease in Lajes, Terceira and the use of geothermal energy to maintain their local economy, during the initial isolation following a declaration of independence and economic support from the Azorean diaspora. Even though the organization gained some support for some time, it was virtually dead by the end of the 70's. Autonomy was granted to the Azores and Madeira (where a similar organization existed, the Frente de Libertação do Arquipélago da Madeira) by the Constitution of 1976, cooling the explosive situation, and the communist threat was slowly eroding.

United States support

José de Almeida attempted repeatedly to negotiate with the U.S. Department of State, in order to gauge support for Azorean independence in the administration. Unfortunately for the FLA, officially the proposal was rejected by the administration as unrealistic and high-level contact with the group was discouraged.[3] The covert actions of the Frente de Libertação dos Açores were possible, though, through nascent support. David Raby, an English academic, contended that some Americans, contradicting their position of neutrality, had supported the group, should they take control in the archipelago. In an international colloquia titled Portugal e o Atlântico: 60 anos dos Acordos dos Açores (English: Portugal and the Atlantic: 60 Yeas of Azores Accords) held in Lisbon, the author presented many of his arguments. Due to Soviet threats during the Cold War, the American administration was not completely hostile to the idea of supporting separatist groups in order to secure their public interests. This tacit support was further confirmed by Thiers Ávila da Cunha in an interview with former members of the FLA and the Autodeterminação do Povo dos Açores (MAPA), who stated:

"The Americans did not support or fail to support. The only promise that existed, was to the Base at Lajes: it was that no one was to touch them and that they would remain totally on the margins of the events that occurred on the island, above all on Terceira".

In the same interview, Thiers da Cunha affirmed that the United States was the seventh nation on a list of concrete supporters of the group, but believed that their position would change substantially, as a consequence of their success in gaining independence for the archipelago. But, although they were officially neutral, as David Raby explained, the United States government was positioning itself to secure the favors of an independent Azorean government. Raby referred to a meeting in September 1975:

"There was a meeting on the 5th of September 1975 in the Hôtel Raphaël in Paris, between José de Almeida (with other representatives of the FLA), agents of the French OAS and Americans associated with Senator Thurmond and some members of organized crime. The French and Americans offered money, arms and mercenaries to support a separatist coup d'etat, in exchange for an agreement that would permit the establishment of casinos on the islands, under extremely favorable terms for themselves."

As Raby would continue, in the spring of 1975 an American offensive in accord with an alliance of reactionary forces in Portuguese society would counter and neutralize the MFA regime. But, the failure of these revolutionaries would end Azorean independence movements, while the Americans would become more interested in saving all of Portugal from "the Red Menace", rather than just a small portion of its territory.

"The decisive element for separatism was not even the desire of the oligarchial classes in Azorean society, it was the strategic interests of Washington. If there never existed North American bases, it is not likely that rural Azoreans would consider the independence option, which would only bring about further isolation and poverty. A real alternative was pseudo-independence, which would pass into the Azores's annexation by the United States. In 1975, that option was publicly discussed in Washington, where several conservative senators, Strom Thurmond and Jesse Helms for example,defended the idea of direct or indirect intervention in favor of the FLA".

Consequences of Azorean political autonomy

Even though the organization gained support for some time, it was virtually dead by the end of the 1970s. Autonomy was granted to the Azores and Madeira (where a similar organization existed, the Frente de Libertação do Arquipélago da Madeira) by the Constitution of 1976, cooling the explosive situation, and the communist threat slowly eroded. The geo-political strategic importance of the Azores continues to be debated by regional and international interests.

References

Notes
  1. ^ Carlos Taveres, 2009
  2. ^ Sabrina Coutinho Furtado, 2009
  3. ^ Sabrina Coutinho Furtado, 2009
Bibliography
  • Furtado, Sabrina Coutinho (2009). "Curiosidade: Frente de Libertação dos Açores" (in Portuguese). A Torre do Desassossego. Retrieved 25 May 2010.
  • Tavares, Carlos (2009). "Independentistas açorianos não são Che Guevaras - afirma líder da FLA José de Almeida" (in Portuguese). RTP Açores. Retrieved 25 May 2010.
  • "FLA apareceu à custa da Base das Lajes" (in Portuguese). Via Oceânica, Lda. Retrieved 16 May 2010. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |trans_title= ignored (|trans-title= suggested) (help)
  • "Açores perceberam que Acordo das Lajes é mau" (in Portuguese). Via Oceânica, Lda. Retrieved 18 May 2010. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |trans_title= ignored (|trans-title= suggested) (help)