Talk:Morality
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Morality in teleology and deontology
In formal ethics morality is used as meaning the 'good' action. A disambiguation can be made however. In teleological ethics the word 'moral' is used as a synonym for ethics. In deontological ethics the word 'moral' is used in a more narrow sense: that act of which one can at the same time will that it becomes a universal law. A remarkable consequence of this is that teleological ethics is immoral from a deontological viewpoint.
- Although the morality of people and their ethics amounts to the same thing, there is a usage that restricts morality to systems such as that of Kant, based on notions such as duty, obligation, and principles of conduct, reserving ethics for the more Aristotelian approach to practical reasoning, based on the notion of a virtue, and generally avoiding the seperation 'moral' considerations. The scholarly issues are complex, with some writers seeing Kant as more Aristotelian, and Aristotle as more involved with a separate sphere of responsibility and duty, than the simple contrast suggests.
Oxford Dictionary of philosophy, 2008, p240
I will make a reference out of this quote, but we might include this quote, for reference purposes. Let me know if any one has any feedback. --Faust (talk) 09:49, 4 July 2010 (UTC) —Preceding unsigned comment added by Faust (talk • contribs)
Sorry for forgetting the sig... --Faust, formerly Arjen (talk) 11:57, 8 July 2010 (UTC)
Since no reactions have been given I will add this under an ethical header. If needs be we can discuss things here after that still. --Faust, formerly Arjen (talk) 07:54, 16 July 2010 (UTC) Ok, after reading the introduction I placed the little part there (with a small edit to suit the place in the text). Since the entire heading was already about ethics and a mention of the word usage of the word 'morality' in ethics this seemed prudent. --Faust, formerly Arjen (talk) 08:20, 16 July 2010 (UTC)
Reference with definitions immorality and amorality
I had placed a reference with the definitions mentioned aboven, but this has been removed for an unclear reason. The fact is that Kant defines these in his 'Kritik der Reinen Vernunft' and it seems to me that definitions like that should be referred to a source at all times. Now, a user has removed this reference for reasons of inappropriateness. I hereby state that I will replace the reference, unless a really good reason will be given why a reference of a definition should not be given. --Faust (talk) 22:23, 31 August 2010 (UTC) This concerns this reference: Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, Immanuel Kant, P25 —Preceding unsigned comment added by Faust (talk • contribs) 08:13, 1 September 2010 (UTC)
- First of all, could you please quote Kant's definitions and specify the reference (for instance, which edition of the Kritik are you talking about?). My main objection however is the fact that Kant held a very specific view on morality. Referring to his particular definitions of related terms in the article's first paragraph, which as I wrote is supposed to be a general introduction to the term "morality", would therefore be inappropriate. Zaspino (talk) 08:39, 1 September 2010 (UTC)
Look, the entire point Kant is making and why this part of the article is UNCPECIFIC is the difference between im- and a-. The deontological idea of morality that I am sure you are referring to is a specific one, but follows from the meaning of the word. So, you are merely confusing the two issues. It is your removal and comments that are inappropriate. --Faust (talk) 09:04, 1 September 2010 (UTC)
Okay, I will elaborate a little for your benefit. Something that is a moral is something that has got nothing to do with morality (in the wide sense). Something that is immoral is something that goes against morality (in the wide sense). This leads to a question as to what exactly is moral than. That is up to the understanding of the subject. The subject will try to act in a way it understands as 'good'. However, this may still cause people unintended suffering. This is why Kant separated the hypothetical and the categorical imperative. One may cause harm inadvertently. This subsequently leads to the more narrow approach to morality. It is a strong argument for Kant's idea. Regardless, it proves the differences between his narrow approach to morality and the im- and a- distinction, which is mere linguistics. Kant does use the im- an a- distinction to construct his narrow moral view though. In fact, it is the very meaning of the word from its creation albeit misused and wrongfully interpreted, which shows the importance of separating between the hypothetical and categorical imperative: it reveals the inconsistencies in one's reasons.--Faust (talk) 09:26, 1 September 2010 (UTC)
- Oh, an online source I have found:
- http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Amoral
- --Faust (talk) 09:28, 1 September 2010 (UTC)
- Thank you for the information, but I fail to see how it underpins the necessity of referring to the Kritik der reinen Vernunft in the first paragraph of the article. So my objection still stands.
- And remember, you claimed that Kant defined the terms "amorality" and "immorality" in his treatise Kritik der reinen Vernunft. That is why you wanted to insert the reference in the first place, isn't it? So just for clarity's sake a renewed request: could you please quote those definitions? Zaspino (talk) 09:52, 1 September 2010 (UTC)
- I fail to see your problem with my reference. I have given an online source that shows it was Immanuel Kant who said so. The separation can only have come from a paleontologist sine teleologists do not separate immoral and amoral, leading to the fact that immoral and moral are not separated. This is why the difference between the hypothetical and the categorical needed to be formulated, hence only Kant could have done so. I am also saying that I know Kant said so (I have read so myself), in fact Schopenhauer for instance credits him for it. He uses it to get to his idea of free will and will an sich in his World as Will and Representation. The only thing is that the grand total is about 4 pages long. Kant has a tendency to draw things out, you see. I will not retype 4 pages here, nor will I read a number of online pages to find the section.
- To me the only problem here is you. It is not the fact that you are unfamiliar with any philosophies at all, but something else. The proof has been given, the source has been given, the place is thereby proven to be appropriate. So, why are you still blocking this reference? It is the first time a reference needed a reference that I have ever heard of by the way, but I humored you regardless. I even gave you some lessons. What is your point of view that blocks you from admitting your mistake?
- --Faust (talk) 19:26, 1 September 2010 (UTC)
- In the general introduction to the concept of morality you provided two concise and very general definitions of the terms "amorality" and "immorality" with a specific reference to Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft, which I objected to for the reasons stated above. Now it also turns out that, contrary to your earlier claim, the source you referred to (Kant's treatise) doesn't contain any definitions. I mean, let's face it, four pages of long-winding sentences can hardly be considered a proper definition, whichever way you look at it.
- By the way, you wrote "nor will I read a number of online pages to find the section." Why not? If you download this and use the search function, it shouldn't take you more than a few seconds to find that section. Just tell me where in the online version of Kant's Kritik the definition of both of the terms starts and where it ends. Zaspino (talk) 22:02, 1 September 2010 (UTC)
- 1)I didn't provide the text. I only added the reference since Kant is credited for it, he should be referred to.
- 2)With that the burden of proof shifts to you. You obviously think Kant is not to be credited with that, so please feel free to back that idea up with proof. If you cannot supply any, I will replace the reference.
- 3)The search function is flawed. There are 1000000 mentions of the word moral in the critque, but only a few show up.
- 4)Why don't you answer the question: "what is your point of view"?
- --Faust (talk) 06:55, 2 September 2010 (UTC)
- 1)+2) Your reference to Kant in the lead paragraph of the article would convey the wrong impression that those terms were coined by Kant, or that the definitions were taken directly from Kant's treatise, or that they are exclusively associated with Kant's work.
- 3) Okay, my bad (I didn't know the google books search function was flawed). But anyway, if you know your way around Kant's work, it shouldn't be much of a problem to find the four pages you referred to above. Suppose you would indeed put back your reference, how then would it enlighten any possible readers if it doesn't direct them to a specific page of Kant's treatise?
- 4) I don't see what my point of view has got to do with our disagreement. I simply object to irrelevant or faulty references being inserted in a wikipedia article. Zaspino (talk) 09:34, 2 September 2010 (UTC)
- I fully agree with Zaspino: Faust wants to insert the reference and therefore the burden of proof lies with him. Furthermore, the distinctions between moral, amoral and immoral were made long before Kant made its entrance on the philosophical scene. The distinction between moral and immoral, for example, is also used within teleological ethics, as this article in the Encyclopedia Brittancia clearly demonstrates. (If this distinction would not apply, teleological ethics would not be ethics at all. Of course it is possible to argue that teleological ethics is not ethics at all, but that is not the way authoritative handbooks of ethics talk about the subject. Encyclopedians are there to represent what authoritative handbooks say, not to refute it). Theobald Tiger (talk) 09:38, 2 September 2010 (UTC)
This is a retracing of our steps. You asked for a reference of the reference and I have given it to you. The reference of the reference proves that the definitions were Kantian and that should be enough for you. Since it isn't it is clear your POV is what is in the way. That is why your POV is important. Now, if you think this isn't true, please prove that. If you cannot I will place my reference back again.--Faust (talk) 13:13, 2 September 2010 (UTC)
- Faust, I urge you not to put back your reference, since two users (Theobald Tiger and me) strongly object to it. Please try to properly address our complaints instead of focussing on my POV. Zaspino (talk) 14:33, 2 September 2010 (UTC)
Hello Zaspino, I have properly addressed your complaints. Why are you retracing our steps? Apart from that I can only say that even in a crowd of thousand, the truth is still the truth and a lie still a lie. --Faust (talk) 14:49, 2 September 2010 (UTC)
- Faust, You have not properly adressed our complaints. Chasing after truths is not an encyclopedic activity. That you can do in your own writings elsewhere. Theobald Tiger (talk) 17:49, 2 September 2010 (UTC)
I have not replaced the reference as of yet, but it should be there. I will walk another path. --Faust (talk) 08:58, 3 September 2010 (UTC)
Undid revision
I undid the revision of 76.168.95.118. An active denial is a moral consideration, and therefore equal to immorality, as per the definition. --Faust (talk) 08:51, 3 September 2010 (UTC)
Changing intro to reflect proper definition of amorality
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I am requesting an RFC to seek WP:Consensus on the definition of amorality specifically in relation to morality.--173.58.234.86 (talk) 04:40, 7 September 2010 (UTC) The intro currently reads: "Immorality is the active opposition to morality, while amorality is a passive indifference toward morality." This sentence should be changed. According to the well-sourced definition of amorality on its own page, amorality can be either of several things (indicated by the word "or"): "Amorality is an absence of a set standard, indifference towards, or disregard of a standard set of moral beliefs." In this article the definition is necessarily restrictive, failing to give full faith to other sources of definitions of amorality. I propose it be changed to instead read "Immorality is the active opposition to morality, while amorality is an absence of a set standard, indifference towards, or disregard of a standard set of moral beliefs." "Disregard" in this instance does not refer to immorality for the simple reason that disregard does not positively indicate opposition. This change may be slightly more wordy, but it is the most concise yet clear definition available that does justice to the concept of amorality. Faust, unless you have objections to raise I will change this in an hour or so. 76.168.95.118 (talk) 09:01, 3 September 2010 (UTC)
- First, Wikipedia has no set time limit - it can take days to achieve new consensus. Second, re-adding will be edit-warring. Thank you for starting discussion, but do not re-add (as per WP:BRD) unless new consensus is reached. (talk→ BWilkins ←track) 09:26, 3 September 2010 (UTC)
- I admit I made a mistake per WP:BRD and that my original edit was lacking compared to my new suggestion above. That said, I have already shown that Faust's original objection was patently false as a matter of definition established in the corresponding article on amorality. This is a minor edit to bring the passing reference in this article in line with the sourced definition in the main article and I only failed to mark is as such in case my understanding of the minor edit policy was similarly lacking. I will not add the above-proposed change until Faust comments per policy, but I would at least like to point out that Faust has a history of making random contentious objections to any change in this article, and it is my opinion that his objections should be ignored outright as a matter of definition. The definition of amorality in the intro to this article is clearly lacking, and a fuller definition is supplied and sourced in the main article. Why leave Faust the option of preventing a helpful minor edit, potentially for "days to achieve a new consensus", when there is clearly no issue beyond Faust's petty insistence on undermining the possible legitimacy of amorality as a non-passive viewpoint despite the sourced establishment of such in the main article on amorality? 76.168.95.118 (talk) 09:51, 3 September 2010 (UTC)
- I agree with the anon here on the definition of amorality. Someone acting immorally would think "I agree that this act is contrary to the correct standards of morality, but I'm doing it anyway." Someone acting amorally would either think nothing and just act, or if he thought anything, he would think "I deny that there are correct standards of morality, so my actions cannot be contradicting them." (Of course these are both just issues of intention; a deontologist or consequentialist, who doesn't care so much about intentions as a virtue ethicist would, might say "that act is immoral", as in "contrary to the correct standards of morality", regardless of whether the perpetrator of the act agrees with those standards or not.) --Pfhorrest (talk) 11:02, 3 September 2010 (UTC)
Hello everybody, I am surprised at all of your reactions. The reason for this is because in the proposed change the difference between immorality and amorality will be null and void. Although I am aware that such a confusion is a well known position in this, it should not be in the general declaration of the terms. The reason immorality is defined as amorality is because a certain 'goal' is wielded by the actor. An act is 'good' when it adds towards achieving the goal (a.k.a. the good) and no further interest is taken in the act itself. Since morality has been thought over (and discarded) by the actor it is immoral and not amoral. The expression 'the end justifies the means' applies. Because of this POV the actor has no further interest in examining the act, as long as the POV is achieved. The act only appears amoral to the actor because of the POV (denial). Since it therefore is a POV that makes one come to this reasoning it should be placed in the article as a POV. This has previously been done under the ethical perspectives header. Can everybody agree to that? --Faust (talk) 17:09, 3 September 2010 (UTC)
- I'm not sure I understand your argument. Are you saying that amorality is always immorality because a moral person (supposedly you are the standard of such a person) would equate immorality and amorality? This reasoning is fallacious and biased. A non-POV position must define amorality by itself, independent of the meaning of morality - amorality and morality are opposing but not directly opposite, and it is not necessary to assume an objective morality to reject it, which the current definition in this article implies. It is true that a non-amoral person would most likely call an amoral person "immoral", but contrary to your view of the world there is not (and almost surely never will be) consensus on objective morality. Considering this lack of consensus, the only possible non-POV definition is the one I proposed from the amorality article: "...amorality is an absence of a set standard, indifference towards, or disregard of a standard set of moral beliefs." Only if you assume an objective existing moral system can you define amorality as it is currently defined in this article, and to assume such would be biased towards the views of moral realists. 157.242.159.225 (talk) 17:51, 3 September 2010 (UTC) (76.168.95.118 on a different network)
- It sounds like you didn't understand the point I was making, Faust. Lets try this exercise for clarification.
- Lets says person P does some action X (or declares his intent to do X), and then someone else asks "but is X moral?" I am saying that:
- If P answers "yes", then P is doing X from a moral intent (he intends to act in accordance with morality).
- If P answers "no", then P is doing X from an immoral intent (he intends to act against morality).
- If P answers either "I don't know" or "I don't care", then P is doing X from an amoral intent (he does not have any concern for morality either way).
- You seem to want to put "I don't care" together with "no" under the category of "immoral". Would you say that is an accurate description of your position? --Pfhorrest (talk) 20:21, 3 September 2010 (UTC)
- @ A forest:I am glad you see things my way Pfhorest. That is my point exactly. What you miss is that when a person evaluates a moral and then decides to disregard that. That is immorality. Amorality is when no moral is concerned in the act (or reasoning). However, humans always evaluate their actions. Choosing to let a certain principle of action be something that one does not will others to do unto the oneself is a conscious choice against morality. Amorality is in that sense something else entirely: something not concerned with 'the good', but with the 'the well' or something, however, this is very much in dispute since all acts are weighed in our minds, conscious or not. So, your entire example is moot. Let us set up an example that is actually to the point:
- Lets says person P is evaluating action X. I am saying that:
- If P thinks X is moral, than he intends to act in accordance with morality.
- If P think X is immoral and wants to go on with it anyway, than he intends to act in contradiction to morality.
- If P doesn't know or doesn't care and still wants to go on with it, than he intends to act in contradiction to morality.
- However, if the entire concept never entered P's mind something else has happened, than P is amoral. So, thinking something over in an ethical way and than deciding that that consideration is not important is, in fact, immoral. Hence my points.
- Lets says person P is evaluating action X. I am saying that:
- @157.242.159.225: I am suggesting that a conscious evaluation of an act, with the conclusion of not caring if or not wanting that one would be treated in the same manner is immoral. And I am saying that this is one of the factors involved (denial) in upholding a certain 'goal' as 'the good'...as the endresult (as stated above). Therefore it is a POV. That is also how I know you are biased.
- @ A forest:I am glad you see things my way Pfhorest. That is my point exactly. What you miss is that when a person evaluates a moral and then decides to disregard that. That is immorality. Amorality is when no moral is concerned in the act (or reasoning). However, humans always evaluate their actions. Choosing to let a certain principle of action be something that one does not will others to do unto the oneself is a conscious choice against morality. Amorality is in that sense something else entirely: something not concerned with 'the good', but with the 'the well' or something, however, this is very much in dispute since all acts are weighed in our minds, conscious or not. So, your entire example is moot. Let us set up an example that is actually to the point:
- NOTE: One might simply consider the lingual difference between a- and un-. I am having trouble coming up with a good example, but I hope you will bear with me.
- Examples:
- To undo something is to make something naught what once was: the opposite of what it is.
- To be agnostic is not to have gnosticism exist for one.
- The difference is a--> not present, un- (or im-)-->the opposite of the present.
- Any dictionary can suffice as a source.
- ADDENDUM: Kant introduced this into ethics, from which he constructed the more narrow idea of morality (as a foundation for his ideas). However, this lingual construction has always been present and that it is, in fact, the sudden disappearance of this difference in ethics that is the symptom (and evidence) of the POV. IN ANY CASE it would be very strange to remove the separation between the terms from the defining of the terms..
- I hope it will be clear to all those involved that this apparent chance in discussion is actually a continuation of the discussion above and that I have already sourced my position, but that the others involved have not. This was imply another way to get what they wanted, by means of an anonymous source even. Let us not retrace our steps again and let the people who what to contest linguistics as well as valid sources come up with a good counter argument with a source or forever hold their peace.
- STIPULATION: A wikipedia article cannot be considered a source.
- --Faust (talk) 09:18, 4 September 2010 (UTC)
- I'm sorry, your grammar is atrocious so it is very difficult to understand what you are trying to say, or even to tell if you understood me to begin with. I gather that English is not your first language (you are Dutch yes?) but when you condescend with edit summaries like "The last lesson I will give for this topic" it makes me much less inclined to try to parse your scrawl. Also, please stop accusing me of bias; aside from WP:Assume good faith, I am a notorious champion of NPOV on moral philosophy issues around here. I'm not even sure what bias you think I have: I'm not saying amorality should be left out of the article, nor that amorality is the same thing as immorality. I'm just saying that I agree with the anon user here about whether "I don't care whether this is moral or not" counts as amoral or immoral. You and I both agree that not knowing whether something is moral or not counts as amorality, and intending to do something one considers to be not moral counts as immorality. It's just on the question of whether disregarding the question of whether something is moral or not counts as amorality or immorality, that we differ.
- You bring up agnosticism as a parallel example on the simple linguistic branch of your argument. I think that makes a very good analogy. If the prefix "a-" worked the way you seem to imply it does when applied to "morality", only people who had never heard of the concept of God would count as "agnostic". But plenty of people weigh the arguments for and against God's existence and aren't persuaded either way, they don't know even though they've thought about it, and they still count as agnostic. Plenty other people hear the arguments for and against and decide it's not an important question to them, they don't know, and they don't care to know -- and they're still agnostic.
- Likewise, a person who acted without ever stopping to think about whether his intended actions were right or wrong would be amoral, as you say. But so would a person who stopped, wondered about it, couldn't decide whether his intended actions would be right or wrong, but went ahead and did something anyway not knowing whether it was right or wrong. And so would someone who was asked whether his intended actions were right or wrong and decided he didn't need to worry about that. Only if he stopped, asked himself, "is this right or wrong", decided "it's wrong", and then went ahead and purposefully did it anyway, would he be acting from an immoral intent.
- Of course, the action itself is going to be either moral or immoral; amoral actors, by disregarding concern for morality, end up committing a lot of immoral acts. But the amorality occurs in the intention, not in the action; and someone can simply refuse to consider the morality of their actions, and be just as amoral as someone who was unsure of the morality of their actions or someone who never thought to consider the morality of their actions. --Pfhorrest (talk) 10:06, 4 September 2010 (UTC)
- Since you ask for dictionary citations, here are some wikt:amoral#Adjective (sense #2): "(of people) not believing in or caring for morality and immorality". Everything that dictionary.com can find] agrees, e.g. "having no moral standards, restraints, or principles; unaware of or indifferent to questions of right or wrong: a completely amoral person." (emphasis mine). Everything else that google can find seems to equate amoral with immoral, which I agree is incorrect. Incidentally, that dictionary.com entry suggests that "amoral" was "First used by Robert Louis Stephenson (1850-1894) as a differentiation from immoral", not by Kant as you suggest. --Pfhorrest (talk) 10:17, 4 September 2010 (UTC)
- Hi Pshorest, before I respond properly first these two:
- 1) Are you the user posting under IP 157.242.159.225? Because I called the reasoning of that user bias, not the user tself, although it might be understood as following from that. I did so because I was called bias, while my position is the only unbiased position in this mess, which is why I support that position. Anyway I did not call you bias, as far as I know, although it seems that you are not separating the reasoning-in-itself from the quantification thereof, leading to the biased position again. Anyway, if I am making a claim and I give sources for that and I give sources for the sources, while the other does nothing of a kind and is merely stating a theory which supports POV's and is unwilling to leave the unfounded position I think it to be very strange.
- 2) I think my grammar is not so bad. I get the remark more often though. Unvaried by people not able to see through paradoxes. So, my second question is if you understand what ontology is and how this creates paradoxes. From there you will understand my point in this and the construction of my sentences.
- --Faust (talk) 10:22, 4 September 2010 (UTC)
- Faust, I have already informed you that I am both 157.242.159.225 and 76.168.95.118; the user Pfhorrest is not me but it seems that in calling my reasoning biased you would include all you share that same reasoning, including Pfhorrest as well as myself and any dictionary. I do not see this issue as one of sources: Kant can say whatever he wants about morals, but this is a linguistic and rational issue that can only be debating using reason and possibly dictionaries as sources. I still fail to see any bias in my own reasoning: I simply think that there are two ways to consider this issue, from the position of a moral realist and the position of a moral skeptic. To avoid bias I will consider the potential arguments of both.
- The moral realist would argue that there are objective morals. From this comes three categories: the moral person, the immoral person, and the amoral person. Given a consideration of action, the moral person decides that the action is in line with realistic morals and acts accordingly, the immoral person decides the action is not in line with realistic morals but still does not act accordingly, and the amoral person decides that no consideration is necessary because he has passively failed to notice the moral contention.
- The moral skeptic would argue that there are not objective morals (but that there may or may not be subjective for himself only). From this again comes the same three categories: the moral person, the immoral person, and the amoral person. Given a consideration of action, the moral person decides that the action is in line with their personal moral system and acts accordingly, the immoral person decides the action is not in line with their personal moral system but still does not act accordingly, and the amoral person decides that no consideration is necessary because he actively rejects a personal moral system.
- Thus we are given three choices in writing this article.
- (1) Assume the position of a moral realist, and write that amorality is passive and falls under the category of immorality. This is biased to the POV of a moral realist.
- (1) Assume the position of a moral skeptic, and write that amorality is active and does not fall under the category of immorality. This is biased to the POV of a moral skeptic.
- (3) Assume neither position and include a definition that covers both possibilities, leaving the reader to apply whatever filtering devices he wishes: "Amorality is an absence of a set standard, indifference towards, or disregard of a standard set of moral beliefs."' I contend that this last option is the only possible non-biased option, because it covers both the view of a moral realist and that of a moral skeptic. On what grounds do you disagree?
- -76.168.95.118 (talk) 02:13, 5 September 2010 (UTC)
- I second the anon's comments above, but at Faust:
- My apologies for thinking you were accusing me of bias, I did not see your "@" addressing that comment to the anon here, and thought it was a continuation of your comments toward me. Note however that you did say "That is also how I know you are biased", which sure sounds to me like you were calling him biased, not just one bit of reasoning put forth by him.
- Perhaps calling your grammar bad was too narrow; it is not just your grammar per se, but your overall sentence construction and the words you use, which makes the things you're trying to say very opaque and difficult to parse. For example when you say "Unvaried by people not able to...", I imagine you meant what a native English speaker would probably write as "Invariably, by people who are unable to...". I don't bring this up to attack you personally, you undoubtedly speak much better English than I speak Dutch; I just mean to flag that it is very difficult to understand you, which may be a source of some of our apparent disagreement here.
- And I am very familiar with the subject of ontology, but I don't get your reference to "how this creates paradoxes", and what being able to "see through paradoxes" has to do with understanding you. Are you claiming to be speaking in paradoxes? And what has that to do with ontology?
- --Pfhorrest (talk) 04:05, 5 September 2010 (UTC)
- I second the anon's comments above, but at Faust:
- @Ip&Pfhorest: Apologies, I am losing my patience with Zaspino and Theobald, who have followed me here to continue a dispute from nl.wiki. I guess I have taken this out on you two. My impatience is definitely my shortcoming.
- Furthermore: I do not agree with your assessment that passive amorality is equal to immorality. You two are taking into account if an actor believes in morals as having a value in ethics or not. This is improper for an introduction to the terms in my opinion. I will elaborate below in two points:
- 1) An introduction to the terms should be clear and state the separation. That is what it does now. I think it should remain that way and separations should be made in disambiguantions in this article.
- 2) Depending on what one thinks holds value one can come to different opinions on what is immoral and what is amoral. The general understanding of the term remains the same though. Although I agree with the separation you are making I am firmly of the belief that we should elaborate said positions below the introduction of terms, as is done now. Depending on ones belief in the entire idea of morals one can come to a different idea of what is immoral or amoral clearly.
- ANYWAY, the entire argument is about what goes where, not a difference of opinion of definitions between the three of us if I understand correctly. However, I do feel as if the only reason this change was proposed was to counter my Kant reference, but I may be mistaken. Note to Pfhorest: Kant died before the person you say is credited with the distinction was born. Other than that I don't care about the referece that much. I just thought it nice to give credit to whom deserves it. --Faust (talk) 20:38, 6 September 2010 (UTC)
- I also don't much care about who coined the term, I just noticed that while looking for definitions and thought it interesting. Perhaps that person first used "amoral" in English, since Kant was writing in German and (correct me if I'm wrong) I doubt the same word is used in German?
- Anyway, I think the issue here is one about definitions, not just about "what goes where". As far as I can see we are all agreeing that:
- "amoral" and "immoral" definitely do not mean the same thing as each other
- the article should say what the difference between them is
- the article should not take a stance on what particular rules constitute morality (i.e. which, if any, moral judgements are correct)
- The question at hand is whether refusing to make a moral judgement (actively ignoring moral considerations) counts as "amoral", or only neglecting to make a moral judgement (passively being ignorant of moral considerations) counts. Note that refusing to make a moral judgement is not the same as purposefully acting against one's own moral judgements.
- To elaborate on my earlier example: Let's say that person P is about to perform action X. Then, consider all the possible scenarios:
- P stops to ask himself if X is a moral thing to do; then either:
- P decides that X is a moral thing to do
- Or, P decides that X is not a moral thing to do.
- Or, P can't decide whether or not X is a moral thing to do.
- Or, P decides that there is no correct answer to the question of whether or not X is a moral thing to do.
- Or, P doesn't stop at all to wonder whether or not X is a moral thing to do.
- P stops to ask himself if X is a moral thing to do; then either:
- Then after one of those things, P does X.
- Now, regardless or whether or not X really is the moral thing to do under whatever system or morality (if any) happens to be the right one, the question is whether P did X out of moral intentions, immoral intentions, or amoral intentions.
- I, and all the definitions I cited above, say that 1.1 is moral, 1.2 is immoral, and all the rest are amoral; whether P can't decide on an answer, P doesn't think there is an answer, or P just didn't think to ask the question to begin with, either way P is acting without first deciding whether or not X is right or wrong.
- You seem to be saying that 1.1 is moral, 2 is amoral, and... all the rest are immoral? That part I'm not clear on. You seem to think that 1.4 is the same thing as 1.2, but then what about 1.3? And do you see how 1.4 and 1.2 are different situations, even if you classify them as same type of moral evaluation (be it amoral or immoral)? --Pfhorrest (talk) 03:45, 7 September 2010 (UTC)
@IP: Kindly do not edit the article before reaching contention. I undid your revision because I think that you misinterpret the entire thing, or maybe I am. Above I did not have the idea there was a real difference of opinion between us, but now I do. Morality is not about the rulebase, it is about the will for acting in such a way that one thinks everybody should act. A set of morals is a rulebase and therefore cannot become moral. Wielding a rule that should apply always is that inequality because acts should alway be seen in the light of the intent. So, the point is not that the moral should be known to everybody, or to be defined at all, just that one can will everybody to act in that manner in that situation. So, immorality is not willing that universality and amorality is never having thought of it, or it never having applied. Exactly what is stated now btw. Are we on the same page? --Faust (talk) 22:23, 6 September 2010 (UTC)
- Perhaps this is just a matter of wording? I agree that the intro should contain short definitions that can be expanded upon lower in the article or in other articles. But as I and several others have pointed out, this definition is too short. It is not clear because it drops half the definition, which in my proposal is covered by the word or. As you say, "one can come to different opinions on what is immoral and what is amoral," but given that we have two directly opposed definition of "amoral," one which considers a position of moral realism and one which considers a position of moral skepticism, we must include both in the briefest way possible. This is accomplished by the definition in the intro to the article for amorality. The meanings of those two opposing viewpoints are important and discussion of the relative value of each should be reserved to the body of the article, but the definition as it stands now is incomplete because it ignores one of the two possible definitions of amorality. I do not wish to have a philosophical or ontological discussion with you right now, and this is hardly the appropriate place. Can you accept that and allow the change to be made? 76.168.95.118 (talk) 03:35, 7 September 2010 (UTC)
- I have followed this as it has come to my attention through my browsing of random pages. I believe the edit by 79.182.17.168 appears to make sense from a prospective of leaving out the part that Faust finds objectionable but includes parts of the definition supported by all other users, including myself, 79.182.17.168, and what appears to be Pfhorrest and 76.168.95.118/157.242.159.225.--173.58.234.86 (talk) 04:28, 7 September 2010 (UTC)