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Catch share

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See also: individual fishing quota

Catch share is a term used for fishery management systems that dedicate a secure privilege to harvest a specific area or percentage of a fishery’s total allowable catch to individuals, communities or associations.[1] Types of programs that are considered catch shares include, but are not limited to, individual transferable quota (ITQs), individual fishing quota (IFQs), territorial use rights fisheries (TURFs), limited access privileges (LAPs), sectors, and dedicated access privileges (DAPs). Catch shares are different from traditional management as catch shares provide long-term secure privileges to participants, which has been theorized as providing an incentive for efficient, sustainable use of fish stocks.[2] Actual outcomes in terms of efficiency and ecological sustainability are varied and widely disputed.

Background

The term “catch share” has been coined recently, but similar management systems providing secure and exclusive access to fishery resources have existed much longer. Community-based management in Japan's near shore fisheries began in feudal times,[3] while modern individually allocated catch share programs were first implemented by the state of Wisconsin in the early 1970s for important fish stocks in the Great Lakes.[4] Additionally, Iceland and the Netherlands implemented catch shares for important stocks in the late 1970s.[5]

The use of catch share programs worldwide has been expanding since the earliest implementations in the 1970s.[6] Some countries, such as Iceland, New Zealand and Australia, have made catch share programs the default management system. Some of the most recently implemented catch shares have been in the United States. In 2010, catch shares were implemented in the United States Northeast Multispecies fishery and in the United States Atlantic Sea Scallop fishery.[7]

Worldwide there are over 275 catch share programs used in 35 countries to manage a wide variety of marine and freshwater species including finfish, sharks and crustaceans. Catch shares are used in developing and industrialized nations; artisanal and industrial fleets; and in high and low value fisheries.[8]

Theory

Fisheries have historically been treated as a common property resource. The number of participants is often limited, but without individually defined shares the fishery resource retains its common property nature. The dangers of managing fisheries as a common property resource were included in the development of modern theory of fishery economics, first introduced in 1954 by H. Scott Gordon. The theoretical framework showed that the common property nature of fisheries results in competition between individual operators to increase their share of the catch, which can ultimately lead to excessive capital, such as fishing vessels and gear, overfishing and resource wastage.[9] In common property fisheries, individual operators face an incentive to harvest as many fish as quickly as possible in order to preempt the activities by other operators.[9]

Catch shares remove the common property nature of the fishery by providing security and exclusivity to the resource through individual (often tradable) quotas, cooperatives or area-based harvest rights, known as territorial use rights fisheries (TURFs).[6] By providing a defined portion of the fishery to individuals or groups, operators can plan for the long-term use of the resource, which often involves maintaining a larger fish stock so as to increase the growth of stock and decrease the costs associated with fishing. With catch shares, the value of the share is tied to the landings value of the fishery.[6]

Catch share programs often allow for voluntary trading, both temporary and permanent, a process that allows operators with higher returns from fishing to purchase shares from those with lower returns.[10] This often results in consolidation of fishing rights, especially during times of low total landings value for the fishery. Transfers ensure that operators have the opportunity to increase harvests, but that in doing so the fishery wide sustainable harvest level is not exceeded. Transfers are considered an important component of catch shares because they promote the most efficient use of the resource for those who are able to remain in the industry.[11] However, transfers also lead to the most controversial aspect of catch shares, which is the consolidation and aggregation of fishing rights, often by non-fishers who then lease the rights back to fishers for a percentage of the landings value, typically between 35-80% of gross revenue.[12]

Outcomes

Empirical research in the past two decades has shown that catch share management of fisheries has a variety of ecological, economic and social benefits and shortcomings when compared traditional management of fishery inputs. When compared to other modern management methods that place limits on fishing outputs, i.e. setting scientifically determined harvest limits, catch shares exhibit no long term ecological gains.[13][14]

Studies examining the ecological impacts of catch shares show that they can reduce the likelihood of fishery depletion when compared to about 11,000 fisheries worldwide,[6] increase participants’ compliance with catch limits,[15] and stabilize landings and catch limits.[16] Additional research has also shown reduced bycatch and discards in catch share fisheries.[15][16] Yet, recent studies have indicated that catch share programs do not result in healthier fisheries,[17] and that the stabilization of landings is likely due to the slowing of the fishing rate. A study of all catch share programs in the US found that the health of a fishery goes unchanged after the implementation of catch shares and that the mean levels of most ecological indicators are unaffected.[18]

The economic impacts of catch shares are also well documented and highly debated. The pre-allocation of catch that accompanies catch shares programs has been shown to stop the race for fish often experienced in traditionally managed fisheries.[16] This pre-allocation allows for the removal of season length aimed at limiting harvests, providing operators with a longer time period to harvest as well as the ability to coordinate fishing trips with market conditions. Empirical evidence has shown that fisheries become more profitable as costs of fishing are reduced and dockside prices for products increase.[11][19] However, it is argued that this economic gain is due to the consolidation of the industry and the movement towards a monopoly and comes at the cost of reduced employment, fewer business opportunities, and a concentration of wealth derived from the industry.[20]

Many fisheries transitioning to catch share programs have the goal of reducing overcapitalization, often resulting in a reduction in the number of vessels and a transition from many temporary fishing jobs to fewer, stable, lower paying, full-time jobs.[21] However, catch share fisheries typically result in greater capitalization of the fishing fleet when accounting for capital required to purchase shares,[22] and though fishing jobs are longer due to the lengthening of the fishing season, the percent of landings value paid to employees typically decreases substantially.[23] These changes often improve the economics of the remaining participants in the fishery, but are sometimes considered undesirable from a community or welfare economics perspective. New institutions are being developed to improve communities’ access to shares, allow new entrants into the fishery, and/or keep quota within the community. These include the development and use of permit banks, community license banks and Community Fishing Associations. Program design features, including concentration caps, owner-on-board regulations, and trading restrictions, can be used help alleviate potential unwanted social outcomes. However, these measures have only served to mitigate, but not prevent the undesirable social and economic outcomes that accompany catch share programs.[24] [25]

Controversies

Catch shares almost universally result in fishing fleet consolidation, leading to job loss, coastal depression, and aggregation of fishing rights.[26] [27] [28] [29] For example, the Bering Sea crab catch share programs in the United States have resulted in a 70% reduction in participants and rapid consolidation resulting in approximately 1000 lost jobs.[30] In these same fisheries, further aggregation of shares, and leasing practices has resulted in substantially lower percentage of revenue paid to the participating fishermen. Although the primary motivation for the implementation of catch shares is to enhance the economic efficiency of the fishing industry, it has been argued that the net economic impacts of these programs are negative. Catch shares typically result in a concentration of wealth, increased unemployment, economic contraction of coastal communities, and economic losses to businesses and communities that rely on the fishing fleet. [31] [32][33]


Corporate Control of Fisheries and Privatization

Many fishing communities, academics, journalists, and non-profit organizations have claimed that catch shares serve as a mechanism for the consolidation of fishing rights, often by corporations with better financing capacity than independent fishermen.[22] [25] [26] [34] [33] [35] It has been claimed that proliferation of catch share management is reflective of the increasingly strong link between the government and the private sector, and that these programs are typically the result of special interest influence over legislation.[33] In the United States, these fears are evidenced by the influence that the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) has had over fisheries legislation. For example, the Jones Amendment, a bill to end funding the expansion of catch share programs that received bipartisan support from congress was dropped by the Senate[36] after intense lobbying by EDF.[37] This same organization produced the head of NOAA, the federal agency in charge of fisheries management, and has been accused[38] of creating and dissemenating literature[39] of questionable scientific and economic analysis. Meanwhile, EDF has promoted investment in catch shares to private investors, claiming substantial profits along with the organization's ability to influence legislation.[40] At one such meeting, the EDF west coast vice president, David Festa, claimed that catch shares provided an average of 400% profits, and stated that it didn't matter who owned the shares.

References

  1. ^ "NOAA Catch Share Policy" (PDF). National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 2010.
  2. ^ Beddington, J.; Agnew, D.; Clark, C. (June 22, 2007). "Current Problems in the Management of Marine Fisheries". Science. 316 (5832): 1713–1716. doi:10.1126/science.1137362. PMID 17588923. {{cite journal}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help); Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
  3. ^ Uchida, H.; Makino, M. (2008). "The Japanese Coastal Fishery Co-management: An Overview". Case Studies in Fisheries Self-governance. Retrieved November, 2010. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
  4. ^ Anderson, T.; Leal, D. (1993). "Fishing for Property Rights to Fish". Taking the Environment Seriously. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
  5. ^ Arnason, R. (2007). "Advances in Property Rights Based Fisheries Management: An Introduction" (PDF). Marine Resource Economics. 22: 335–346.
  6. ^ a b c d Costello, C.; Gaines, Steven D.; Lynham, J. (September 19, 2008). "Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse?". Science. 321 (5896): 1678–1681. doi:10.1126/science.1159478. PMID 18801999. Retrieved November, 2010. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
  7. ^ "Catch Share Spotlight No. 16: Northeast Multispecies Sectors" (PDF). National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 2010.
  8. ^ Bonzon, K.; McIlwain, K.; Strauss, C. K.; Van Leuvan, T. (2010). Catch Shares Design Manual: A Guide for Managers and Fishermen. Environmental Defense Fund.
  9. ^ a b Gordon, H. S. (1954). "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery". Bulletin of Mathematical Biology. 53 (1/2): 231–252.
  10. ^ Grafton, R. Q. (1996). "ITQs: Theory and Practice". 6. Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries: 5–20. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  11. ^ a b Newell, R. G.; Sanchirico, J. N.; Kerr, S. (2005). "Fishing quota markets". 49 (3). Journal of Environmental Economics and Management: 437–462. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  12. ^ Pinkerton, Evelyn (2009). "The elephantintheroom:Thehiddencostsofleasingindividualtransferable fishing quotas". Marine Policy. 33. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  13. ^ Essington, T.E. (2009). "Catch Shares Improve Consistency, not Health, of Fisheries". Lenfest Ocean Program.
  14. ^ Essington, Timothy (2012). "Catch shares, fisheries, and ecological stewardship: a comparative". School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences.
  15. ^ a b Branch, T. A. (2008). "How do individual transferable quotas affect marine ecosystems?". Fish and Fisheries. 9: 1–19.
  16. ^ a b c Essington, T. E. (2010). "Ecological indicators display reduced variation in North American catch share fisheries". Proceedings of the National Academies of Science. 107 (2): 754–759. doi:10.1073/pnas.0907252107.
  17. ^ "NEW STUDY FINDS CATCH SHARES IMPROVE CONSISTENCY, NOT HEALTH, OF FISHERIES".
  18. ^ Essington, T.E. (2010). "Ecological indicators display reduced variation in North American catch share fisheries". School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences.
  19. ^ Grafton, R. Q.; Squires, Dale; Fox, Kevin J. (2000). "Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A Study of a Common-Pool Resource". The Journal of Law and Economics. 43 (2): 679. doi:10.1086/467469. {{cite journal}}: no-break space character in |first3= at position 6 (help)
  20. ^ Phillips, Gregory (2002). "Private property and public interest in fisheries management: the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery". Marine Policy. 26. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  21. ^ McCay, B. J. (1995). "Social and Ecological Implications of ITQs: An Overview". Oceans and Coastal Management. 28 (1–3): 3–22. doi:10.1016/0964-5691(96)00002-6.
  22. ^ a b "A cautionary tale about ITQ fisheries".
  23. ^ ABBOTT, JOSHUA K. (2010). "Employment and Remuneration Effects of IFQs in the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands Crab Fisheries". Marine Resource Economics. 25.
  24. ^ "Catch shares: Consolidation and the tipping point".
  25. ^ a b Bromley, Daniel (2009). "Abdicating Responsibility: The Deceits of Fishery Policy". Fisheries. 34.
  26. ^ a b Eythórsson, Einar (2000). "A decade of ITQ-management in Icelandic fi sheries: consolidation without consensus". Marine Policy. 24 (6). {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help); line feed character in |title= at position 43 (help)
  27. ^ [Individual Transferable Quotas in Fishery Management "Individual Transferable Quotas in Fishery Management"]. {{cite web}}: Check |url= value (help)
  28. ^ Yandle, Tracy (2008). "Consolidation in Individual Transferable Quota Regime: Lessons from New Zealand 1986-1999". Environmental Management. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  29. ^ McCay, Bonnie J. (1995). "Social and Ecological Implication of ITQ's: an Overview". Ocean and Coastal Management. 28.
  30. ^ "Leasing practices in North Pacific fisheries Bering Sea and Aleutian Island crab fisheries". North Pacific Fishery Management Council. 2009. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  31. ^ Copes, Parzival. "Social Impacts of Fisheries Management Regimes Based on Individual Quota". {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  32. ^ Pinkerton, Evelyn (2009). "The Elephant in the Room: The Hidden Costs of ITQ Leasing". Marine Policy.
  33. ^ a b c Phillips, Gregory (2002). "Private property and public interest in fisheries management: the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery". Marine Policy. 26.
  34. ^ "System turns US fishing rights into commodity, squeezes small fishermen".
  35. ^ "Catch shares help corporations more than fish populations".
  36. ^ "U.S. Senate KOs bid to stop catch shares".
  37. ^ "Catch Shares - Jones Amendment dies in U.S. Senate".
  38. ^ "System turns US fishing rights into commodity, squeezes small fishermen".
  39. ^ Grimm, Dietmar (2012). "Assessing catch shares' effects evidence from Federal United States and associated British Columbian fisheries". Marine Policy. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  40. ^ "MILKEN INSTITUTE GLOBAL CONFERENCE 2009" (PDF).

Further reading

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